

प्रहसूत्रम्

भाष्यव्याख्या-नाम-संग्रह-संस्कृत टीकाया तया
वचनविद्या-समन्वितेन वाचस्पत्यानिबद्धेन भाष्येन

उपनिषद् गीता-सम्पादकेन

श्रीसीतानाथ-तत्त्वभूषणेन व्याख्यातं सम्पादितञ्च

मुद्रादा टीकायाच वाचस्पत्यानुवादी व्याख्याया तया एव एवमुपाधिधारिणा

श्रीसतीशचन्द्र चक्रवर्तिना कृतं

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पुस्तकमिदं अस्तिवाचस्पत्यव्याख्यम्

१११ संस्कृतमन्त्रे 'ब्राह्ममिमं तस्यै मुद्रयाचधे

श्रीदेवेन्द्रनाथवर्णिन मुद्रितं मन्त्राधिकार

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THE BRAHMA SÚTRAS

EDITED WITH SHORT AND EASY SANSKRIT ANNOTATIONS
AND AN ENGLISH COMMENTARY GIVING AN EXPOSITORY
AND CRITICAL SUMMARY OF THE CONCEPTS

By
SÍTÁNÁTH TATTVABHÚSHAN
Editor of the twelve principal *Upanishads* and
the *Bhagavadgītā*

The *sūtras* and the annotations translated into English
by the Editor and
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CALCUTTA
PRINTED & PUBLISHED BY
DEVENDRANATH BAG
AT THE
BRAHMA MISSION PRESS
211 Cornwallis Street.
1932

To be had of

- 1 The Editor
- 2 Principal Ramkrishna Rao Bahadur
P R College, Cocanada, Godavari Dt
3. Chakravarti Chatterji & Co
15, College Square, Calcutta

વિવેચસૂચી

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Rāmmohana Bhāshya

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PREFACE

The *Brahma Sūtras* called also the *Vedānta Sūtras* the *Sārtraka Mīmāṃsā*, the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā*, and by several other names, are a body of aphorisms expounding and systematising the teachings of the *Upanishads* and refuting doctrines opposed to them. They are the earliest known work on the subject and are ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa the supposed compiler of the Vedas. As such they are held in high esteem by all the chief schools of Hindu religious thought. As one of the three *prasthānas* or institutes of Vedic Theism revivalists of the national creed have, ever since the days of Sankarāchārya appealed to them and written commentaries on them. We thus possess, besides the commentary of Sankara, those of the Sivites of Southern India and the Vaishnava *bhāṣyas* of Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka Ballabha and Baladeva. Rājā Rāmmohan Rāy, the last great reviver of Indian Theism, also followed his predecessors in the line by writing Bengali commentaries on the *Prasthanatraya*. His commentary on five of the principal *Upanishads* and that on the *Sūtras* are included in his published works, while that on the *Bhagavadgītā* is lost. As a humble worker in the same field and a follower of the Rājā, it has been a part of my life's aim and object to publish the twelve principal *Upanishads*, the *Gītā* and the *Sūtras* with annotations and translation. With the publication of this work that arduous task is completed by the

grace of God inspite of numerous obstacles and difficulties. The annotations were completed as early as 1907. This was done at the earnest request of my esteemed friend, Babu Pratulchandra Sora, the present editor of the *Indian Messenger*, who was at that time carrying on a publishing business. He had already published my *Uddet* and my Devanagar and English edition of ten of the principal *Upanishads* and now proposed that the contemplated edition of the *Sūtras* should be prepared and published even before those of the two remaining *Upanishads* and the *Gītā*. But this it seems was not the will of God. Through unforeseen causes my friend's business languished and failed and the incomplete manuscript of the *Sūtras* lay in my desk for nearly a quarter of a century. But God, in his own good time, raised helpers in his inscrutable way. After the Sanskrit and Bengali editions of the *Chhândogya* and the *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, and the Devanagar and English edition of the *Gītā* had come out, my esteemed brother, Sir R. Venkata Ratnam, who must be too well-known to readers of my works to need any introduction, proposed that the *Sūtra* manuscript should be completed and published*. As in the case of the *Gītā*, an unexpected helper came forward to sustain my old and enfeebled hand. My translation of the text and the annotations

By the Brâhma Mission Board of Cocanada founded through the pious munificence of the Maharaja of Pithapuram.

had proceeded only up to the tenth *sūtra* of *pāda* I chapter II, that is a little more than five of the sixteen sections of the book. The remaining and major portion of the work was now undertaken and ably done by my dear and esteemed friend, Āchārya Satīschandra Chakravarti M. A., Missionary Śādhāraṇ Brāhmaṇa Samāḥ. It has been carefully revised by me. The long-completed annotations also have undergone a thorough revision. They are written, like my annotations on the *Ten Upanishads* with the help of Sankara's great commentary. I have freely quoted from him words, phrases and sentences required to explain the verbal meaning of the *Sūtras*, often re-writing his sentences in a diffuse and more intelligible form where they seemed too compact and so unintelligible to the general reader. But I have not followed him in his philosophical interpretation of the *sūtras*. That interpretation based on his doctrine of illusion, seems to me often forced and biased. I have tried to find out by an independent study of the aphorisms, helped indeed by Sankara's literal exposition of them, what the real philosophy of the *Sūtrakāra* is, and to expound it in the English *bhāṣya* forming the introduction to this book. Neither in my annotations nor in my introduction, however, have I given my own views of Sankara's philosophy. Such as they are, these views are set forth in my other works, specially in my *Vedānta and its Relation to Modern Thought* and my account of his teachings in Natesan's *Śrī Sankar-āchārya*. My *bhāṣya*, as the reader will see, is a

summary, expository and critical, of all the sixteen pádas of the *Sútras*. A clear idea of the entire *Sútra* teaching will, it is hoped, be got from it even without going through the annotations and their translation.

As to the date and authorship of the aphorisms, the historical research of Indologists has, up to the present time, failed to come to a satisfactory conclusion. That Bádaráyana or Kṛṣṇa Dvaipáyana, the reputed compiler of the Vedas, is the author of the aphorisms, is a mere tradition. Bádaráyana is indeed often referred to in them as one of several early exponents of the *Upanishads*, but there is nothing in these references to prove that he was the author of the *sútras*. About the compilation of the Vedas, it is tentatively concluded from a statement in an old astronomical work, that the task was concluded about 1181 B C. But the *Brahma Sútras* cannot really be so old. The schools of thought mentioned in them, specially such doctrines as Buddhism, Jainism and the Bhágvata-Pancharátra cult, belong to much later times. Panini's *Sútras*, which probably belong to the end of the fourth century before Christ, mention (in iv 3 110) a *Bhikshu Sútra* and ascribe it to Párasarya, that is Kṛṣṇa Dvaipáyana, the son of Parásara. If this means our *Sútras*, they must have existed at least a century before Panini to have merited his attention and reference. But if they at all existed then, they must have done so in a much briefer form than what has come down to us and cannot have contained the elaborate discussions of opposed doctrines we find in them, for even if these doctrines had at all been taught

in those days, they must have been then in a more or less incipient form. However, our concern is with the book itself, its intrinsic worth and usefulness, and not its age and authorship. Whoever may have written it, and in whatever period of our history it may have appeared, it has largely and profoundly influenced the religious and philosophical thought of our people through ages and given rise to a vast literature. As such, it deserves our attentive, reverent and at the same time critical study. If the present edition of the work helps in such a study, my labours, in this evening of my life, will not have been in vain.

210 3 2 Cornwallis Street }
Calcutta, July 25, 1932. }

EDITOR

Ramamohana Bhashya* on the Brahmasutras

CHAPTER I

Pada I

The sources of knowledge recognised by the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy may be divided though bearing various names and forms, into three classes,—*Pratyaksha*, perception, *Anumana*, inference and *Sabda*, revelation. The unity of these is only ultimately and then also not explicitly recognised. The author of the *Sutras* depends primarily on the third of these sources of knowledge and only secondarily on the second for the conclusions arrived at by him. His work therefore is more exegetical than philosophical in character. This distinction of exegesis and philosophy however is not clearly recognised in this country. Revelation being commonly recognised as an independent source of knowledge, the interpretation of scripture is accepted as a philosophical process equally with inference or reasoning. This needs to be remembered in entering upon the study of these aphorisms. The reader who begins his study with the expectation of

* So named out of reverence for Raja Rammohan Ray of whom the author is a humble follower. The Raja's own bhashya, included in his collected Bengali works, is given in Dr Guruprasad Mitra's edition of the *Sutras*.

going through a process of pure reasoning as he is made to do by a philosophical work in the western sense, is likely to be greatly disappointed. Revelation, that is the Vedas recognised as a distinct source of knowledge, being a common ground between our author and his orthodox opponents, a large part of his work is devoted to showing by means of interpretation that words and phrases in the Upanishads and other parts of the Vedas which his opponents take as meaning nature or the individual self, really mean God, the Universal Self. To him such appeals to scripture is final, establishing to his own satisfaction the creed he holds,—the Upanishadic system of Brahmanvāda, Absolutistic Theism. It is only incidentally that he appeals to reason in elucidation of Theism and that mostly in refutation of opposed systems. His appeal to scripture, however, will be found to be ultimately nothing more than an appeal to the direct spiritual vision of every purified soul, but he adopts no method likely to be satisfactory to modern thinkers by which such direct knowledge of [things super-sensuous can be distinguished] from superstition and acquired beliefs. As the present writer has often said in his former works on the Vedānta, the composers of the Upanishads, the makers of the scriptures appealed to in these aphorisms, were perfect free-thinkers, recognising no external authority and appealing only to the introspection and understanding of their readers. Their thoughts do not constitute a regular system. The *Brahmasūtras*, though entitled the *Nyāya-māsthāna* or logical form of Hindu Theism, realises only partially the idea of

a system. Its idea of scripture as a revelation to be dogmatically accepted whether uno directly accept its truth or not, restrains its free course of thought and prevents it from growing into a truly philosophical system. However with this short introduction as to their true character we proceed to give in our own words the purport of these aphorisms. They seem to represent, in their studiously condensed form calculated to aid the memory, the essence of long discourses on the subject-matter of the Upanishads. The lecturer or some advanced and thoroughly reliable pupil must have embodied the substance of the discourses in the form which has come down to us. The aphorisms most have been used by successive lecturers as texts of their discourses and thus given rise to the commentaries which now help us to understand them.

In the first chapter the opponents criticised seem to be chiefly the Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsaka the followers respectively of Kapila and Jaimini. They give to Prakṛti and Puruṣa, nature and the individual self what belongs properly to Brahman the Universal Self the Absolute. Our author by his true interpretation of some texts of the Upanishads misinterpreted by his opponents tries to bring them to Theism. The first sūtra merely proposes the general subject of the whole treatise, —inquiring into Brahman. The phrase *athātah* seems only a conventional form of beginning a sūtra treatise and may not really mean all that Sankara attributes to it. But we have followed

him and his commentator, Govindánanda, in their exposition of the phrase because the doctrine here propounded by them, namely (1) that the four disciplines, *sádhana-chatushtaya*, must precede a serious inquiry into the Absolute and (2) that liberation is impossible without a real knowledge of God, are integral parts of Vedantic teaching whether they are symbolised or not by the *sútra* words '*atha*' and '*atah*'. However, the second aphorism necessarily follows the first. Inquiring into Brahman being proposed, the next question is 'What is Brahman?' The word may mean the Vedas, the Bráhmāna order or caste, the created universe conceived as an embodied being and called '*Hiranyagarbha*', and even nature conceived as the whole or the material cause of the sensuous world. All these meanings are set aside by the definition given in the *sútra*, namely that the Brahman whose nature is about to be inquired into is the cause of the origin, continuance and disappearance of the world, and one of the most oft-quoted scriptural texts, *Taittiríya* III 1, is referred to in its support. But how can we be sure that the cause of the world is an intelligent being and not an unconscious or indefinable substance or power? The third aphorism answers this question. Among the things created by Brahman are the scriptures, the Vedas, a store-house of vast wisdom. This is stated in the *Bṛihadárayaka* II 4 10. Now, how can the scriptures, such as they are, be the product of any other than an intelligent cause? If there were no wisdom in the cause, there could not be any wisdom

in the effect. But 'Sastrayoni' may also mean a reality whose evidence is in the scriptures. If so the same conclusion follows. The scriptures everywhere speak of the cause of the world as an intelligent being. So the wisdom of God follows from the scriptural proof of his existence. But an objector may contend that the scriptures do not everywhere teach an intelligent cause of the world—that there are passages in them speaking of causes other than intelligent. The answer to this objection is given in detail in the fourth and the following seven sūtras. In the fourth it is generally stated that the only true and self-consistent interpretation of the scriptures is that which shows that Brahman the omniscient cause of the world is the final purport or object of all scriptural teaching. The next seven aphorisms show how, on the authority of the scriptures, the Sāṅkhya doctrine that Prakṛti or Pradhāna, an unintelligent power is the cause of the world, is untenable. The fifth sūtra points out that in the *Chhândogya* description of creation (vi. 2) *Sat* the primal reality before he manifests himself as the world, thought, 'May I be many may I grow forth'. How can one who thinks he the unintelligent cause spoken of by the Sāṅkhya philosophy? But may it not be, an objector may say that thinking is attributed to the first cause only in a secondary or figurative sense? The sixth sūtra answers this objection by pointing out that in the very scriptural passage referred to the primal reality is spoken of as 'self'. *Sat* is made to say, "Let me now enter these three divinites (*tejas*,

ap and anna) in the form of this living self' The use of the term 'self', which can never mean an unintelligent reality, with reference to the cause of the world in the passage clearly shows that thinking is attributed to it in its primary and not in a secondary or figurative sense. But may it not be, the objector continues, that by 'self' the scripture means nothing but Prakṛti? This objection is answered by the seventh aphorism *Śrīśāstratara* II 15 says that it is only by seeing Brahman through the knowledge of the self that one is liberated. If 'self' means the unconscious Pradhāna, it follows that liberation is attainable by devotion to an unconscious object which is absurd. Another reason why the scriptural *sat* described as the self cannot be the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna is this. Liberation implies both a negative and a positive process. It is attainable by setting aside the unreal and holding fast to the real. The Sāṅkhya system itself teaches that to attain knowledge the Pradhāna should be set aside, not being a part of the real nature of Puruṣa, and the latter in its unalloyed form held fast to. Now if the 'self' in the scriptural passages referred to really meant the Pradhāna, the scriptures should have spoken of the self as something to be set aside (*heya*). As they do not say so, they cannot mean by it the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna. A further reason why the unconscious Pradhāna cannot be meant by the scriptural *sat* and self is stated in the next sūtra, the 9th. Here and there in the Upanishads it is taught that in dreamless sleep the individual self gets united with, is merged in, the *sat*

It is then said to go to its real self. One of the clearest of such passages is *Chhândogya* vi 8 1. Now, if the *sat* and the self really meant the unconscious Prakriti, then it would seem that in sleep the conscious merges in the unconscious as in its true nature. This view is absurd and does not form a part either of the Vedānta or the Sāṅkhya philosophy. The 10th sūtra merely emphasises the fact that the Upanishads everywhere teach an intelligent cause of the world. The 11th aphorism instances a clear expression of the truth in scripture namely *Svetasvatara* vi 9 where in speaking of the all knowing Lord, it clearly says "He is the cause."

In the next eight sūtras, from the 12th to the 19th the discussion centres round the second chapter of the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* called the "Brahmānanda Vallī." This chapter is very important and constitutes the scriptural basis of the Vedāntic doctrine of *Panchakoṣha* the five sheaths of the self. It speaks of the five manifestations of Brahman as matter, life, sensibility, understanding and bliss. The last *Ānandamaya* being the fullest and highest manifestation the author of the sūtras identifies it with the Absolute and would not allow it to be regarded as anything relative. His first reason, given in the 12th aphorism for his contention is that in the chapter in question and elsewhere too the term *ānandamaya* is repeatedly applied to Brahman. But his opponent objects—the suffix *mayat* is used in the sense of modification, *anandamaya* therefore means something modified or changed into the form of bliss, something therefore which is subject to change

and so cannot refer to the Absolute, which is above change or modification. This objection is answered in the 13th sūtra. The answer is that the suffix *mayat* is not exclusively used in the sense of modification, it means also abundance, for example in '*annamaya yajna*', which means a sacrifice in connection with which there is an abundant provision for food. Here, in '*ānandamaya*', the suffix is clearly used in that sense. Brahman as abounding in bliss is called '*Ānandamaya*'. This conclusion is confirmed, says the 14th sūtra, by the seventh verse of this chapter, which speaks of Brahman as the only source of bliss. That '*Ānandamaya*' in the passage in question means the Supreme Self, is further proved, says the 14th aphorism, by the fact that the same Brahman who is spoken of in the *Taittiriya* mantra, '*Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma*' (II 6 5) is also mentioned in the *Ānandamaya* section referred to. The 15th sūtra points out that having spoken of the *Ānandamaya* the passage referred to says (in the 6th verse), "He created all this whatever there is". Now, this proves that the '*Ānandamaya*' means the Supreme Self, and not any inferior self, for it is impossible for any but the former to create all things. That the *Ānandamaya* cannot be any created self, is further proved, says the 17th sūtra, by the fact that in the passages under discussion the Creator and the created are spoken as different from each other, the latter as gaining the former and thus becoming happy. As the gainer cannot be the gained, the *Ānandamaya* cannot be any created self. This sūtra is significant

as one of these in this body of aphorisms which clearly admits the difference between the universal and the individual self. However the 18th sūtra adduces one more reason for setting aside the supposition that the unconscious Pradhāna is meant by Ānandamaya. In the passage in question the Ānandamaya is represented as wishing before creation to be manifested in the form of the variegated universe (ii 0). How could the unconscious Pradhāna wish? Hence there is no reason for the above supposition. The last argument against a non theistic interpretation of the Ānandamaya passage is set forth in the 19th sūtra, and it is this — In its seventh verse the passage teaches that the created self obtains fearlessness, that is *moṣha* liberation through union with the Ānandamaya. How could liberation be attained through union with an unconscious object or a finite self?

The next two sūtras, the 20th and the 21st, refer to the *Chhândogya* passage i 0 0 and to another passage *Bṛihadâraṇyaka* iii. 7 0, which seems to support the interpretation put by the author of the aphorisms upon the former passage. The *Chhândogya* speaks of an offalgent person in the solar regions who is free from sin. The description given is that of an embodied being, and hence the *prima facie* interpretation of the passage is that it refers to a finite being, a deity, but not the Supreme Deity. It may be the individual self of the sun,—the self who regards the sun as his body. Every important object is regarded by the author and other followers of the Upanishads as having an *abhimānini devatā*, a deity who thinks,—‘I am this

object, this is my body" But no finite being even though a deity, can be sinless, perfect, by nature though one can attain to perfection by *sādhana*, spiritual endeavour. Now, the person referred to in the passage in question is said to be transcending all sin. The conclusion which necessarily follows is therefore this, that the person of whom the passage speaks is the Supreme Self and not any finite self who has attained to excellence through a course of spiritual culture. A good deal of discussion arises out of this conclusion into which we will not enter. We shall only briefly indicate the progress of Vedic thought as regards the sun. At first it was only one of the thirty-three gods of the Vedic pantheon. It was then raised to the place of the Supreme Deity, at which stage the *Gāyatrī mantra* was composed. The rise of Upanishadic Absolutism again reduced the sun to his former place as only one god among many gods. But as all finite selves, whether human or divine, must have the Infinite, the Perfect, in them, so the sun-god was regarded as containing the sinless in him. His 'beard', 'hair', 'nails' and 'eyes' may be taken as only metaphorical, specially as '*hūanmaya*' means consisting of consciousness, that is spiritual, in many Upanishadic passages, or they may be a relic of the old anthropomorphic way of thinking which some of the composers of the Upanishads could not quite shake off. It may be stated here that the person spoken of in this passage is mentioned also in verses 15 and 16 of the *Īsopanishad* and v 15. 1 of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, where his nature is called

lalyánatama, perfectly good, another divine attribute inapplicable to a finite being

However let us now come to the next sūtra the 21st. The passage referred to in it occurs in a remarkable passage of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*,—the *Antaryāmi* Brāhmaṇa of its third chapter, and embodies the substance of Yājñavalkya's speech in reply to a question put to him by his *guru*, Uddālaka Āraṇi in Jaṇaka's great assembly. To see the full significance of the passage the reader must go through the whole Brāhmaṇa or section. The use which the author of the sūtras makes of it is this. In it the distinction of the Supreme Self from the individual self of the sun is distinctly acknowledged. In the other parts of the same discourse its distinction from the *abhimānīnt* *devatās* embodied in the other important objects of the world is brought out in the same manner. This confirms the conclusion arrived at in the 20th aphorism that the golden person in the sun is the Supreme Being and not the particular self of the solar region or any other finite person. We now come to the 22nd sūtra. It refers to *Chhāndogya* i 9 and vii 14 where occurs the word *ākāśa* which usually means elemental ether but here as our author shows, means the Infinite Cause of all phenomena. *Chhāndogya* i 8 and 9 record a conversation on the *udgītha* that is the syllable *Om* and the Absolute which it indicates between two Brāhmaṇas and Pravāhana Jaibali a king. In their search after the Absolute one of the Brāhmaṇas stopped at heaven and the other at the earth. King Jaibali having heard both showed that both of them

were wrong, for the real Absolute, that from which all phenomena arise and to which they all return, is *Ākāśa*, which is the true Infinite. The same thing is said more explicitly in the other passages in which the terms 'Brahman' and 'Ātma' are clearly applied to *ākāśa*. Our author's argument for the interpretation he puts upon the word '*ākāśa*' is that the attributes ascribed to *ākāśa* in the passages referred to, namely that it is the origin (*gati*) of this world and that it is "the revealer of names and forms" are those of Brahman and cannot belong to any person or thing other than he.

In the 23rd sūtra the term '*prāna*,' which may mean, as it usually does, 'breath,' which is only a form of air, is interpreted as meaning Brahman, and for the same reason as in the preceding sūtra, namely because in the passage referred to attributes which can belong only to God are ascribed to *prāna*. The reference is to the interesting story of Ushasti Chákráyana, which the reader will find in the tenth and eleventh sections of the first chapter of the *Chhándogya*. In reply to the question of the singer of a particular hymn as to who the deity of that hymn was, Ushasti said, '*Prāna*,' and added, "All these creatures merge into *Prāna* alone and from *Prāna* alone do they rise." Now, this can be said of Brahman alone and of nothing else.

The four succeeding sūtras, 24th-27th, discuss the meaning of the word '*jyoti*,' light, used in *Chhándogya* in 13.7. They interpret it as meaning Brahman and nothing else, and answer the objections that may be raised against this interpretation. The passage referred

to is connected with the previous section *Chh. III. 12*, which in the course of a meditation on Brahman identifies him with the *Gayatri mantra* composed in the *Gayatri* metre which has four pādas (feet) : 1. 2. 3. 4. parts. It may seem that the word *jyotiḥ* in the first *Chhândogya* passage means either natural light or points to the *Gayatri* metre. But our author says in his 24th aphorism that the word means Brahman because in the meditation contained in the second passage the same reality that is indicated by *jyotiḥ* in the first passage is said to have four feet that is four aspects or forms of manifestation. Now this attribute that of having four feet or forms of manifestation belongs to Brahman and not to natural light. But if *jyotiḥ* does not mean Brahman may it not mean the *Gayatri mantra* or metre which in *Chhândogya III. 12* is said to have four feet? This objection is mentioned and answered in sūtra 25. It points out, what we have already said in effect above that the *Gayatri* is used in the passage referred to only as a help to the fixing of the mind in Brahman. This way of realising the presence of God with the help of some phenomenal object is mentioned the sūtra adds in other scriptural texts also for instance in the *Aitareya Aranyaka* which mentions the *Uktha* hymn fire and the *Mahābrata* ceremony as so used by the followers of the *Rik*, the *Yajur* and the *Saman* respectively. Moreover though the *Gayatri* metre has 'feet' in a sense, the text in *Chh. III. 12. 1*, "One foot of it constitutes all beings three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven" at once settles the doubt whether *jyotiḥ* means the *Gayatri* or Brahman, because without reference to Brahman the

mere Gáyatrí metre cannot be said to have all beings as one of its feet This is the purport of the 26th sūtra It may be mentioned here that the text speaking of all beings as a foot of Brahman is taken from the celebrated Purusha Sūkta of the *Rigveda* (x 90 30) But the objector is not satisfied, and raises a verbal difficulty He says, 'In the first passage (*Chh* iii 12 6) *du*, heaven, has the seventh case-ending and means a place, whereas in the second, *Chh* iii 13 7, the same word bears the fifth case-ending and means a limit Now, this change of termination having broken the unity of the subject-matter, the word cannot mean the same object in both the texts Our author answers this objection in his 27th sūtra by saying that this change of form in the word '*div*' does not constitute any real change in the teaching In spite of the difference in the case-ending of *div*, the object dealt with in the two texts is recognised as the same

In the next four sūtras, forming the last *adhikarana* or topic of the pāda, a very important subject is discussed, a discussion which has an important bearing on our later religious literature In the *Bhagavadgītā* and such other books an individual identifies himself with the Supreme Being and speaks in his name In the third chapter of the *Kaushītaki* Upanishad, India, a Vedic god, does the same The author of the *Sūtras* thinks that the sage Vāmadeva does the same thing in *Rigveda* iv 26 1 The present discussion shows in what sense such an identification of the individual and the Universal is possible and defensible The Sāstras, by which the Vedas are meant,—and here their Upanishad

portions are specially meant,—teach that the individual self is really one with the Universal, though spiritually unenlightened people do not feel this unity. Those who know and feel it are entitled to speak in the name of God. This is the philosophical basis of the doctrine of incarnation so prominent in Puranic literature. The whole subject is somewhat fully discussed with the necessary quotations in the second lecture of the present writer's *'Krishna and the Gita*. Here in the 9th sūtra, the word '*Prāna* in *Ānū* iii. 2 is interpreted as Brahman because the very connotation of the words in the sentence wherein the term occurs clearly shows this. But the objection may arise that in the passage in question Iodra an individual god, speaks of himself and so '*Prāna* cannot mean Brahman. This objection is stated and answered in the 20th sūtra. The answer is that as in the chapter where the passage occurs there are numerous references to the Inner Self of all selves Iodra, in speaking of himself as *Prāna*, means his Inner Self and not his individuality. But why does he speak of himself at all? This question is put and answered in the oft-quoted 30th sūtra, the most important aphorism of the group. The answer is that Iodra does so by looking upon his own self in the light of scriptural teaching,—the teaching which shows the fundamental unity of the individual and the universal self. In sūtra 31 another objection is raised and answered. *Prāna* in the passage in question cannot mean Brahman, it may be said, for the characteristics of the individual self and those of the vital breath are mentioned in the passage and so either one or both

of them are meant by '*Prāna*' The answer is this If it were so, then we should have to admit that in the same passage three distinct meditations,—those on Brahman, the individual self and the vital breath, are prescribed, which is improbable. As '*Prāna*' is used for Brahman with his characteristics in other passages of the Upanishads, for instance in *Prasna* iii, and in *Mundaka* iii 14 &c, it is reasonable to suppose that here also Brahman alone is meant In that case the three forms of meditation may be taken as a meditation on the same Being, the Supreme, under three forms, the phenomenal forms of the individual self and the vital breath, and Brahman's own transcendent form or nature In the well-known Sāndilya Vidyā (*Chh* iii 14 2) Brahman is meditated upon in several phenomenal forms

Pada 2

The Sândilya Vidya in *Chhândogya* lil. 14 is one of the most important and oft-quoted passages in the Upanishads. It is also one of the best of the *vidyās* or *upasanās* (devout meditations) prescribed in them. In a few sentences it sets forth the gist of Upanishadic teaching—the immanent and transcendent nature of the Deity and the goal and destiny of man which is union with God. There can be no doubt that the subject matter of the *vidyā* is the Supremo Being, but there will be objectors even about the plainest matters. And so our author is at pains to show that it is God and no inferior being to whom the great affirmations of the *vidyā* refer. Sûtras 1-4 form a group giving a true interpretation of the scriptural passages referred to and answering objections. In the first sūtra the author's contention that the Sândilya Vidya speaks of Brahman and not of any other reality remains implied and only the argument in its support is given. The argument is a general one—as all Vedānta texts teach Brahman, so this particular text must also be supposed to teach him. The second sūtra is more definite. It says that the attributes mentioned in the passage for instance whose thoughts are true can belong only to the Supremo Being. The third sūtra points out that as these attributes cannot belong to the embodied self, it cannot be the subject matter of the meditation. The fourth sūtra supports the contention of the third by pointing to the fact that he to whom the mentioned attributes belong is

set up in the passage as the object of meditation and the embodied self as its subject. The fifth sūtra finds a further support of the same contention in the fact that in the *Satapatha* passage treating of the same subject there is an actual difference of case-ending in the words meaning respectively the finite and the infinite self. Whereas the former has the seventh case-ending, the latter has the first, clearly proving that the two words indicate different objects. This difference of the finite and the Infinite is recognised, says the 6th sūtra, in the *Smṛiti* also (the *Bhagavadgītā* xviii 61) and in the same way, that is by difference of case-endings in the words indicating them. But is not the subject-matter of the *Sāṅdilya Vidyā* said to be *anīyān*, small, an attribute which can belong only to the individual self? No, says the seventh sūtra, for the Lord is so described only with reference to the lotus-like cavity of the heart where he is to be thought of as manifested, and not because he is actually small. Space, though infinite, is said to be small when it is thought of as existing in the eye of a needle and such other things. But if the Lord really exists in the heart of the individual, is he not subject to the pleasures and pains of the world? No, says the 8th sūtra, for the finite and the infinite self being different from each other, only the former is subject to pleasure and pain, and not the latter.

We now come to the second group consisting of two sūtras, the 9th and 10th. The first of these contends that he who is said in *Katha* 1 2 25 to eat up, that is absorb or take back into himself, the *Brāhmanas*

and the *kshatriyas* is no other than the Supreme Self, for such taking in of all things moving and unmoving as is spoken of in the passage is possible only of the Supreme Being. The second sūtra adds one more reason for the contention and that is, that the section in which the eating up is mentioned namely verses 18-25 of *Katha* 1-2, has for its subject matter none but the Supreme Being.

Sūtras 11th and 12th form the next group. In the first of these reference is made to *Katha* 1-3-1, where two objects are said to exist in the heart of man. Some suppose them to be the individual self and the understanding. But our author says they are the universal and the individual self. His reason for this interpretation of the text is that in various other texts both in the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti*, it is the Universal Self and not the understanding that is spoken of as existing in the heart. The second aphorism adds the further argument for the interpretation that in the texts referred to the Universal and the individual are distinguished as the *gosi* and the *goer* the object thought of and the thinker and so on.

The next group of aphorisms, consisting of the 18th and the following four discusses the text *Chhândogya* iv-15 repeated in the same *Upanishad* viii-7-4. It shows against all objections that "the person seen within the eye" spoken of in the text is none but the Supreme Being. This Person is characterised as immortal and fearless. These attributes are possible only of the Supreme Being. So much for the first sūtra of the group. The next answers an objection,—How can God, who is

all-pervading, be spoken of as existing within the eye ? The answer is,—Particular spaces and things are mentioned not as limitations of the Absolute, but only as helps to his realisation. In the ‘Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa’ of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* as well as in other scriptural passages, many things are mentioned as such helps. The fifteenth sūtra points out that in *Chh* iv 10 4 the ‘person within the eye’ is said to be endowed with bliss, which can be said of the Supreme Being only. The 16th aphorism adds another reason for the same conclusion. In various scriptural passages such as *Chh* iv 15 5 and *Pras* 1 10 the Devayāna Patha, the way of the gods, leading to the divine regions, is assigned to the knower of Brahman. In the present text the same path is assigned to the knower of ‘the person within the eye’. Hence none but Brahman can be meant by the ‘person within the eye’. The 17th aphorism sets aside a different interpretation of the passage, namely that the person in question means either the reflection of the seer in the eye, the seer himself or the self of some deity. The answer is that none of these can have any permanent existence in the eye and that the attributes of ‘the person within the eye’ enumerated in the passage, namely immortality &c, are impossible in their case.

Sutras 18-20 form the next group. They refer to the ‘Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa’ of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, a very important section of the book, which Āchārya Rāmānuja regards as the scriptural authority for his doctrine of Qualified Monism. The question dis-

cussed is whether the term 'antaryāmi', inner ruler used in every verse of the chapter, means the Supreme Being or the Sāṅkhya Prakṛiti, or the individual Self. The 18th sūtra says that it clearly indicates the Supreme Being, for divine attributes like ruling and the like are ascribed to the antaryāmin throughout the section. The next sūtra points out that attributes like seeing, hearing &c mentioned in the section with reference to the 'inner ruler' are opposed to the nature of the unconscious Prakṛiti and therefore cannot refer to it. In the last sūtra, the 20th it is shown that as in both the recensions of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* the Kāva and the Mādhyandina the universal and the individual selves are spoken of as different from each other—the former as the ruler and the latter as the ruled—the term antaryāmin cannot mean the individual self. The difference between the readings of the two recensions is only this that while the Kāva speaks of the embodied self as 'the understanding', the Mādhyandina mentions it as 'the self'.

What the last group does with the term 'antaryāmin' the next group sūtras 21-23, does with 'bhūtayoni' used in *Alundala* i 10, and by similar arguments. Bhūtayoni 'the source of things', may be identified with the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna or the Subjective Idealist's individual self. But that would be improper for the qualities ascribed to it in the text are all divine, those of God, and the 'Bhūtayoni' is clearly distinguished from the individual self, the lower Brahman and the undecaying principle underlying created things. Further, in another part of the same section, ii 14, the world, with its

various parts, is spoken of as the Lord's 'form'. Such a description would be quite inappropriate in the case of a not-self like Prakṛiti and a finite reality like the individual self

The last group of the pāda, sūtras 24-32, discusses the meaning of the word '*Vaisvānara*' used in sections 11-18 of the 5th chapter of the *Chhândogya*. These sections contain a remarkable story, one of several similar stories told in the prose Upanishads, where we find eminent Brāhmanas approaching Kshatriya teachers for religious instruction. In the present case six Brāhmanas, including Rishi Uddālaka Āruṇi as their leader, pay a visit to Asvapati Kaikeya, a king, and receive instruction from him on the Vaisvānara Ātman. The same story is told with some variations in the *Satapatha Brāhmana*. Before studying the sūtras under discussion the reader will do well to read carefully the *Chhândogya* sections referred to with the translator's remarks appended to them. He will note that Asvapati's Brāhmana pupils all make the mistake of identifying a particular deity, one conceived as presiding over a limited part of the world, with the Vaisvānara, the Universal Self, whereas the truth is that he is the Whole, the all-comprehensive Infinite, of whom natural objects and individual selves are parts. The Whole is indeed in every part, but an exclusive emphasis on a part or parts is liable to obstruct the vision of the Whole. This is the mistake of *deva*-worshippers everywhere and in every period of human history. The priestly class, absorbed in ceremonial religion, is specially liable to the mistake, while those un-

trammelled by convention and tradition like the ancient *rajarsis*, royal sages, discover this error more easily than others. However, coming to the arguments by which the Sutrakāra shows that the Vaisvānara Ātmā spoken of in the *Chhândogya* passage is none but the Universal Self, we find that in sūtra 24 he says that though Vaisvānara has a general sense meaning in differently the gastric juice, the elemental fire and the god of fire and though 'Ātmā' may mean either the individual or the universal self both the terms are here used in a special sense and mean the Supreme Being for the attributes mentioned in the passage are such as point to God alone. In the next sūtra our author points out that the description of God's visvarūpa or world form in such smṛiti passages as the eleventh chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā*,—a description based on the *Chhândogya* passage under discussion,—helps us to infer that the Vaisvānara of the latter passage can be no other than the Supreme Lord. But the objector is not satisfied. He says (1) that as the terms Vaisvānara and 'agni' usually mean other things than the Supreme Being they should mean those things here and (2) that as the text speaks of Vaisvānara as existing *within us*, the term should mean the gastric juice. The Sutrakāra replies (1) that by speaking of the Vaisvānara as existing within us the scriptural passage really teaches us to realise the presence of the Lord in the gastric juice, (2) that the attributes of Vaisvānara enumerated are impossible in any other object than the Supreme Being, and (3) that the *Satapatha* version of the story distinctly speaks of the

Vaisvánara as a Person For the reasons already mentioned the 27th aphorism states that the Vaisvánara of the *Cihándogya* passage cannot be either the god of fire or elemental fire The 28th sūtra states Jaimini's view that there would be no inconsistency in taking the Vaisvánara passage as a direct meditation on the Supreme Being without reference to the gastric juice Sūtra 29 refers to Áshmarathya's view that as v 18 1 of the passage teaches the meditation of Vaisvánara as 'prādesamātra', that is the heart, which is conceived as of the measure of a span and wherein the Supreme Being is specially manifested, 'Vaisvánara' really refers to him Sūtra 30 adds Bádari's comment on the term '*prādesamātra*' The Lord is described as 'of the measure of a span' because he is meditated upon by the mind situated, as he thinks, in the heart, which is of the measure of a span The 31st aphorism says that according to Jaimini the *prādesamātra* text is intended to teach *sāmpatti* or *sampadupāsanā*, that is the realisation of the non-separation of God from objects of sense A similar passage, it is added, namely *Sathapatha* x 6 1, teaches the same form of meditation The 32nd sūtra, the last of the páda, adds another reason for the use of the phrase 'prādesamātra' with reference to the Lord The Jábálas speak of him in their Upanishad as dwelling 'in that place' i e in the span-measured space between the head and the chin

Pada 3

Sotras 1—7 of this páda discuss a few passages of the *Mundaka Upanishad*, specially II. 2. 5 and show that the Support of heaven, earth &c., spoken of in the latter, is God, and neither the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna nor the individual self. The first aphorism argues that the word 'self' used in the passage referred to which properly means Brahman, makes it clear that it is he whom the text speaks of. The second aphorism refers to III. 2. 5 of the same Upanishad in which the same Being who is mentioned in the first text is spoken of as one to whom the liberated go as to as their true Self. Such a Being cannot be anything but God. The third aphorism points out that in the first text there is no word meaning the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna. The fourth sūtra says that the individual embodied self cannot be the support of heaven, earth, &c. and so cannot be meant in the text. The fifth sūtra points out that in the text under discussion the individual self is exhorted to know the support of heaven, earth &c. thus distinguishing the latter as the object of knowledge from the former as its subject. The sixth sūtra adds another argument in favour of the author's contention, namely that the section in which the text occurs has the Supreme Being as its subject matter and not anything else. The seventh sūtra refers to *Mundaka* III. 1. 1 which is really an extract from the *Rigveda*. Of the two 'birds' spoken of in this passage the one is said to be eating —enjoying the fruits of its actions,—and the

other as not eating,—remaining indifferent or inactive. From these two marks distinguishing the individual and dependent self from the universal and independent, it is evident that the latter, and not the former, is the Support of heaven, earth &c

Sútras 8 and 9 form the second group of the páda. They refer to the 7th chapter of the *Chhándogya* Upanishad, which is a dialogue between Nárada, a divine sage, and Sanatkumára, the general of the divine army, here represented as a philosopher. It leads the inquirer gradually from the lowest category, *náman* (name), through various intermediate categories to the highest and most comprehensive, *Bhúman* or the Infinite, beyond which there can be nothing. It thus reminds the student of western philosophy of Hegel's *Logic* and its gradual progress from Being to the Absolute Idea, but there is nothing in it of the Dialectical Method of Hegel. There is, however, some method in it, however imperfect, and a better definition of the Infinite than the one given by Sanatkumára has not been given, as Prof Maxmuller truly says in his Gifford Lectures on Psychological Religion, by any modern philosopher. The Sútrakára's reference to the subject is, however, short and superficial. The 'Bhúmá' in the texts referred to means, he says, the Highest Self, and not *prána* the vital breath, for the Bhúmá is spoken of in the text as higher than *prána*. In 'the state of great bliss' experienced in dreamless sleep, *prána*, it is said, awakes. It is *prána*, therefore, which is meant by this state of bliss. But Bhúmá is spoken of as higher than *prána*, he is therefore the Supreme Self different from

the vital breath Further, the attributes of Bhuman mentioned in the dialogue, namely blissfulness Immortality, all pervasiveness, establishment in his own glory, his being the self of all, and his being such that when he is seen and heard nothing else can be seen and heard—all these are possible only of the Supreme Self

The next group sūtras 10-12, deals with the meaning of 'Akshara' occurring in Īśānavalkya's second discourse in reply to Gārgi in the great assembly held on the occasion of king Janaka's sacrifice In his first discourse he had spoken of *ākāśa*, ether or space, as the container of all phenomenal things In his second he speaks of Akshara, the unchangeable One as the support of space itself The sūtras show that the Rishi's 'Akshara' cannot be a letter, in fact nothing else than the Supreme Self, for it is only the latter that can support all phenomena, including space The texts speak of Akshara as guiding the action of the sun, the moon &c, by his command, and a command can proceed only from an intelligent being and not any inanimate object Besides, inanimate objects like letters &c, are clearly distinguished from the Akshara in the text and so they cannot be meant by the term

Sūtra 13 forms an *adhikarana* or section by itself It shows that the syllable *Om* in the fifth *prasna* of the *Prasnopanishad* means the Supreme Self, and nothing else, for the reality indicated by the syllable is spoken of in the 5th verse as the object of spiritual realisation

The next *adhikarana*, sūtras 14-18, discusses the meaning of the word '*dahara*' in the *Daharavidyā* dealt

with in the 1st and more or less in some of the following sections of the 8th chapter of the *Chhândogya*. The Rishi's teachings show his insight into the truth that the Whole, the Absolute, is present in everyone of its parts, however absurd this may seem to the thoughtless and the superficial. But the Sûtrakâra does not enter into the metaphysics of the subject. He is concerned only to show that the *dahara âkāsa*, small space, of which the Rishi speaks, is not really the space in the heart where the self is usually located by the ancients or the merely individual self which distinguishes one person from another, but is really the Supreme Universal Self which is common to all of us. As a proof of his assertion he cites the third verse of the section where the attributes of this *dahara âkāsa* are enumerated, attributes which can belong only to God. In the next sūtra the text viii. 3. 2 is cited to show that all creatures daily go in dreamless sleep to Brahmaloka indicated by '*dahara*', though they are not aware of it. This 'going' and the word 'Brahmaloka' distinctly meaning God are further proofs of the correctness of the Sûtrakâra's interpretation of '*dahara*'. The same distinction of goers and the goal and the fact that the goal is Brahman, are found in another scriptural text, namely *Chh* vi 8. 1. The 16th sūtra points out that in viii 4. 1 *Dahara* is said to support the world, proving that it is the Supreme Self who is meant by the word. This supporting power in him is also seen in another scriptural text, namely *Bṛ* iii 8. 9. Further, says sūtra 17, the use of '*ākāsa*' in the sense of the Infinite is well-known and is found

In such texts as *Chh* viii. 14 10 and the same i 9 1 But does not the mention of the individual self at the end of the section (*Chh* viii 1 1) prove that *dahura* means that? The 18th sūtra says No because attributes like sinlessness &c, enumerated there are impossible in the case of the individual self

The next group sūtras 19 21 may be regarded as a continuation of the last, though it refers to other scriptural passages than those already discussed The conclusion of the last group may be doubted on reading *Chh* 12-3, in which the individual self is clearly spoken of But the doubt is removed when it is considered that the individual self is there conceived not in its individuality but with its unity with the Universal manifested Besides the reference to the individual in the last part of the *dahura* section already discussed has another meaning, or object Its object is the 20th aphorism says to set forth the real nature of God Further, if any one doubts our interpretation because the *dahura ālāsa* is said to be *alpa* small, then we have only to remind him that we have already met the objection in the seventh sūtra of pada 2

Sūtras 22 and 23, which constitute the next group interpret the All revealing one spoken of in *Mund.* ii 2 10 They say it is the Supreme Self who is meant here and not any elemental light, for all elemental lights like the sun and the moon are said therein to reflect the light of the shining One His in All this shines by his light indicates God This interpretation is confirmed by verses 9 and 12 of the 15th chapter of the *Bhagavadgīta*.

The next adhikarana, sūtras 24 and 25, interprets verses 12 and 13 of *Kath* II 12 and 13. They speak of a person who is apparently 'pramitah', measured or finite, for he is said to be "of the size of the thumb". But from the words spoken of him, namely that he is the regulator of the past and the present and that he who knows him ceases to hate, &c., it is evident that this Person is really the Supreme Self and not the individual. But why is he then said to be of the size of the thumb? The answer is that as the Supreme Self is manifested in the heart of man, which is (as the ancient doctrine is) of the size of the thumb, and as the Vedic knowledge of God is the exclusive sphere of man, God is poetically represented as of the size of the thumb. A controversy somewhat irrelevant to the subject of the pāda, but very interesting, arises out of the doctrine broached in the 25th sūtra, namely that the sāstric knowledge of God is the exclusive sphere of man. Are then the *devas* and such other ethereal beings shut out from Vedic knowledge? The *prima facie* reply to this is,—Surely they are shut out, because how can they, having no gross bodies like ours, study the Vedas? But suppose we grant, as Bādarayana does in sūtra 26, that they have bodies and are therefore entitled to study the Vedas, would not this corporeality on their part conflict with their connection with Vedic rites? How can a god with one body be present at different sacrifices offered simultaneously? The answer, as given in sūtra 27, is,—Scripture speaks of the same god assuming many forms. But does not the idea of the gods having forms conflict with 'the Word',

the eternal words constituting the Vedas from which as Sruti and Smṛiti both say, the world, including the gods, has originated? Bodies are ephemeral things subject to decay and death. How could they originate from Vedic words which are admitted to be eternal? Words and their meanings causes and their effects, are eternally related. It is this eternal relation on which according to Jaimini, the authoritativeness of the Vedas rests. To him the gods are identical with Vedic words and are, as such eternal and formless. The popular view of them as embodied beings—a view which finds support from *Bhādarāyana*,—conflicts with Jaimini's view of the nature and authority of the Vedas. However *Bhādarāyana*, though upholding the popular idea of the gods, does not think that the authoritativeness of the Vedas is affected thereby. In his view as expounded by the commentator it is only *vyākṛtayaḥ* particulars and not *ākṛtayaḥ*, universal forms that are originated and it is with the latter that Vedic words are eternally connected. This connection and the authoritativeness of the Vedas founded on it remain unaffected, says he in sūtras 28-30, by the origination of new eternal things like the bodies of the gods from the eternal words of the Vedas. He seems to think of the Vedic texts as archetypal ideas in the divine mind of which earthly things and their qualities are transient ectypes. As such they are not transient. Both Sruti and Smṛiti—the *Rik* and the *Gītā* are quoted—tell us that in each cycle the same things are created, i. e., manifested after their disappearance during *pralaya*, the state of universal submergence. So there is no contradiction

between the eternality of the Vedas and the apparent transiency of the world proceeding from them. But Jaimini is not silenced by this reasoning. Even admitting for a moment the personality or corporeality of the gods, he says, as stated in sūtra 31, that they are clearly not entitled to the study of the Madhu-vidvā in *Chhândogya* III, for it treats of their own worship. Debarred from one or more such vidyās, they are, he thinks, debarred from all Vedic vidyās. But the real cause of Jaimini's opposition to the gods comes out most clearly only at the end. He thinks, as we see in sūtra 30, that words like 'īditya' &c. meaning the gods, are applied only metaphorically to luminous bodies which are '*mudādīvat achetanā eva*'—really inanimate like mud and such other things. How can such things have any title to the study of the Vedas? Bādarāyana meets his scepticism in sūtra 33 by re-affirming the statements of Śruti and Smṛiti, already given, about the gods as real embodied persons. Jaimini indeed is aware of these affirmations. But his method of interpreting them is very different, as we have already said, from Bādarāyana's. It remains a curious fact in the history of our ancient literature that the author, real or supposed, of the *Pūruṣa-mīmāṃsā*, which deals chiefly with the worship of the gods, is an unbeliever in their existence as personal beings, whereas Bādarāyana, or whoever else may be the author of the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*, which treats almost exclusively of the worship of the Supreme Being and has little to do with the gods, is a staunch upholder of their reality.

The next group, consisting of sūtras 34-38, discusses

the title of the Sûtras to the Vedic vidyâs. About the time the *Brahmasûtras* were composed perhaps long before that time, the opinion seems to have been established that the Sûtras were not entitled to the study of the Vedas and therefore to at least a direct acquisition of Vedic knowledge. But there seem to have been thinkers who questioned this disqualification as appears from the discussion we are entering into. A supposed questioner refers to the story of king Jânasroti Pañdrâyaṇa and his receiving the Sambarga Vidyâ from the sage Raikva in sections 1-3 of the fourth chapter of the *Chhândogya*. This king says the questioner, was evidently a Sudra, for in 2. 4 and 5 Raikva addresses him as such. Now, Sûtra 84 answers the objector by saying that the word Sudra in the text does not mean caste. It means *suk* the sadness which Jânasroti felt and with which he had gone to see the sage, caused by the rather disrespectful manner in which the flaminis to the story had spoken of him. The word therefore does not prove that the king was a Sûdra by caste. In the next sūtra the kshatriyahood of Jânasroti is proved by the fact that he is mentioned in the same section along with a Kshatriya named Abhipratârî, a descendant of Chitraratha. The next sūtra refers to purificatory rites like *upanayana* mentioned in the sâstras in the case of the higher castes but prohibited in that of the Sûtras thus proving their non title to Vedic study. Sûtra 87 refers to the remarkable story of Satyakama Jâbâla in *Chhândogya* iv 4, where his teacher Haridrumata Gantama does not undertake to initiate him until he is satisfied that the

boy is not a Súdra. As to the real import of the story the reader is referred to the observations in our edition of the *Chhándogya*. Sútra 38 refers to specific Smṛiti passages prohibiting the hearing of the Vedas and following their meaning by Súdras. Now, a good deal might be said on this subject both on grounds of reason and sastric teaching. But we confine ourselves to referring to the teaching ascribed to God in the *Gítá*,—‘*Cháturvarnyam mayá sṛṣṭam guṇa-karma-vibhāgasah*’ (iv 12) “The fourfold order of castes has been created by me according to the division of qualities and duties.” If there is any natural distinction of castes at all, it is based on the division of qualities or aptitudes and the life and occupations they lead to. Judged by this criterion, many so-called twice-born people should be called Súdras, and many so-called Súdras should be classed as *dvijas*. But the Sútrakāra and those who follow him implicitly seem to think of caste as depending on birth and not on *guṇa* and *karma*.

The next three aphorisms, 39, 40 and 41 are each a distinct adhikarana. They discuss the meaning of ‘*prāna*’ in *Katha* II 3 2, ‘*jyotiḥ*’ in *Chh* viii 12 and ‘*ākāśa*’ in *Chh* viii 14. 1 respectively. With arguments already familiar to the reader, namely that the actions and qualities ascribed to the objects denoted by the words are possible only of the Supreme Being, it is shown that the terms mean God and no phenomenal objects. In the case of *ākāśa* it is moreover shown that the scriptural passage differentiates *nāma-rūpa*, phenomena, from the *Ākāśa* of which it speaks. None

but the Ahsalata can thus be differentiated from phenomena.

Sūtras 42 and 43 form the last group of the pāda. They discuss the meaning of 'self' in *Bṛ. iv 3 7*. The sections are most important. In fact no other portion of Upanishadic literature is more important. But the Sātrākāra's treatment is very brief. It only shows that the Self spoken of in the scriptural passages is the supreme and non-transmigrating Self and not the individual and transmigrating, as if their difference could be conceived apart from their unity. But Yājñavalkya speaks of both the aspects of the self. The Sātrākāra's treatment thus does not do justice to the gravity and difficulty of the subject. We shall discuss it later on. Our author's arguments here are (1) that in the state of dreamless sleep and the self's departure from the body, the Universal and the individual are clearly distinguished, and (2) that in the 2nd of the two texts referred to the Universal is called 'the Lord of all' 'the King of all' &c., thus differentiating him from the individual.

Pada 4

The first adhikarana of the páda, sūtras 1-7, discusses the meaning of the term 'avyakta' in *Katha* 1 3 10, 11, and cites another adjacent passage, 1 3 15 in support of the given interpretation. Some Sāṅkhyas seem to have claimed that 'avyakta' means their Pradhāna or Prakṛti. The Sūtrakāra says it cannot do so, for from the metaphorical description, given at the beginning of the *Katha* section, of the body as a chariot, it is clear that it is the body that is meant by the term. But it is not the gross but the subtle body that is meant, for the term suits it alone. The subtle body is said to be superior to the individual self, for the bondage and liberation of the latter are dependent on the former, just as the functions of the senses are dependent on objects. It will be noticed by the careful reader that this interpretation of the *Katha* text is different from ours as given in our Devanagar and English edition of the *Ten Upanishads* and extracted in the English translation of our sūtra text and annotations. However, the 4th sūtra points out that if 'avyakta' meant the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna, it would have been mentioned as something to be known. The Sāṅkhyas emphasise the knowledge of their Pradhāna as distinct from Puruṣa as a means of attaining *kaivalya*. Again, if the Sāṅkhyas claim that the other text beginning with '*Aśāṁdam aśpaṁsam*' speaks of their Pradhāna, the Sūtrakāra says he must say 'No', for it really speaks of the Supreme Intelligent Self, as the section in which the passage occurs belongs

to him Besides, in the dialogue between Yama and Nachiketas with which the section deals, and in the course of which the former grants boons to the latter only three things are spoken of,—fire, the individual self and the Supremo Self. Anything else like the Pradhāna is out of the question and cannot be mentioned. Lastly, it should be noticed that as the Sāṅkhya use the term *mahat* in the sense of the first substance generated from Prakṛiti and not in the Vedic sense of the individual self so they use the term 'avyakta' not in the Vedic sense of the subtle body but in the sense of the Pradhāna. But this un Vedic application of the term can be no reason for the identification of the Vedic Avyakta and the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna.

The next group also which consists of sūtras 8-10, corrects a Sāṅkhya misinterpretation of a Vedic word 'Ajā', the unborn, or she-goat, in *Svetāsvatara* i 5 5 is claimed to be the Sāṅkhya Prakṛiti. But 'the unborn may mean other things also just as 'a cup with its mouth below and its bottom above means all spoons indifferently and not a particular kind of spoon. Ajā in the text really means the substance of the elements *tejas* &c., spoken of in *Chh.* vi 4. There is nothing unreasonable in the *Srūti* metaphorically speaking of the primal substance as a she goat. Such metaphorical descriptions are numerous in scripture, for instance in *Chh.* iii the sun is called 'honey' though really it is not honey.

Sūtras 11-13 interpret the phrase 'pancha panoh janāh' in *Bṛ.* iv 4. 18 'Panchajanāh' as is evident from the next verse means breath, the eye, hearing, food

Brahman from whom it and the world come out in the state of waking

Sutras 19-22 discuss the well known 'Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa in *Bṛi* ii 4 and iv 5. Is 'the self to be seen, heard &c.' spoken of there the individual or the universal self? Considered from beginning to end the passage, says the Sūtrakāra, is seen in all its parts to refer to the Supreme Self? But is not the Supreme Self also taught as identical with the individual? Yes. But why? Are not they also different? Yes, but their unity is emphasised in order that the promise may be fulfilled which is made at the beginning that when the self is seen all things are seen. The fulfilment of the promise depends upon the identity of the two selves. This seems to be the view of the ancient teacher Āśmarathya referred to in sūtra 20. The view of another ancient śhārya, Audulomi, is given in sūtra 21. He thinks that the identity of the Universal and the individual taught here is really that state which the latter finally attains when released from its body and other adjuncts. Sūtra 22 adds the view of still another ancient teacher, Kāśakṛitana, about the identity spoken of. The individual, he says, is the form in which the Universal exists in man, and so their identity is taught.

The next group sutras 23-27 shows that Brahman is not only the efficient but also the material cause of the world—the substance of which the things of the world are forms or appearances. The arguments, rational and scriptural, are the following —(1) *Chh.* vi. 1 promises that there is one thing (that is God) which, being known, all things are known, and instances clay

CHAPTER II

Pada 1

The whole of the first páda of chapter II is devoted to meeting Sāṅkhya objections to the Vedāntic theory of the creation of the world by God and otherwise defending the latter. An idea of the Sāṅkhya doctrine in a few words should therefore precede an exposition of the various topics of discussion. For a detailed account based on Śvarakrishṇa's *Sāṅkhya Lārīka* and the *Sāṅkhya pravachana* with Vijnanabhikṣu's commentary thereon, the reader is referred to our *Krishna and the Gita*. The Sāṅkhya postulates two eternal principles, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛiti* from a combination of which the world as we perceive it, has arisen. *Puruṣa* or rather *Puruṣas*, co eternal and mutually independent, are conscious but inactive beings. *Prakṛiti* is unconscious, but active but she can act only when she is in nearness *samudhya* to some *puruṣa*. From their union come out (1) *buddhi* or *mahat* a form of consciousness undifferentiated into the ideas of subject and object, (2) *aḥankāra*, egoity or self-consciousness. 3-7) *pañcatanmātra*, the subtle essence of the five gross elements, (8) *manas* or the sensorium, (9-18) the five *jñānendriyāṇi* or organs of knowledge and the five *kārmendriyāṇi* or organs of action and (19-28) the five gross elements,—earth, water &c. A knowledge and direct realisation of *Puruṣa*'s distinction from *Prakṛiti* leads to the former's

release from the latter's bondage and the attainment of *kavalya*, aloofness, the goal of Sāṅkhya *sādhana*. The system leaves no room for a Creator, but what is called the *Sesvara* or theistic school of Sāṅkhya postulates an eternally perfect Being under the name of *Īsvara*, who, though not the Creator of either Prakṛiti or the Puruṣas, helps all human endeavours after *kavalya*.

We now come to the various topics into which the section is subdivided. In the first two sūtras the Sāṅkhya objector says to the Vedāntist,—You reject the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *Piadhāna* on the authority of the *Sruti*. But the *Smṛiti*,—the class of religious and philosophical books other than the *Sruti* and ascribed to great teachers,—also deserves honour. Such are the works embodying the teachings of the Sāṅkhya *āchāryas*. In rejecting the Sāṅkhya doctrine you deny the authority of the Sāṅkhya *Smṛiti*. The Sūtrakāra's reply to this objection is, There are also *Smṛitis* teaching the Vedāntic doctrine. In rejecting this doctrine you deny their authority. You commit the same offence that you charge us with. The fact is that the *Smṛiti* is to be accepted only so far as it agrees with the *Sruti*. Where it opposes the latter, one is at liberty to reject its teachings. Besides, the Sāṅkhya teaching on *mahat* and other derivatives from *Prakṛiti* are not taught in the *Sruti*, neither are they recognised by common sense, hence they must be rejected. For the same reason the third sūtra rejects the Yoga philosophy, otherwise called the theistic Sāṅkhya. The Yoga accepts the Sāṅkhya metaphysics *in toto*. It supplements the latter, as we have already seen, by

recognising an uncreative *Īśvara*, and teaching a system of mental and some physical discipline

In Sūtras 4.11 the Sāṅkhya raises more serious objections against the theism of the Vedānta, and the Sūtrakāra tries to answer them. The Śāṅkhya doctrine is based on the common sense distinction of subject and object, mind and matter. The Sāṅkhyas point out that this distinction is accepted by the Vedānta also though it recognises presiding deities in various departments of nature. If then mind and matter are really distinct, how can mind, the Divine Mind, account for the existence of matter? The disparity of their nature goes against the creation of the one by the other. The answer which the Sūtrakāra gives to this objection is rather unsatisfactory and inconsistent with his final and serious opinion. He says the disparity of nature between mind and matter does not prevent a relation of cause and effect between them. Material things like hair and nails come out of living beings and living beings like scorpions come out of cow-dung. The objector is not satisfied and again urges—In that case, in the case of mind producing matter and matter producing mind, the effect must be regarded as non-existent. The Sūtrakāra does not accept this view. He says, just as on its emergence from the cause the effect exists in the cause so before its emergence too it exists therein. The Sāṅkhya does not press the question which naturally arises here,—how such disparate things as mind and matter can exist in each other,—but raises a very different question, namely, that Brahman being the Cause both of the creation and re-absorption of the

world, does it not follow that he is tainted by the imperfections of the world absorbed in him ? The Sūtrakāra's answer is again unsatisfactory and rather tentative. He says, when things made of clay or gold, with their various qualities, are absorbed in their material causes, they do not communicate their qualities to the latter. So the imperfections of the world do not taint its Supreme Cause. Further, you, Sāṅkhyas, have no right to charge us with inconsistencies of which you are yourselves guilty. Your Pradhāna is devoid of sound and various such other qualities which you say, it produces. And in the final absorption, when cause and effect become one, is it not tainted by these qualities ? The fact is, adds the Sūtrakāra in the last aphorism of the adhikarana, arguments based only on individual opinions and not on the scriptures cannot afford a firm standing ground. If you try to argue better, your better argument will be refuted by a still better one. So in matters religious and philosophical the only stable basis is the direct knowledge of the rishis. But in indirectly accepting the direct knowledge of the rishis, do we not reason ? And if we directly gain the same experience as the rishis did, have we not still to argue in satisfying ourselves and those about us that what we call our experience is not either superstition or an inherited belief ? The Sūtrakāra does not raise these questions.

In the 12th sūtra our author says that by appealing to the Vedas, whose authority his opponents also accept, but with which their conclusions do not tally, he has refuted all those other systems also,—systems

other than the Sankhya. Nevertheless he will take them up in the next *pada*

In sutra 18 another objection to the Vedantic theory of creation is answered. As we have already seen, this doctrine does away with the distinction of subject and object, mind and matter. The Sūtrakara says he accepts this identification, which does no harm to his doctrine. The sea, though one has in it the varieties of froth, ripples, waves, bubbles &c. The one undivided space seems divided by limiting adjuncts like pots and walls. So the distinction of subject and object is not unreasonable in the one Brahman who includes all. What we have to say is that these metaphors do not go into the root of the matter. The mutual relations of objects do not represent but rather misrepresent the relation between subject and object. This relation, which involves difference as well as unity, has yet to be examined and the real meaning of both the unity and the difference explained.

In the next *adhyakaraṇa*, which consists of sūtras 14-20 our author does not take up any such analysis as we have suggested but he shows by the sort of analogical argument he is fond of and by referring to two scriptural texts that the effect is one with the cause and before its emergence from the latter really exists therein. If the effect did not so exist in the cause, anything would come out of anything else. Curd would come out of clay and a pot would be made out of milk instead of clay. But this does not occur showing that there is a necessary relation between cause and effect. The two scriptural texts referred to are *Chh.* vi. 1-4

and *Ītī* 11 7 The objector points out that in these texts the world is clearly said to be non-existent and its Cause as the only thing existent The Sūtrakāra replies that the non-existence mentioned is not absolute non-existence, but non-existence in the sense of non-manifestation as *nāma-rūpa*, name and form The objector might still say, but does not say, that to the All-knowing One there can be no distinction of manifest and non-manifest,—everything being ever-manifest to him Manifestation as a change implies the existence of a limited intelligence which passes from ignorance to knowledge

In the next group, sūtras 21-23, another objection to Vedantic Brahmanavāda is answered In this doctrine, says the objector, the Universal and individual selves are identified It follows therefrom that the Universal becomes liable to the charge of bringing upon himself evils like birth, bondage and death The Sūtrakāra replies that texts like *Bṛ* 11 4 5 declare the distinction of the Knowable and the knowing and the Universal and the individual and thus show that the former is greater than the latter He also shows, by the analogy of different kinds of precious stones and the production of leaves, fruits, flowers &c, from seeds that it is possible for different kinds of effects *and such differences as individual selves and the Supreme Self to be in the same Brahman* The italics correct a misprint in the translation (P 101)

But we find in the world potters and other mechanics depending upon clay and other substances and their various instruments for making the objects made by

them. How then can Brahman be thought of as creating the world without any pre-existing substance and any instruments? This objection is answered by the Sūtrakāra in aphorisms 24 and 25. He instances the change of milk into curd as a case of creation without extraneous help forgetting atmospheric action and the addition of leaven as necessary causes in producing curd. He also takes for granted the alleged power of the gods and the rishis to produce things by the mere power of their meditation,—a power which according to him, exemplifies the divine power of creation.

Sūtras 26-29 answer the objection to the Vedantic theory of creation arising from Brahman's incorporeality. The sūtras characterise Brahman as incorporeal. The incorporeal must be indivisible. When the indivisible turns into the world, as scripture says he does, he must do so as a whole and not in part, and thus cease to be Brahman. The Sūtrakāra cannot answer this objection in any better way than by appealing to the sastras. The sastras, as we see in *Isā* 5 and *Ātharv* ii. 2. 9 teach that in becoming the world Brahman nevertheless remains beyond it. We must accept both his immanence and transcendence on the authority of the scriptures. We think that his immanence and transcendence, which are only two sides of the same fact, can be shown on grounds of reason also. But the Sūtrakāra does not appeal to reason here. He only refers to the state of dreaming mentioned in *Bṛ* iv 3. 9 in which the same self is seen to create various objects without extraneous help and without losing its identity and indivisibility. But after all, the objections

urged against the Vedantic theory of creation are fully applicable to the Sāṅkhya theory. Pradhana is also taught to be incorporeal and devoid of the various qualities it creates. It either cannot create these or in creating them it ceases to be incorporeal.

In sūtras 30 and 31 several scriptural texts are referred to which declare God's possession of various powers and attributes and his capability of knowing and acting without organs.

But how can God act, the objector continues, when he is without any want, and has therefore no motive for action? The Sūtrakara answers in aphorisms 32 and 33 that as a king having no wants still acts as a matter of sport or pleasure, so may God be conceived as acting though without any want or motive. The answer must be pronounced very unsatisfactory. The king takes to sport out of inanity, his vast resources failing to satisfy him. This cannot be said of God. The fact is that there is no satisfactory answer to the objection from the standpoint of Unqualified Monism, the doctrine of a solitary God.

The Sūtrakāra evidently sees this and so tries to get out of the *impasse* brought about by the theory of creation he has thus far been defending. The world contains numberless pleasures and pains and their apparent or real causes in the form of partialities and cruelties. Are not these causes attributable to the one only cause of all effects,—God? A consistent Monist should say 'yes', but our author does not do so. In the next adbhikarana, which consists of sūtras 34-36, he says that partiality and cruelty cannot be attributed

to God, for differences in men's lot are due to their own actions in their past incarnations. But creation proceeds, the objector says, from a condition in which there are no actions and so no distinctions. The Sutra LĀMA says creation has no beginning a tenet which is proved by both reason and scripture. No reason however is adduced and no reference made either to any Śruti or Smṛiti text. Reason indeed finds no beginning in creation the very idea of time being that of an indefinite over-beginning never ending as we have tried to show in the second chapter of *Brahmajyotiḥ*. But we find no definite statement about the matter in Śruti or Smṛiti except the occasional mention in the latter of recurring *kālpas* or cycles. However the idea of time as having no beginning or end does not solve the problem of the relation of the many and the one and that of change and the changeless. It seems evident that one and many and change and the changeless being correlative ideas, implying one another, the many cannot be derived from the one and change from the changeless, as the Śruti texts on creation seem to attempt. The proper task of philosophy is not to explain creation,—God becoming something other than himself—but to analyse experience and reality and find out their final synthesis,—the necessary relation of their constituent elements. Such an analysis discloses the fact that subject and object and the Absolute which both makes and overlaps their distinction, are necessary moments of an indivisible reality—that God creates man and the world not in the sense of bringing existence out of non-existence or of differen

Pada 2

This pada, usually called the Tarkapada, is very important. It attempts to refute on grounds of reason the chief of what the Sūtrakāra regards as no Vedio systems of philosophy. These systems are (1) the Sāṅkhya, (2) the Kāṇḍa, (3) the Realistic Bauddha, (4) the Sensationalistic and Nihilistic Bauddha, (5) the Jaina, (6) the Naiyāyika and (7) the Bhāgavata. This is done in forty five sūtras divided into eight adhikaraṇas.

The first adhikaraṇa, consisting of sūtras 1-10 refutes the Sāṅkhya doctrine. The arguments are the following —

(1) The world is not a choos. Its parts are so ordered that they serve certain ends — the life happiness and propagation of living beings and the spiritual progress of rational beings. Such a world cannot be the effect of an unconscious cause like the Sāṅkhya Prakṛti. Activity itself is impossible in an unconscious object. Even if the possibility of unconscious activity be granted, it cannot account for the various ends served by the world-order referred to for they imply purpose or motive which Prakṛti admittedly does not possess.

(2) Bet milk, though unconscious nurses the calf, and unconscious water assuages thirst and sustains life. Cannot the unconscious Prakṛti be supposed in the same manner to serve our ends? So argues the Sāṅkhya. The reply is that in the cases referred to the effects justify the inference of an intelligence "guiding the unconscious causes".

(3) It must not be said that as grass, leaves, water &c., taken by a cow, turn into milk &c. from Prakriti come its various modifications, *mahat* &c. It is only in living bodies like the cow, and not else where, that grass &c. become milk showing the presence of intelligence in them

(4) The Sāṅkhya Prakriti is an independent reality, not dependent on Purusha or anything else. And the Sāṅkhya Purusha is inactive. Yet the Sāṅkhyas ascribe Prakriti's activity to her nearness to Purusha. A naturally inactive reality influencing another reality to act is an absurd idea. As Prakriti's activity, like its existence, is independent, it cannot be explained why it sometimes changes into the forms of *mahat* &c. and sometimes does not so change.

(5) Sāṅkhya thinkers often explain the relation of their Purusha and Prakriti by the analogy of a blind man conveying a lame man on his shoulders and being guided in his movements by the latter's directions. But the analogy breaks down at every point. The blind man is not naturally inactive as Prakriti is supposed by the Sāṅkhyas, nor is the lame man inactive like the Sāṅkhya Purusha for he is able to direct the blind man by his words. The analogy therefore fails to make the Sāṅkhya theory reasonable.

(6) The Sāṅkhya doctrine is inconsistent with itself. Its adherents differ widely among themselves as to the number of the *tattvas*, the order of their production from Prakriti and their mutual relations as causes and effects.

The above arguments, though valid, are not suffi-

cient They do not go into the root of the matter—the Sāṅkhya dualism of knowing and acting and knowing and being. The Sūtrakāra indeed thinks that action cannot be unconscious and unmotivated but he does not show this by analysing action and tracing out very idea of activity to our conscious conditions. He even concedes to his opponent if only for a moment that action can be unconscious and unmotivated and rests his argument for theism on the impossibility of ordered things,—things related as means and ends—proceeding from unmotivated action. His opponent might therefore contend as he practically does that where we cannot trace order we may recognise the reign of mere matter independent of intelligence. As to mere existence the existence of things independent of any intelligent puruṣa, the Sūtrakāra stands on the same ground as his opponent and therefore fails to refute him fully. To show the error of Dualism either Sāṅkhya or otherwise knowledge must be analysed and it must be shown that subject and object, knowing and being,—and even the finite and the Infinite to which the distinction ultimately resolves itself—though distinguishable, are not divisible that unity and difference are not opposed but complementary ideas or facts.

The 11th sūtra answers an objection from the Vaiśeṣika standpoint to the Vedānta doctrine of creation and sūtras 12-17 refute the Vaiśeṣika system. This system is ascribed to Kaṇāda or Kaṇabhuk, meaning the eater of particles apparently a nickname derived from the nature of the system. It is an Atomic

system representing the material world as a combination of subtle indivisible particles called *paramāṇus*. That all gross objects can be divided into more or less small particles, is indeed evident, but that this division ends or must end at some point is a mere dictum. The very idea of extension or space involves infinite divisibility. The Sūtiakāra does not mention this point. He confines himself to showing (1) that his own doctrine of the creation of the material world by an immaterial or intelligent cause is at least as reasonable as Kanāda's theory of the growth of this world from atoms, and (2) that atoms by themselves without an extraneous power to move them cannot combine themselves into a world. The Atomic theory conceives the original single atoms as spherical and minute and thinks that from their combination arise binary atoms which are minute and short, and from the latter again come ternary compounds which are big and long, not minute and short. The point of the Sūtrakāra's self-defence is that if effects so different from the causes can come out of the latter, why cannot an unintelligent world come out of an intelligent cause? The Atomist might rejoin that his effects are different from his cause only in form, not in substance, whereas the material world is substantially different from the non-material intelligent cause from whom the Vedantist derives it. If God is to be shown as both the material and efficient cause of the world, it must, we think, be shown as through and through mental or spiritual. In fact this is the position of the Upanishadic rishis, as appears from the descriptions of creation given by

them though it cannot be said that they consistently keep up this position everywhere. It seems to us that the Sātrākara in recognising a duality of substances—the one conscious and the other unconscious—really plays into the hands of his opponents and weakens the theism he would establish. However, his criticism of Atomism proceeds as already stated on his showing that the original atoms are incapable of movement, cannot combine and form a world. To this it may be said that it is *adrishta* an unseen power possibly the effect of the past actions of selves which move the atoms. But this unseen principle as an unintelligent entity, is incapable of producing motion. The next supposition is *Samarāya* a relation which binds together atoms and produces combinations. Now as distinct from the atoms themselves, it is inexplicable how this *samarāya* comes to help them. Something else seems necessary to connect it with the atoms. But if this is allowed it will lead to an infinite regress and no stable conclusion will be arrived at. The supposition of a *samarāya* therefore does not help the Atomist. But let us waive this objection and allow the activity of the atoms through *adrishta*. Will that help the Atomist? The constant proximity of *adrishta* would make their activity permanent and the state of *pralaya* or end of creation impossible as their inactivity has been already shown to make creation impossible. Moreover the Vaiśeṣika assume the atoms to have the qualities of colour, taste &c. found in the gross objects which result from their combination. In fact atoms are classified according to the four classes of objects they give

rise to,—earth, water, fire and air, and are conceived as possessing the varying qualities of the latter. But this makes them gross objects and affects their minuteness and permanency and thus makes them unfit for being causes of this gross and impermanent world. If, to avoid this difficulty, we suppose the atoms to have only one quality each, or all to have all the four qualities, the variety of objects with their various qualities would remain unexplained. On the ground of these discrepancies and lastly owing to the fact that the system has not been accepted by authorities on the Vedas, Atomism, says our author, must be rejected. We may remark in passing that the Atomic theory, which once reigned supreme among the votaries of science in the west, is now a practically exploded theory there owing chiefly to the progress of philosophical speculation during the last half a century or more. Atoms and the force they were once conceived to be moved by are now recognised by a large and growing class of scientific thinkers to be metaphysical noumenal ideas having no place in science proper, which deals with phenomena or appearances on grounds of positive experience. Our perceptions, so it seems agreed to by thoughtful scientific men, are confined to sensuous events and our belief in the world as a whole is the result of a systematic association of the ideas left by these sensuous events. To ascribe our sensations to atoms, forces or an intelligent mind or minds is to go beyond experience. Thus from solid entities atoms came to be (1) centres of force, then (2) centres of mere motion and are now regarded as (3) mere centres

of radiation and called electrons and protons. What the latter mean will be somewhat clear from the following extract from an article on "The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell" contributed by us to *Advance* and the *Indian Messenger* nearly two years back. Mr (now Lord) Russell is the ablest British representative of New Realism, which has succeeded the old Materialism. In his "*Outlines of Philosophy*" he says—"Until 1925 theories of the structure of the atom were based upon the old conception of matter as indestructible substance, although this was already regarded as no more than a convenience. Now, owing chiefly to two German physicists, Heisenberg and Schrodinger the last vestiges of the old solid atom have melted away and matter has become as ghostly as anything in a spiritual science (P 104). Again "Every atom is a structure consisting of electrons and protons" (P 106). "All protons carry a certain amount of positive electricity and all electrons carry an equal amount of negative electricity" (P 106). "The aim is to confine the theory to what is empirically verifiable, namely radiations as to what there is where the radiations come from we cannot tell and it is scientifically unnecessary to speculate" (P 112). The reader will thus see how far thought has travelled since the days of our old Atomists,—travelled in the very lines followed by them not to speak of other lines. However, we now come to speak of our ancient Buddhists whose advanced sections greatly anticipated modern thought on Idealistic or rather Sensationalistic lines.

Buddhist philosophy is examined in *adtras* 18-32

The philosophers are broadly divided into three classes,—(1) the Realists, (2) the Idealists or Sensationalists and (3) the Nihilists. The third class, though mentioned, is not dealt with by the Sūtrakāra. The Realists are Dualists, holding matter and mind to be different. Their theory of matter is atomistic, and the Sūtrakāra's refutation of it resembles his criticism of the Atomic theory. Their theory of mind may also be said to be a species of mental Atomism. Transient mental events are said to form themselves into five *skandhas* or groups,—form, perception, feeling, concept and idea,—and constitute the basis of personal experience. As the Buddhists do not recognise any permanent self, individual or universal, the Sūtrakāra argues that their attempts to show the formation of these aggregates are quite futile. As the mental events are distinct and perish as soon as they arise, they cannot be related as causes and effects of one another. Even if their causality be admitted for a moment, so that an antecedent event be regarded as giving rise to its consequent, it cannot be explained how several events form an aggregate. There are two modes of escape from this difficulty,—either to deny the principle of causality altogether or to say that the antecedent lasts just long enough to give rise to the consequent. The first case brings a perfect chaos into our experience. In the absence of a law of causation, anything at any time and place must be supposed to produce anything else. In the second case the very basal principle of *Kṣhanabhaṅgavádā*, that all impressions are momentary, is rejected. This principle of momentariness, however, which necessarily leads to

the denial of a permanent self is negatived by the fact of remembrance. Remembrance implies the recognition by the same person of a past and a present impression as his own. He must know— I who *had* the past impression *have* the present also. This proves the permanence of the percipient and also of the past perception. Buddhist Idealism or Sensationalism is specially examined in sutras 27-34. The Sutrakara's arguments against the doctrine are the following —

(1) You say there are no external things and only mental things exist but we do perceive external things. Why go against patent experience? The Mentalist might however ask what the Sutrakara means by external. External to what,—body or mind? The Mentalist does not deny the existence of things external to the body. Some percepts are really related externally to one another that is are in different spaces. What the Mentalist denies is the externality of percepts to perception. Percepts divorced from perception are meaningless.

(2) The Idealists urge that as things perceived in our dreams are admittedly not caused by things beyond the mind, things seen in the waking state need not be ascribed to non mental causes. The two classes of things are exactly alike. Why ascribe them to different causes? The Sutrakara says they are not alike for things seen in a dream are proved to be unreal on the termination of the dream while those perceived in the waking state remain permanent. Our author here does not see the point of the Idealists argument. The similarity of the waking and the dreaming states lies

in the fact that in both cases the objects are percepts, necessarily related to the percipient mind and explicable only by reference to it. The permanency of the objects of the waking state does not take away this similarity. And the permanency is only relative, if real at all. Our waking perceptions go and come,—they are in a constant flux. As perceptions of individual minds, subject to oblivion and remembrance, they are not permanent. Their identity in this flux may prove the existence of a higher self in us which never forgets anything, but it does not prove any extra-mental reality. As to the similarity of the waking and the dreaming state and the creative power of the self, Yājñavalkya's views in *Bṛ* iv 3 tally, at least partly, with those of the Viśṇānavādins and seem opposed to those of the Sūtrakāra. But, as we shall see later on, our author sets forth another and a maturer view elsewhere.

(3) The Idealists think that mental impressions can be caused by *vāsanās*, preceding impressions, and that no extra-mental causes need be postulated. But *vāsanās* are modifications and imply a substratum, the existence of which the Idealists deny. We might ask the Sūtrakāra whether he thinks of material or mental substrata. Mental substrata might be allowed for mental phenomena, but material, that is, unconscious substrata for mental or conscious phenomena are not only uncalled for, but meaningless. However, the variety of mental impressions demand, so argues the Sūtrakāra, various kinds of external things as their causes. But, apart from the unreasonableness of explaining conscious effects by unconscious causes, are not various pul-

poses a better explanation of them? If the same self can be the subject of various mental conditions such as we experience daily and hourly and such as the Sūtrakāra himself has spoken of elsewhere what prevents various mental impressions from being the effects of the same conscious cause with various purposes?

(4) The Sensationalists substitute what they call *Ālayavijñāna* a sum total of sensations for a permanent self. But as we have already briefly said in (1) momentary sensations cannot be summed up without a permanent ego that retains sensations as fixed ideas. A self that persists while events pass away retains the knowledge of the past and relates it to the present, and also anticipates the future can alone combine *vijñānas* ideas which, as necessarily related to the self have an element of permanence in them. Space with its relations of *here* and *there* *far* and *near* time with its *now* and *then*, causality with its union of the *permanent* and the *transient* are all impossible and meaningless without a self which, while making space time and causality possible, yet transcends their limitations. However the student of recent British philosophy will see that the refutation of Sensationalism embodied by the Sūtrakāra and amplified by Sankara, which we have sketched above, is a remarkable anticipation of T. H. Green's refutation of Hume in the introduction to his edition of Hume's works reproduced in the first volume of his own works.

The Jaina philosophy is considered in the next *adhikarana*, sūtras 33-39. The Jainas recognise only two fundamental categories or classes of objects, *jīva*

and *ajīva*, self and not-self. But these include various other subordinate categories, as the reader will find on reference to our annotations and their translation. They have also got a method of reasoning which they call *saptabhaṅginaya*, according to which any object, considered from seven distinct standpoints, appears to have different contradictory qualities. The method seems to have a distant resemblance to Hegel's doctrine of the identity of contraries. Both the *Sūtrakāra* and the *Bhāsyakāra* are very brief on the subject and nothing definite can be said about it without a direct study of Jaina philosophy. However, the *Sūtrakāra* shows the erroneousness of this method by the simple statement that contradictory qualities cannot inhere in the same object at the same time. He then examines the Jaina doctrine of the self from the standpoint of the Vedantic view of it as eternal and unchangeable. According to the Jainas the self assumes various sizes corresponding to the bodies it occupies in its successive transmigrations. But in the final stage of liberation it is, they say, unalterable. The *Sūtrakāra* characterises this theory as inconsistent. He thinks that to be unchangeable in the state of liberation, the self, regarded either as *vibhu* or *anu*, minute or pervasive, must always be unchangeable.

In the next group of *sūtras*, 37-41, the doctrine of the theistic or rather deistic *Sāṅkhyas*, the *Saivas*, the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vaiśeṣikas*, which says that God is distinct from both matter and the individual self and is only their Ruler and not their Creator, is examined and refuted. Our author's arguments are the following —

(1) God as Ruler has ordained for different beings unequal positions, high low and middling. He is therefore subject to love and hate and therefore no real *īśvara* or Ruler.

(2) Being distinct from and therefore unconnected with matter and the selves how can such a God rule them?

(3) A potter can control his clay because it is an object of his perception. *Prakṛiti* is devoid of form and other qualities and not an object of perception. Hence *īśvara*'s control over her is unthinkable.

(4) It may be said that *īśvara*'s control over *Prakṛiti* is like that of the soul over its senses. But its senses make the soul subject to pleasure and pain. The analogy would therefore make the Deity subject to pleasure and pain and so take away his divinity.

(5) According to the *Sāṅkhya*, *Prakṛiti* is unlimited and so are the *Puruṣas*. Now, one may ask if *īśvara* knows their and his own measure. If he knows it, he is limited. If he does not know it, he is not omniscient.

The last *adhikāraṇa* of the *pāda*, *sūtras* 42-45, examines the *Bhāgavata Pancharātra* doctrine. The ancient works of the school seem to have been lost. The present *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* is evidently a modern book and though teaching the peculiarly *Bhāgavata* tenets, is—at any rate tries to be—in harmony with Vedantic teachings. The current *Nārada Pancharātra* and the *Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇa*, which are more distinctly *Bhāgavata* in spirit, seem even later than the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. But they do sound a note of opposition to the *Vedas* and the *Vedānta*, which is mentioned

in sutra 45. They can thus be taken as the modern representatives of the ancient Bhāgavata-Pancharātra system. According to this system Bhagavān, the Supreme Being, though one, manifests himself in four distinct *vyūhas*, forms or aspects, namely Vāsudeva, Sankarshana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Vāsudeva is the Infinite One in his fulness. Sankarshana is his manifestation as the individual self. Pradyumna is *manas*, the sensorium, which unites the five senses and the five organs of action. Aniruddha is *ahankāra*, egoity, each person's consciousness of himself as distinct from other selves. The Sutrakātas' criticism of the system turns upon its dual procedure of representing the subsequent *vyūhas* as at once one with Vāsudeva and so infinite and eternal, and as proceeding from him and so non-eternal and finite. If Sankarshana, the individual self, proceeds from Vāsudeva, the Absolute Self, then the former becomes transient and finite and cannot be said to be one with the latter. The cause, to be a real cause, must have some *atīśaya*, superiority, over the effect, or else causation is impossible. As to the third and fourth *vyūhas* the doctrine is even more inconsistent. *Manas* is an organ or instrument (such as a hatchet) of the individual self and *ahankāra* the same of *manas*. Now, we never see an instrument proceeding from an agent. But the Bhāgavatas derive their Pradyumna from Sankarshana and then Aniruddha from Pradyumna. Such a theory is opposed to common experience and has no support from the scriptures. The Bhāgavatas also contradict one another as regards attributes and

the beings possessing them,—representing the former sometimes as mere qualities and sometimes as selves as holy Vāsudevas. And they are opposed, at least partly, to the Vedas. They say Sāṅdilya failed to get the highest good in the Vedas and found it in their *sāstra*.

The ancient Bhāgavata Pancharātra cult has gradually developed into what is now called Vaishnavism with its four chief schools and their many divisions and sub-divisions. The four divine *ayuhās* have given rise to an elaborate story of love and war in which Vāsudeva has become Krishna, the son of a Kshatriya named Vasudeva, and Sankarshana has become Balarama, Krishna's half brother. Pradyumna is Krishna's son and Aniruddha his grandson. The present writer has given a sketch of the rise and development of Vaishnavism in a small volume of twenty essays named *Krishna and the Puranas* in which, besides other things, the earlier form of the cult, which is in harmony with the Vedānta, and the later form which practically rejects it are clearly distinguished. As to the Sūtrakara's criticism of the Bhāgavata doctrine of *Chaturvyuha* could it not be said from the Bhāgavata standpoint so far as it accepts Vedāntic teachings that the distinction of cause and effect, and even of agent and organ can be regarded both from the eternal and the temporal point of view. Considered from the latter the Sūtrakara's criticism is valid. The individual self as proceeding from the Universal *in time* is not the Universal. And the same thing can be said of egoity as proceeding from the sensorium. But looked at from a standpoint

beyond the time-process, these very effects, though distinguishable from their causes, are not separable from them and are in that sense one with them. Such an explanation is suggested by, if not clearly set forth in, the higher Vaishnava puranas like the *Vishnu* and the *Bhágavata*.

Pada 3

The first adhikarana of the pāda, sūtras 17, discusses the origin of ākāśa space. The pūrvapakṣa holds that space is eternal not a created object. The arguments in favour of this position are (1) that the scriptures do not speak of the origin of space or if they do speak of it, as in *Tait* it is in a figurative sense and (2) that space has not that composite and changing nature which all created objects have. The Sūtrakāra meets these arguments by saying (1) that the scriptural statement of the creation of space is not figurative (2) that the scriptural promise of knowing all things by knowing God can be fulfilled only by accepting all things including space as one with God which he interprets as meaning that all things are caused or created by God, and (3) that, as observed in this world, there is division or distinction only in effects, not in causes. Space being indistinguishable from earth and other things, it must be an effect or created object. As to the last argument, is it not evident that earth as extended as is space, can not be distinguished from it? However, the whole discussion can hardly be called philosophical. Neither party undertakes to analyse experience and show like the English Empiricists that space is derived from sensations, or like Kant that it is an *a priori* form or condition of perception. The pūrvapakṣa seems to have a glimpse of the latter view, but does not elaborate it. In substance we side with Kant and regard

space and time as undervived *forms* of perception But it would be going out of the way to attempt here an exposition of this view We refer the reader for a somewhat detailed treatment of the subject to the first chapter of our *Brahmajñásá* either in its English or Bengali version Space is not derived from perception, for it is an *a priori* condition, mode or form of perception But perception itself is a human form of knowledge, which is essentially above the limitations of space and time Knowing or the knowing self, inasmuch as it is aware of limitations, transcends limitation He who knows *here* and *there*, *now* and *then*, *far* and *near*, really comprehends all these and is above their divisions Man, though his actual perceptions are in space and time, has the unspatial and the timeless, the Infinite and the Eternal, in him and is in that sense one with the latter If the comprehension of space in God makes it a created thing, and if this is what the Sūtrakāra means by calling it so, he is right And in this sense, the creation of space is continuous, "ever beginning, never-ending" Every time the transcendent knowledge of God is manifested as human knowledge or the knowledge of some superhuman finite being, space is created

Sūtra 8 merely states that by a procedure similar to that adopted in the case of space, air also may be shown to be created by God.

In sūtra 9 the childish question "who made God?" sometimes asked even by people who are not children, is discussed In explaining one thing by another we really explain, says the Sūtrakāra, the particular by the

general When the most general *i. e.*, the Universal, is reached, namely *Sat*, Being the causal question ends. The Universal requires no explanation *Sat* cannot be derived from *asat* non being because it is non-existent and therefore cannot be a cause That the Upanishadic *Sat*, Being, is not a mere empty conception but is the same as knowing, which cannot be derived from any thing else for all other things imply it as their condition, is clear from *Chh vi 2* and such other passages

Sūtras 10 11 and 12 treat respectively of the origin of fire, water and earth In the last of these sūtras it is shown that 'anna' in *Chh vi 2* and 4 means earth and not food, such as rice or barley

In sūtra 13 it is shown that the elements mentioned do not of themselves produce the other elements, but that the Lord, residing in them as their selves, produces effects by his creative thought.

The 14th aphorism teaches the doctrine by illustrations from observed facts that the order of creation *e. g.*, water from fire and earth from water is reversed in dissolution or retraction into Brahman.

Sūtra 15 answers an objection to the order of creation given in scripture arising from the intervention of *buddhi* and *manas* between the Creator and the elements We merely mention it, as it is of no importance and pass on to the next topic, which is really important.

Sūtras 16, 17 and 18 are regarded as different topics, but they, in fact the remaining whole of the pāda, may be taken as one topic, the nature of the self However, we shall take up 16-18 first They teach the indestructibility of the self As it manifests itself with the birth

of the body, and disappears with its death, it seems to be born and to die, but its birth and death are *bhákta*, apparent and not real. It is really eternal and indestructible. The proof adduced by our author is purely scriptural. He does not attempt any rational proof. As in speaking of space, so here, he does not analyse the idea of time and show, as he might do, that there can be no time without the timeless,—the knowing self in us which, seen in the fulness of its nature, is seen to be also the Self of the universe. For a detailed treatment of the subject we refer the reader to the second chapter, *Nityántyaviveka*, of our *Brahmajñásá*.

The next topic, comprising sūtras 19-32, is the size, minute or pervasive, of the self. The pūrvapaksha defends its minuteness, the Sūtrakāra its pervasiveness. The pūrvapaksha argument extends up to the 28th aphorism. There is much in this long discussion which does not call for or indeed deserve exposition or abbreviation. Its strong point is the scriptural doctrine of transmigration. A self that migrates from body to body, from one world to another, cannot be *vibhu*, pervasive, it must be *anu*, minute. The pūrvapaksha also cites scriptural texts in support of his view. The Sūtrakāra's answer turns upon his view of the conjunction of the self with *buddhi*, the understanding, with its expressions,—desire and aversion, pleasure and pain &c. as long as its individuality lasts. It is this limiting or differentiating adjunct that makes the self appear as minute, and scriptural statements of its minuteness have all a reference to the self's conjunction with it. In its essence, that is as free from this adjunct, the self

is not minute, but pervasive. Our author finds a support of this view in such scriptural passages as *Bri* iv 3 7. This passage which we have explained in the light of Sankara's commentary, may admit of another interpretation at any rate some words in it, for instance *samāna*. But its general trend undoubtedly supports the Sutrakāra's view. '*Dhyayati ita iclayati ita*' really means that thinking and moving do not belong to the self's real nature. But this view of the self is not shared by all the rishis of the Upanishads, as we shall see by and by. However the Sutrakāra's idea of the self is as already mentioned above in substance that its minuteness its special perceptions its pleasures pains and movements in short its individuality are all due to its connection with *buddhi* apparently an extraneous substance and that this connection ceases in the state of liberation. But does not this connection cease even before liberation? In *sushupti* dreamless sleep which represents *pralaya* submergence of the world in Brahman all expressions of individuality cease and the self is united to Brahman. This view is set forth in *Chh* vi 8 1 *Bri* iv 8.22 and several other passages in the Upanishads. The Sutrakāra's reply to this given in sūtra 31 is that in dreamless sleep *buddhi* remains in a potential condition and is re-manifested in the waking state, like the mustaches and the virile seed in the child, manifesting themselves in youth. Our author tries to strengthen his position in sūtra 32 by saying that in the absence of a limiting adjunct like *buddhi* there would be either perpetual non-perception or constant perception, neither of which is actually the

case But even in the presence of *buddhi* there is change from perception to non-perception and the reverse This is explained by the contact or non-contact of *buddhi* with external objects and its attention or inattention to them The *Sūtrakāra* cannot think of the self in its real nature, without contact with a not-self, as capable of producing the changes of our conscious life How far this view is consistent with his avowed Monism, we shall see later on

In the next two *adhikaranas*, *sūtras* 33-39 and 40, our author shows, on the authority of many a scriptural text, that the self, with the understanding as its organ, is an agent in matters both temporal and spiritual But it can also cease to act, by not using its instrument, as a carpenter does by laying aside his adze

In *sūtras* 41 and 42 our author tries to solve, too briefly it would seem, the problem of man's dependence upon God and his freedom as a moral agent Man's activity, he says, is dependent on God But if so, he suffers the evil consequences of actions which, as dependent on God, are not properly human This, says the *pūrvapaksha*, is not compatible with God's justice and goodness But, says our author, God in awarding the consequences of human actions has regard to men's moral efforts,—their choice of virtue and vice The various moral injunctions in the *sāstras* prove this They would be meaningless if man had no free choice Our author stops here He does not seem to see that the idea of man's free choice and that of the dependence of his actions on God are

naturally contradictory, at any rate they seem to be so. The problem recurs in another form and is discussed at length in the next *adhyakaraṇa*.

Sūtras 43-53, the last *adhyakaraṇa* of the *pāda* discuss the question of Monism and Pluralism,—whether what we call finite selves are one with God or really distinct selves independent of God and independent of one another. As we have already seen, our author accepts the former view, but he qualifies his Monism by teaching that individual selves are parts of God and not God in his totality. He thinks that by this qualification he solves many a problem which unqualified Monism and Pluralism cannot solve. Besides the many positive declarations of monistic distinction from God already referred to by him (in sūtras 43-45) he adds here a few more. On the other hand the Atharvans go so far as to identify even fishermen, slaves and gamblers with Brahman. Our author thinks these opposite views of unity and difference can be reconciled by his own view that the individual is a part of the Universal. The objection (in sūtra 46) that on his view God would be affected by human afflictions, he meets in a way already familiar to us, namely by his theory of *buddhi* as a limiting adjunct of the self. As light, space and the sun seem bent, moving and trembling respectively though not really so, owing to such adjuncts as fingers, jars and water, so God is not affected by the pain to which his part, the individual limited by *buddhi*, is subject. This view is again supported (in sūtra 47) by texts from Śruti and Smṛiti. Sūtras

18-53 answer some objections to our author's Non-dualism urged by Pluralists and show that their system is not free from inconsistencies. If there is only one Self, they ask, what can be the meaning of the sastre injunctions and prohibitions? Do they not imply a plurality of selves? Our author answers this question by admitting the one self's connection with many bodies and drawing his illustrations from the material world, thus practically reviving his Advaitavādi. Fire, he says is really one, yet fire in contact with a dead body is untouchable. Earth is one, yet of the two things, a diamond and a corpse, both (as he thinks) made of earth the one is worthy of acceptance, the other of rejection. The second objection (urged in sūtra 19) is this—You admit only one self and therefore only one agent. But there are many actions attributed to many agent. If there were only one agent, the fruits of actions would get mixed. Evil-doers would be happy and virtuous people miserable. The Sūtrakāra answers—(1) Buddha keeps agents distinct from one another and prevents the confusion you speak of. (2) The individual self is after all (as says sūtra 50) a reflection of the Supreme Self, not a reality different from the latter, yet not quite (sākshāt) identical with it. In sūtra 51 the Sūtrakāra turns the tables against the Pluralists. Your *adrishta*, he says, the invisible fruit of actions, inheres in an unintelligent object open to all selves, so there being nothing to confine any particular *adrishta* to any particular self, the possibility of confusion you ascribe to my theory really belongs to

joors. The Pluralist rejoins (in sūtra 52) that the particular resolutions of particular selves to secure this end and avoid that, is sufficient to avoid the supposed confusion and bring to each the result of his own action. Our author replies that there is nothing to prevent the confusion for the particular resolutions of particular selves are taken in conjunction with the *manas* (a form or expression of bodhī) and ultimately of Prakṛiti which is open to all selves. There is nothing to regulate these resolutions and confine their results to particular selves. But the Pluralist is not yet silenced. In sūtra 53, the last of the pāda he says—As the conjunction of the selves with *manas* takes place in their respective bodies, the distinction of their resolutions and the result of these resolutions are secured by the locality in which the conjunction takes place. The Sūtrakāra replies that as the selves are *ubhu* pervasive and as the body originates in proximity to all selves, the latter are in all bodies and there are no particular bodies belonging to particular selves. The conjunction of the *manas* with the selves cannot therefore be assigned to any particular locality. The possibility of confusion therefore remains on the Pluralist theory and the Monistic view is proved to be the only one which solves all difficulties.

have effects all over the body. If they were pervasive, there would be no meaning in their passing out of the body at death. The mukhya prāna is sometimes called pervasive, but its pervasiveness pertains only to its universal aspect, as Hiraṇyagarbha. Some thinkers would not call the mukhya prāna an organ for it does not reveal any object as sight or hearing does. But as it sustains the body and the organs of knowledge and action, it is surely an organ of the self.

So far we have given the substance of the first nineteen sūtras of the pāda. The 20th sūtra seems abruptly to introduce another subject already sufficiently discussed in the foregoing parts of the book, namely the creation of name and form, that is the world in space and time. In answer to a supposed purvapakṣa asserting that the speaker in *Chh* vi 3 2 and 3 is the individual and not the universal self the Sūtrakāra shows that it cannot be so. The 'living self' is mentioned only as the form which the Universal assumed in entering the three elements which he had already created and subsequently made tripartite. The 21st sūtra refers to the rise of some of the minor elements from the chief elements made tripartite. The process is described in *Chh* vi. The 22nd affirms that though all things are now of a mixed nature fire, water and earth retain their distinctive names owing to the pre dominance of the original elements in them. Thus what we now call fire contains one-half of the original fire and one-fourth of each of the other two elements.

CHAPTER III

Pada 1

This páda treats of the destiny of those who follow the *karmakánda*, the ceremonial portion, of the Vedas, that is, who practise the threefold religion of *ista*, *púrta* and *datta*, sacrifices, digging tanks and such other philanthropic work, and giving alms and presents to deserving persons. We fear that to modern readers, to those who have been taught to think in all matters, including religion, according to the established methods of science, namely observation, experiment, deduction and induction, much of what is said in this section will seem extremely crude and even meaningless, even though they may be believers in the immortality and transmigration of the soul. Our summary of the section will therefore be very brief, indicating only the broad lines of our author's thought and leaving the details to be gathered from the text and our annotations and translation by those who feel interested in them.

The first adhikarana, occupying sūtras 1-7, affirms that the individual self, when it passes out of the body at death, goes enveloped by subtle parts of the elements, *i e*, in an etherial body composed of these parts. The authority referred to is the "Panchágni-vidya," meditation on the five fires, in the *Chhândogya* Upanishad, v 3-10, which is set forth in the course of a conversation between the Bráhmāna sage Uddálaka Áruni and the royal sage Praváhana Jaivali. It is one of those

stories already referred to in this *bhāṣya*, in which a Brāhmaṇa takes instruction on religious subjects from a Kshatriya. The peculiarity of this particular story is that Jaivali tells Ironi that the latter is the first Brāhmaṇa to learn the vidyā, which was up to that time confined to the Kshatriyas. This seems an extreme assertion if it means that the whole subject of the soul's immortality and transmigration was unknown to the Brāhmaṇas till the time Āruṇi learnt it from Jaivali. But it may mean only that the priestly class as a whole owing to their absorption in ceremonial religion, did not attend to matters pertaining to the future life and had only vague notions about it. It may also mean that the form in which Jaivali expounded the Panchāgni vidyā was hitherto unknown to Brāhmaṇas. However, the same story is told with some variations in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* vi. 2. The first chapter of the *Kaushītaki* tells the same story with important omissions and elaborations and the name of the king changed into Chitra.

In the second adhikaraṇa, sūtras 8-11 and the third 12-21, it is stated that the followers of the karmakāṇḍa go to the lunar regions through a path called the pitṛyāṇa, the way of ancestors, which consists of or are symbolised by smoke, mist &c., and having experienced the results of their actions there, return with a residue of karmic effects to the earth in an order which is the reverse of what they followed in going. After return they are re-born in forms varying according to their merits. Those who do not follow the karmakāṇḍa, but live lives of unrestrained sin, go to the abode of Yama

and having suffered punishment there, return to the earth and are re-born

In the 22nd and 23rd aphorisms, it is stated on sástric authority that the self, both in its ascent to and descent from the moon, takes the form of, that is becomes similar to, certain objects such as ether, smoke, rice and barley. Release from the latter kind of objects during the descent is delayed

In the last adhikarana, sūtras 24-27, it is further explained that entering into or taking the form of rice, bailey &c, means only coming into contact with these objects. In such contact the selves enter human bodies. It is only when they enter a womb that they are re-born

In reading the sūtras and our annotations on them it will be found that in more than one instance statements made on the passage of the individual self to and from the lunar regions are interpreted metaphorically. Did it not occur to our author, we have often asked ourselves, that the whole description, as given in the Upanishads, may be metaphorical? Perhaps the Sūtrakāra, as he lived in an age when the freedom and originality of the Vedic rishis had given place to an uncritical acceptance of their utterances, did not think so. But the careful reading of Chitā's description, referred to above, of the Devayānapatha and the Brahmaloṇa to which it leads, leaves us in no doubt that to him at least and those who thought with him, the two paths, Pitriyāna and Devayāna, and the lunar and solar regions to which they lead, are only two methods of religious culture and two spiritual conditions which result from them. These two methods

and conditions are not indeed confined to our life *here* but also extend to *hereafter* but they do not indicate two spatial passages and two regions in space. The Pitriyāna is really the blind following of rites and customs promulgated by our ancestors and the Devayāna the method of *sādhana* discovered by the direct experience of *devas*, enlightened souls—an experience to be repeated in every *sādhana*. The uncritical blindness characterising the former path is compared to smoke, mist, the dark fortnight &c., and even the goal it leads to is nothing better than the borrowed and dim light of the moon. Such a method of *sādhana* cannot lead to any stable spiritual gain. The unstability attached to it is typified by repeated transmigrations to high or low forms of life. The Devayāna is symbolised by fire, the solar rays, the bright fortnight &c., and it leads to the solar regions, the very source of light. The goal achieved is lasting, from which there is no descent. However we shall return to the subject when we have occasion to speak in detail of Brahmaloka, the divine regions, and the way which leads to it.

Pada 2

In his dealing with the Buddhist Idealists we have found the Sūtrakāra to be a Dualist, believing in things external to the mind as the cause of its sensations. Here, in this páda, which discusses the relations of the individual and the universal self, we find him still holding to the same Dualism and establishing on its basis the doctrine of a lonely Self whose self-consciousness, inasmuch as he is untouched by the material world, is not broken by the idea of anything distinguishable from him. In the latter part of the section our author indeed tries to get rid of his Dualism by appealing to well-known Upanishadic texts proclaiming the sole reality of Brahman, but he gives us no rational grounds on which the material world can be rejected,—a world which, according to him, supplies us with both our sensations and the ‘adjunct’ consisting of *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahankāra*, the medium of our contact with matter and the ultimate cause of our bondage. The proof of our author’s doctrine of an absolutely *niṣguna* Brahman is furnished by a philosophical discussion of the three states of the self, *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *sushupti*, waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. Such a discussion is to be found in several parts of the Upanishads, chiefly in *Chh* viii 7-12, *Bṛ* iv 3-4, *Pṛas* iv and *Mund* 1-7. But there is a fourth, a ‘*chaturtha*’ or *túrīya* state, variously described in the first and last passages referred to, which our author ignores. A thorough discussion of that would have,

as we shall see by and by either deepened his *nirguna* *rāda* and made it more consistent, or led him to reject it altogether at any rate in the exclusive form in which he holds it. However, to enter into the discussion which leads to such important issues, what does our waking life teach us as to the relation of the individual self to any not self that may exist and to the Universal Self? Our author as we have already seen, takes the common sense view of which the Sāṅkhya view is a philosophical form, that our waking perceptions are caused by the contact of our *upādhis* adjuncts with objects external to the self. As the reader has already seen, our *upādhis* also according to our author are composed of unconscious elements. We have briefly shown in our summary of the Tarkapāda, the reasonableness of this view and referred to our *Brahmajyotiśā* for a detailed discussion of the subject. The error of this way of thinking lies in taking abstractions for concrete realities. Sensations, perceptions, *viśādas* even minds or selves without objects of which they are aware, are abstractions and not concrete realities. The mind or self is supposed to be like a lump of clay or wax susceptible of taking impressions from a stamp and actually taking such impressions when the stamp is pressed against it. Sensations and ideas are thought of as such impressions made on the mind or self by things external to it. But the self, and knowledge which forms its very essence, have nothing even remotely similar to wax, clay or the impressions made on them. In knowledge, of whatever kind or degree, the knower and the known are undivided and indivisible. They

may be distinguished, but the distinction is not a difference without unity, but a difference in unity or a unity in difference. Knowledge or the self is the real infinite beyond which nothing is seen, heard or thought of,—‘*Yatra nānyat paśyati, nānyat śṛṇoti nānyat vijānāti*’ (*Chh vi 24 1.*)—In which nothing but itself is seen, heard or thought of. In it the self knows itself and nothing but itself. In it there is no external difference between the self and any not-self. But there are in it undemable internal differences some of which may be briefly pointed out. There is for instance the difference of *here* and *there* (space *now* and *then* (time), and good and evil (morality). In knowing something *here* I distinguish it from what is *there*, but nevertheless I know that what is there, though not before my senses, yet exists. In knowing this I know that my self, which makes this distinction of here and there, overlaps or transcends the limitation implied in it. So in knowing the book before me *now*, I distinguish the *now* from the *then* when the object was not and shall not be before my senses. Nevertheless I know that it existed and will exist beyond my senses, and in knowing this I recognise that my self, though there are for it these distinctions of present, past and future, transcends the limitations of time. In the same manner, though I sometimes choose the evil, my higher self soon reveals the good to me, makes me feel penitent for my sin and thus makes itself known as the Perfect. All knowledge, therefore,—perceptual and conceptual, theoretic and practical, turns out to be the self-revelation of the Infinite to the finite, of the Perfect to the imperfect.

The true cause or explanation of our waking life is not the contact of the self with a not self,—a bondage to be got rid of,—but a necessary and inalienable relation of God and man.

Before taking up the discussion of *śvapna* and *sushupti* it should be seen that in what we call our waking life we are not fully awake. Most part of the knowledge we have acquired remains in the background of our consciousness and what comes to the light of consciousness is in a constant flux. As creatures we are subject to oblivion and are constantly forgetting things. But the Creator who forgets nothing is in us as our true Self, and it is this which explains our passing from oblivion to remembrance. The Lord says in the *Gītā* —

Sarvasya chaham hridi sannivishito

Mattah smritirjñānam apohamāncha.

That is, 'I abide in the hearts of all. Memory and knowledge, as well as their disappearance, are from me' (xv 15). Our passage from oblivion to recollection, if truly understood, will convince even an ordinary unphilosophical thinker that we, individual selves, are not independent realities, but are dependent for our conscious life on an over-knowing never forgetting Being who, though so different from us, exists in us as our truest Self. People think that things forgotten by us somehow continue to exist in us, forgetful beings and start up into consciousness again, perhaps through the instrumentality of the brain cells. They do not see that such an idea involves a self-contradiction,—knowledge remaining unknown and becoming known again.

Knowledge, in all its forms,—perception, conception, memory, imagination etc —can exist only as knowledge, as the property of a knowing being. It cannot become unknown and come back as knowledge. So, when we, as individuals, lose our knowledge, it still exists in the Universal, our true Self, and comes back to us through his activity. The brain-cells, as parts of the Supreme Reality, have indeed something to do with the revival, even with the acquisition, of knowledge, but conceived as unconscious objects, they explain neither the one nor the other. Knowledge can exist, come from, and go back to only a knowing being. The individual, inasmuch as it acquires, loses and gets back knowledge, is not sufficient for itself, cannot explain itself. It has its true cause, explanation and permanent abode in a Being in whom knowledge is original, eternal and perfect. Our waking life then, seen in its fullness, in relation to its Cause and Support, already, without any consideration of our dreams and dreamless sleep, bears testimony to an ever-waking, all-knowing Being who never forgets anything, who therefore never dreams or sleeps. Dreaming and sleeping are only forms of oblivion, and cannot be ascribed to the self in its fullness. And as is clear from what we have said above of the nature of *our* waking, which is never full and perfect, even waking in this sense cannot be ascribed to him. He is above the three states of *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *sushupti*. To him knowledge is not a process, as it is to us, but an unchanging eternal possession. His is the fourth or *tūīya* state. Prajāpati in *Chh* viii 12 truly interprets it, while Māndūkya, at any rate his interpreters, Sankara

and Gonrapáda, misunderstand and misinterpret it. The Sūtrakāra, as we have already said, ignores it altogether, but his trend of thought, as we shall see, resembles Mandūkya's more than Prajāpati's.

Sūtras 1-6 of the pāda under discussion treat of *raṇa*. We need not touch upon all that the Sūtrakāra says about this state. Much of what he says has nothing to do with philosophy. The point to be specially noted is the contrast he draws between the waking and the dreaming state. As the latter does not represent reality—reality as it appears in the waking state in all its aspects it is according to him a state of illusion. He misses the real point of Īśhvārya's contrast of the two states though he quotes it,—“There are no chariots in that state (dreaming) no horses no roads. He himself creates chariots, horses, roads” (*Bṛi* iv 3, 9 and 10). Īśhvārya suggests, though he does not here say so explicitly, that as the self can create in dreams things which seem to be external to it but are actually not so things perceived in the waking state are also its own creation. Elsewhere for instance in *Bṛi* iv 3, 23-32, he says so explicitly. What the Sūtrakāra emphasises is that the self in *raṇa* is still in bondage, for it still sees a plurality of things while reality is absolutely one. However coming to *sushupti* in sūtras 7 and 8 he says on the authority of many a text of the Upanishads, that in this state the individual reaches its true Self—becomes one with it and has no feeling of difference. In sūtra 9 he shows the identity of the sleeping and the re-awakened individual. This identity depends upon the union of past with present

experience As we have shown in our prefatory remarks, this implies that the individual's experience, with all the differences of which it is composed, remains in tact in the Universal during the former's sushupti and that the Universal is not the abstract unity without difference which the Sūtrakāṇa would make it The fourth adhikarana, sūtra 10, deals with the state of swoon and need not detain us In the fifth adhikarana, sūtra 11-21, scriptural texts are quoted to show that God's immanence, his unity with objects in time and space, which makes him *saguna*, qualified, is only apparent, and that his transcendence, his *nirguna* or unqualified nature, is alone real Scripture indeed often describes him as *saguna*, but that is because he appears one with the objects in which he is present, as the rays of the sun or the moon seem straight or curved in conjunction with such an object, or as the reflection of the sun seems multiform in water though the sun itself is one An objector showing the inappropriateness of the analogy is answered by the statement that the cases compared have some points of similarity Our author also shows that the immanental attributes of God mentioned in the scriptures are often negated by them and a decided prominence is given to his transcendental attributes That immanence and transcendence, the *saguna* and *nirguna* natures, are only two aspects of the same truth, and so equally real, the one being meaningless without the other, our author does not see However, the next adhikarana, sūtras 22-31, contains the same subject with some variations The chief point in it is that though God as transcendent is

unmanifested that is not an object of sense, he is realised in worship by the purified soul. In the next adhikarana sūtras 32-33 arguments urged in favour of the existence of other realities than Brahman on the authority of some scriptural analogies are answered in a way already indicated above and the sole reality of God affirmed on the authority of the sastras. The last adhikarana, sūtras 30-33 discusses the same subject,—God as the true source of the results of *Karma* ,—which we have seen already discussed in sūtras 41 and 42 of the third pāda of the second chapter.

Pada 3

This section, which deals with *Upāsana*, worship or meditation, and might be expected to be helpful to devotional exercises, is on the contrary highly technical and textual. It indeed speaks of the scriptural passages, variously named *vidyās*, *upāsanās* and *pratyayas*, which set forth the attributes of God and thereby help the aspirant to meditate upon and worship him. But instead of affording any aids to devotion our author occupies himself mostly with such questions as (1) whether the *vidyās*, because of their variations in minor matters, should be recognised as different or in regard to their common object, helping the mind's concentration in God, should all be accepted as fundamentally one, (2) whether some of them do not belong to ceremonial religion though apparently *upāsanās*, (3) whether attributes found to be enumerated in some *vidyās*, but absent in others, should or should not be taken over and joined to the latter in the actual practice of meditation, and so on. Readers interested in the details of this discussion are referred to our annotations and translation. The monotony of this scholastic dissertation, extending over sixty-six aphorisms divided into forty topics, is broken only once or twice. In sūtra 53 a digression, an admitted one, is made. The Chārvāka objection to the separate existence and immortality of the self is mentioned and in the next sūtra it is answered. The self with its properties of perception &c., appears only so long as the body

lasts disappearing on the dissolution of the body. There are therefore the Materialists conclude one and there is no future life — any life in view of which your elaborate rites and meditations are prescribed. The Sutrakara answers — If the self were one with the body the properties of the self perception would be manifested in the dead body but they are not manifest therein thus showing the distinction you ignore. You admit the existence of perception which we regard as the very essence of the self. On this very ground you should admit the difference of self and body for perception means you should admit, perception of matter and things material, implying a difference of reality of subject and object. Objects of perception change but the perceiving self persists and remains identical during the change. That prove that it cannot die even on the dissolution of the body. The other break rather slight, is seen in *sūtra* 1 wherein our author gives the aspirant the option of choosing any one or more of the many scriptural meditations as helps in his devotion. The common object of them all is to enable us to have a direct vision of the Lord. To realise this object it is not necessary to use all the meditations. If only one chosen out of them and steadily followed in our devotion gives us success a second is not necessary. This indeed does not exclude the possibility that the others if devoutly studied, may have a cumulative effect on the mind. However it may help the reader if we mention below all the scriptural references given by the Sutrakara, so far as we could verify them. We exclude only his references to

those meditations which he rejects as merely ceremonial

Prána-vidyá,—*Bṛ* vi 1 1 *Chh* v 1 1 *Kau* ii 9

Panchágni-vidyá,—*Bṛ* vi 2 *Chh* v 10

Vaisvánara-vidyá,—*Chh* v 11-18

Sándilya-vidyá,—*Chh* iii 14

Udgitha-vidyá,—*Bṛ* i 3 7 *Chh* i 2 7

Parovariya-udgitha-vidyá,—*Chh* i 9 1, 2, i 6 6-8

Kath i 9 10, 11, i 3 12 *Ait* i 1 2 *Chh* v 2 2

Bṛ vi 1 14 *Satapath Br* xc 6 3 2 *Bṛ* vi 6 1

Mund iii 1 1 *Svet* iv 6 *Kath* i 3 1. *Bṛ* iii 4 1,

iii 5 1 *Svet* vi 11.

Ait Ar ii 2 4 6 *Bṛ* v 4 1 v 5 2 *Chh* viii 1 1,

viii 7 1 *Bṛ* iv 4 2'

Paḍa 4

This section, which treats of the relation of knowledge and work, has fifty-two sūtras divided into eighteen adhikaraṇas. The division is immaterial and not quite logical. The whole paḍa may be taken as a single dissertation on the main subject mentioned with incidental digressions to ceremonial matter such as the permissibility of taking forbidden food in critical conditions of life and whether a *naiṣṭhika brahmachari* one who has taken the vow of perpetual celibacy can ever be purified by *prāyaścitta* an expiatory rite. The chief controversy is that between the *Samuchchaya* rāḍin the advocate of the constant union of knowledge and action to the same life and the *Sannyāsin*, the advocate of mere knowledge without any obligation to work. The first position is taken by Jaimini as he is represented in the *Para mīmāṃsā* the second by Bādarāyaṇa, as referred to by the *Sutrakāra*. The gist of the controversy is given in the first two adhikaraṇas sūtras 1-20, though some of the succeeding aphorisms also touch upon it. We will not enter into the details of the controversy but leave the reader to gather them from the text and our annotations and translation. Both the parties appeal exclusively to scriptural authority. None of them descend to reasoning,—to any analysis of experience which may show either the indissoluble union of knowledge and action or their independence of each other. Our judgment is that as exponents of the scriptures both of them are right, be

cause the rishis, the composers of the Vedas, are not of the same opinion on the matter. Some of them are advocates of *samuchchaya* and some of *sannyása*. But none of them are extremists like some of the later Vedantists, according to whom *moksha*, liberation, is impossible without *sannyása*. Neither is the *Sútrakárin* an extremist. He only contends that *sannyása* is an *áśrama*, a condition of life, as much recognised in the scriptures as *gárhasthya*, the life of the householder. He knows, and any close student of the Upanishads may see, that almost all the most eminent of the sages mentioned in them were life-long house-holders, and several of them kings. However, the *Sútrakáras* predilection for *sannyása* is not without significance. We have already seen that his idea of Brahman as really transcendent and only apparently immanent makes his God practically an inactive Being. *Moksha* being *Brahmabháva*, partaking of the nature of God, it must be a state of pure knowledge without activity. There are Upanishadic rishis who hold this view, and there are also those who are opposed to it. We shall see this more clearly in our summary of the next chapter of the *Sútras*. Our view of the nature of the Absolute has already been briefly set forth and will be more completely expounded as we proceed. In ultimate analysis knowledge and action are found to be inseparable. The Absolute is not only an all-knowing but also an ever-active Being imparting his perfection more and more to imperfect beings dependent on him. His perfection consists not in mere knowledge, but in the fullness of knowledge, love and activity. For man to

partake of his nature is not to gain a static condition of wisdom but to share in his incessant activity in perfecting his creation. God as God is indeed perfect there is nothing which he does not possess, which he has to gain — *niravayam arisptaryam* nevertheless he says *Iata eta cha Larmam*—yet I am working (*Gita* iii 22). Even for him there is an obligation to work. We shall find a confirmation of these views in some of the eminent rishis of the Upanishads.

CHAPTER IV

Pada 1

This pāda treats of the attainment of liberation even while still living in the body, through the worship of God. The form of *sādhana* chiefly recommended is the one which Yājñavalkya teaches his wife Maitreyī in the 'Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa' of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* Upanishad. It consists of *darsana*, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nīdīdhyāsaṇa*. Of these *darsana*, seeing or realising God, Śāṅkara explains, is the end, and the other three are the means to the attainment of the end. *Śravaṇa*, hearing, is taking instruction from competent teachers and good books on the nature of God. *Manana*, thinking, is trying to grasp the meaning and be convinced of the truth of such instruction by reasoning, '*taṭkātāh*'. *Nīdīdhyāsaṇa* is deep and prolonged meditation ending in *darsana*. This *sādhana*, our author says, is to be practised again and again, for it is only by such constant practice that it comes to fruition. But what is the nature of the *darsana* which is the end of the process? In seeing God do we see anything else but what we call our own self? Our author answers this question in the negative. God-vision, according to him, is really self-vision. In seeing God we see our own true Self as devoid of all limiting adjuncts. This is said in numerous Upanishadic texts. But has not our author, in several previous occasions, told us that in the act of worship the subject and object of worship are

distinguished as the finite and the Infinite? He has, but here he does not speak of the distinction, though it is undeniable. As we have shown in our comments on pada 2 chapter III, in all acts of knowledge direct or indirect, gross or subtle, this distinction is a necessary condition. In seeing God the aspirant indeed sees the Infinite as his true Self but he cannot do so without realising his own finitude. He sees the Infinite in the finite, that is as the supporter of the finite, and the finite in the Infinite that is as dependant on the Infinite. To deny this relation, in which both unity and difference are implied, is to make God vision meaningless. Self knowledge as divine,—God's knowledge of himself and of man—is eternal and does not imply any process. But man's knowledge of himself and of God passes through a long process of *sādhana* in coming to fruition, and even when it comes to fruition, it is distinguishable from the divine knowledge. A world of mischief has been caused and is still being caused by ignorantly denying or wilfully ignoring this distinction,—a distinction which must be emphasised in the interest of both philosophy and practical religion. However we shall return to the subject in dealing with the subject of *Moksha*, liberation. From *ahangraha upāsana*, the worship of God as our Self which we have just briefly discussed, our author comes to *pratīka upāsana*, the worship of God with the help of such symbols as the sun, lightning, the sensorium &c. Such worship is prescribed in many a passage of the Upanishads. In the age when they were composed images of gods and goddesses,

now so largely used in popular worship, seem not to have come into vogue. In his 4th sūtra our author forbids the worship of symbols as the Self, for the worshipper does not really think of symbols as one with the Self, knowing them to be finite objects while the Self is infinite. Where the finite is sharply distinguished, that is conceived as separate, from the Infinite, so-called symbolic worship, either in the ancient Vedic or modern popular form, cannot be called divine worship. But what if and when the finite has been seen in its true relation to the Infinite? The Sūtrakāra draws a fine distinction even in such a case, a distinction which he does not make quite clear. According to him the symbols are to be meditated upon as God, but God is not to be meditated upon as the symbols. Perhaps he means, as he suggests in his 5th sūtra, that in the former case the finite is taken up into a reality higher than it, whereas in the latter the infinitude of the Infinite is practically forgotten. This forgetting comes out most clearly when worship takes the form of offering food, drink and other creature comforts to the object of worship.

We pass over, with only a bare mention, the aphorisms in which our author says that worship should be gone through in a sitting posture, that it is irrespective of any particular time, place or direction, and that the practice should continue till the time of death. We come to the far more important question, discussed in sūtras 13-15, whether virtue and vice, good and evil, do or do not stick to man when he has been blessed with the knowledge of God. The Sūtrakāra's view is that

the truly wiseman is freed from both virtue and vice and their fruits except in the case of *prārabdha karma*, i. e. actions whose fruits, for instance the body, the fruit of pre natal *karma*, have commenced and cannot cease except by *bhoga* experience. He supports his view by quotations from the scriptures but does not reason it out. But we can guess his reason from his metaphysical views. From the standpoint of unqualified Monism, the doctrine of a solitary Absolute unrelated to finite beings, the distinction of virtue and vice, good and evil, is indeed groundless. It is due to *avidyā* nescience, which is an illusory and vanishing entity, a mere appearance without reality. Ethical relations imply persons distinct from though related to one another. We have seen that even the relation of subject and object in knowledge imply distinction of persons. Now, judged by this standard, our author's wiseman who is *jñāna mukta* liberated though still in the body, and waits for complete release at its dissolution, is not really 'wise' inasmuch as he still believes in the theoretic distinction of body and soul, whereas there is no such distinction, God being all in all, and in the ethical distinction of bondage and liberation, the former of which is an evil the supreme evil, and the latter the supreme good, not to speak of the numberless evils and goods he has wrestled with before reaching the condition he has gained. The doctrine of an abstract undifferentiated Unity cannot be held without being guilty at every step of such inconsistencies. A life of true wisdom, purity and spirituality also cannot be lived with the idea, haunting one at

every step of life, that distinctions are all apparent, none real.

However, in the concluding aphorisms of the páda, 16-19, our author again takes up the subject, already discussed in III 4, of the relation of *harṇa*, chiefly ritual, to *jñāna*. We need not recur to it. Whether the daily *agnihotra*, the performance of which by the *jñānin* is here insisted upon as purificatory,—though its end, the propitiation of the gods, has ceased for him and even the objects of these rites as distinct personalities have disappeared from his mental vision,—still continues to purify the heart and help the fruition of wisdom, the reader will judge for himself.

Pada 2

This section speaks of the passing of the embodied self at death, out of the body and of its starting on the Devayāna Patha already mentioned in III 1. The very mooted of the subject raises the question, Is the self whether it be gross or subtle an extended object, something enclosed in the body like a bird in a cage that it should pass out of it and travel from one region to another? Is not such a conception opposed to the Vedantic idea of the self, at any rate the truly philosophical idea of it as something which is the very presupposition of time, space, motion and individuality, and therefore transcending the limitations implied in these? The self indeed has, as we have seen in III 2 a finite moment or aspect, but the finite and the infinite are not divisible or separable they are co-existent and inseparable. What then can be the meaning of the *jīva* or finite self passing out of the body and following a route to meet the Infinite? To answer these questions we must have a clear idea of the Vedantic theory specially the Sūtrakā's theory of the individual self, its relation to the body and the nature of the body it assumes at birth and gives up, either at once or gradually, after death. As we have already seen in III. 2, our author though avowedly a Monist, is only dogmatically so, believing on the authority of the scriptures that the Supreme Self is all in-all, but unable, by any process of reasoning, to reconcile the common sense Dualism of matter and spirit with his dogmatic Non dualism.

This becomes more clear than elsewhere in these concluding sections of his book. His interpretation of the Upanishadic narration of creation, for instance that given in *Chh* vi, is that the things originally created, *tejas*, *ap* and *anna*, and their various combinations in the shape of things earthly and heavenly,—do not represent the Creator's real nature, and that the individual self which arose from God's entrance into these things also misrepresents his true character. The fact is, according to this theory, that creation,—the material world and the individuated self, is not real. Our bondage consists in thinking it to be real and our liberation in knowing it to be unreal. As we have already seen in the last section, liberation, for the truly wise-man, is delayed only so long as his body, the result of actions done under the influence of *avidyá*, is not dissolved. This point is taken up again, in some detail, in the present section. The body is threefold, gross, subtle and causal. All these three kinds of body must perish before liberation can be secured. The gross (*sthúla*) body need not be defined, being known to all. The subtle (*linga* or *súksma*) body consists of sixteen elements, the five vital airs, the five organs of knowledge conceived as powers, the five organs of action similarly conceived, and *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahankāra* regarded as a single principle. The causal (*kāraṇa*) body is the *avidyá* which has caused our embodiment and all its consequences. All these three bodies perish in the case of the fully awakened man, so that he is released as soon as he dies. He obtains what is called '*sadyo mukti*', immediate liberation. In this condition he becomes in-

divisible from God. The *Sūtrākāra* calls this condition *avibhīna* (16th sūtra). But from the texts speaking of it it seems to be indistinguishability. When the powers of knowing and acting—principles which distinguish finite selves from one another and from the Infinite—perish how can any distinction remain? And in the absence of any distinction how can it be said that the individual exists in a liberated condition? Would it not be more appropriate to say that with the destruction of its distinguishing characteristics it is itself destroyed? However, from *sadyo muktā* we now come to *brahma muktā* liberation by successive grades. This kind of liberation is obtained by those who though they have acquired some knowledge of God have not been able to forsake their negligence (sūtra 7). The first grade of their progress is the *merging* of the functions of their organs of knowledge and action in the sensorium of the sensorium in the vital principle of the vital principle in the individual self and the individual self in *īśa* and other original elements constituting its individuality and these elements themselves in the Highest Self. This merging is not the final absorption which can take place only in the state of liberation. As we have shown in III 2, the idea of this merging is taken from the state of dreamless sleep. However in this merged state, not with a momentary lighting of the heart which shows its way out the individual self helped by the Universal Self abiding in its heart comes out of the body through the 10th artery and joins the solar rays which lead to the divine regions (sūtras 17 and 18). These rays are in constant connection with the artery,

a connection which is not severed either at night or during the southern solstice. In works on *yoga* like the *Bhagavadgītā* it is said that a man dying at night or during the *lakṣhṇāyana* cannot reach the divine regions. Our author says that this restriction may apply to those who follow the *Smṛiti*, but it has no application to followers of the *Sruti*.

We hope that the summary we have given will make the reading of the section easy. We have not followed the order of the *adhikāraṇas*, as it does not seem quite logical to us, though we have sometimes referred to some of the *sūtras*. As to *sadyo mukti*, so summarily dealt with by our author, we shall return to it in dealing with the next two sections. His radical mistake lies in his idea of the subtle body as composed of material elements subject to change and destruction, or pseudo-material illusory entities vanishing on the dawning of true knowledge. The powers of knowing and acting which belong to spirit and are inseparable from it have nothing unconscious or evanescent in them and cannot be destroyed with the dissolution of the body or vanish with the advent of knowledge. And, after all, what are our bodies and the elements they are composed of but different modes of the divine existence. As an integral part of God, what we call the material world partakes of the divine eternity and though ever changing its form, can never perish.

Padm 3

As we have already said in III.1 when speaking of the Pitṛyāna Patha and the lunar regions which it leads to, the two paths and the two goals are really metaphorical descriptions of two ways of life and two spiritual conditions, here and hereafter attained through them. As we have also said the Sātrakāra sees the metaphorical character of the description only partly. On the whole he takes both the paths as spatial routes and the goals reached as regions in space. He does not speak in detail of the different stages of the Devayāna Patha as described in the Upaśhada. After speaking of only a few,—light, the year Vāyu, lightning and Varuna,—he proceeds to speak of what he considers the real nature of these stages. For a full description the reader must consult *Chh.* v 10 1 3, *Bṛ.* vi 2 15, and *Kau.* 1 3. As to the real nature of these stages our author says that they are not either landmarks or places of enjoyment, but super human beings who conduct the selves to their destination. As already said, the selves remain unconscious throughout the route and the objects and regions named as stages are also unconscious. How could then the selves move on unless they were conducted by the intelligent divinities presiding over the latter? And the first two scriptural passages referred to actually mention such a super-human guide in the regions of lightning. It may therefore be concluded that there are guides at all the other stages also.

However, we have now proceeded up to the 6th aphorism. In 7-14 our author discusses a more important question. It is whether the Brahmaloka reached by the way of the gods is the world of the Higher Causal Brahman or that of the Lower Effect Brahman. The distinction must by this time be quite familiar to the reader. It is the same as that of the unqualified and the qualified Brahman. In the language of western philosophy it is that of God conceived as transcendent and as immanent. To us, with whom transcendence and immanence are related and inseparable aspects of the same Being, the distinction exists indeed, but is of no practical importance. To those, however, for whom the distinction is practically a division, making Para-Brahman an infinite and eternal Being, and Apara-Brahman, Brahmá or Hīranyagaṇbha, a created, finite, though indefinitely great being, appearing at the beginning of a cycle and disappearing at its end, the question raised is of spiritual importance. If the goal reached is the world of the Lower Brahman, that is union with him, then a higher world or spiritual stage has yet to be reached. The liberation secured is only relative and not absolute. If the Higher Brahman has been reached, the liberation is absolute and no higher stage is possible.

In dealing with this question the Sūtrakāra adopts a method very different from what he has hitherto been following. His usual method is to state a *pūrvapakṣa*, the objector's view, and then meet the objection by his own view, the *siddhānta-pakṣa*. In the present case he states Bādarī's view as the *pūrvapakṣa*, and meets

it by an *uttarapakṣa*, the view of Jaimini without identifying himself with the latter. It may be that he accepts Jaimini's view, but he does not expressly tell us so. Bādarī's view is that it is the Lower Brahman who is reached by the *Dorayāna* Patha, whereas Jaimini thinks it is the Highest Brahman who is thus reached. Bādarī argues that as the Highest Brahman is all pervasive and the Inner Self of all beings there is no meaning in reaching him by a route. This is possible only in the case of the Lower Brahman who is confined to a particular locality. The misconception on which this argument is based is obvious. The Higher Brahman though all pervasive and the Inner Self of all has yet to be known and realised by a long course of *sādhana*. On the other hand, the Lower Brahman or the Cosmic Self, the *Viśvātman* or *Viśvarūpin*, is also all pervasive. He seems confined to a particular locality only in the popular imagination which takes him as an ordinary *deva* occupying a more or less small body. However Bādarī thinks that when the time comes for the Effect Brahman to merge in the Causal, the selves united to the former also merge in the latter. Scriptural authority is appealed to for this doctrine but no text is quoted in the *bhāṣya* to this effect. *Prasna* v 5 however seems to point to it. A *smṛiti* passage clearly stating Bādarī's view is given, but we have not been able to trace its source. However, coming to Jaimini, we find him arguing thus — (1) 'Brahman primarily means Para Brahman and only secondarily Apara Brahman. There is no reason why the secondary meaning should be accepted here. (2) The scriptural passage (*Pras vi*

Pada 4

The self has now reached the Brahmalo^{ka},—the world of Brahman, that is union with him. As we have seen it is associated in the mind of the Sūtrakāra with a particular region in space. All the same he must enumerate the characteristics of the liberated self, and this he now proceeds to do. We are glad to see that in this task he has taken the lead of just the class of sishis with whom we agree most,—Prajāpati, Indra and Chitra. But as we shall see in the course of his exposition he comes into an inevitable collision with those others under whose influence he has mostly been up to this point and has said much that we have not been able to accept. However, to begin with, he says on the authority of a passage in the *Chhandogya* that in the state in question the self, possessed of the highest light, manifests itself in its own form that is in its form as a pure self without any extrinsic quality derived from its real or fancied association with a not-self. The text occurs in a most important portion of the *Chhandogya*, in the course of Prajāpati's colloquy with Indra. As we have shown in our *Pancharshi*, Prajāpati's exposition of the state of liberation seems to be a refutation of Yājñavalkya's, given in the latter's conversation with Maitreyi and Junaka. At any rate the two positions are irreconcilably opposed, and the Sūtrakāra, though he does not say so seems to feel it. However, to proceed with our author's description of the individual Brahmanhāva, he reminds us of the second sūtra, which

says that the state described is unquestionably the liberated state, for in the colloquy referred to Prajapati promises to speak of a condition of the self in which it is freed from the imperfections pertaining to the states of *jágrat*, *svapna* and *sushupti* and is untouched by worldly pleasure and pain. As the description proceeds, the self is spoken of as sinless and one with the Highest Person. 'The highest light', we are again reminded in sūtra 3, is the self, and not any physical light. And on the authority of well-known texts it is said in sūtra 4 that the liberated self is inseparable from Brahman. We shall see as we proceed that this inseparability is not indistinguishability. In the 5th sūtra Jaimini says on the authority of *Chh* viii 7 that the liberated self is endowed with Bráhmīc, that is God-like, qualities. But the scriptures include 'true desires' &c, in such qualities. Āchārya Audulomi, in sūtra 6, thinks that this latter class of qualities, as they depend on "limiting adjuncts", cannot inhere in a pure intelligence like the liberated self. In the next sūtra Bādarāyana thinks these other qualities are not incompatible with pure intelligence. But do not desires and their fulfilment imply bodily organs? The answer in sūtra 8 on the authority of *Chh* viii 2 1. is that the liberated self's desires are fulfilled by its mere will. The reading of the passage referred to will show how much of what is regarded as 'worldly' is deemed compatible by the scriptures with the liberated state. However, having such a powerful will, the liberated self must be considered, as is done by sūtra 9, as having no over-lord,—no over-lord, it would seem, among other individual selves. The over-lordship

of God is everywhere recognised Bādarī says on scriptural authority in sūtra 10 that the liberated self has no body and sense-organs. Jaimini in sūtra 11 on the same authority affirms their existence Bādarīyana reconciles the two positions by affirming in sūtra 12 that assuming or not assuming a body depends on the liberated self's own option Sūtras 13 and 14 liken perceptions in the disembodied and embodied states to dreams and the waking state respectively Sūtra 15 compares the liberated self's power of entering several bodies described in *Chh. vii 20 2*, to a flame's self multiplication.

But now comes an abrupt halt. Our author seems to feel that what he has been saying about the liberated state in the aphorisms so far summarised conflicts with what he has said on *sadyo mukti* in the 2nd pāda of the present chapter. The state he has there described is one of undifferentiated unity and absolute inactivity. But the liberation he now speaks of is one which, in spite of the individual's affirmed non-division from God, admits of several differences and also a good deal of activity on the part of the released self. Before proceeding further therefore he disposes of this apparent conflict by practically denying that the former state—that of undifferentiated unity with God and of inactivity,—is a state of liberation. He calls it here, in sūtra 16 *śrāpyaya*, dreamless sleep or *sampatti*, union with God. But union with God, as also dreamless sleep, which according to several scriptural texts symbolises that union, is nothing but liberation. All the texts referred to here and elsewhere as descriptions of *sampatti* are

descriptions of liberation as well according to the rishis who have uttered them. The Sūtrakāra also has all along taken them as such before arriving at this point. But now he is in a real difficulty. The two ideas of liberation held by the two classes of rishis are, it is clear, mutually conflicting. But how can our author, with his idea of the Vedic sages as infallible authorities, say or even think so? They are not mere *āchāryas* like Bādari and Jaimini that he would pit them against one another. He therefore tries to get out of the difficulty by calling the former description of liberation one of *sampatti* and the latter that of *mukti*. But really they are both descriptions of liberation, the one given by Yājñavalkya, the teacher of undifferentenced unity and the other by Prajāpati, who teaches unity-in-difference. The later systems of unqualified and qualified Non-dualism rose out of emphasising these two views by their respective advocates.

However, with this rather unpleasant interruption, our author continues his characterisation of the state of liberation. In sūtra 17 he says that inspite of the many lordly powers acquired by the liberated self, such as that of making itself indefinitely large or small, it never acquires that of creating the world, to which that of preserving and destroying it may be added. Creation &c, are mentioned in the scriptures only in sections speaking of the Supreme Lord and not those dealing with the finite self. And the latter is not proximate to, but very far removed from, creation, having appeared long after it. Hence the power of creation can never belong to it. But does not scripture

sometimes speak plainly, e g in *Tait* i 0, of the individuals attaining *svādyānam*, lordship? Yes, says the author in sūtra 18, but such lordship primarily belongs to the Supreme Lord abiding in the solar regions for discharging certain specified functions and it is from him that finite selves derive such powers. However, the Lord should not be conceived as only qualified as he really is in the solar regions. He has got, says our author in sūtra 19 also an unqualified transcendent form as is clear from *Rik* x. 90 8 *Chh.* iii. 12 0 and several other similar texts. Sūtra 20 refers to other scriptural texts and to the *Gitā* in support of this position. If however the Universals and the Individual are so dissimilar where lies their *sāmā*, sameness, which is so often spoken of in the sūtras? Their sameness lies only, says our author in sūtra 21 in enjoyment. The individual inherits all the bliss and honour which belong to God. Texts from the *Kaushītaki* and the *Bṛihadāranyaka* are quoted in support of this proposition. Sūtra 22, the last aphorism of the chapter and of the whole body of *Brahmasūtras*, affirms on the authority of *Chh.* viii. 15 1 the permanent abiding of the individual self in Brahmaloka. It does not return to the world, that is, as we understand, to worldly life, but lives in unending union with God. Nothing is said of its attaining any 'higher destiny' in the form of mergence in an undifferentiated Unity of which the reader has heard not a little in this exposition of the *Sūtras* and of which he bears much more in works on Advaita Vedānta.

We are afraid however, that notwithstanding much

that is comforting and re-assuring which the aspirant after the divine life has heard in this chapter and in this treatise as a whole, the reading of it will leave him cold. This is due mainly to the aphoristic form of the work, but partly also, it would seem, to the fact that what may be called emotional elements in the Upanishads have not been brought into prominence by our author. Such elements are indeed rare in them, but such as they are, our *Bhakti Śāstras* have utilised them to the utmost. Both the classes of rishis mentioned by us have spoken of love, the love of the Infinite Self for the finite. Yājñavalkya, in spite of his unqualified Non-dualism, has said some of the finest things ever spoken on love. The other school too has not been silent on the subject. But it would be going out of the way on our part to speak of it at any length. However, it may not be inappropriate to close this section on Liberation by transcribing below Rājārshi Chitra's description of the Brahmaloṇa and Brahma-dhāma in the first chapter of the *Kaushītaki* as expounded by us in our pamphlet on *Panchārshi* already mentioned more than once in the course of these comments. We begin from the point where Chitra speaks of the finite self's starting on the Devayāna Patha —

“Chitra begins by saying that having reached the Devayāna path, which evidently means spiritual religion as contrasted with the merely ceremonial or traditional (the Pitriyāna), the soul reaches successively the regions of Agni, Vāyu, Aditya, Varuna, Indra, Prajāpati and Brahman. The first six seem to mean Heno-theistic

forms of religion,—the identification of the Supreme Being with one or another of the Vedic gods until a pure idea of God freed from anthropomorphism is reached is the seventh stage. However, even when the divine regions are reached that is a pure form of Theism is embraced, there is yet a long way to traverse before one reaches the divine city. At the very beginning of this journey Brahman calls five hundred of his *oparases* divine nymphs commands them to meet the pilgrim soul with various divine equipments and to bring him to the divine city with honours due to himself (*mama yatasā*). These nymphs are of two classes, *amṭāh* and *ambāyabāh*, the former being divine texts like *Satyam jñanam anantam* which lead us to God and the latter the mental powers which enable us to conceive and apprehend the Divine Reality. The nymphs carry powder, clothes, fruits, anointments and garlands for the pilgrim. The spiritual nature of these things is evident from the statement that when the messengers meet the pilgrim soul they adorn him with divine ornaments,—*Tom Brahmāṅkareṇḍāṅkurant*. Thus equipped for his arduous journey, the worshipper of God (*Brahmajña*) reaches a lake named *Aro Hradah*,—the lake of *Ara* or evil passions. These must be abandoned before any progress along the route is possible. Already sufficiently strengthened for the bold feat, the worshipper crosses the lake with his will power—*'Manasā ntyeti*. Those lacking the necessary equipment sink into the lake. The next stage is represented by *Icchāṭhā muhurtāh*—the harmful moments,—the injurious way of spending life in fruitless pursuits.

which is seen even in many an otherwise good man. Before our pilgrim, thus gifted with self-control and a grim determination, such moments, such wasteful modes of life,—‘*apadhravanti*’, fly away. The third stage of the journey is a river name *Vyāśā*, free from senility, which, when crossed, gives one perpetual youth, entire freedom from indolence and despondency. ‘*Tām manasā atyeti*’,—the pilgrim crosses the river by dint of his will-power. He is then said to be freed from both his merits and demerits,—merits which make egotistic men proud of their achievements, and demerits which weigh them down with the thought of unrelieved and unmixed evils. The pilgrim’s dear ones are said to take possession of the former and his enemies the latter. The fourth and final land-mark of the route is ‘*ulyo brikshah*’, a tree named the ‘earthly’. Even when in a comparatively advanced stage of the spiritual life, one feels he is not fully spiritual. An idea that the world is earthly, material, that there are things in it which have no spiritual end or purpose, still haunts him. We cannot reach the divine city until this practical materialism is entirely got rid of and the world is seen to be spiritual, divine, through and through. As soon as the pilgrim-soul attains to this view of the world, ‘*I am Brahmagandah pransati*’,—the odour of God enters into him. He does not yet directly see God and his abode, but he feels that they are very near. Spiritual endeavours lose the weariness with which the unspiritual go through them. They become attractive and lead the aspirant with the promise of a rich and yet unseen enjoyment. The divine city is now very

near the next march takes him directly before it. "[The Goal] The divine city is called the *sálayya samsthánam* 'Samsthánam means a city. The commentator explains *sálayya*' thus,—having reservoirs of water with banks as high as howstrings equal to *sála* trees, that is, as we understand, very deep tanks such as may not be dried up even in the hottest seasons. A true city of God must indeed have such reservoirs with an inexhaustible supply of drink for thirsty souls. However, as the worshipper enters the holy city *Tam Brahmarasah pravisati*,—the flavour of Brahman enters into him. He directly tastes the presence and loveliness of God. His foretaste of the sweets of true worship is turned into direct experience. Henceforth everything pertaining to God is delightful to him. Grace takes the place of Law. But there are degrees in directness also. The divine city is entered but not yet the divine abode, the holy of holies. Before that all forms of mediation must be got rid of. Even in what seem very deep and sweet devotions, the thought of human teachers and leaders,—those who have helped men to draw near to God,—is mixed up with the experience of the divine sweetness,—showing that the truest directness is not yet reached, and the danger of lapsing into man worship or *deva* worship is not yet fully escaped. This fact the Upanishadic sage expresses by saying that at the gate of *Aparájitam Áyatanam*, the impregnable abode of God there stand Indra and Prajapati, the highest of *devas*, as *dvargopau*, gate-keepers. On the approach of the true worshipper, *Tau asmád apadravatah*,—they withdraw from him

The implication is that less true worshippers, those who mix up their worship of the Infinite with that of 'incarnations', 'great men' and 'centres',—are held back. However, as soon as the pilgrim-soul enters the Aparájitam Áyatatanam, '*Tam Brahmatejah pravisati*' Tejah is both light and heat, both wisdom and power. Henceforth there is no more groping in darkness, but more and more light day after day, and no more compromise with untruth and wilful ignorance. Henceforth also there is no parley with and no yielding to weakness and impious indolence and sluggishness. The true worshipper of God is known above all by the power which his words and actions express and radiate. However, our pilgrim is now in the *sabhá sthánam*, council chamber, of God, called *Vibhu* (all-pervading). As the immediate effect of this entrance,—'*Tam Brahmayasah pravisati*,—the glory of God enters into him. His thoughts, purposes and actions being now wholly attuned to God's, God himself is glorified in all that he says and does. He takes praise and blame indifferently, for he knows he is but the servant of God and it is God who acts through him. There are indeed egotistic pietists who sometimes ascribe their selfish actions to God. But the distinction between such men and the truly selfless servants of God is so transparent that it does not require much insight to see it. However, the *rishi* now describes Brahman's throne named *Vichakshaná*, which is *Prágná*, Reason, and his 'coach of infinite brightness,' *Amitaúgasam Paryankam*, which is *Prána*, Life. The description is indeed allegorical, but couched in scriptural language. It need not detain us

We rather hurry to the dialogue which follows that between the finite and the Infinite Spirit. The wisdom of the former is tested by the latter with many a question the details of which need not detain us. The most important part of it is the affirmation made by the finite of its relation of unity in difference with the Infinite. In reply to the question *Kosi?*—Who art thou,—the worshipper says, *Tram átmási, yastram asi so hamasmi*—Thou art the Self what thou art, that I am. There is unity of essence or substance and yet a difference of personality indicated by the distinction of thou and I. There is nothing in what follows,—and there is little that follows—which may imply that this distinction is obliterated in any higher stage of progress. On the contrary the divine city is said to be watered by rivers called *ambayah* which the commentator explains as '*upásanárupinyah*' of the form of worship, leading to insight into the divine nature. A city where acts of devotion form the necessary medium of communication cannot represent the monist's heaven of undifferentiated unity. And we have seen that the *devas* are there not as objects of worship, but as worshippers. And we are introduced into a world of real and not illusory creation for we are told how Brahman's consort ('*prīya*') that is his creative power, and her reflection ('*pratirupa cha chākshushī*') the individual self, in whose knowledge the world is reproduced, 'weave the creatures like flowers ('*pushpānyātrayatau vai jagāni*')'. The divine promise to the worshipper is 'This world of mine, consisting of water (the chief element as symbolising all elements) is thine. Can the father keep any

thing from his son ? So the *ṛish* ends with the words, 'He who knows all this obtains whatever glory and power belong to God' And what are these glory and power ? Evidently they are wisdom, love, holiness, peace, joy, beauty and sweetness, all of which form the very essence of the divine nature and are beyond time and destruction, stored eternally in God and ever ready to be communicated to his children "

ब्रह्मसूत्रे

समन्वय नाम प्रथमाध्याये

प्रथम पादः,—स्रष्टृ मध्यबोधक-श्रुतिवाक्याणां समन्वय

१। अथातो मल्लनिशासा ।

[illegible]

1 Then therefore (should begin or should be made) inquiry into Brahman

Athia means then or after that is, after adopting the

fourfold system of spiritual culture 'Atah' means as it is from knowing Brahman that man's highest object is fulfilled, therefore 'Brahmajñāsā, means inquiry into or wishing to know Brahman 'The fourfold system of spiritual culture' comprises (1) the discrimination of things eternal and temporal, (2) indifference to enjoying the fruits of actions here or hereafter, (3) the spiritual acquisitions 'sama' &c, and (4) desire for liberation 'Sama' is drawing away the mind from earthly things 'Dama' is restraining the external senses 'Uparati' is giving up, for the sake of the higher knowledge, the prescribed duties called *niṭya* (habitual) and others 'Titikshā' is enduring the correlatives of heat, cold &c 'Samādhi' is the steadiness of the mind arising from giving up sleepiness, laziness and inattention 'Sraddhā' is trustful respect for all higher things

२ । जन्माद्यस्य यतः ।

२ । 'अस्य' जगत 'जन्मादि' जन्मस्थितिभङ्ग 'यत' यस्मात् सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्ते कारणात् भवति, तत् ब्रह्म इति वाक्यशेष । श्रुतिप्रमाणम्,—“यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति, यत् प्रथममसितविशन्ति, तद् विजिज्ञासस्व, तद् ब्रह्म” (तैत्तिरीयोपनिषदि ३।१) इत्यादि ।

2 From which the origin &c, (that is, origin, subsistence and dissolution) of this world proceed, [that is Brahman] Scriptural proof, “From which these creatures are born, through which they, being born, live, and into which they return and enter, seek to know that well. That is Brahman” (Taittirīya Upanishad, III 1) and similar other passages.

३ । आत्मयोगित्वात् ।

३ । आत्मस्य स्वयंदादि 'योगि' कारणं ब्रह्म । ब्रह्मस्य आत्मयोगित्वान् आत्मकारणत्वात् तस्य सर्वज्ञत्व सर्वशक्तित्व च सिद्धम् इति शेषः । (३१२।१० & १।३।१) अथवा आत्म योगि प्रमादम् अथ ब्रह्मस्य स्वस्वादिभिः आत्मा एव प्रमादान् जगति स्वकारिकात् एव अविद्यमान इति शेषः । ब्रह्मस्य आत्मयोगित्वान् आत्मप्रतिपाद्यत्वात् अथ स्वस्वकारि सिद्धम् इति शेषः ।

3 *Brahman being the source of scripture (Bṛihad ranyaka II 4 10) [his omniscience and omnipotence are established.] An alternative explanation is this Scripture is the source of the knowledge of Brahman's nature. The purport is that it is from scriptural proof that Brahman the Cause of the origin &c. of the world is known As Brahman is taught by scripture his omniscience &c. are established*

४ । तदुपपन्नत्वात् ।

४ । 'तु' पूर्वपदसि शब्दे 'तत्' ब्रह्म आत्मप्रमादम् एव । 'अथ ब्रह्मस्य आत्मप्रमादत्वम् ? इति पूर्वपद । तदुपपन्नम्—समन्वयात् । समन्वयात् सम्यक्त्वत्वात् ईदृशवाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि एव तात्पर्यावधानात् । तानि एतत् सर्वस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनुपपत्तिः । न त्वाम् अपागच्छन्त्या युक्ता ।

4 *But that (i e that Brahman is established by the scriptures) is true on account of (the r) correct interpretation only when taken as speaking of him*

Tu but, is used to set aside the *pūrvapakṣa* (the objector's view) The objector's contention is not established by scripture *Tat* i e. Brahman is really

established by scripture 'How do you know that Brahman is established by scripture?' is the objector's question The answer is—'On account of correct interpretation,' that is, because Brahman is the final purport or object of the Vedānta texts They are rightly interpreted only when they are taken as establishing this truth It is not possible to imagine another interpretation

५ । ईक्षतेनाशब्दम् ।

५ । 'अशब्दम्' शब्दाप्रतिपाद्य, श्रुतिभिः अकथित साध्यपरिकल्पितम् अचेतन प्रधानं न जगतः कारणम् । कथम् ?—'ईक्षते', वेदान्तेषु जगत्कारणस्य ईक्षितत्वस्य ब्राह्मण्यस्य कथनात् । तथाहि छान्दोग्योपनिषदि "तदैक्षत बहु स्या प्रजाययेति" (६।२) ।

5 *On account of seeing (being predicated of the cause of the world) that which is not spoken of in the Word (that is, Prakṛti, Nature, spoken of by the Sāṅkhyas) is not (the real cause)*

'Asabdam,' that which is not established by the Word, that is, scripture, the unconscious *Pradhāna* imagined by the Sāṅkhya Philosophy is not the cause of the world Why not? 'On account of seeing,' because the Vedāntas speak of the Cause of the world as seeing or knowing For example, in *Chhandogya*, vi 2, "It thought, 'May I be many, may I grow forth'"

६ । गौणशब्देनात्मशब्दात् ।

६ । 'चेत्' यदि उच्यते सच्छब्दवाच्ये प्रधाने 'ईक्षित'-शब्द 'गौण' औपचारिक इति, तत् 'न' न उपपद्यते । कथात् ?—'आत्मशब्दात्' जगत् कारणे 'आत्म'शब्द-

[illegible]

6 If I note no, on account of the word self If it is said that to the *Pradhāna* indicated by the term *Sat*. Being the term *Ikshitrī* thinker is *gauna* remotely or metaphorically applied then this contention is not proved Why?—*Ātmatatvāt* because the word self is applied by scripture to the Cause of the world For instance in *Chhāndogya* vi 2 'The Divinity thought Let me now enter these three divinities as the living self and evolve names and forms. By the word self it is established that the Cause of the world is a thinker in a direct and not a metaphorical sense

୭ । ତଦ୍ବିଷୟ ମିଷୋପଦେଶାତ ।

७। न भवान्मृषां पण्डितम् आश्रयन्तवन्तं भवितुम् चाहति । कुत ?—
तद्विषयं आश्रयितव्यं भोषीपण्डितान् यतः शास्त्रं भोषन् उपदिशति । यदा

५. आचार्य ने ही कहा था

दीकी५मं६ पुनः प्रपश्येत् ।

पञ्च वर्ष भवतस्मिन् विद्या

छात्रा द्वि सुपति नमपाहे. । (नेतावर्ग १/१५)

न अक्षितगणिता भीषयाभी भवितुम् पश्यति ।

7 As liberation is promised to those devoted to it
The unconscious *Pradhāna* cannot be meant by the word

'self' Why not? *Mokshopadeshāt*, as liberation is promised in the scriptures, *tanmislithasya*, to him who is devoted to him For instance, "When one practising *yoga* truly sees Brahman by seeing his self, as one sees objects by a lamp, when he knows the unchangeable God unsullied by any object, he is freed from all bonds". (*Svetāsvatara* II 15)

८। हेयत्वावचनाच्च ।

८। यदि प्रधान सच्छब्दवाच्यम् उपदिष्टं स्यात्, तदा श्रुति आत्मन 'हेयत्वं' लान्यतां ब्रूयात्, न च एवम् अभीचत्। अस्मात् हेतुत्वात् च,—'हेयत्वस्य' 'अवचनात्' अवधानात् च । प्रधान सच्छब्दवाच्यम् ।

8 And as the scriptures do not say that the self should be set aside

If the *Pradhāna* were taught by scripture as 'Being', then scripture would speak of the self as something to be set aside,—would say, "It is not the real self" But it does not say so For this additional reason also,—'*Heyatva abachanāt*', because the necessity of its being set aside is not said,—it is not the *Pradhāna* that is spoken of as 'Being'

९। स्वाप्ययात् ।

९। कुतश्च न प्रधान सच्छब्दवाच्यम् ?—'स्वाप्ययात्', 'स्वप्निन्' 'मप्यय' लय तत्त्वात्। सपुत्रावभ्यासम् उपाविहृत-विगिष्यामावात् पुरुष स्वात्मनि प्रलीन इव भवति, इत्युच्यते इत्यादिगद्यौ। न तु चैतन आत्मा अचेतन प्रधान स्वल्पत्वेन प्रतिपद्यते।

प्राप्तम् । ॥५॥ १ गतिमभ्यासम् — 'उद्दालकादीनां चित्तहेतुं दुःखमुपायं प्राप्य
मि कीदृशं विज्ज्ञासीति यावत् पुनश्च सति नमः सदा भवेत् तदा कदाचि भवति
भवतीति भवति तच्चादिन सति तदा चेतः सदा भवति । (दाम्नीये १।१११)

9 *As the individual soul merges in the Self* From what other ground is it to be asserted that the *Pradhāna* is not spoken of as Being ?—*Sādhyat*? On account of merging in the Self In the *Chhāndogya* and elsewhere, it is said that in dreamless sleep on account of the absence of differentiation due to limiting adjuncts, the individual soul merges, as it were in its own Self But the conscious soul cannot merge in the unconscious *Pradhāna* as to its true nature. Therefore it is not the *Pradhāna* but the Conscious, spoken of as Being which is the Cause of the world. The passage specially referred to in *Chhāndogya* vi 8. 1 — Uddālaka Āruni said to his son Svetaketu Learn from me my dear the truth about sleep. When a man is said to sleep, then my dear he is united with Being is gone to his Self Hence people say he sleeps because he goes to his Self

१० । गतिमभ्यासात् ।

१ । सदा एव हि सर्वेषु विद्वान् चित्तव्यापकमिति । यतः तेषां 'गति
मभ्यासात्' तात्पर्येण न सर्वेषु ब्रह्म एव ब्रह्मत्वं जायते ।

10 *As the scriptures uniformly point (to a conscious Cause)* To all the Vedantas there is a uniform teaching of a conscious cause of the world So because of this uniformity of teaching the omniscient Brahman alone is the Cause of the world

११ । श्रुतत्वाच्च ।

११ । सर्वज्ञम् ईश्वरं प्रकृत्य 'स कारणम्' (श्रुताश्वतरे ६।८) इत्यादि स्वतः 'श्रुतत्वात्' श्रुत्या कथितत्वात् सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म एव जगत् कारणं, न अपेक्षितं प्रधानम्, अन्यत् वा इति सिद्धम् ।

11 As it is directly stated in scripture, for instance in *Svetâsvatara* vi 9 Having spoken of the omniscient Lord, the text clearly says, "He is the Cause" Therefore it is established that the all-knowing Brahman is the Cause of the world, and not the unconscious Pradhâna or anything else

१२ । आनन्दमयोऽध्यासात् ।

१२ । तैत्तिरीयश्रुत्युक्तं 'आनन्दमय' परं एव आत्मा भवितुम् अर्हति । कुत, 'अध्यासात्' पुनः पुनः प्रयोगात् । परस्मिन् एव हि आत्मनि 'आनन्द'-शब्दः बहुकालं अभ्यस्यते । तथाहि तैत्तिरीये (२।५)—"तस्मात् वा एतस्मात् विज्ञानमयात् अन्योऽन्त आत्मानन्दमयः" इत्याद्याः ।

12 'Anandamaya' is the Brahman, as the term is applied again and again 'Ānandamaya', the Blissful, spoken of in the *Taittirīya Upanishad*, can only be the Supreme Self On what ground? 'Abhyāsāt', because of its repetition, because it is to the Supreme Self that the word 'bliss' is applied again and again The texts referred to are "Verily there is an Inner Self consisting of bliss different from this Self consisting of the understanding" and the following texts (*Taittirīya*, ii. 5 &c)

१३ । विष्वात्मनेति चेन्न प्राप्नुयात् ।

१३ । विष्वात्मनात् सपटमयस्य विष्वात्मनात् अममयादि मन्वत् विष्वात् विषय एव आनन्दमय इति न आनन्दमय मन्मा इति चेत् यदि उच्यते तत् न न उपपद्यते । प्राप्नुयात् प्राप्नुयि चेति सपट् प्रकीर्त्तम् । यदा अममय एव इति अममय उच्यते, एवम् आनन्दमय इति आनन्दमय उच्यते ।

13 *If it is said that Anandamaya cannot mean Brahman because mayat means a modification then the answer is No because it may mean abundance*

If it be objected that because the suffix *mayat* in *Anandamaya* means a modification therefore the term *Anandamaya* refers to something which is subject to modification like the term *Annamaya* and such other terms then the reply is, No the objection is not valid *prachuryat* because *mayat* is used also in the sense of abundance. As *annamaya jajnah* means a sacrifice in which there is an abundant provision for food so the Brahman which abounds in bliss is called *Anandamaya*

१४ । तदेतुष्यपदेगाच्च ।

१४ । इतश्च प्राप्नुयि सपट् इत्यात् इत्याच् आनन्दमयस्य अपदियति उपपद्यते इति । यदा, "एव विष्वात्मनेति (तैत्तिरीय १०) तस्यात् प्राप्नुयि सपट् अममयात् आनन्दमय एव एव आत्मा ।

14 *And because Brahman is spoken of as the source of bliss* On this ground also it may be said that *mayat* is used in the sense of abundance, because scripture speaks of Brahman as the source of bliss, as

for instance the *Taittirīya*, II 7 says, "For he alone causes bliss" Therefore, as 'mayat' may be used in the sense of abundance, 'Ānandamaya' is really the Supreme Self.

१५ । सान्त्ववर्णिकमेव च गीयते ।

१५ । इतश्च आनन्दमय पर एव आत्मा यस्मात् "सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म" (तैत्तिरीये २।१) अभिन् मन्त्रे यत् ब्रह्म कथितं तत् 'सान्त्ववर्णिकम्' मन्त्राक्षरे कथितम् ब्रह्म 'एव' इह आनन्दमयाधिकारे 'गीयते' उच्यते ।

15 And the Brahman spoken of in the mantra is here referred to On this ground also is the *Anandamaya* the Supreme Self, namely that the same Brahman that is spoken of in the Vedic verse *Taittirīya* II 1) is referred to in the *Ānandamaya* passages

१६ । नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः ।

१६ । इतश्च आनन्दमय पर एव आत्मा, 'नेतर' न ईश्वरात् अन्य सञ्चारी जीव, 'अनुपपत्ते' यत जीवस्य सृष्टिकर्तृत्वं न उपपद्यते । आनन्दमयं हि प्रकृत्य श्रूयते, "स सर्वमसृजत् यदिदं किञ्च" (तैत्तिरीये २।६) इति । न सर्वविकारसृष्टिं परस्मात् आत्मन अन्यत्र उपपद्यते ।

16 Not any other, for it is not possible On this ground also is the *Anandamaya* the Supreme Self, and not any creature subject to birth and death, and distinct from God, namely, that creatorship is not possible for a creature. For, having mentioned the *Ānandamayā*, scripture (*Taittirīya* II 6) says "He created all this, whatever there is" Now, it is not possible for any but the Supreme Self to create all phenomena

१०। मीदयपदेनाय ।

१०। इतः च नान्यत्र न संसारी दद्यात् आनन्दमयपरिहारं जीवमनन्दो भवेत्तु इति चेति — “अथ वा न तस्य स्वयं नान्यत्र भवति (तत्परीक्ष १०) इति । न हि तथा एव लभ्यते भवति ।

17 Also to cause they are spoken of as different On this ground also is the *Anandamaya* not a creature that in this passage treating of it it and the creature are spoken of as different Thus Verily he is joy for it is by gaining that joy that this (creature) becomes happy (*Taittiriya* II 7) Now the recipient cannot be the thing to be received

१८। यामास मातुमानापिघा ।

१८। तदा, “आत्मनो बहु वा प्रवर्तते (तत्परीक्ष १६) अथ वा नान्यत्र आनन्दमयपरिहारं न मातुमानो मेव परिचितम् अथवा तदा तदा एव परिचितम् वाचनीयम् ।

18 As wish is mentioned the *Pradhāna* inferred or imagined by the *Sāṅkhya* cannot be regarded (as cause) *Anandamaya* is spoken of as having wished in the text Let me be many let me be born (*Taittiriya* II 6) How could then the unconscious *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhya* be the cause of the world ?

१९। अध्विनस्य च तद्वयीर्ग मास्ति ।

१९। इतः प्रथमं जीवं वा आनन्दमयस्य न प्रवर्तते इत्यात् ‘अस्ति’

आनन्दमये विषये प्रतिबुद्धस्य 'अस्य' जीवस्य 'तद्व्योम' तदभावापत्तिं सोऽस्य 'शान्ति' उपदिशति शास्त्रम्,—“यदास्तिवैष पतञ्जिनदृश्येऽनात्मनि निरुक्तं इति लयनेऽभयं प्रतिष्ठा विन्दते अथ सोऽस्य गती भवति (तैत्तिरीयि २।७) इत्यादिना ।

19 *And scripture speaks of the union with it (the Anandamaya) of the soul which has acquired knowledge about it* On this ground also the term 'Ānandamaya' cannot be applied either to the Pradhāna or the individual soul, namely that scripture speaks of the union with it, acquiring its nature, which is liberation,—of this, the individual self, when it has acquired knowledge about it Thus, “It is only when the creature gains an immovable footing on this invisible, incorporeal, inscrutable, and self-supported One, that he becomes fearless ” (*Taittiriya* II 7)

२० । अन्तस्तद्वर्णोपदेशात् ।

२० । 'अन्त'—“अथ य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्यस्य पुरुष दृश्यते हिरण्यवस्मिन् हिरण्यकेश आग्रयणात् सर्व एव सुवर्ण, तस्य यथा कप्रास पुण्डरीकमेवमचिणी तस्योदिति नाम, स एव सर्वेभ्य पाप्मभ्य उदित, उदेति ह वै सर्वेभ्य पाप्मभ्यो य एव वेद” इति छान्दोग्ये (१।६।६, ७) श्रूयमाण परमेश्वर एव, न कश्चित् प्राप्नुतुर्कार्यं संचारी । कुत ?—‘तद्वर्णोपदेशात्’ तस्य हि परमेश्वरस्य ‘धर्म’ अपापविह्वलादय लक्षणा इह उपदिष्टा ।

20 *'Antah' (within) is God, for his nature is spoken of* “Now, the golden person who is seen in the sun, the Person with golden beard and golden hair, all golden up to the tips of the nails, his eyes like the lotus of the colour of a monkey's lower part, his name is *ut*, above, transcending all sin Verily he rises above all sin

who knows this (*Chhandogya* : vi 6 7) The Person spoken of in this passage is really the Supreme Lord and not any exalted individual self. Why?—Because in this passage the nature freedom from sin &c. of the Supreme Lord is mentioned.

२१ । मीदप्रपटेगायान् ।

[illegible]

21 And God is distinct as scripture speaks of distinction And as in another text namely He who dwells in the sun is distinct from the sun whom the sun does not know whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun within he is thy Self the Inner Ruler the Immortal (*Bṛhaddāraṇyaka* iii 7 9) God is spoken of as distinct from the individual self who thinks of the sun as his body therefore God is distinct from individual selves

२२ । आकाशभूतिसिद्धात् ।

२१। "यस्य नाकस्य चा मतिर्निष्पाद्याम इति ईशाया [प्रवादको जयति]
(इशायी ११८) पाकामा वै नामरूपयानि दक्षिता (इशायी ८१३) इत्यादि
सुतिष्ठु उच्यते । पाकामा'मय' परब्रह्मवाचकः । कुत ?—तस्मिन्नात् तत्र तत्र तस्मिन्
व्यवसाये परस्य ब्रह्मणः परं नामरूपयानिदक्षित्यादिविस्मयव्यवसायान् ।

22. Ether means Brahman because his attributes are spoken of in texts like the following What is the

origin of the world' ? 'Ether', he (Pravāhana Jaivali) replied" (*Chhândogya*, i 9) "Ether is the revealer of names and forms" (*Ibid*, viii 14) the term 'ether' means the Supreme Brahman and not elemental ether Why ? 'Because of his attributes,' because in those passages his attributes, that of being the revealer of names and forms and such others belonging to the Supreme Brahman are spoken of

२३ । अतएव प्राणः ।

२३ । 'अत' ब्रह्मलिङ्गकधनात् 'एव' "कतमा सा देवतेति प्राण इति श्रुतिवाच [उपस्ति चाक्रायथ]" (ऋग्वेदे ११११४, ५) इति श्रुतिवाच 'प्राण' ब्रह्मवाचक, न वायुविकार-विषय ।

23 For the same reason, 'Breath' means Brahman For the same reason, that is, because Brahman's attributes are mentioned in the passage, "'Which is that deity ? he [Ushasti Chákráyana] said, 'Breath' " (*Chhândogya*, i 11 4, 5) the term '*Prāṇā*' (breath) means Brahman

२४ । ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् ।

२४ । "अथ यदत परी दिवी ज्योतिर्दीप्यते" (ऋग्वेदे ३१३३७) इति, श्रुतिवाच ज्योति ब्रह्मवाचकम्, न तत् प्रकृत सूच्यते । कुत ?—'चरणाभिधानात्', यत पूर्वस्मिन् वाक्ये (ऋग्वेदे ३१३१६) "पादोऽस्य सर्वभूतानि विपादस्याहृत दिवि" इति ज्योति-लक्षितस्य ब्रह्मस्य पादत्वेन चराचराणि कथितानि । पादत्वम् ब्रह्मलिङ्गमेव ।

24 *Light means Brahman because of the mention of feet* The term light in the passage, 'Now that light which shines above this earth (*Chhândogya* iii (13.7) means Brahman and not natural light. Why?—Because of the mention of feet—because a preceding passage namely 'One foot of it constitutes all beings three feet of it are the immortal in heaven' (*Chhândogya* iii 12.6) speaks of the feet i.e. four aspects or manifestations of the same Brahman that is indicated by the term light? Now having feet (or various manifestations) is an attribute of Brahman alone.

२३ । अन्तोऽभिधानावेति चेन्न तथा चेतोऽर्पणनिगदात्त-
याहि दर्शनम् ।

२३ । अन्तोऽभिधानम् पूर्वेण च शब्दे (अन्तोऽन्ते ३।१।१) वाच्यत्वात्तस्य
अन्तः अभिहितत्वात् 'न' न ब्रह्म अभिहितम् अस्ति 'इति चेत् यदि एवं श्रवसि 'न'
न एवं दर्शनीयम् ।—कुतः ?—तथा वाच्यत्वात् अन्तोऽन्ते चेतोऽर्पणनिगदात्
ब्रह्मसि वि १३।१।१-उपनात् । वाच्यत्वात् वा एवं शब्दे श्रुतं यदिदं चिच्छेत् अनेन शब्देन
ब्रह्मसि विषयमात्रात् नियमते । तथाहि दर्शनम् यत् विचारवारेण चक्षुषि यत्
ब्रह्म उपलब्ध इत्यस्ति यथा, "एवं श्रेष्ठं ब्रह्म वा महत्पूज्यं सीमातन्त्रा एतन्मन्त्रावधर्म्यं
एवं मन्त्रवत् अन्तोऽन्ते इति" (अन्तोऽन्ते ३।१।१) ।

25 If it be said No for the Gâyatrî metre is spoken of there" then we say No, for the fixing of the mind is thereby taught. For it is seen If it be objected that in the preceding passage (*Chhândogya* iii 12.1) the Gâyatrî metre is spoken of and therefore Brahman is not spoken of then the reply is that this objection is not valid. Why?

For thereby, that is by the metre called the *Gáyatrí*, the fixing of the mind in Brahman is taught. The sentence, “*Gáyatrí* is all this, whatever exists,” teaches us to fix our minds in Brahman. ‘For it is seen’, that is in other passages also, the meditation of Brahman by means of a phenomenon is found, for instance in the *Āitareya Āraṇyaka* III 2 3 12 “For the Bahvrīchas (the followers of the *Rigveda*) think of him in the great *Uktha* hymn, the Adhvaryus (the followers of the *Yajurveda*) in fire, the Chhandogas (the followers of the *Sāmaveda*) in the Mahāvratā ceremony”

२६ । भूतादिष्वपदेशोपपत्तेश्चैवम् ।

२६ । इत्यत्र कारणात् ‘एवम्’ पूर्वमिह वाक्ये ब्रह्म एव कथितम् इति सिद्धम्, यत् तस्मिन् वाक्ये भूतादीन् पादान् ‘व्यपदिशति’ कथयति श्रुतिः । नहि ब्रह्म-अनाद्यर्थे केवलस्य कृत्स्नं भूतादयः पादा उपपद्यन्ते ।

26 And so also because thus alone can natural objects be called ‘the feet’ On this ground also is it so, that is, the conclusion is right that Brahman is spoken of in the preceding passage, namely, that in that passage natural objects are spoken of as ‘the feet’ Of the mere metre, without reference to Brahman, natural objects cannot be spoken of as ‘the feet’

२७ । उपदेशमेदान्नेति चेन्नोभयस्मिन्नप्यविरोधात् ।

२७ । यत् अपि एतत् उक्तं पूर्वम्, “विपादस्यार्धत दिवि” (छान्दोग्ये ३।१।६) इति सप्तस्या दौर्गाधारत्वेन उपदिष्टा, इह पुन “यदतः परो दिव” (छान्दोग्ये ३।१।७) इति पञ्चस्या सार्वादात्वेन, तस्मात् ‘उपदेशमेदात्’ ‘न’ न तस्य इह प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् अस्ति

In the story of Indra and Pratardana in the *Kaushîtaki Brâhmana-Upanishad* it is said, "I (Indra) am the vital breath I am the conscious self Worship me as Life, as Breath" (vi 2) '*Prâna*' here means Brahman and not an individual god. How? Because of such understanding, because the connection of the words is understood as pointing to Brahman. If the sentence is considered from the beginning to the end, it is found that the connection of the words is intended to mean Brahman

२९ । न वक्तुर्वात्मीपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसम्बन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन् ।

२९ । 'वक्तुः' इन्द्रस्य 'वात्मीपदेशात्' आत्मविषयकथनात् 'न' न प्राणशब्द-
ब्रह्मविषय, देवतात्मविषय एव, 'इति चेत्' आशङ्क्यते, तत् न युक्तम् । 'हि'
यत् 'अस्मिन्' अत्र अध्याये, 'अध्यात्मसम्बन्ध' प्रत्यगात्मसम्बन्ध तस्य 'भूमा'
बाहुल्यम् उपलभ्यते । तस्मात्, अध्यात्मसम्बन्ध-बाहुल्यात् ब्रह्मीपदेश एव अयं, न
देवतात्मीपदेशः ।

29 *If it be objected that this is not so, because Indra speaks of himself, then the reply is that this chapter contains many references to the Inner Self*

If it be objected that as the speaker, Indra, speaks of himself, the word '*Prâna*' does not mean Brahman, but an individual god, the objection is not valid For here, in this chapter, we find a multitude of references to the Inner Self So, because of a multitude of references to the Inner Self, the passage relates to Brahman, and not to an individual god

३० । शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेसो वामदेववत् ।

३ । कसं तदि वस्तु, चात्मीपदेसः ?—शास्त्रदृष्ट्या 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' इति आर्षेण दृष्टमेव यवाम्नास्य 'तु' उपदेसः इत्यस्य आत्मवचनम् । वामदेववत् यथा अयं वामदेवः प्रतिवेत्ति "अहं सन्नामसं सूर्यवेति (अथर्ववेद ३।१६।१)" एवम् ।

30 That reference to self by Indra is in accordance with the śāstric vision like that of Vāmadeva

Why then does the speaker refer to his own self?—According to śāstric vision Indra speaks of himself in accordance with the scriptures by realising like the Rishis, the truth I am Brahman just as Vāmadeva realised the truth I was Manu and Surya." (Rigveda iv 26.1)

३१ । जीव मुख्यमात्र लिङ्गादेति चैवोपासार्थैर्विध्यादात्रित
त्वादिव तद्वयोगात् ।

३१ । 'जीव मुख्यमात्र लिङ्गात्' अस्मिन् वाक्ये (आदीन्ये ३।१३) जीवलिङ्गस्य मुख्यमात्र-लिङ्गस्य च उच्यते, न इति चेत् इह जीवमुख्यमात्रस्यैव अन्वयः, उभौ वा प्रतीयमानौ, न ब्रह्म, इति यदि आशङ्कते तदा 'न' न एतत् एवम् आशङ्कनीयम् । कुत ?—उपासार्थविध्यात् एवं सति विविचम् उपासनम् प्रसज्येत—जीवोपासनं मुख्यमात्रोपासनं ब्रह्मोपासनं च इति । न च एतत् एतद्विद्वांसोऽप्युपगतं मुक्तम् तत्र अर्थवचनम् एव मुक्तम् आवर्तितम् । आशितव्यात् अन्यत्रापि ब्रह्मलिङ्गवशात् 'मात्र'शब्दस्य ब्रह्मविज्ञाने इह अपि जीव-मुख्यमात्र-लिङ्गात् ब्रह्मोपादेसः एव अयम् इति ज्ञेयम् ।

अथवा, जीवोपासार्थैर्विध्यादात्रितत्वादिव तद्वयोगात् इति, यत्र अयम् अर्थः अर्थः—ब्रह्मवाक्ये अपि जीव-मुख्यमात्र-लिङ्गात् न विवक्ष्यते । कसं ?—उपासार्थविध्यात् । विविचम् इह ब्रह्मवाक्यः उपासनं विवक्षितम्—(१) मात्रवर्णेन, (२) मात्रवर्णेन,

(३) स्वधर्मेण च । अन्यत्र अपि “मनोमय, प्राणशरीर ” (कान्दोग्ये ३।१४।२) इत्यादी उपाधिधर्मेण ब्रह्मण उपासनम् आश्रितम् । इहापि तत् युज्यते । तस्मात् ब्रह्मवाक्यम् एतत्, इति सिद्धम् ।

31 *If it be said, 'No, for the marks of the individual self and those of the chief vital air are mentioned', then we say, 'No, for in that case there would be three forms of devout meditation, and because the word 'Prāna' being used in other passages for the Brahman, here also it is so used, as the same characteristics are mentioned'*

If the *pūrvapakṣa* says that as the marks of the individual self and those of the chief vital air are mentioned in this passage, either the individual self or the chief vital air or both are meant here, and not Brahman, then we say 'No, it is not so, for in that case there would be three distinct forms of devout meditation prescribed in the same passage, namely that on the individual self, that on the chief vital air, and that on Brahman. But it is not reasonable to suppose that in the same passage three distinct forms are prescribed, it is rather reasonable to think that the passage has the same purport. As also, in another passage the word 'Prāna' is used for Brahman, because Brahman's characteristics are mentioned there, therefore here also, the characteristics of Brahman being mentioned, it must be understood that it is Brahman alone that is spoken of'.

Or, the portion of the aphorism beginning with '*noṇāsā*' &c may be explained otherwise, Thus Even in a passage speaking of Brahman, the characteristic marks of the individual self and the chief vital air are not conflicting elements. Why? Because of the three forms of devout

meditation Three forms of devout meditation on Brahman are intended to be taught here (1) that through characteristics of *Prāṇa* (2) through those of *Prajñā* (the individual self) and (3) through those of Brahman himself Elsewhere too, for example in such passages as He who consists of *manas* whose body is *Prajñā* &c." (*Chhāṇ* in 14 2) devout meditation on Brahman is taught with reference to his attributive adjuncts. This applies to the present case also. Therefore it is settled that the passage speaks of Brahman

समन्वय-नाम-प्रथमाध्याये

द्वितीयः पादः—उपास्य-ब्रह्मबोधकास्यष्ट-श्रुतिवाक्यानां समन्वयः.

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१ । सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् ।

१ । छान्दोग्योपनिषदि शण्डिल्यविद्यायाम् परम् एव ब्रह्म उपदिष्टम् । कुत ?—
यत 'सर्वत्र' सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु 'प्रसिद्धम्' ब्रह्म एव 'उपदिश्यते' । शण्डिल्यविद्या,
“सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तन्नलानिति शल्ल उपसीत । अथ खलु कतुमयः पुरुषः । यदा-
कतुरभिर्लोकैः पुरुषो भवति तथैतं प्रेत्य भवति । स भवत् कुर्वति । मनोमयं प्राण-
गरीरो भावः सत्यसङ्गः स आकाशात्मा सर्वकर्मा सर्वकाम सर्वगतः सर्वरसः सर्व-
मिदमभ्यासीऽवाक्यनादरः । एष स आत्माऽन्तर्हृदयेऽणीयान् ब्रीहैर्वा यवावा सर्पपादा
श्लामाकाशा श्लामाकतण्डुलावा । एष स आत्माऽन्तर्हृदये जयायान् पृथिव्या न्यायान्
अन्तरीचात् न्यायान् दिवी न्यायान् एभ्यो लोकेभ्यः । सर्वकर्मा सर्वकाम सर्वगतः
सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यासीऽवाक्यनादरः । एष स आत्माऽन्तर्हृदये एतद् ब्रह्मेतमितं
प्रेत्याभिसम्भविताभीतिः । यम्य स्यादद्वा न विचिकित्साऽसीति ह आऽहं शण्डिल्य
शण्डिल्यः ।” (छा ३।१।४।१-४) ।

1. *Because the well-known Brahman is taught everywhere*

In the 'Sândilya-vidyâ' of the *Chhândogya* Upanishad, it is the Supreme Brahman that is taught Why ? For everywhere, in all the Vedântas, it is the well-known Brahman that is taught The Sândilya Vidyâ is as follows
“All this is Brahman, for all this originates, disappears

and continues in him. Meditate on him calmly. Man consists of will. As his will is in this world so will he be when he has departed from here. He should will accordingly. He who consists of mind (*i.e.* intelligence) whose body is life whose form is light whose thoughts are true who is (boundless) like space to whom belong all deeds, all desires, all odours and all tastes, who pervades all this, who is without speech and without partiality — this (Person) is my Self existing in the heart. He is smaller than a grain of wheat or barley than a mustard or canary seed than even the kernel of a canary seed. This Self within my heart is greater than the earth greater than the mid regions (those between earth and heaven) greater than heaven greater than these worlds. He to whom belong all deeds all desires, all odours and all tastes who pervades all this who is without speech and without partiality, — this is my Self in the heart this is Brahman. I shall reach him after departing from this world. He who has this faith has no uncertainty that is, he is sure to reach Brahman. Thus said Sāṅdilya, thus said Sāṅdilya. (*Chh. iii. 14. 14*)

२। विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तये ।

१। इदं वा बलम् यत् विविता गुणा उपपन्नायाम् अपादिभ्यो अपदिता
अपठत्यपठय लपथ परञ्चि ह्रस्वि एव उपपद्यते ।

2 And because the attributes intended to be expressed are possible only in Brahman This is another reason for the above conclusion—because the attributes

intended to be expressed, the attributes of having true thoughts and others, are possible only in the Supreme Brahman.

३ । अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शरीरः ।

३ । तेषा गुणाना शरीरं जीवे अनुपपत्ते तु न शरीरं जीवं शङ्खित्यविद्यायाम्
उपास्य ।

3 *Because they are not possible in the embodied self, therefore the embodied self is not taught* Because those attributes are not possible in the embodied self, therefore the embodied self is not to be meditated upon in the *Sāṅdilya Vidyā*

४ । कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च ।

४ । इतश्च न शरीरं मनोमयत्वादिगुणं यस्मात् श्रुतिं मनोमयत्वादिगुणम् उपास्यम्
'कर्मत्वेन' उपासकस्य प्राप्यत्वेन, तथा शरीरम् उपासकम् 'कर्तृत्वेन' प्रापकत्वेन
'व्यपदिशति' ।

4 *And because there is a reference as to object and subject* And for this reason also is the embodied self not that which has the attribute of 'consisting of *manas*' and such other qualities, because scripture speaks of that which is to be meditated on and which has the attributes of 'consisting of *manas*' and such other qualities as an object, as what is to be attained by the meditator, and of the embodied self, the meditator, as the subject or agent.

५। मण्डयिगेयात् ।

[illegible]

5 Because of the difference of words And for this reason also is that which consists of *manas* and such other attributes different from the embodied self because in another scriptural passage treating of the same subject there is a difference of words, that is a difference in case ending between two words referring respectively to the Lord and the individual In the *Satapatha Brahmana* (x 6. 3 2.) it is said Thus that golden person is in the self Here the term referring to the embodied self has the seventh case-ending, and the term person different from it and having the first case-ending refers to Brahman

६। स्मृतये ।

६। निबन्धन ५। १-१२५ पद—यत् "वैश्वर्यं नर्त्तयितुम्" उद्दिष्टं
निबन्ध (अथ १२५) इत्याद्या अन्तिमं शब्दं परमात्मनः सिद्धं दृश्यते ।

6. And because of the *Smṛiti* Another reason for the conclusion is given. Because a *Smṛiti* passage like O Arjuna, the Lord is seated in the heart of all creatures (*Bhagavadgītā* xviii 61) shows the difference between the embodied and the Supreme Self.

७। अर्मकौकारूपात्तद्वपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं
व्योमवच्च ।

७। 'अर्मकम्' अल्पम्, 'ओकाः' स्थान यस्य स अर्मकौका, तस्य भाव अर्म-
कौकस्त्वम्, तस्मात्, 'अर्मकौकस्वात्' अण्यीयस्वादियुक्तात्, 'तद्वपदेशात् च' तस्य
शाण्डिल्यविद्याविषयस्य अण्यीयस्वकथनात् च, 'न' न स परमात्मा, परन्तु शरीर एव, 'इति
चेत्, न' । कुत ?—'निचाय्यत्वात् एवम्' यतः स एवम् अण्यीयस्वादियुक्तीपेत ईश्वरः
हृदयपुच्छरीके निचाय्य द्रष्टव्य इति उपदिश्यते । 'व्योमवत् च' एतत् द्रष्टव्यम् । यथा
सर्वगतम् अपि सत् व्योम सूचीपाशादपेक्षया अण्यीय व्यपदिश्यते, एव ब्रह्मण अपि
हृदपेक्षया अण्यीयस्त्वम् ।

7 If it be said 'No, because of the smallness of the space, and because of its being mentioned', then the reply is 'No, because Brahman has thus to be realised, and because of the similarity to ether.' If it be said that because of the smallness of space, that is because such attributes as minuteness are mentioned in the passage, and because the attribute of minuteness as belonging to the subject-matter of the *Sāṇḍilya Vidyā* is expressly mentioned, therefore that is not the Supreme Self, but rather the embodied self, then we say 'No' And why ? Because it is taught that the Lord, as possessing such attributes as minuteness has to be realised in the lotus of the heart And he has to be considered as similar to ether As ether, though pervading all things, is spoken of as small when considered in relation to the eye of a needle or a die &c, so is Brahman said to be minute in relation to the heart

८ । सम्भोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वेद्येऽप्यात् ।

८ । सम्भोगः सम्भोगः वदन्त्येवम् । अत्र 'सम्भोगप्राप्ति' इति चेत् 'न' । अत्र तस्य सम्भोगप्राप्तिः । अत्राप्यात् अतः प्राप्तिरप्यपि यी विधिः भवति । एतच्चात् अत्रापि विधिः । एतच्चात् एव भोगः न इत्यर्थः ।

8. If it be objected that from this the subjection of Brahman to pleasure and pain follows then the reply is No on account of the difference. If it be objected that on the supposition of Brahman being related to the hearts of all creatures it would follow that he is subject to the pleasures and pains of the world then we reply "No it would not follow that he is subject to pleasure and pain for there is a difference between the Creator and the creature. As the two are different only the latter is subject to pleasure and pain not the former

९ । अतो पराचरयद्व्यात् ।

९ । "यस्य ब्रह्म च चरयति तमि भवति चोदयति । अन्त्यधर्मपरीक्षणं च इत्यादिदं ब्रह्म च" (कठ १।१।१३) अत्र चोदयतीति 'अतो ब्रह्मचर्यादि भवति परमात्मा एव न इत्यर्थः । कुतः ?—पराचरयद्व्यात् अतः चरययद्व्यात् अतः न ब्रह्मस्य चात्तरेण उपलब्धः परमात्मनः अन्त्यधर्मः न भवति ।

9 The eater means Brahman for he is mentioned as taking in the moving and the unmoving. In the Kathopanishad verse, He of whom both Brahmanas and Kshatriyas are food and death is the sustaining material who can say as to where he is,—it is so and so (1. 2. 25)

the *Atmā*, the 'eater' of Brahmanas, Kshatriyas and others, is the Supreme Self, and no one else. How? For the taking in, the final absorption, of the moving and the unmoving, of the whole world, is possible only of the Supreme Self, not of any other thing or being.

१० । प्रकरणाच्च ।

१० । इतश्च परमात्मा एव इह 'अचा' भवितुम् अर्हति यत्कारणं प्रकरणम् इदं परमात्मनः,—“न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्” (कठ १।२।१८) इत्यादि ।

10 *This follows also from the section* For this reason also it is possible only for the Supreme Self to be the 'eater', that this section, the one beginning with "The knowing Self neither is born nor dies" (*Katha*, 1 2 18) deals with the Supreme Self

११ । गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात् ।

११ । कठवल्लीषु एव पठ्यते,

ऋतं पिवन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके

गुह्यान्प्रविष्टौ परमे परार्धे ।

छायातपो ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति

पञ्चाग्रयो ये च दिशाचिकेता ॥ (१।३।१)

अथ 'गुहा प्रविष्टौ' 'आत्मानौ' विज्ञानात्म-परमात्मानौ एव गृह्यन्ते, न बुद्धिचेवज्ञौ ।
अथ हेतुः,—“हि तद्दर्शनात्” यतः गुहाहितत्वं श्रुतिस्मृतिषु भ्रष्टत्वात् परमात्मनः एव दृश्यते,
—“गुहाहितं गङ्गरेष्टं पुराणम्” (कठ १।२।१२), “यो वेदं निश्चितं गुहाया परमे व्योमन्”
तैत्ति १।१), “आत्मानमन्विष्य गुह्यान्प्रविष्टम्” इत्याद्यासु ।

11 *The two who have entered into the cavity of the heart are the individual and universal selves [and not the understanding and the individual self] for it is seen.* It is said in the *Kathopanishad* "In this world in the highest place of Brahman the two who have entered into the cavity of the heart are enjoying the fruits of their work. Those who know Brahman describe them as light and shade also those who feed the five fires (the house holders) and those who feed the fire thrice (1 3 1) In the phrase 'the two who have entered into the cavity of the heart' the individual and the universal selves are mentioned, and not the understanding and the individual self (as some suppose). The reason is this,— It is seen "That is, in the *Śruti* and the *Smṛti* the Supreme Self alone is frequently spoken of as existing in the heart as for instance "Who is in the heart who lives in inaccessible places, and who is ancient (*Katha* i 2. 12) "Who knows (him) as hidden in the heart the highest heaven" (*Taittī* ii 1) Seek the Self who has entered into the cavity of the heart" &c.

१२ । विशेषणम् ।

११ । सुषुप्तौ विमलस्य जीवित्येव भिन्नम् — दृष्टान्तं मनुष्यादि भिन्नं च यत्र पूर्वाणि विद्वान् बुद्धम् एव ।

12. *And on account of the distinction* The above conclusion is right also on account of the distinction mentioned in the *Śruti* between God and the individual self, namely the distinction of the goal and the goer the object thought of and the thinker and so on

१३। अन्तर उपपत्तेः ।

१३। “य एषोऽचिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते एष आत्मेति जीवात्तदमृतममयमेतद् ब्रह्मेति” (छान्दोग्ये ८।३।४) । अथ ‘अन्तर’ अक्षय्यन्तरं पुरुषः परमेश्वर एव । ‘उपपत्तेः’ यतः अथ उपदिश्यमानं गुणजातं परमेश्वरे एव उपपद्यते ।

13. *The Person “within” is Brahman on account of attributes* “He said, this Person who is seen within the eye, that is the Self. This is the Immortal, the Fearless, this is Brahman” (*Chh viii 74*) Here “The Person within the eye” is the Supreme Lord, for the qualities mentioned here are attributable only to him.

१४। स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च ।

१४। कथं पुनः आकाशवत् सर्वगतस्य ब्रह्मण्यप्यक्षय्यस्थानम् उपपद्यते ? अथ उच्यते,—ब्रह्मण्य उपलब्धार्थं स्थानादिनामरूपव्यपदेशः [“य पृथिव्या तिष्ठन्” “यश्चक्षुषि तिष्ठन्” (तृहं ३।७) इत्यादिषु] श्रुत्यन्तरेषु अपि दृश्यते ।

14 *And on account of the mention of place and other things* But how can the location of a small space like the eye be attributable to Brahman, who is all-pervading as ether? To this objection it is replied here, In other scriptural texts also, for instance, “Who, residing in the earth”, “Who, residing in the eye” (*Br iii 7*) names and forms like space and other things are mentioned as helps to the realisation of Brahman

१५ । सुप्रविगिताभिधानादेव ।

१५ । इतए अचिदुक्व एभिदए एव एता अचिदु वाव ताव सुप्रविगता
वदितम् । "एता इदं ब्रह्म एव वेति (ता ३।१ । ४) । इदं ब्रह्म सुप्रवि-
गता एव वेति । इति तदर्थं वेति इति इति सुप्रविगता इति एवम् ।

15 And also because the Person in the eye is mentioned as endowed with bliss For this reason also is the Person within the eye none but the Supreme Lord that in this text he is spoken of as endowed with bliss "Breath is Brahman Ka is Brahman Kha is Brahman" (Chh iv 10 4) Ka means bliss and Kha either Qualifying each other they indicate the blissful Brahman

१६ । श्रुतीपनिषत्कथात्मभिधानाच्च ।

१६ । इतए अचिदुक्व एभिदए एव एता अचिदुक्व वाव ताव सुप्रविगता
वदितम् । "एता इदं ब्रह्म एव वेति (ता ३।१ । ४) । इदं ब्रह्म सुप्रवि-
गता एव वेति । इति तदर्थं वेति इति इति सुप्रविगता इति एवम् ।

16 And because the path of him who has heard the Upanishads is mentioned For this reason also is the Person within the eye none but the Supreme Lord that the path named the Devayana, which is assigned by the Sruti to him who has heard the secret science—the knower of Brahman—is here, in this text, mentioned as the path of him who knows the Person in the eye (Prasna i. 10 Chh iv 15 5)

१७ । अनवस्थितेरसम्भवाच्च नेतरः ।

१७ । यत् पुनरुक्तं आयात्मा विज्ञानात्मा देवतात्मा वा स्यात् अचिस्थान इति अव उच्यते,—‘न’ आयात्मादि ‘इतर’ इह ग्रहणम् अर्हति । काश्चात् ?—‘अनवस्थिते, न तावत् आयात्मन चक्षुषि नित्वावस्थानं सम्भवति । ‘सम्भवात्’ यत अस्तत्वादीना गुणानां न आयात्मनि सम्भव ।

17 *Not others, on account of impermanency and impossibility* And then as to the contention that the person within the eye is the reflected self, the cognitional self (the individual soul) or the self of some deity, it is said here, the reflected and other selves cannot be accepted here Why not? On account of impermanency the reflected and other selves cannot permanently exist in the eye And on account of impossibility the qualities of immortality &c cannot exist in the reflected and other selves

१८ । अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् ।

१८ । बृहदारण्यके (तृतीयाध्यायस्य सप्तमब्राह्मणे) इधिव्यादिषु ‘अधिदैवादिषु’ य ‘अन्तर्यामी’ श्रूयते स परमात्मा एव स्यात्, न अन्य इति । ‘तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात्’ यतः तस्य परमात्मन धर्मा यमयितादय इह निर्दिश्यमाना दृश्यन्ते ।

18 *The ‘Inner Ruler’ of the presiding deities of the devas &c is the Supreme Self, as his attributes are mentioned* The “Inner Ruler” spoken of in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (Chap III Brahmana 7) as ruling over the earth and other presiding deities among the *devas*, is the Supreme

Self and none other for in this passage the attributes of the Supreme Self—ruling and such others,—are found mentioned in this section

१८ । न च आत्मतत्त्वमिहापातः ।

१८ । 'न च आत्मे' शब्दस्यैव प्रमाणम् अत्रापि न स्यात् अत्रापि न स्यात् । न च आत्मे शब्दस्यैव प्रमाणम् अत्रापि न स्यात् । न च आत्मे शब्दस्यैव प्रमाणम् अत्रापि न स्यात् । न च आत्मे शब्दस्यैव प्रमाणम् अत्रापि न स्यात् ।

19 *The Inner Ruler is not that spoken of in the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti for attributes not its own are spoken of* The Inner Ruler cannot be the *Pradhāna* spoken of in the *Sāṅkhya Smṛiti* for seeing and other attributes opposed to the nature of the unconscious *Pradhāna* are mentioned with reference to the Inner Ruler About the end of the passage (Br III. 7 23) it is said of him 'He is the unseen seer the unheard hearer the unthought of thinker the unknown knower

२० । यारीत्योभयेऽपि हि मिदेनैवमधोयते ।

२० । यारीत्योभयेऽपि हि मिदेनैवमधोयते । यारीत्योभयेऽपि हि मिदेनैवमधोयते । यारीत्योभयेऽपि हि मिदेनैवमधोयते । यारीत्योभयेऽपि हि मिदेनैवमधोयते । यारीत्योभयेऽपि हि मिदेनैवमधोयते ।

20 *The Inner Ruler is not the embodied self for*

both the schools speak of it as different The 'Inner Self' is not the embodied self, for both the schools,—the Kanvas and the Mādhyandīnas (in their different readings of the section) speak of it (the embodied self) as different from the Inner Ruler,—the former as the ruled, and the latter as the ruler The *Kānvās* read, "Who, dwelling in the understanding" Here 'the understanding' means the embodied self The Mādhyandīnas read, "Who, dwelling in the self" Here 'the self' indicates the embodied self

२१ । अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तः ।

२१ । सुखकोपनिषदि श्रुते "यत्तदद्रेक्ष्यमग्राह्यमगीतमवर्णमचक्षुःश्रीत तदपाणि-
पादे नित्यम् । विमु सर्वगत सुसूक्ष्म तदव्यय तदभूतयोनि परिपश्यन्ति धीराः" (१।१।६) ।
अथ य 'अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको' भूतयोनि प्रोक्तः स परमेश्वर एव, न अन्य । 'धर्मोक्तः'
यत तस्य एव धर्मा अव उक्ताः ।

21 *He who is spoken as having the qualities of being unseen &c is the Supreme Lord, for his attributes are mentioned* In the *Mundaka Upanishad* it is said, "That source of things which the wise see, is invisible, intangible, uncaused, uncoloured, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, eternal, omnipresent, all-pervading, extremely subtle and undecaying" (I 1 6) The source of all things spoken of here as 'having the qualities of being unseen &c) is the Supreme Lord, and none other, as it is his attributes which are mentioned here

२२ । विशेषण-भेदव्यपदेशाभ्याञ्च नेतरौ ।

२२ । इतश्च परमेश्वर एव भूतयोनिः, 'न' 'इतरौ' शरीर प्रधानं वा, यतः श्रुति

एतत् सृजतीति शरीरात् स्वभात् च विनिर्दिष्टं विवक्ष्यते, तस्मै च 'अवर्ति'ति
व्यवर्ति । तद्वर्ति

स्मिन् समूहं पुरः स वृत्तान्तर्गता इव ।

अथ तां समस्तं तस्मै व्यवर्तन् पुराणं च ॥ (सु. १।१।३)

22. *The Supreme Lord is the source of all things and not the other two because of his being given specific attributes and his being spoken of as different. For this reason also it is the Supreme Lord and not the other two,—the embodied self and the *Pradhāna*—which is the Source of all things, that Scripture gives specific attributes to the Source of all things that it speaks of and differentiates him from both of them. For instance it is said (II. 1. 2) 'That Divine Person is incorporeal he is within and without unborn without breath without a sensorium pure and higher than the high undecaying (person or principle meaning either the Lower Brahman or the eternal creative power of God)*

२३ । कुर्योपस्थासाय ।

२३ । तत्र पञ्च नूयते,—

अधिमर्हं चक्षुषी चानूयते

दिशः शक्तिं वाग्विज्ञानं च ।

वायुं शक्तीं दृष्टं विज्ञानम्

पञ्चां पृथिवीं चैव सर्वभूतानामका ॥ (सु. १।१।४)

अथ त्रयीयवासाम् तस्य सृजतीति सर्वविद्याऽप्यवस्थाय उपवासाम् चयनार्थं 'च'

स परमेश्वर एव, न शरीरः, न प्रवानम् । न शरीरस्य अल्पशक्तेः, न अपि अनात्मनः प्रधानस्य, अयं अपीपन्यासः सम्भवति ।

23 *And because of the description of his form*
In the same section it is said,—“Heaven is his head, the sun and the moon are his eyes, the quarters his ears, the uttered Vedas his speech, air his breath, and the world his heart Out of his two feet has come out the earth. This Person is the Inner Self of all creatures ” Because of the description of form here,—the form of the Source of all things as consisting of all appearances, it is the Supreme Lord, and neither the embodied self nor the *Pradhāna* Such a description of form is not possible in the case either of the embodied self whose power is limited or of *Pradhāna*, which is a not-self

२४ । वैश्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात् ।

२४ । आन्दोग्योपनिषदि पञ्चमप्रपाठके एकादशादिषु अध्यायेषु “को नु आत्मा किं ब्रह्म” इति, “आत्मानमेव इमं वैश्वानरं सम्प्रति अब्येपि तमेव नो ब्रूहि” इति च उपक्रम्य द्युसूर्यवात्वाकाश-वारिपृथिवीनां सुतेजस्वादिगुणयोगम् एकैकोपासन-निन्दया च वैश्वानरं प्रति एतेषां मूर्खादिभावमुपदिश्य आत्मायते, “यस्त्वेवमेव प्रादेशभावम् अभि-विमानम् आत्मानं वैश्वानरम् उपपान्ते स सर्वेषु लोकेषु सर्वेषु भूतेषु सर्वेष्व्वात्मव्यवसृजति । तस्य ह वा एतस्यात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य मूर्खेव सुतेजायद्युर्विश्वेऽपि प्राण पृथग्वर्त्मात्मा सन्देहो बहुलः बन्तिरेव रयि पृथिव्येव पादावुर एव वेदिर्लोमानि वह्निर्हृदयं गार्हपत्यो मनोऽन्वाहार्यपचन आस्यमाहवनीयः” इत्यादि । अत्र “वैश्वानर आत्मा” परमात्मा भवितुम् अर्हति । कुत ?—‘साधारणशब्दविशेषात्’ । साधारणशब्दयोः विशेष साधारणशब्दविशेषः । यद्यपि एतौ उभयौ अपि आत्मवैश्वानरशब्दौ साधारणशब्दौ, वैश्वानरशब्दस्तु जाठर-भूताग्नि-देवताना वयानां साधारणः, आत्मशब्दश्च जीवपरमेश्वरयोः द्वयोः, तथापि विशेषो

दग्धं विन परमेष्ठपरत्वं तयोः सम्बन्धव्यतिरेकः । तद्वत्तुतिष्ठति । निवृत्तिः ।
परमेष्ठं नृ पृथग्मपत्तिः ।

24 *The Vaisvānara means the Supreme Lord on account of the particular meaning of the general terms.* In the fifth *Prapāthaka* of the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* in the chapters beginning with the eleventh the scripture, beginning with "What is our self and what is Brahman?" and "You now know this Vaisvanara self do thou instruct us about him" teaches that heaven the sun air ether water and the earth possess the qualities of good light &c. disparages the distinct meditation of each of these and teaching that they stand to the Vaisvānara as the head &c. says, But he who meditates on the Vaisvānara Self as thus limited as in space eats food in all worlds in all beings, in all selves. (However) of this Vaisvānara verily the head is possessed of good light the eye multiform (or having the world as its form) the breath moving in various courses, the trunk manifold the bladder wealth the feet the earth the chest the altar the hairs the holy grass, the heart the Gārhapatya fire the *mannas* the Anvā hārya fire and the mouth The Āhavanīya fire &c. Here the "Vaisvānara Ātmā" is the Supreme Self Why?—On account of the particular meaning of the general terms. Though both the terms, Ātmā and 'Vaisvānara' are general terms, Vaisvānara meaning indifferently the gastric juice the elemental fire and the god of fire, and Ātmā meaning the individual and the Universal Self yet they have here a particular meaning which shows that they are here applied to the Supreme Lord. The attributes mentioned in the texts quoted point to him alone.

२५ । अर्थमात्रमनुमानं स्यादिति ।

२५। परमेश्वरस्य अर्थमात्रं स्मृत्युक्तं भगवद्गीतैकादशाध्यायादिषु उक्तं त्रैलोक्यरूपं
वैश्वानरश्रुतिम् अनुमापयत्, अस्य वैश्वानरशब्दस्य परमेश्वरपरत्वेन अनुमानं लिङ्गं गमकं
स्यात् इत्यर्थः । 'इति'शब्दः हेत्वर्थः ।

25 And because the form described in the *Smṛiti* is an inference The world-form of the Supreme Lord described in the *Smṛiti*, for example in the eleventh chapter of the *Bhagavadgīta*, helps to infer (or explain) the Vaisvānara *Smṛiti* passage on which it rests, that is, constitutes an indicatory sign of the term 'Vaisvānara' denoting the Supreme Lord 'Iti' in the aphorism means 'therefore'

२६ । शब्दादिभ्योऽन्तःप्रतिष्ठानान्नेति चेन्न तथा दृष्टुप-
देशादसम्भवात् पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते ।

२६। अथ शङ्का—'शब्दादिभ्यः' अर्थान्तरप्रसिद्धेभ्यः वैश्वानराद्यादिशब्देभ्यः, 'अन्तः
प्रतिष्ठानात्' वैश्वानरस्य पुरुषस्थान्तरावस्थान-कथनात् च, 'न' न वैश्वानरः परमेश्वरः, परन्तु
जठराग्नि एव प्रत्येतत् । शङ्कानिराशः,—'तथा' जठराग्नौ 'दृष्टुपदेशात्' परमेश्वरः
द्रष्टव्य इति उपदेशात्, वैश्वानरस्य परमेश्वरार्थं युक्त एव । 'असम्भवात्' वैश्वानरस्य
कथितपुरुषलक्षणस्य अर्थान्तरस्य असम्भवात् च न शङ्का युक्ता । 'पुरुषम् अपि च' 'एनम्'
वैश्वानरम् 'अधीयते' वाजसनेयिनः शतपथब्राह्मणे ।

26 If it be said, "No, because of the word and other reasons, and because of its existing within," then the reply is, "no, because we are told to see him there, because of the impossibility, and because one school,

speaks of him as the Person Our opponent may object thus —Because of the word and other reasons, that is because there are words in the text such as 'Vaisvānara and Agni' which are well known to mean other things and because of its existing within that is because the text speaks of the Vaisvānara as existing within the individual therefore Vaisvānara does not mean the Supreme Lord but the gastric juice. Our reply to the objection is as follows. Because the text teaches us to see the Supreme Lord there in the gastric juice therefore the Vaisvānara properly means the Supreme Lord and nothing else. And because of the impossibility that is because it is impossible that the Vaisvānara which is spoken of as possessing the characteristics of a person should mean otherwise therefore the objection is invalid. Besides, the Vājasaneyins in the *Satapatha Brahmana* speak of the Vaisvānara as a person.

१७ । अतएव न देवता भूतञ्च ।

१० । 'यत् एव उच्यते हेतुभ्य न देवता देवता अप्रदेवता, न भूतं च भूतादि च ।

27 From this verily that is for these reasons, Vaisvānara is neither a god—not the god of fire,—nor an element —i.e. not the elemental fire.

१८ । साक्षादप्यविरोधं ज्ञेयमिति ।

१८ । साक्षात् अपि तदप्युपाधि मुख्यं विना अपि उक्तवाक्य परमेश्वरोपासन परित्यज्य च विधीयते न कश्चित् विधीयते इति ज्ञेयमिति मन्वते ।

28 *Jaimini thinks that even in supposing direct meditation there is no contradiction* Jaimini thinks that even if we suppose that the meditation of the Supreme Lord is taught in that passage directly, without reference to the adjunct of the digestive fire, there is no contradiction

२८ । अभिव्यक्तो रित्याश्मरथ्यः ।

२८ । 'अभिव्यक्त' हृदयादिषु उपलब्धिस्थानेषु परमेश्वरस्य विशेषण-प्रकाशात्, "इति" "प्रादेशभाव" श्रुति (छा० ५।८।१) तस्मिन् अपि उपपद्यते, इति 'आश्मरथ्यः' एतन्नामक आचार्य्य मन्यते ।

29 *Asvarathya thinks that the text applies to the Supreme Lord on account of manifestation* 'On account of manifestation' that is, as the Supreme Lord is specially manifested in such places of realisation as the heart, the text speaking of *pṛādeśhamātra*, 'of the measure of a span' (Ch v 8 1) applies to him, so thinks Āchārya Āsamarathya

३० । अनुसृतेर्वादिः ।

३० । 'अनुसृते' यत् प्रादेशभावहृदयस्थितेन मनसा परमेश्वर अनुसृत्यते 'ध्यायते', तत् स "प्रादेशभाव" उच्यते, इति मन्यते 'वादि' नामक आचार्य्य ।

30 *Badari thinks that God is so called on account of meditation* 'On account' of meditation, that is because the Supreme Lord is meditated upon by the mind which is situated in the heart, which is of the measure of a span, so

he is described as of the measure of a span—so thinks Ācharya Bādari

३१ । सम्पत्तेरिति जैमिनिभूया हि दर्शयति ।

३१ । 'सम्पत्ते' सम्पदुपलभ्य निमित्तं 'मादिममात्र' द्युतिं क्ताम् 'इति' सम्पत्ते
नमिति । 'तदा हि' लभ्यमानमात्रं शास्त्रेणैवित्यत्र (१ । १ । १) परमेश्वर
मादिममात्रस्यति मयति । सम्पत्तिं सम्पदुपलभ्य वा — ध्यायेत् इत्यत्रापि
परमेश्वर एव दर्शयति ।

31 *Jaimini says the text is intended for sampatti (a form of meditation) Another text of a similar import shows this For sampatti—for teaching the sampat form of meditation the "pradesamātra" text is intended—so says Jaimini Another text of a similar import the Vdjasaneyi Brahmana (Satapatha x 6. 1) teaches meditation on the Supreme Lord in the heart of the measure of a span Sampatti or sampat updsand means the realisation of the non-difference of the Supreme Lord with a visible object*

३२ । आत्मनस्ति चैनमस्मिन् ।

३२ । 'अस्मिन्' मूढोऽवस्थानादि मादिमामि 'एतम्' परमेश्वरम् आत्मनस्ति
आत्माना 'च' आत्मानोपनिषदि ।

32 *And the Jābālds speak of him as in that place And the Jābālds also in the Jābālopanishad speak of him as dwelling in that place, that is in the span measured space between the head and the chin*

समन्वय-नाम-प्रथमाध्याये

तृतीयः पादः ज्ञेय-ब्रह्मबोधकास्पष्ट-श्रुतिवाक्यानां समन्वयः



१। द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् ।

१। मुखकोपनिषदि श्रूयते,—

यस्मिन् द्यौ पृथिवी चानरिचमोत

मन सह प्राणैश्च सर्व्वे ।

तमेवैकजानथ आत्मानमन्या

वाचो विमुञ्चयाधृतस्यैव सेतु ॥ (१।१।५)

अत्र 'द्युभ्वाद्यायतन' द्यु-भू-आदि-आयतन स्वर्गपृथिव्यादे आधातु, ब्रह्म एव,
न अन्यत् । कुत ?—'स्वशब्दात्' अस्मिन् आयतने ब्रह्मवाचकस्य 'मात्म'शब्दस्य
प्रयोगात् ।

1 *The Support of heaven, earth &c, is Brahman, on account of the use of his own proper word, i e 'self'*
It is said in the *Mundaka Upanishad* "Know that one self alone in which heaven, the earth, the sky, and the sensorium, with all the vital airs, are woven Give up other words He is the bridge of immortality" (II 2 5) Here the support of heaven, earth &c is Brahman, and nothing else Why ?---Because the word 'self', which properly means Brahman, is applied to it

० । सुलोपस्य व्यपदेशात् ।

१ । इति वाच्यम् एव इदं धुम्रापायतनं एषत् चण मुनीपवयता मुने
नामनेन स्यता वरि माणा इत्यने । तयाहि —

यदा नवः भवतामः समुद्र

इति नवनि नामकपि विज्ञातः ।

तया विज्ञातः नामकपादिमुक्त

५१५१ पुनश्चमुपति निवृत्तम् ॥ (मु १।१।८)

2 Because he is spoken of as one to whom the libera-
ted go On this ground also is the support of heaven and
earth Brahman and nothing else that he is spoken of as
one to whom the liberated go as to their self For instance
it is said in the same Upanishad — As flowing rivers are
absorbed in the sea, giving up their names and forms so
the wiseman freed from name and form enters the Divine
Person who is higher than the high " (iii 2 8)

१ । नाशुमानमवच्छेदात् ।

१ । 'न अशुमानम् न सांख्यमुति परिच्यते' प्रमाणम् इदं धुम्रापायतननेन
प्रतिपद्यते । अत्राह — अतश्चत्वात् तत्तत्प्रतिपत्तिरिति तत्प्रतिपादकस्य शब्दस्य
अवधानात् ।

3 Not the inferred on account of the absence of
words denoting it It should not be thought that the in-
ferred, that is the Pradhāna assumed in the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti
is the support of heaven and earth Why ?—Because no
words denoting it are mentioned in the text in question

४ । प्राणभृच्च ।

४ । 'प्राणभृत्' जीव 'च' न दृग्धायाऽननम् ।

4 *Nor is the living self* Nor is the living (lit life-bearing), that is the individual self, the support of heaven and earth

५ । भेदव्यपदेशात् ।

५ । यत श्रुति "तमेवैकं जानय आत्मानम्" इति (२।२।५) ज्ञेयज्ञातृभावेन जगदीयतनात् प्राणभृतं भेदं व्यपदिशति ।

5 *For distinction is shown* For scripture, in saying "Know that one self alone" (II 2 5) shows the distinction of the living self from the Support of the universe as the Knower

६ । प्रकरणात् ।

६ । यत इदं प्रकरणं परमात्मन एव ।

6 *Because of the section* Because the present section relates to the Supreme Self alone

७ । स्थित्यदनास्याच्च ।

७ । तृतीयमुच्छ्रितं श्रूयते,—

ज्ञा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया
समान वृक्ष परिप्लव्यते ।
तयोरन्य पिप्पलं स्वाद्वि

अनन्यन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ॥ (सु० ३।१।१ , ऋक् १।१६४।२१)

अथ भिन्नदशायां परमात्मन 'भ्रिति' बीदासीत्येव चरन्त्या तया जीवत्वन
'चदन' चरन्त्यात्मनः इति भेदव्यवस्था । 'च' कर्मत्वतस्तु चरीरत्वं सिद्धम् ।

7 *And by reason of indifference and eating* It is said in the third *Mundaka* — 'Two birds, related to each other and friends, are sheltered in the same tree. One of them eats sweet fruits, while the other looks on without eating (in. 11 *Rik* I 164 21) Here by reason of indifference and eating that is by the indifference of the Supreme Self and the eating—the enjoyment of the fruits of its actions on the part of the individual self—two distinguishing marks it is established that the support of heaven and earth is not the individual self

८ । भूमा सम्प्रसादाद्युपदेष्टात् ।

८ । आसीत्सुत्तु (पार३ २४ इत्याद्यासु) 'भूमा' प मात्मा एव न प्राणः ।
अद्यात् — सम्प्रसादात् अमुपदेष्टात् । सम्प्रसाद इति सुखं भोगम् उच्यते
सम्बन्धं प्रदीदति अस्मिन् इति निश्चयनात् । तस्मात् च सम्प्रसादात्प्राणा प्राणं जायति
इति । (मन्त्रे ३।३) प्राण एव सम्प्रसादं अभिप्रेक्षति । प्राणात् उच्यते भूमा उपदिष्टा
भागत्वात् प्राणात् अथ परमात्मा भूमा भवितुम् चर्हति ।

8. *The Bhṛmā is the Supreme Self for it is spoken of as higher than the vital air* The *Bhṛmā* (Infinite) spoken of in the *Chhândogya Sṛuti* (vol. 23 24 &c.) is the Supreme Self and not the vital air Why ?—For it is spoken of as higher than "the state of great bliss." "The state of great bliss" means the state of dreamless sleep on account of the description of it,—the self feels great bliss

in it (*Prasna* iv 6) In that state of great bliss the vital air (it is said) awakes (*Prasna* iv 3) So here, by "the state of great bliss" the vital air is meant Because the *Bhūma* is spoken of as higher than the vital air, therefore the '*Bhūma*' is the Supreme Self, different from the vital air

८ । धर्मोपपत्तेश्च ।

८ । अपि च वे भूमि श्रूयन्ते धर्माः, अन्यद्गुणादि व्यवसायाभावः, सुखत्वम्, अमृतत्वम्, स्वभक्तिप्रतिष्ठितत्वम्, सर्वगतत्वम्, सर्वोभत्वम् च, एते परमात्मनि एव उपपद्यन्ते । अतः परमात्मा एव भूमा ।

9 And the attributes of the *Bhūman* that are mentioned, the absence of seeing, hearing &c, other things, blissfulness, immortality, establishment in his own glory, all-pervasiveness, and being the self of all, are all possible only of the Supreme Self Hence the Supreme Self alone is the *Bhūmā*

१० । अक्षरमखरान्तर्धृतेः ।

१० । ब्रह्मदारण्यकोक्तम् (शां० ७, ८) 'अक्षरम्' परमात्मा एव, न वर्णः । 'अखरान्तर्धृते' पृथिव्यादेः आकाशत्वस्य विकारजातस्य धारणात् । तत्र समस्तस्य विकारजातस्य आकाशे प्रतिष्ठितत्वम् उक्त्वा "कस्मिन् न खलाकाशं शीतश्च प्रीतश्च ?" इति अनेन प्रश्नेन इदम् अक्षरम् अवतारितम्, तथा च उपसङ्गतम्,—“एतस्मिन् न खल्वक्षरे गार्ध्याकाशं शीतश्च प्रीतश्चेति । न च विकारजातधारणं ब्रह्मणः, अन्यत्र सम्भवति ।

10 *The Akshara is the Supreme Self on account of its supporting all phenomena* The Akshara mentioned in the *Bṛhaddāraṇyaka Upanishad* (iii 8 7 8) is the Supreme Self and not a letter on account of its supporting all phenomena beginning with the earth and ending in the ether. There having spoken of all phenomena as supported by ether the scripture introduces this *Akshara* with the question "In what is ether woven like warp and woof?" and concludes thus—"Verily O Gārgi it is in this Akshara that ether is woven like warp and woof. Now it is not possible for any one or anything else than Brahman to support all phenomena."

११ । सा च प्रमादनात् ।

११ । सा च' अत्र 'प्रमादनात्' परमेश्वरस्य एव कार्यं । अस्यात् ?—प्रमादनात् यतः प्रमादनादूर्ध्वं आत्मानं इह दूयते—'यतस्य सा अपरस्य प्रमादने मासि सूर्या चन्द्रमसौ विद्यन्ते तिष्ठतः' (इह १।१८) इत्यादिना । प्रमादनात् च परमेश्वरं अन्यं न दृष्टव्यमस्य प्रमादनात् समर्थम् ।

11 *And thus is the work of the Supreme Lord only on account of command* And this, the supporting of all phenomena beginning with the earth and ending in ether is the work of the Supreme Lord alone. Why?—On account of command—for texts like "By the command of that Aksharam, O Gārgi the sun and the moon exist supported" (*Br* iii 8. 9) speak of supporting by command. Now commanding is the work of the Supreme Lord. It is not possible for an inanimate object

१२ । अन्यभावव्यावृत्तेऽथ ।

१२ । इत्थं अक्षरम् परमात्मा एव, यतः श्रुतिः अक्षरम् 'अन्यभावात्' वक्ष्यमाण-
चेतनभावात् 'व्यावर्तयति' पृथक्त्वा कथयति, "तदा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यं द्रष्टुं
श्रीवसतः सत्त्वविज्ञातं विज्ञात (ब्रह्म ३।८।११) इत्यादिना ।

12 *And on account of its being distinguished from things which are different* And for this reason also is the Akshara nothing but the Supreme Self, that scripture distinguishes the Akshara from 'things which are different,' that is inanimate objects such as letters, for instance in the text "That Akshara, O Gárgi, is an unseen seer, an unheard hearer, an unthought of thinker and an unknown knower" (Br iii 8 11)

१३ । ईक्षतिकर्म-व्यपदेशात् सः ।

१३ । प्रश्नोपनिषद् पञ्चमप्रश्ने उक्तं ओकार 'स' परमात्मा एव, यतः तम्
'ईक्षतिकर्म'त्वेन ध्यानविषयरूपेण 'व्यपदिशति' श्रुतिः — "स एतस्माज्जीवधनात् परात्परं
पुरिश्रयं पुरुषमीक्षते" । (प्रश्न ५।५) इति ।

13 *It is he, for he is spoken of as the object of sight.* The 'Om' mentioned in the fifth *prasna* (question) of the *Prasna* Upanishad is 'he', the Supreme Self, and none else, for the scriptural text, "from this Concentration of life (i.e. the source of all life) he sees the Person, higher than the high and pervading all organisms" (Pr v 5) speaks of him as the object of sight, that is of meditation

गति-ब्रह्मलोकैकशब्दौ भवतः । “इमां सर्वां प्रजा अप्रहर्षयिष्यामि एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्ति ।” (ऋ० ८१२) तत्र प्रकृतं दृश्यं ब्रह्मलोकैकशब्देन अभिधाय तद्विषया गतिं प्रजाशब्दवाच्यानां जीवानाम् अभिधीयमानां दृश्यस्य ब्रह्मतां गमयति । ‘तथाहि’ सुत्यन्तरे (छा० ६।८।१) “सता सीत्य तदा रुप्यग्री भवति” इति एवमादौ सुप्तप्रवस्थायां ब्रह्मविषय गमनम् ‘दृष्ट’ । तत् एव दर्शनं दृश्यस्य ब्रह्मवाच्यत्वे ‘लिङ्गम्’ प्रमाणम् ।

15 The “small” (*ākāśa*) is Brahman on account of going and a term, for thus is it seen, and this seeing is a sign. For this reason also is the Supreme Lord alone the “small” that at the end of the passage treating of the “small” there is the mention of a going and there is the term “Brahmaloka,” both of which refer to the Supreme Lord. “All these creatures,” it is said, “day after day going into that Brahma-world do not discover it” (*Ch viii 3 2*) This passage speaks of the “small” in the term “Brahma-world” and of individual selves called “creatures” as going there, and thus shows that the “small” is Brahman. And in another scriptural text, “He, my dear, becomes united with the True &c” (*Ch vi 8 1*) we read of the self going to Brahman in dreamless sleep, and this becomes a sign or proof that the “small” means Brahman.

१६ । धृतेऽसि सहिष्णोऽत्यास्मिन्नुपलब्धेः ।

१६ । “अथ य आत्मा स सेतुर्विधृतिरेषा लोकानामुत्तमं दाय” । (छा० ८।११) यत्र दृश्यस्य ‘धृते च’ जगद्धारणात् च परमेश्वर एव दृश्यः । कुत ?—‘अस्मिन्’ परमेश्वरे ‘अस्य’ ‘सहिष्णु’ जगद्धारणशक्ते ‘उपलब्धे’ दर्शनात् सुत्यन्तरे,—“एतस्य वा अचरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसी विधृतौ तिष्ठतः” (ऋ० ३।८।८) इत्यादौ ।

18 *If it be said, from the mention of the other one, that that is meant, we say 'No', because of the impossibility* If it be doubted that because at the end of the passage the other one, that is the individual self, is meant by the "small," then we must say that this doubt should not be cherished, because the attributes of sinlessness &c, are impossible in the case of the individual self

१८ । उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपसु ।

१८ । 'उत्तरात्' उत्तरस्यात् प्रागापल्यात् वाक्यात् "एवमेवैष सप्रसादोऽप्याच्छरीरात् समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपमापद्य भ्येन रूपेणाभिनिर्गम्यते ।" (छा० ८।१२।३) इत्यादि 'चित्' यदि जीवश्च । भवेत्, सा न युक्ता, यत 'आविर्भूतस्वरूप' आनननेन प्रकाशितब्रह्मभाव जीव एव तत्र उक्त । 'तु' शब्द पूर्वपक्षनिराकार्यः ।

19 *If the doubt arises from a subsequent passage, we say that there the individual self, with its true nature manifested, is spoken of* If the doubt that the "small" is the individual self arises from a subsequent passage where Prajāpati speaks, for instance the text, "Thus does this serene being, rising above this body, and having reached the highest light, appears in its own form" (Ch VIII 12 3), then it is not reasonable, for that passage speaks of the individual self with its unity with Brahman manifested through the power of knowledge 'Tu' (but) rejects the objector's view

२० । अन्यार्थश्च परात्मनः ।

२० । दहरवाक्यशेषस्य जीव-परात्मनश्च 'अन्यार्थ' परमेस्वरस्वरूप निर्देशार्थः ।

20 *And the reference has another meaning And the reference to the individual at the end of the passage treating of the small" has another meaning—it is meant to set forth the real nature of the Supreme Lord*

२१ । अहमवुतेरिति चेत् तदुक्तम् ।

११ । अहमवुते दहमण्ण अयायत्तम् सुतो दह उवाच ॥ अहमवुतयात् दह न पामिद वाचम इति चेत् 'तत्' अभावात्तम् त्रितीयपादस्य अत्र न 'उक्तम्' एव ।

21 *If the doubt arises from the scriptural declaration of smallness it has been answered elsewhere If it is objected that the small does not mean the Supreme Lord because the term dahara means small and scripture speaks of the dahara dāsa as small then we say that we have answered the objection in the seventh aphorism of the second pāda*

२२ । अनुक्षतेऽप्य च ।

११ । अनुक्षीपनिपदि उक्तम् —

न तत्र क्षीयं भवति न चन्द्रता च

मेवा विद्युती भवति क्षीयप्रभवि ।

तमेव भग्नमनुभाति सर्वं

तस्य भाषा सन्निविष्ट विभाति ॥ (१।१।१)

अवीर्य सर्वप्रकाशक आकाश परमात्मन एव । कुत ?—अनुक्षते अनुभावात्

“तमेव भात्मनोभाति सर्वम्” इति सर्वस्य तदनुभात्यवशात् । ‘तस्य च’ “तस्य भास सर्वमिदं विभाति” इति च परमात्मानं गमयति ।

22 On account of reflecting, he who is spoken of in the Mundaka text is the Supreme Self And “his” &c. indicates that Self The Mundaka Upanishad says, “The sun does not shine there, nor do the moon and the stars These lightnings do not shine there How can this fire ? After that shining One alone does all shine All this shines by his light ” (II 2-10) The all-revealing Self spoken of here is the Supreme Self Why ? On account of ‘reflecting,’ for in the clause “All shines after him” all things are said to reflect him ‘And his,’ i e “And all this shines by his light,” also indicates the Supreme Self

२३ । अपि च स्मर्यते ।

२३ । ‘अपि च’ परमात्मन इदं सर्वविभासरूपं भगवद्गीताश्रुतौ पञ्चदशाध्याये कथ्यते,—

न ज्ञास्यते सूर्यो न शशाङ्को न पावकः ।

यद्गत्वा न निवर्त्तन्ते तद्धाम परमं मम ॥ ६ ।

यदादित्यगत तेजो जगज्ञास्यतेऽखिलम् ।

यच्चन्द्रमसि यश्चाग्नौ तत्तेजो विद्धि मामकम् ॥ १२ । इति ।

23 And thus is said in the Smṛiti also And that aspect of the Supreme Self which reveals all things, is also spoken of in the fifteenth chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā Smṛiti*, thus,—“Neither the sun nor the moon nor fire reveals that abode (or aspect) of mine from which no one returns”

(Verso 6) The light in the sun which illuminates the whole world that which is in the moon and in fire,—know that light to be mine (Verso 12)

२४ । अन्दादेव प्रमित ।

१४ । अतीपनिपदि द्वितीयाऽपि प्रथमवत् । दूर्ध्वं —

अद्भुतमात्रं पुरुषी मत्तं चात्मनि तिष्ठति ।

ईशानी भूतमन्त्रं न ततो विमुक्तमस्ति ॥ ११ ॥

अद्भुतमात्रं पुरुषी गीतिरिवायमत्र ।

ईशानी भूतमन्त्रं य एवायं उच्यते ॥ ११ ॥

यस्य अन्दात् एव ईशानादि-परमात्मवत्त्वं मत्तान् एव प्रमितयति यत् 'प्रमितं' सुप्त्वं अद्भुत-परिमितं पुरुषं परमात्मा एव न विद्यानाम्ना ।

24 The measured is Brahman from the term itself In the Kathopanishad chap. II valli I it is said —
—“The Person of the size of the thumb is seated in the middle part of the body He is the Regulator of the past and the future. So the wiseman does not hate any one. This is that. The Person of the size of the thumb is like a light without smoke. He is the Regulator of the past and the future. He is today and he will be tomorrow (12,13) Now from the term itself that is from such words in the text quoted as Regulator which mean the Supreme Self it is proved that the measured that is “the Person of the size of the thumb mentioned in the text is the Supreme Self alone, and not the individual

२५ । हृदयेष्वपि तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात् ।

२५ । शास्त्रस्य 'मनुष्याधिकारत्वात्' 'हृदयेष्वपि तु' अङ्गुष्ठपरिमित-मनुष्यहृदया-
वस्थानम् अपेक्ष्य च परमात्मन आङ्गुष्ठमावृतम् उच्यते ।

25 It is so described with reference to the heart because the study of the scriptures is man's sphere As the study of the scriptures is man's sphere, the Supreme Self is described as of the size of a thumb-with reference to its dwelling in man's heart, which is of the size of a thumb

२६ । तदुपर्यपि वादरायणः सम्भवत् ।

२६ । 'तदुपरि अपि' तेषां मनुष्याणाम् उपरिष्ठात् वे देवादयः, तान् अपि शास्त्रम्
अधिकरोति, इति वादरायण आचार्य नन्यते । 'सम्भवात्' यत देवादीनाम् अपि
अधिकार-कारण विग्रहवत्त्वादि सम्भवति ।

26 According to Bādarāyana beings above man are also entitled to that study, for that is possible The teacher, Bādarāyana, thinks that beings such as the gods, who are above man, are also entitled to the study of the scriptures, for in their case also these causes, for instance that of having bodies, that give that title, do exist

२७ । विरोधः कर्मणीति चेन्नानेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात् ।

२७ । देवादीनां शास्त्राधिकारे अविरोधे अपि 'कर्मणि विरोधः' स्यात्, यत
बहुषु योगेषु युगपत् एकस्य विग्रहवत् देवस्य सन्निधानं न उपपद्यते । 'इति चेत् न' ।
'अनेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात्' यत श्रुति एकैकस्य देवस्य अनेकरूपग्रहणं दर्शयति ।

27 *It cannot be said that this is opposed to sacrificial rites for the scriptures speak of their assuming many forms* Though nothing stands in the way of the gods being entitled to the study of the scriptures, yet it may be said that this is opposed to the performance of sacrificial rites, for the presence of the same embodied god at the same time at different sacrifices is unreasonable. But it is not so for scripture speaks of the same god assuming many forms

२८ । यत् इति चेदात प्रमवात् प्रत्ययागुमानाम्याम् ।

१८ । अथचि चरितेधि चरि 'मर्थ' विरिच स्वात् । पूर्वमीमांसायां शब्दावर्षी निवृत्तत्वात् चरित्वे विदुषा प्रामाण्यं आपितं दिवागाच मन्त्रावर्षसं दमितम् । तेषां मरीचकत्वत्वात् तु चरित्वत्वं प्रसज्येत, नित्यत्वं यदप्य चरित्वेन चर्येण निवृत्तत्वात् प्रवीतमसि विदुषा प्रामाण्यं च विरिच स्वात् । 'इति चेत् न । 'यत्' प्रमवात् यत् एव हि विदित्वात् यत्वात् दिवादिषु जगत् प्रभवति । द्रव्यगुणव्यप्या हि व्यक्तय एव उत्पद्यन्ते, न आकृतय । आकृतिसिद्धिं यदानीं निवृत्तत्वात् कर्तुं पुनः चरित्वेन यदानीं प्रभवति जगत् इति ? प्रत्ययागुमानाम्याम्—प्रत्यय हि स्तुतिः, प्रामाण्यं प्रति चरित्वत्वात् । अनुमानं चरित्वं, प्रामाण्यं प्रति आपेक्षत्वात् । तै हि शब्दपूर्वैः छटि दर्शयत ।

28. *It cannot be said that it is opposed to the Word for the world originates from it as appears from Sruti and Smṛiti* It may be said that though not opposed to sacrificial rites, it (the gods title to scripture in virtue of their being embodied) is opposed to the 'Word' The *Pūroḍhā Mīmāṃsā* establishes the authoritativeness of the

Veda on the fact of the eternal connection of word and meaning and shows that the gods are of the nature of *matras* (Vedic texts) If they were supposed to have bodies, their non eternity would result from such a supposition, and if eternal words were supposed to have non-eternal meanings, the eternal connection of word and meaning would be destroyed and the authoritativeness of the Veda would become questionable But we say that all this would not follow For 'from this,' that is from Vedic words, the world, including the gods, originates Of substances, qualities and actions, it is indeed the individuals, and not the species, that originate, and it is with the species, and not with the individuals, that words are eternally connected But how do we know that the world originates from Vedic words? From *pratyaksha*, direct knowledge, and *anumana* inference The *Śruti* is direct knowledge, for it does not depend on any thing else for its proof, and the *Smṛiti* is inference, for it depends on *Śruti* Both of them declare that the world proceeds from the Word

२६ । अत एव च नित्यत्वम् ।

२६ । 'अत एव च' देवादे जगत् वेदशब्द-प्रभवात् एव च वेदशब्दस्य नित्यत्वम् प्रत्येतत्त्वम् ।

29 *And from this follows eternity* And from this,—from the origination of the world, including the gods, from Vedic words, there follows the eternity of these words

३० । समान नामरूपत्वाद्याहसावप्यविरोधो दर्शनात् स्मृतेश्च ।

१ । समान नामरूपत्वात् य चाहती अपि चविरोध दर्शनात् स्मृति च इति पञ्चेद । चाहती प्रलयान् पुन सृष्टौ समान नामरूपत्वात् च पूर्वोक्तोक्त-नामक्य साह प्रत्यगात् 'अपि चविरोध एव सिद्धः । प्रत्यपि अपि ईहादि जयत आपत्तिक विनाश न भवति । यत प्रत्याप्य ईहादि आपत्तिक निवृत्त्यात् विदमानास्तस्य न स्मृति विरोध इति । अतः पुन नामरूपयो समत्वम् ?—दर्शनात् स्मृतेश्च इत्यनेन हि तत् स्मृति-स्मृतिद्वयः । "तृतीयोऽहोरात्रो जगता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् । त्विद्यं पृथिवीशान् रीचमभीक्ष्णं (अथ १ । ११ । १) इति स्मृतिः ।

धर्मभूतानि चोक्तोक्तं प्रवृत्तिं ज्ञानि मांसिष्ठान् ।

कल्पयेत् पुत्रानि वृक्षानि विद्वज्जगत्सु ॥

प्रवृत्तिं भ्रामयन् विद्वज्जगत्सु पुन पुन ।

भूतधामनिमं जगत्सु भवन् प्रवृत्तिवत्सु ॥ मन् (१५, ८)

इति स्मृतिः ।

30 And on account of the sameness of name and form in the renovation of the world there is no contradiction as appears from Sruti and Smriti. And as, in the creation of the world after its destruction, the names and forms of the previous cycle remain the same the above doctrine remains uncontradicted. That is, even at the destruction of the world the world, including the gods is not destroyed once for all. Therefore, as the gods and other things, the meanings of the Vedic words, are relatively eternal, the authoritativeness of the Veda is no way prejudiced. But how can we know that names and forms remain the same?—From the *Sruti* and the *Smriti* both of which declare this. A *Sruti* text says, 'The

Creator made the sun, the moon, the sky, the earth, the middle regions and heaven, as they were before" (*Rik* x 120 3) And a *Smṛiti* text, "O son of Kuntī, at the end of a cycle all things return to my [lower] nature at the beginning of [every] cycle I create them again With the instrumentality of my [lower] nature I create again and again this assemblage of creatures, devoid of freedom, being subject to [their respective] natures [moulded by previous deeds]" (*Bh* ix 7, 8)

३१ । सञ्चादिष्वसम्भवादनधिकारं जैमिनिः ।

३१ । छान्दोग्योपनिषदि तृतीयाध्याये उक्ता सधुविद्या देवोपासनात्मिका एव, न नस्या देवादीनाम् अधिकारः सम्भवति । एव सञ्चादिषु विद्यासु देवाधिकारस्य 'असम्भवात्' विद्याभावे एव देवानाम् 'अनधिकार' मन्यते आचार्य 'जैमिनि' ।

32 As the gods can have no title to the 'Madhu' and other vidyās, Jaimini thinks they have no title to any vidyā The 'Madhu Vidyā' given in the third chapter of the *Chhândogya* Upanishad consists of the worship of the gods, the gods therefore can have no title to it On account of this impossibility of the gods having title to the 'Madhu' and other vidyās (meditations) the teacher, Jaimini, thinks they are unentitled to all vidyās

३२ । ज्योतिषि भावाच्च ।

३२ । 'ज्योतिषि' ज्योतिर्भवे पिण्डे आदित्यादीनां देवतावचनानां शब्दानां 'भावात्'

मयीमात् दीवाद्य चन्द्रादिकम् चरितम्, एव । इत्येव चरितम्, एव तेषां वैदुः इति
ब्रूयते जैमिनिः ।

32. And because deva is applied to light As the words Aditya and the like meaning the gods are applied to light to shining globes,—the gods and such other objects are only inanimate things like mud. From this also Jaimini thinks they have no title to the study of the Vedas.

३३ । भायन्तु वादरायणोऽस्ति हि ।

३३ । ३८ । ५० । ५१ । भायन्तु दीवादीनाम् अविचारः अस्ति मयते ।
‘हि’ यत तेषां विषये दृष्टीत्, भायन्तु म् ‘यति’ ।

33 But Bddarāyana admits the existence of this title as there is a power in the gods to assume bodies But Bddarāyana thinks that the gods are entitled to the study of the Vedas, for they have the power of assuming bodies

३४ । शुभाश्व रादनाद्व्यवसायात् तदादेवयात् सृष्यते हि ।

३४ । न शुभश्च अविचारः विद्यासु ईनाभ्यसनाभावात् । अथ तस्मिन् शास्त्राग्दी
परिषदः अनुष्ठाप्यति उच्यते । संवर्गविद्यायां शुद्धत्वं ज्ञानसुते अविचारः ? इति श्रुता
निरासाहम् इहं ब्रूयम् । अस्तुतः तन्मोक्षे छ ज्ञानधृति संवादि रक्षेन उच्यते ‘शुद्ध’शब्द
न जातिवाचकः । ‘हि’ यत तेषां व्यवसायात् व्यवसायात् आत्मनः अनात्-एवैव व्यवसायात्
तदा व्यवसायं तेन शब्देन मय ज्ञानसुते । अस्मिन्नेव व्यवसायात् विद्याचारित्यं शुद्धमर्थेन
यस्य ज्ञानसुते ‘यच्च’ शब्दः लीला । अथ वा सृष्यते ।

34 The term 'Súdra' expresses his sorrow, as he had heard a speech disrespectful to himself and had gone with that grief. This aphorism is meant to meet the following objection —A Sudra is not entitled to the *vidyás*, as he cannot study the Vedas. How is it then that the title of Jánasruti, a Súdra, to the Sambarga Vidyá given in the fourth chapter of the *Chhandogya* Upanishad is recognised? Now, the fact is that the term 'Sudra' used by Raikva in the dialogue between him and Jánasruti given in the passage in question does not mean caste. For, as he had heard himself disrespectfully spoken of by a flamingo and had gone to Raikva with sorrow caused thereby, the term 'Súdra' uttered by Raikva expresses Jánasruti's sorrow or his going with sorrow.

३५ । चतुर्विधगतेऽप्युत्तरत्वे चैत्ररथेन लिङ्गात् ।

३५ । 'उत्तरत्वे' सवर्गवाक्यशेषे (४।३।५) 'चैत्ररथेन' एतन्नाम्ना चतुर्विधं जनमि व्याख्यातुं 'लिङ्गात्' जानयते 'चतुर्विधगते' चतुर्विधं सिद्धे 'च' न वैकौशारित्यं सूत्रशब्दं कतिवाचकम् ।

35 And because the Kshatriyahood of Jánasruti is established by a mark, -his being mentioned later on with Chitraratha. For this reason also the term 'Súdra' uttered by Raikva does not mean caste, that the Kshatriyahood of Jánasruti is established by a mark, namely his being mentioned along (in the same section) with a Kshatriya named Chitraratha later on, that is at the end of the passage containing the Sambarga Vidyá (iv 35)

२४ । संस्कारपरामर्शत् तदभावाभिज्ञाप्य ।

୧୧. ଜଣେ ମ ଯାଏ ବିଦ୍ୟାଧିକାର ଦେବି ବିଦ୍ୟାଦେବୀ (ବା) ତାହା ନା ୧୧)
ପଦକ୍ରମାବଳୀ: ଶିକ୍ଷାଦାୟକ ପଦାବଳୀ, ଯଦି ଏକ ଶିକ୍ଷାଦାୟକ 'ଦକ୍ଷିଣାଦି' ଶବ୍ଦମାନ
(କ୍ରମ ୧ ଓ ୨ : ୧୧୧୧)

36 And on account of the mention of purificatory ceremonies (in the case of the higher castes) and of their absence in the case of Śūdras. And for this reason also are the Śūdras unentitled to the *vidyās* that in several passages dealing with them (for instance *Chh* vii 1 1 *Pr* 1 1) purificatory ceremonies like the *upanayana* are mentioned, while in the case of the Śūdras the absence of such ceremonies is often spoken of (for instance in *Manu* x 4 and x 126).

६७। तदभाषनिर्हासश्च प्रवृत्तिः ।

३०। इत्यत्र यस्याः विद्याविद्या यत् साधनेतिपनिवत् चतुर्थीये स साधन
वीतम-संवादि सन्त्यनेन सत्यकामस्य यद्व्यासाय निदर्शितं वीतमः तम् उपमेतम्
पुनराहितं च प्रवर्तते ।

37 And because Gautama proceeded to initiate Jāḍā on the ascertainment of his not being a Śūdra. And for this reason also are the Śūdras unentitled to the vidyās that in the fourth chapter of the *Chhāndogya* Upanishad in the dialogue between Gautama and Satya kīma, the former proceeded to initiate the latter only when it had been ascertained that he was not a Śūdra.

भूताकाश । 'अर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात्' यत इति. "ते यदन्तरा तद् ब्रह्म" इति नामरूपाभ्याम् 'अर्थान्तरत्वादिना' भिन्नार्थत्वादिना लिङ्गेन ब्रह्म व्यपदिशति । न च ब्रह्मेण अन्यत् नामरूपाभ्याम् अर्थान्तरं सम्भवति, सर्वस्य विकारजातस्य नामरूपाभ्याम् एव व्याप्तावत्वात् । नामरूपयोः अपि निर्वहणं निरङ्कुशं न ब्रह्मेण अन्यत् सम्भवति । "सर्वं देवतैश्चत हन्ताहमिमांसी देवता अनेन जीविनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि" (छा० ६।३।२) इति ब्रह्मकर्तृत्वश्रवणात् । 'तद् ब्रह्म तदद्वयं स आत्मा' इति च ब्रह्मवादस्य लिङ्गानि ।

41 The 'Akasa' is Brahman, as he is spoken of as something different &c It is said in the Chhandogya Upanishad, "Verily Akāśa' is the revealer of names and forms, that within which these are contained is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (viii 14 1) The Akāśa (ether) mentioned here is the Supreme Self, and not elemental ether, for in the words "within which these are contained" scripture indicates Brahman by such marks as differentiation from names and forms There cannot be anything else than Brahman that is different from names and forms, for all phenomena are evolved from names and forms Besides, nothing else than Brahman can reveal names and forms, for the Sruti speaks of the creative agency of Brahman in the words, "This Deity willed, 'Well, let me enter these three deities with this living self and reveal names and forms'" (Ch. vi 3 2) The words, "That is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self" are also indications that Brahman is meant here

४२ । सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्मदेन ।

४२ । उपदारय्यकीपनिपद. चतुर्थाध्याये "कतम आत्मेति योज्यं विज्ञानमय

शब्देषु ब्रह्मण्येति पुरुषः (३।३।१०) इति उपरहस्य भूतान् प्राण्यविषय इत्यत्र इति ।
 यदीति, आत्मा परब्रह्म एव न संसारी, यतः सुषुप्ती 'उतृहणी च अवस्था' इति
 परमात्मनः स्वीयान् भेदेन व्यपदिशति ।

42. *The Self is Brahman because he is spoken of as different in dreamless sleep and departure* In the fourth chapter of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣhad* the *Śruti* begins with 'Who is that self? He who is within the heart, among the *prāṇas* the person of light consisting of knowledge" (iv 3 7) and gives a lengthy exposition of the nature of the self. The self mentioned here is the supreme and not the transmigrating self for scripture speaks of the Supreme Self as different from the embodied self in the states of dreamless sleep and departure from the body

४३ । पत्न्यादिमय्येभ्यः ।

४३ । इत्यत्र चर्मसारि-भक्ष्यप्रतिपादनपरम् एतत् वाक्यम् अन्नपानाद्यम् यतः
 चक्षिन् वाक्ये 'पत्न्यादि' इत्यत्र,—“स सर्वज्ञ इत्यो सर्वभोजनो सर्वभक्षिपति”
 (३।३।११) एवञ्चातीत्यत्र,—चर्मसारि स्वरूप-प्रतिपादनपरम् भवति ।

43 *And on account of such words as Lord &c* That this passage treats of the nature of the non transmigrating Self is also known from the fact that such words as Lord &c., in the passage "He is the Lord of all the King of all the Protector of all &c. (iv 4 22) set forth the nature of the non transmigrating Self

समन्वय-नाम-प्रथमाध्याये

चतुर्थः पादः—अव्यक्तादि-सन्दिग्ध-पदानां ब्रह्मणि समन्वयः

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१ । आनुमानिकमप्येकोषामिति चेन्न शरीर-रूपक-विन्यस्त-
गृहीतेर्द्दर्शयति च ।

१ । कठीपनिषदि पठ्यते,—

इन्द्रियेभ्य परा अर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च पर मन ।

मनसश्च परा बुद्धिं पुंछेरात्मा महान् पर ॥

महत् परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात् पुरुष पर ।

पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गति ॥ (१।३।१०, ११)

अव्यक्ताव्यक्तास्य अप्रधानत्वं दर्शयति सूत्रकार । ‘एकोषाम्’ आखिना कठशाखिनाम्
“अव्यक्ताम्” आनुमानिका साध्यभृत्युक्ता प्रधानम् ‘अपि’ उपलभ्यते, तत् एव जगत
कारणम् ‘इति चेत् न’ । ‘शरीर-रूपक-विन्यस्त-गृहीते’ यत शरीरम् एव अत्र
रूप-रूपक-विन्यस्तम् “अव्यक्ता”शब्देन परिगृह्यते, न साध्यकाल्पित प्रधानम् । प्रकारणान्तरे
“आत्मान रयिन् विद्धि शरीरं रयमेव तु” (१।३।३) इत्यादौ श्रुति शरीररूपक
‘दर्शयति च’ ।

1 If it be said that the “avyakta” of one school is the
inferred ‘Pradhāna’, then we say “no”, for the term
refers to the body likened to a chariot, and scripture
shows thus We read in the Katha Upanishad —“The

objects are superior to the senses, the sensorium is superior to the objects, the understanding superior to the sensorium and the great self (the cosmic self Himnyagarbha) superior to the understanding. The undeveloped is superior to the great self and the Supreme Person superior to the undeveloped. There is nothing superior to the Person he is the end the highest goal. (1 3 10 11) The author of the aphorisms shows that the *avyakta* or undeveloped is not the *Pradhāna*. If it be said that the *avyakta* of one school—the *Kathas*—seems to be the inferred that is the *Pradhāna* spoken of in the *Sāṅkhya Smṛiti* and that is the cause of the world, then we say no for it is the body likened to a chariot and not the *Pradhāna* fancied by the *Sāṅkhya*, that is meant by the term *avyakta*. And scripture shows the likeness of the body to a chariot by saying "know the self to be the charoteer and the body to be the chariot" &c. in another passage (1 3 3)

२ । सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात् ।

१ । "अव्यक्तं" तु सूक्ष्मं शरीरम् इति । तत् एव अव्यक्तं प्रकृतम् 'अव्यक्तं' न तु सूक्ष्मं शरीरम् ।

2. But the subtle body is meant for the name suits it. But the *avyakta* is the subtle body for the name *avyakta* suits that alone and not the gross body

३ । तदधीनत्वादर्थधत् ।

१ । शरीरस्य अव्यक्तीत्यव्यक्तत्वात् तदधीनत्वात् सूक्ष्मशरीराधीनत्वात् तस्य सूक्ष्म-

शरीरस्य जीवात् परत्वम्, “महत परमव्यक्तम्” इति । ‘अर्थवत्’ यथा तस्मिन् एव वाक्ये इन्द्रियव्यापारस्य अर्थाधीनत्वात् अर्थानाम् इन्द्रियेभ्यः परत्वम् ।

3 *The subtle body is superior to the individual self because of dependence on it, as objects* The subtle body is superior to the individual self, because the bondage and liberation of the latter is dependent on the former, “The undeveloped is superior to the great self” ‘As objects,’ that is as, in the same passage, objects are said to be superior to the senses because the functions of the latter are dependent on objects

४ । ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च ।

४ । न इह “अव्यक्त” ज्ञेयत्वेन उच्यते । तस्मात् अपि न “अव्यक्त”शब्देन प्रधानम् अभिधीयते ।

4 *The ‘avyakta’ is not the Pradhāna also because it is not spoken of as something to be known* The ‘avyakta’ is not spoken of here as something to be known For this reason also the Pradhāna is not meant by the ‘avyakta’

५ । वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात् ।

५ ।

अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं

तथाऽरसनित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् ।

अनाद्यनन्तमहत् परं ध्रुव

निचात्य तन्मृत्युमुखात् प्रमुच्यते ॥ (१।१।१५)

इहं चतुर्मुक्तिं सांप्रसीतं प्रवक्तुं 'वदति इति चेत् न । 'किं दत्तं 'मात्रं' परमात्म-
एव इदं चक्षितं 'प्रवक्तव्यं' यत् 'इदं प्रवक्तव्यं' इत्यत्र एव ।

5 If you say the text speaks of Pradhāna we say no for the Intelligent Self is here spoken of because of the section. If you say that the *kātha* text 'That which is without speech without touch without form without decay without taste without smell eternal without beginning and end greater than the great and unchangeable — knowing that the worshipper is delivered from the mouth of Death' (1 3 15) speaks of the Pradhāna taught by the Sāṅkhya, then we say no for the Intelligent Supreme Self is really spoken of here, because this section relates to the Intelligent Self.

६ । अथाप्यमिव धैर्यमुपन्यास प्रथम ।

६ । इत्यत्र च प्रवक्तव्यं 'अथर्ववेद' इत्यत्र वा, यस्यात् अथाप्याम् एव
पदावाताम् — अथि ग्रीव परमात्मानाम् — अथिन् प्रवर्तन् 'एवम्' वदन् 'मात्रं' परमात्म-
वक्ष्यतया उपन्यासं उपदिष्टं इत्यस्ति तद्विषय एव 'अथर्व' न 'यत्' 'अथर्व' इत्य-
उपन्यास वा अस्ति ।

6 And there is thus a mention of and a question about only three things. For this reason also is the Pradhāna not meant by the term *avyakta* nor an object to be known that in this section only three things,—fire, the individual self and the Supreme Self—are mentioned thus that is as things to be spoken of by way of granting a boon and the question relates to these three things only. There is neither a mention of nor a question about any other thing.

७। महत्त्वम् ।

७। इत्यत्र न “अव्यक्तम्” प्रधानम्,—यथा “महत्”शब्दः सांख्ये, सत्त्वानामे अपि प्रधानजे प्रयुक्तः, न तम् एव वैदिके अपि प्रयोगे अभिधत्ते, तथा “अव्यक्त”शब्दः अपि न वैदिके प्रयोगे प्रधानम् अभिधातुम् अर्हति ।

7 And the case is like that of mahat And for this reason also is *avyakta* the Pradhāna,—As the Sāṅkhyas apply the term “mahat” to the mere substance first generated, and not in the Vedic sense, so the term *avyakta*, as used in the Veda, cannot denote the Pradhāna

८। चमसवदविशेषात् ।

८। श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदि कथ्यते,

अजामेका लोहितशुक्लश्या

वह्नी प्रजा सृजन्तानां भूपा ।

अजो ह्येको जूपमाणोऽनुश्रिते

जहत्यानां सक्तभोगासजीऽन्य ॥ (४।५)

अत्रोक्ता “अजा” सांख्योक्त प्रधानम् इति न शक्यते नियन्तुम् । ‘अविशेषात्’ विशेषावधारण-कारणमावात् । ‘चमसवत्’ यथा हि “अर्वाग्विलम्बसस ऊर्ध्वगुप्ते” (ब० २।२।३) इति अस्मिन् मन्त्रे स्वातन्त्र्येण अथ नाम ‘सौ चमसः अस्मिमेतः’, इति न शक्यते नियन्तु, यतः सर्वत्र अपि यथाकथञ्चित् अर्वाग्विलत्वादि-कल्पना उपपद्यते ।

8 ‘Ajá’ does not mean the Pradhāna on account of the absence of any special characteristic, as in the case of the spoon “It is said in the Svetāsvatara Upanishad — “The one she-goat or unborn (Nature or elementary sub-

tance) red white and black, bearing many creatures and uniform—some unborn (self) lies near her and enjoys her while some other unborn (self) abandons her after she has been enjoyed (iv 5) It cannot be said that the “unborn spoken of here is the Brahman taught by the Sāṅkhya. For there is no reason to take the word in that special sense. As in the case of the spoon that is as it cannot be said that in the text There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above (Br II 2. 3) a particular spoon is distinctly meant for in every case the idea of having the mouth below &c. applies more or less so in this case.

८ । ज्योतिरप्यक्षमा तु तया ह्यधीयत एके ।

८ । ज्योतिरप्यक्षमा तु ज्योतिःप्रभुता तैजोऽवतलतया अगुविजृम्भतप्रभुता
प्रज्जलिमृता तु त्वम् पश्चा प्रतिपत्तया । अस्यात् ?—‘तया हि एके सृष्टिन—
दालो यत्—‘परीपति’ तस्मिन् अस्ति ब्रह्माध्यात्म्यं अगुर्वैश्वं ३ प्रथमवाक्यवत्पुटये ।

9 But the elements beginning with light are meant by *ajd*, for some teach this But this *ajd* is to be understood as the substance of the four kinds of elements beginning with light and consisting of *teja ap* and *anna* Why ?—For some, that is the Chhândogya, teach this in the first four verses of the fourth section of the sixth chapter of their Upanishad

१० । कश्चनोपदेशाच्च भष्वादिवदविरोध ।

१ । तया ज्योतीरपक्षमात् यतः सृज्यते पश्चात् कलनया एव उपविशति

enumerated the *Pradhāna* &c are not to be taken as mentioned in the scriptures for the *Sāṅkhya* categories are diverse and there is excess. Though certain categories are enumerated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text. In whom the five five people and ether rest him alone I believe to be the Self. I who know and am immortal believe him to be Brahman the immortal (iv 4 17) it must not be apprehended that the *Pradhāna* &c. are taught in the *Sruti*. Why not?—For the twenty five *Sāṅkhya* categories are diverse and every five of them have no common characteristics by reason of which they may be included by five and five in the total twenty five. So by five five people the twenty five categories are not meant. And also because there is excess, the twenty five categories cannot be meant. The addition of ether and the self makes the Vedic categories more than twentyfive.*

१२। प्राणादयो वाक्येऽपि ।

११। प्राणा यः प्राणः चक्षुः श्रोत्रम् चक्षुः मनः एव पञ्चमगः विद्वत्पणः । वाक्येऽपि यत् प्राणश्च मानसश्च चक्षुश्च श्रोत्रं मनो यः त्वः विदुः (भा० १८) इति वाक्येऽपि ते एव उक्ताः । ननु पञ्चमात् प्राणादयः ननु पञ्चमात् भवन्ति ।

12. The five five people are breath &c., as appears

* As to the five principal Indian tribes of Vedic times, see the Editor's *Krishna and the Puranas*. But the author of the aphorisms gives a psychological interpretation of the phrase 'पञ्च पञ्चमः ।'

from the end of the passages. Life &c., that is life, the eye, the ear, food and the sensorium are meant by "the five five people" for these are the things that are mentioned at the end of the passage, thus, they who know the life of life, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, and the *manas* (mind or sensorium)" (iv 4 18) On account of their being related to people, the word "people" is applied to life &c.

१३ । ज्योतिषैकेषामसत्यत्वे ।

१३ । 'पक्षेपा' शक्तिना—कल्पानाम्—'यत्र पक्षति' पक्षशब्दे पविद्यमाने अपि पूर्वमन्वीकृतं (४।४।१६) 'ज्योतिषा' ज्योतिशब्देन तेषां पक्षसंख्या पूर्यते इति वाक्यमेष ।

13 In the case of some, the number is made up by 'light' in the absence of 'food' In the case of one school, the Kánvas, though 'food' is absent, the number is made up by 'light' mentioned in the preceding verse (iv 4 16)

१४ । कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तैः ।

१४ । वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगत्कारणविषय मतवैचित्र्यम् अस्ति इति न आशङ्कनीयम्, यत प्रतिवेदान्तं सृज्यमानेषु 'आकाशादिषु' क्रमादिद्वारके मतवैचित्र्ये सति अपि, एकस्मिन् वेदान्ते यथाभूत सर्वज्ञ सर्वेश्वर सर्वात्मक अद्वितीय 'कारणत्वेन' कारणरूपेण व्यपदिष्ट, तथाभूत एव वेदान्तान्तरेषु अपि व्यपदिश्यते ।

14 Notwithstanding diversity of views as to things created, like ether &c, there is no diversity as to the Creator, as he is mentioned in one passage as well as in

१६। जगदाचिन्मात् ।

१०। वायोतकि-जातमिदमिति श्रुते "ये न पश्यन् एतदां पश्यन्तां यथा, यस्य वै तत् कर्म स वै विदितः इति ।" (१।१५) अथ तत्तत्परं परमेश्वर एव, न जीव न सात्त्विक प्राण इति । तद्वत् १—"यत्तत्"—"पश्यन्"मन्त्र- "जगदाचिन्मात्" । अत्र च सप्रतिष्ठितं भवत् "एतत्"मन्त्र- "विदितः"संज्ञकत्वेन च वक्ष्यते ।

16 The "Invisible" is the Supreme Lord for the term "person" means the world. In the Kaushitaki Brahman Upanishad it is said,—"O Baliki, he who is the creator of these persons, he of whom these are creations, verily he is to be known" (iv 19) He who is described in this passage as "to be known" is the Supreme Lord, and not the individual self or the chief vital air, for the "persons" in the passage means the world. The world directly proximate is indicated by the word "these" and spoken of as the work of him who is to be known.

१७। जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गमेति चेत् तद्व्याख्यातम् ।

१०। आपशिखण्डनम् । 'जीव-मुख्यप्राण-लिङ्गात्' पूर्वोक्तवाच्यमित्ये जीवलिङ्ग मुख्यप्राणलिङ्ग च भवति, अथ अत्र परमेश्वरस्यैव न युक्तम्, 'इति चेत्', 'तत्' पूर्वम् एव, प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमे पादे एकविंश-सूत्रे 'व्याख्यातम्' ।

17 If this statement be questioned because of the marks of the individual self and the chief vital air, then we say that we have already explained this. An objection is met here. If it be said that because at the end of the above passage there are the marks showing

that the individual self and the chief vital air are meant therefore it is not reasonable to understand the Supreme Lord by the above word then we say that we have already explained this before in the 31st aphorism of pāda 1 Chap. 1.

१८। अभ्यार्यसु जैमिनि प्रत्युपस्थानाभ्यामपि चयमिके ।

१८। अपि च न एव एव निरास्तित्वे श्रीरुपधान वा इदं वाक्ये स्यात् ब्रह्मरूपेण वा इति एव च यत् वाक्ये 'अस्यापि ब्रह्मरूपिण्यपि जीवपरामर्शे जैमिनि मन्दति । अस्यापि'—'प्रत्युपस्थानाभ्यां' वाच्यमित्यत एव तत्प्राप्तिरप्यत्र च दृष्टा । प्रत्युपस्थानं सुप्रस्थितप्रवृत्तिविरहे,—“कैव एतद् वाक्यात् प्रवृत्तिरपि कर्तव्या भूत् कृत एतन्नाशान् इति (श्रीरी ३।१८) । प्रतिवचनम् तदा व्याख्यानम् यदि,—“एतां सुप्तं सप्त न च एतन् पञ्चमपरिज्ञम् प्राक् एवमेव भवति । स एतां प्रतिवृत्तिरपि एतां प्रवृत्तिरपि मर्त्ये दिव्ये विष्णुस्तिष्ठा विप्रतिष्ठ एवेतिवैतत्या । अत एव प्राक् अथापतन विप्रतिष्ठते । प्रवृत्तिरपि दिव्ये दिव्ये जीवतः । सुप्रस्थितानि परैव ब्रह्मणा श्रीरः एकतां पञ्चति, पञ्चान् च ब्रह्मणः प्राक्दिक् जगत् कर्तते इति उपनिषत्पूर्वमर्थः । चयमिके अपि च, एके मास्तिन्—वाच्यमिति—इदं वाक्यं जीवनिवदि (१।१।१८) एवम् एव चयमि ।

18. Jaimini thinks the passage has another import from the question and the explanation and so thinks one school. And it is not to be disputed whether this passage deals with the individual self or with Brahman for Jaimini thinks that it has another import—that it deals with the individual self in order to establish Brahman. How?—It appears from the question and the answer in the passage. The question, which is about a person roused from sleep

is this, "Wherein, O Bālāki, did this person sleep? Where was this person? Where did this person come from?" (*Kau* iv. 19) The answer and the explanation follow,— "When the individual sleeps and does not dream, then he becomes one with this life. When he awakes, then, as sparks from a burning fire fly around, so from this Self fly around the senses towards their respective seats, from the senses the cosmic powers, from the cosmic powers the worlds." The Upanishad concludes that in deep sleep the individual self attains unity with the Supreme Brahman and from the Supreme Brahman goes out the world beginning with the vital air. And one school, the Vājasaneyins, also says the same thing in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* Upanishad (ii 1 16)

૧૯ । વાક્યાન્વયાત્ ।

૧૯ । વૃહદારણ્યકે મૈત્રેયીબ્રાહ્મણે (૨૧૪, ૪૫૫) શ્રૂયતે, “માત્મા વા અરે દ્રષ્ટવ્ય શ્રીતત્ત્વો મત્તત્ત્વો નિદિઢ્યાસિતત્ત્વો મૈત્રેયાત્મનો વા અરે દર્શનેન શ્રવણેન મત્ત્વા વિજ્ઞાનેનેદં સર્વં વિદિતમ્” (૪૫૫૧૬) । અતઃ દ્રષ્ટવ્યત્વાદિરુપેણ પરમાત્મા એવં ડપદિશ્યતે । વાત્માત્ ?—‘વાક્યાન્વયાત્’ તત્ત્મિન્ એવં અત્ત વાક્યસ્ય અન્વયાત્, યતઃ હૃદ વાક્ય પૌર્વાપયર્થેણ આવેદ્યમાણ પરમાત્માનં પ્રતિ અન્વિતાવયવં લક્ષ્યતે ।

19 *The self to be seen &c is the Supreme Self because of the reference of the passage* In the *Maitreyi Brahmana* of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* Upanishad (ii 4, iv 5) we read “Verily the Self is to be seen, heard, understood and deeply meditated upon, O Maitreyi. When the Self has been seen, heard, understood and known, then all this is

known" (li 5 G.) Here it is the Supreme Self that is taught as the object to be seen &c. Why? Because of the reference of the passage—when considered from beginning to end, it is seen in all its parts to refer to the Supreme Self

२० । प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेऽस्मिन्मात्रमर्थः ।

१ । अस्मिन् प्रतिज्ञा—“आत्मनि विद्याते शतम् इदं विद्याते भवति, “इदं सर्वं यत्प्रमाणा इति च । तत्राह प्रति-१५ सिद्धं भवति एतत् निश्चयं यत् सिद्धं यत् विद्याते शतम् इदं विद्याते भवति इति च । प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेऽस्मिन्मात्रमर्थः । इति चाग्राह्यं चापार्थं मन्ते ।

20 *Asmarathya thinks that the representation of the self as something to be seen &c is the sign of the fulfilment of the promise There is a promise in this passage,—‘The self being known all this is known and also, All this is that self Now this mark—the statement that the self denoted by the word dear is to be seen &c., indicates the fulfilment of the promise It is for the fulfilment of the promise that the individual and the Supreme Self are taught in the beginning as identical so thinks the teacher Asmarathya.*

२१ । उत्कृष्टमित्यत एवभावादित्योक्तोऽस्मि ।

११ । ‘उत्कृष्टमित्यतः’ इति संवादात् उत्कृष्टं जीवात्मन एवभावात् अस्मिन्मात्रमर्थः इति चोक्तोऽस्मि चापार्थं मन्ते ।

21 *Audulomi thinks that this teaching is due to that*

state (identity with Brahman) of the self The teacher Audulomi, thinks that on account of that state,—that is identity with Brahman, of the individual self, when risen or liberated from its contact with the body and other adjuncts, it is taught in the beginning as so identical

२२ । अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ।

२२ । परमात्मन जीवादाभावेन 'अवस्थिते' अवस्थानात् इदम् अस्मिन्नेन उपनिषत्सु,
इति काशकृत्स्न आचार्य मन्यते ।

22 *Kāśakṛtsna thinks it is due to its existence in that form* The teacher Kāśakṛtsna thinks that because the Supreme Self exists in the form of the individual, therefore scripture teaches this in the beginning.

२३ । प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ।

२३ । ब्रह्म जगत 'प्रकृति' उपादानकारण 'च' निमित्तकारण च, न केवल निमित्तकारणम् एव । एव हि 'प्रतिज्ञा-दृष्टान्तौ' 'न उपपद्येते' न वाच्येते । प्रतिज्ञा तावत् एकविज्ञाने सर्वविज्ञानम् "उत तमादेशमप्राची येनास्तुत स्तुतं भवत्यनत नतम-विज्ञात विज्ञातमिति" (छा० ६।२, ३) । उपादानकारण-विज्ञाने एव सर्व-विज्ञान सम्भवति, यत कार्यम् उपादानकारणात् अव्यतिरिक्तम् । दृष्टान्त अपि ब्रह्मोद्-सुवर्णादिः—“यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञात स्यादाचारम्भण विकारी नामधेयं मृत्पिकेत्येव सत्यम्” (शा० ६।३) ।

23 *Brahman is also the material cause, as this doctrine is consistent with the promise and the example*

Brahman is both the material and the occasional cause of the world, and not merely its occasional cause. For thus only are the scriptural promise and example found to be self-consistent. The promise — knowing all by knowing one, — is as follows — Have you asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard, that which is not known becomes known ? (*Chh.* vi 2 3) It is only by knowing the material cause that all is known for the effect is one with the material cause. The example, such as clay iron gold is as follows — My dear as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known the modification being merely a name created by speech while the truth is that it is merely clay " &c. (*Chh* vi 3)

२४ । अभिधीयदेयाच्च ।

२४ । अभिधा' सदित्यस्य — "बहु सां प्रधायेव (का ६।१।२) इति । यसां उपदेसात् य इत्यत्र चतुर्लक्षं प्रकृतिर्लक्षं च उपपद्यते ।

24 *This is also proved by the statement of purpose* Purpose means the creative purpose — "May I be many may I multiply ! (*Chh* vi 2. 3) From the scriptural teaching of this purpose also follows the truth that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world

२५ । साक्षाद्योभयाभ्यामात् ।

२५ । इत्यत्र प्रकृति' इत्यत्र यत्कारणं साक्षात् इत्यत्र एव कारणम् उपपत्त्यै 'तमी प्रमत्त-प्रकृतौ साक्षादिति शब्देति सुदी । तदाहि,— स्यादिति वा इति

भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते आकाश प्रत्यक्षं यन्ति” (छा० १।१।१) । यत् हि यस्मात् प्रभवति यस्मिन् च प्रलीयते तत् तस्य उपादानं प्रसिद्धम् ।

25 *Also by the teaching that Brahman is the direct cause of both creation and dissolution* For this reason also is Brahman the material cause that Scripture teaches that Brahman is directly the material cause of both creation and dissolution Thus, “All these beings take their rise from *Akása* (meaning Brahman) and return into *Akása*” (*Chh* I 9. 1) Now, it is well-known that the material cause of a thing is that from which it rises and into which it returns

२६ । आत्मकृतेः परिणामात् ।

२६ । इत्यत्र प्रकृतिं ब्रह्म यत्कारणं ब्रह्मप्रक्रियायां “तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत” (तै० २।७) इति आत्मनः कर्मत्वं कर्तृत्वं च दर्शयति । कथं पुनः पूर्वसिद्धस्य सत् क्रियमाणत्वं शक्यं सम्पादयितुम् ?—‘परिणामात्’ पूर्वसिद्धः अपि हि सन् आत्मा विशेषेण विकारात्मना परिणमयामास आत्मानम् इति । ‘परिणामात्’ इति चेत् पृथक् सूत्रम्, तस्य एषः अर्थः, इत्यत्र प्रकृतिं ब्रह्म यत्कारणं ब्रह्मण एव विकारात्मना अयं परिणाम आत्मायते,—“सृष्टं त्यजामवत्, निरुक्तञ्चानिरुक्तञ्च” (तै० २।६) इत्यादिना ।

26 *This is proved by the self making itself by modification* For this reason also is Brahman the material Cause, that in speaking of Brahman in the words, “It made itself” (*Taitt* II 7) scripture represents Brahman as both the subject and object of action. But how could

something already existing make itself?—By modification. The self though already existing changed itself into a certain effect. If “by modification” were taken as a distinct aphorism the meaning would be this—For this reason also is Brahman the material cause that scripture thus speaks of Brahman himself as having modified himself into the form of an effect—“He became *sat* (what has form) and *tyat* (what is formless) the defined and the undefined. (*Taitt* ii 6)

२०। योनिय द्वि गीयते ।

१०। एतच्च स्मृतिः इन्द्र ५५। ५ इन्द्र योनिः इति अपि पठ्यते वेदान्तसु—
“ब्रह्मा श्रीमं पुनश्च इन्द्रोऽयम् (मृ १।१।१) इति “यस्यमुपयोगेन सा यद्यन्ति
एतत्” (मृ १।१।६) इति च । “यन्ति प्रत्यक्ष स्मृतिवचनं यन्निश्चितं भवेत् ।

27 And because Brahman is spoken of as the source
For this reason also is Brahman the material cause that in the Vedantas he is spoken of as the source. Thus, ‘The Creator the Lord the source of (the lower) Brahman (*Mun* iii 1 3) and “That source of things which the wise see (*Mun* i. 1 6) Now it is well known that “source means a material cause

२८। एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याता ।

१८। ‘एतेन प्रमाणेन प्रतिषिद्ध-व्याख्यायैव ‘सर्वे’ अत्रादि वाच्यत्वात् अपि

प्रतिपिद्धतया 'व्याख्याता.' । ते अपि प्रधानवादवत् श्रुतिविरुद्धा, ज्ञातव्याः । 'व्याख्याता व्याख्याता,' इति पदाम्बास, स्यात्प्रसङ्गमिति द्योतयति ।

28 *Hereby all are explained, are explained* Here by, by this series of arguments refuting the Sāṅkhya doctrine of Pradhāna, all, that is such theories also as that atoms are the cause of the world, are explained by way of refutation. It should be known that they too are opposed to the scriptures. The repetition of the phrase "are explained" indicates the end of the chapter.

अविरोध नाम द्वितीयाध्याये

प्रथम पाद—माध्यादि स्मृतिभयुक्ततर्क्य

संज्ञकादिसिद्धादस्य विरोधपरिहार



१। अतुल्यत्वकागदोपरमस्य इति चेमान्यतुल्यत्वकागदोप-
पमत्वात् ।

१। सङ्ख्यापरादस्य स्मृतिविरुद्धं तदस्य परिहृतिः । पूर्वपक्षः—इह
आदिपरदोषं 'अतुल्यत्वकागदोपरमस्य' इत्यं सङ्ख्यापरात्वात्तुल्यत्वकागदोप-
पमत्वात् इति चेत् 'अतुल्यत्वकागदोपरमस्य' इत्यं 'अतुल्यत्वकागदोपरमस्य' इति चेत्
इति चेत् न । यदि अतुल्यत्वकागदोपरमस्य सङ्ख्यापरात्वात् अविरोध एवम् अपि
यदा सङ्ख्यापरादस्य स्मृतिरपि अतुल्यत्वकागदोपरमस्य ।

1 If it be said that in that case the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti
would be untenable we say no for in the other case the
other smṛitis would be untenable An objection based on
the doctrine of Brahman as the cause being opposed to the
Sāṅkhya Smṛiti is raised and answered The *Pūrnāpakṣha*
(objector) says —If it be said that in case the doctrine of
Brahman as cause be accepted the objection of the unten-
ableness of the smṛiti would arise that is the Sāṅkhya
Smṛiti which teaches a cause other than Brahman and
other smṛitis agreeing with it would be untenable, we say
No If the doctrine of Brahman as cause were to be reject

ed on the ground that in that cause some *smṛiti* or *smṛitis* would be untenable, the objection would arise that on its rejection other *smṛitis*, those which teach the causality of Brahman, would be untenable '

२ । इतरेषाञ्चागुपलब्धेः ।

२ । इत्यथ श्रुत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गं न दोषः, यत् प्रधानात् इतराणि यानि प्रधान-परिणामत्वेन सांख्यश्रुतौ कल्पितानि महदादीनि, न तानि वेदे लोके च उपलभ्यन्ते ।

2 And on account of the non-recognition of the others On this ground also is the objection of the untenable-ness of *smṛiti* invalid, that the *mahat* and others imagined as other than and effects of Pradhāna in the Sāṅkhya *Smṛiti* are recognised neither in the Vedas not in the world

३ । एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः ।

३ । 'एतेन' सांख्यश्रुतिप्रत्याख्यानं 'योग' योगश्रुति अपि 'प्रत्युक्तः' प्रत्याख्याता द्रष्टव्या । तथापि श्रुतिविरोधेन प्रधान स्वतन्त्रम् एव कारणं महदादीनि च कार्यानि अलोकावेदप्रसिद्धानि कल्पन्ते ।

3 By this Yoga is answered It should be seen that by thus rejecting the Sāṅkhya *Smṛiti* the Yoga *Smṛiti* also is rejected And yet the Sāṅkhyas imagine, in opposition to the *Sṛuti*, an independent cause called Pradhāna and Mahat and others as its effects, things which are unknown both to the Vedas and to people in general.

ing about their respective superiority, went to Brahman,' (Br vi 1. 7), "They said to speech, 'Do sing for us' " (Br I 3 2) &c The answer to this objection is given in the 5th aphorism

५ । अभिमानिन्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् ।

५ । 'तु'शब्दः शङ्काम् अपनुदति । न खलु "सृष्टवतीत्" इति एवञ्जातीयकथं श्रुत्या भूतेन्द्रियाणां चेतनत्वम् आशङ्कनीयम्, यत 'अभिमानिन्यपदेश' एषः । सृष्टाद्यभिमानिन्य वागाद्यभिमानिन्य च चेतना देवता वदन-सवदनादिषु चेतनोचितेषु व्यवहारेषु व्यपदिश्यन्ते, न भूतेन्द्रियमात्रम् । कस्मात् ?—'विशेषानुगतिभ्या' भेदसंयोगाभ्याम् । भोक्तृणां भूतेन्द्रियाणां च 'विशेषः' भेदः प्राक् अभिहितः । कौषीतकिन प्राणसंवादे अधिष्ठातु चेतनत्वपरिग्रहाय प्राणान् "देवता"शब्देन विशिंषन्ति । सर्वत्र च सत्कार्य-वादेतिहासपुराणादिषु वागादिकारणेन सह अनुग्राहिकाया देवताया 'अनुगति' संयोग इत्युच्यते ।

5 But such a text only speaks of the presiding deity on account of distinction and connection The word 'but' sets aside the objection From such a text as "The earth spoke" the consciousness of the elements and the senses must not be thought of, for it only speaks of the presiding deity (the deity, in this case, who regards the earth as herself or her body) In mentioning actions like speaking and conceiving, possible only for conscious beings, conscious deities, deities presiding over earth, speech &c, are meant, and not mere elements or causes How? 'On account of distinction and connection' The distinction of the subject on the one hand and elements and senses on the other has already been pointed out In the dialogue on *Prāna*, the (Kaushītakin, for the purpose of the presiding

deity distinguish *Prdina* with the term *devatā* (a deity)
And everywhere in *mantras*, *arhavaddas* (descriptions of
things illustrating the meaning of the *mantras*) stories and
histories, we find the connection of auxiliary deities with
speech and other senses.

६ । दृश्यते तु ।

६ । 'तु' इत्य् पूर्यपच आनययति । अत उक्तं विवचयत्वात् न इदं अत
ब्रह्ममन्त्रितम् इति न अयम् एकात् । 'इत्युक्तिं हि लोके चेतनत्वेन प्रसिद्धेभ्य
इत्यादिभ्य विवचयत्वात् चेतनत्वादीनाम् अतूपपत्तिं अचेतनत्वेन प्रसिद्धेभ्य दीमन्नादिभ्य
इति चत्वीनाम् ।

6 But it is seen Bat sets aside the *pūrvapakṣa*
What has been said about the world not being caused by
Brahman because of its distinction from him is not abso-
lutely true In the world it is seen that hair nails &c.
though different from their cause, grow out of men and
other beings known as conscious and that scorpions &c.
arise from cowdung and such other things known as un-
conscious.

७ । असदिति चेन्न प्रतिपेक्षमात्रत्वात् ।

७ । अत्रात्रापि प्रागुक्तं चाप्य असत् इति प्रसज्येत 'इति चेत् न' ।
प्रतिपेक्षमात्रत्वात् प्रतिपेक्षमात्रं हि इदं न असत् प्रतिपेक्ष्यम् अस्ति । यथा अपि हि
इदानीम् अपि कार्यं कारणान्मना सत् एव प्रागुक्तं! अपि इति स्यात् ।

7 If it be said that in that case the effect is non

existent, we say 'No, for it is a mere negation.' If it be urged that in case Brahman were acknowledged as the cause of the world the effect would have to be declared as non-existent before its origination, then our reply is, 'No, for such a declaration would be a mere negation without anything to be negated. Just as at present this effect is existent only as in the cause, so was it before its origination.

८ । अपीतो तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् ।

८ । पूर्वोक्तं,—‘अपीतो’ प्रत्यये ‘तद्वत्प्रसङ्गात्’ कारणस्यापि ब्रह्मण्य कार्यस्य इव अयुक्ष्यादिरूपताप्रसङ्गात्, कारणे अविभागम् आपद्यमानं कार्यम् आत्मीयेन दीयेत्य कारणं दूषयेत्, इति प्राप्ते ब्रह्मकारणत्वादि-दर्शनम् ‘असमञ्जसम्’ आसमीचीनम् एव ।

8 On account of a similar objection arising in respect of final re-absorption, this doctrine is inconsistent. The *pūrvapakṣa* says, Because a similar objection arises in respect of the final re-absorption, because Brahman the Cause would in that state be tainted by impurity and such other qualities like the effect, for the effect, entering into the cause and becoming indistinguishable from it would taint it with its defects, therefore the system that teaches Brahman to be the cause of the world is inconsistent with itself.

९ । न तु दृष्टान्तभावात् ।

९ । न एव अक्षदीयदर्शने किञ्चित् असमञ्जसम् अस्ति । यत् तावत् अभिहितं

कारणम् अपिमप्यत् कार्यम् आक्षीयेन धर्मैश्च कारणं दूषयितुं शक्तिः, तत् न युक्तम्
 दृष्टान्ताभावात् । अस्ति हि दृष्टान्ता यथा कारणम् अपिमप्यत् कार्यम् आक्षीयेन धर्मैश्च
 न दूषयति । तत् यथा मृदाबादस्य धूम्रवर्णिका विद्यायां पुनः भक्तितम् अपिमप्यत्
 न ताम् आक्षीयेन धर्मैश्च संशुश्रूयति । स्वयत्वादस्य च सुवर्णवर्णिकाया अपीतो न
 सुवर्णम् आक्षीयेन धर्मैश्च संशुश्रूयति । प्रविष्टीविद्यायां चतुर्विधं मृतपाम न प्रविष्टीम्
 अपीतो आक्षीयेन धर्मैश्च संशुश्रूयति ।

9 *Not so for there are instances* The author of the
 aphorisms replies —There is no inconsistency in our sys-
 tem. What has been said as to the effect tainting the
 cause with its own defects by entering into it is not reason-
 able. For there are instances of effects not tainting the
 causes with their defects by entering into them. For ex-
 ample when plates and such other things, which are differ-
 ent forms of objects made of clay are absorbed in their
 substance, they do not impart their own qualities to it. So
 also ornaments and such other things made of gold do not
 impart their qualities to gold when they are absorbed in it.
 So again the four kinds of objects which are forms of the
 earth do not communicate their qualities to the earth when
 they are absorbed in it.

१० । स्वपक्षदोषाश्च ।

१ । न स्वपक्षदीपे दहने अमानसस्वदीपाद्यप्यन्त्या प्रतिवादिनः स्वपक्षे अपि
 ईदृशः दोषः अस्ति । यत् तावत् अतिरिक्तं विषयचक्षणात् न हरेत् अत्रत् न भ्रमप्रवृत्तिम्
 इति, प्रवाह-भ्रमविवक्षितायाम् अपि अमानम् एतत् अत्र साक्षात् मत्स्यादिदीपात् प्रवागात्
 मत्स्यादिमत्तं व्यक्तं लभ्यते चतुर्पक्षवर्ति । तथा अपीतो कार्यस्य कारणविभागा
 लुप्यमाना कार्यैश्च कारण-दूषणप्रसङ्गः अपि समाप्तः ।

10. *And because there are faults in his own system* It is not reasonable for our opponent to find fault with our own system, for there are similar faults in his own system also. What he says about Brahman not being the material cause of the world because the two are different in nature, applies equally to the doctrine of the Pradhāna being the material cause of the world, for the Sāṅkhya derives the world characterized by sound and such other qualities from the Pradhāna devoid of such qualities. Similarly, as our opponent teaches the non-difference of effects with the cause in the final absorption, his objection as to the cause being tainted by the effect applies equally to his case

૧૧ । તર્કાપ્રતિષ્ઠાનાદપ્યન્યથાનુમેયમિતિ चेदेवमप्यविमोक्ष-
प्रसङ्गः ।

૧૧ । ‘તર્કાપ્રતિષ્ઠાનાદપિ’ इत्यत्र न आगमगम्ये अर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यं, यच्चात् निरागमा पुरुषोत्तमप्रेक्षाभावनिवन्धना’ तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिता । ‘अन्यथानुमेयम्’ अथ उच्येत अन्यथा ययम् अनुमास्यामहे यथा न अप्रतिष्ठानदीष भविष्यति । ‘इति चेत्, एवम् अपि अविमोक्षप्रसङ्ग’ तर्कात् तर्कान्तरं समुत्थास्यति, अत तर्कस्य ‘विमोक्ष,’ विराम न भविष्यति । अथवा प्रतिष्ठित-तर्कालाभे अपि ‘अविमोक्ष’ मुक्त्यभावः, यत तर्कातीतम् अपरोक्षज्ञानम् एव मोक्षकारणम् ।

11 *And because reasoning is baseless* And if it be said that one should reason otherwise, then it must be said that there is no release even in that case And for this reason also should reasoning not be relied on in matters to be known from scriptures, that reasonings not founded on the scriptures but only on individual opinions, are base-

13 *If it be said that in that case, the subject and the object interchanging their natures, there would result an absence of difference between the two, we say, 'Let it be so, as in the world' If it be objected that on the acceptance of the theory of Brahman as cause there would be left no difference between the subject and the object, for in that case the subject would take the character of the object and the object that of the subject, we reply, 'Let there be such an absence of difference, such as we see in the world Froth, ripples, waves, bubbles &c, which are modifications of the sea, and which are not different from the watery sea, are yet distinguishable from it and from one another In the same manner space seems divided on account of limiting adjuncts like pots &c So the distinction of subject and object, though they are different from the Supreme Cause, Brahman, is reasonable*

१४ । तदनन्तत्वभारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ।

१४ । 'तदनन्तत्वम्' कारणात् ब्रह्मण कार्यस्य जगत् अनन्तत्वम् अवगम्यते 'भारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य' शब्दोपगम्यात् "वाचारम्भण विकारो नामवेद्य मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्" (६।१।४) इति वाक्यात्, एतदर्थक-श्रुत्यन्तरेभ्य च ।

14 *The effect is one with the cause on account of such scriptural terms as 'origin' &c That the effect, the world, is one with the Cause, Brahman, is known from such words as 'origin,'—from the *Chhândogya* text, "The modification is merely a name having its origin in speech, clay alone is the real object" (vi 1 4) and from other scriptural texts of similar import*

१३ । भावे चोपलब्धे ।

१३ । इत्थं कार्यस्य कारणात् अनन्तरम् अवगम्यते यत् कारणात् 'भावे सत्ये' एव कार्यस्य सत्त्वम् उपलभ्यते ।

15 And because the effect is seen to exist on the existence of the cause From this also we know the unity of the *कारण* and the effect that the existence of the effect is seen only on the existence of the cause.

१६ । सत्त्वाद्यावरस्य ।

१६ । अवरस्य परावर्तिनः कार्यस्य प्राक् उत्पत्तेः कारणं कारणात्मना सत्त्वात् स्थितं च कार्यस्य कारणात् अनन्तरम् अवगम्यते ।

16 And because the consequent exists in the antecedent We know the unity of the cause and the effect also from the fact that the consequent, the effect exists before its origin in the cause and in the form of the cause.

१७ । असद्व्यपदेशावेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषात् ।

१७ । 'यमवा इदमप्य आसीत् (तेन ११०) इति असद्व्यपदेशात् न प्राक् उत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वम्, 'इति सित्, न' इति ब्रूमः । न हि अन्वयावस्थामिमांश्च प्राक् उत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य असद्व्यपदेशः । किं तद्धि ?—आज्ञातनामक्यत्वात् यथात् अन्वयवर्तमानक्यत्वे वर्तमानम् । तेन वर्तमानस्य 'अवम् असद्व्यपदेशः । अथम् एतत् नवम्यते ?—आसीत्वात् "वशात्मानं क्षवमस्तुतव (११०) इत्यादि ।

17 If it be said No because the effect is spoken of

as non-existent', then the reply is, 'No, because it is spoken of in the sense of a different state, as appears from the closing part of the passage' If it be said that the effect does not exist before its origin in the cause, because the effect is spoken of as non-existent in the passage, 'Verily the world was non-existent in the beginning' (*Taitt* ii 7), then we reply It is not in the sense of absolute non-existence that the effect is spoken of as non-existent before its origin What then? The non-manifestation of name and form is a state different from that of their manifestation It is in the sense of that state that the non-existence of the effect is spoken of But how is that known? From the closing part of the passage, 'That (Brahman) made itself' (ii 7)

१८ । युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च ।

१८ । 'युक्ते' च शब्दान्तरात्' च प्राक् उत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वम् कारणात् च अनन्त्यत्वम् अवगम्यते । युक्तिं तावत् वर्ण्यते—क्षीरात् एव दधि उत्पद्यते, न मृत्तिकाया , मृत्तिकाया एव घट उत्पद्यते, न क्षीरात्, इति यावत् । शब्दान्तरं तावत्—"सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्" (छा० ६।१।१) इत्यादि ।

18 From argument and from another scriptural text The existence of the effect before its origin and its unity with the cause are known from argument and from another scriptural text Here is the argument it is from milk and not from clay that curd is produced , it is from clay and not from milk that a pot is made, and so on The text referred to is this "This (world), my dear, was only Being in the beginning &c" (*Chh* vi 1 1)

१८ । पटवत् ।

१८ । यथा च सहेतितान् पटान् प्रधायि, पट अभिघ्न, तथा अन्धतात् कारणात्
पट कार्यम् अभिघ्नम् ।

19 And the case is like a piece of cloth And as a
piece of cloth spread out is one with the same rolled in so
is the manifest effect one with the unmanifested cause.

२० । यथा च प्राणादि ।

१ । यथा च प्राणादि (प्राणायानसमाधीनामन्येता) मुख्यप्राणात् अन्धम्
(पट १) तथा कारणात् कार्यम् अन्धम् ।

20 And like the Prana and the rest And as Prāna
and the rest (prāna apāna samāna udāna and vyāna)
are one with the chief Prāna (Pra 3) so is the effect one
with the cause.

२१ । इतरव्यपदेशाचिताकारणादिदीपप्रसक्तिः ।

११ । पूर्वपक्ष — इतरव्यपदेशात् इतरान् जीवन् ब्रह्मात्मकत्वात् इतरस्य वा
इदस्य जीवात्मकत्वसम्भवात् इति। इतरादिदीपप्रसक्तिः चात्मनो ज्ञान-मरण-वन्धनादि
परिणामाच्च प्रसज्येत । अथ यन्नाथ स्ये इदम् ।

21 The one being called the other the fault of doing
harm and such other things would attach to the self The
Pārvaṣakṣha says —As in the theory of Brahman as the
Cause, the one is said to be the other—the Individual called

Brahman or Brahman called the individual, the fault of doing harm and such other things attaches to the Self, that is it becomes liable to the charge of doing such harm to itself as that of birth, death and bondage So this theory is unreasonable

२२ । अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् ।

२२ । 'तु'-शब्द पूर्वपक्ष व्यावर्तयति । ब्रह्म जीवात् 'अधिकम्', 'भेदनिर्देशात्' यत "आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्य" (बृह० २।४।५) इति एवञ्जातीयका कर्तृकार्मादिभेद-निर्देश ब्रह्म जीवात् अधिकम् इति दर्शयति ।

22 But Brahman is greater than the individual, on account of the declaration of difference The word 'but' sets aside the *pūrvapaksha* Brahman is greater than the individual, on account of the declaration of difference, for texts like "The Self, my dear, is to be seen " (Br II, 4 5) declare that the individual and the Universal are distinguished as subject and object, and thus show that the latter is greater than the former

२३ । अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ।

२३ । यथा अश्मना प्रस्तराणां केचित् महार्हा मणयः, अन्ये मध्यमवीर्या, अन्ये च प्रहीणा पाषाणा इति अनेकविध वैचित्र्य दृश्यते, यथा च बीजानां बहुविध पत्र-पुष्प-फल-गन्ध-रसादि-वैचित्र्यम् उपलभ्यते, तथा एकस्य अपि ब्रह्मण जीव-प्राज्ञ-वृथक्त्वं कार्य-वैचित्र्यं च उपपद्यते, इति अतः 'तदनुपपत्तिः' पर-कल्पित-दोषः न उपपद्यते ।

23 The case being analogous to stones and such

other things the objection is unreasonable. As among stones a great variety is marked—some being precious gems, some of medium value and others very inferior,—and as from seeds a great variety of leaves, fruits, flowers, perfumes and juices is seen to come out, so it is possible for different kinds of effect, such as individual selves and the Supreme Self to be in the same Brahman. Therefore the objection urged by our opponent is not reasonable.

२४ । उपमहासदगनावेति चेन्न सीरयहि ।

[illegible]

24 If it be said No for the adoption of means is seen then we say No for the case is analogous to that of milk If it be said that the creation of the world by Brahman alone is not possible for we see that potters and other mechanics adopt such means as clay staffs and the like in making pots and such other things, then our reply is No for the case is analogous to that of milk As milk changes into curd so can Brahman create the world out of his own power

२५ । देवादिष्वपि स्त्रीके ।

१३ । यथा हि लोके देवाः पितरः ऋषयः इति एवमाद्यम् अभिधानमात्रेण व्यतः
एव धामादानां निरवधारितां च निश्चिन्तायाः उपबन्धने, एवं ब्रह्म अपि व्यतः एव जगत्
अवर्तति ।

25 *And the case is similar to that of gods and such other beings. As we see in the world that the gods, the manes, the sages and such other beings make palaces, chariots &c unaided and simply by the power of their meditation, so is it possible for Brahman also to create the world merely by his own power*

२६ । कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्व-शब्दकोपो वा ।

२६ । पूर्वपक्षसूत्रमेतत् । निरवयव-ब्रह्मकारणवादे 'कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति' कृत्स्नस्य न सग्रस्य ब्रह्मस्य काव्यरूपेण परिणाम प्राप्नोति । यदि ब्रह्म पृथिव्यादिवत् सावयवम् अभविष्यत्, तत अस्य एकदेशः पृथगन्यत, एकदेशः च अवस्थान्यत । निरवयव तु ब्रह्म क्षुतिभ्यः अवगम्यते । अतः एकदेशपरिणामासम्भवात् कृत्स्नपरिणामप्रसक्तौ सत्याः सूलीर्छेदः प्रसज्येत । अथ एतद्विपरिहाराय सावयवम् एव ब्रह्म अभ्यपगम्येत, तथा अपि 'निरवयवत्व-शब्दकोप' ब्रह्मस्य निरवयवत्व-प्रतिपादक-शब्दानां कोप आनर्थक्यं स्यात् ।

26 *Pūrvapakṣa — Either the whole of Brahman must be conceived as changed into the world or the texts declaring his incorporeality must be regarded as meaningless* If the incorporeal Brahman be regarded as the cause of the world, the whole of Brahman must be conceived as changed into the effect, that is the world. If Brahman were corporeal like the earth and such other things, one part of him might be conceived as changed and the other as remaining unchanged. But Brahman is known from the scriptures as incorporeal. So, it being impossible that a part of him is changed, the whole must be conceived as changed, the consequence being that the very roots of all things must be conceived as lost. If, to avoid this objectionable conclusion,

Brahman be conceived as corporeal the texts declaring his incorporeality must be regarded as meaningless

२७ । अतस्तु गच्छभूतत्वात् ।

१० । 'तु'सम्बन्धेन पूर्वपक्षे परिहरति । न तावत् ह्यल्पमत्र चक्षितं । कुत ? — 'सुत' । यथा एव हि ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्तिरूपं एव विभाव्यतिरेकेण च विज्ञेयं चक्षितं भूयते । 'गच्छभूतत्वात्' गच्छभूतं गच्छमापन्नं हि ब्रह्म । ब्रह्म च जगदम् च विज्ञेयं प्रतिपादयति ।—अतस्तु गच्छभूतं निरवयवतां च । तदा हि —

तदीजति तत्र जति तदुदे तदगतिश्च ।

तदनात्म्यं सुखं तदु सुखभाजं वाक्यतः ॥ (इत्यादि १)

अप्रतिपक्षो भूयते निरिहा

कथं कथं प्रतिपक्षो भूयते ।

एकतया सुखभूतत्वात्

कथं कथं प्रतिपक्षो भूयते ॥ (अतः १।१।८)

27 But it is not so on account of scriptural texts and because the scriptures are the source But sets aside the *pūrvapakṣa* The whole of Brahman is not changed into the world How is this known?—From the scriptures. As they teach that Brahman created the world so do they teach that he exists without being changed As the scriptures are the source—the source of the knowledge of Brahman And the scriptures teach both that Brahman is not wholly changed into the world and that he is incorporeal. For instance, It moves and it moves not. It is far and it is near It is in all this, and it is out of all this. (Isd 5) 'As the one fire, entering the world, takes the

form of each object it burns, so the one Inner Self of all creatures takes the form of each object and is also beyond all objects" (*Katha* 11. 2 9)

२८ । आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि ।

२८ । अपि च न एव अत्र विवदितस्य कथम् एकस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि अनेकाकाराः सृष्टिः स्यात्, यतः 'आत्मनि' अपि एकस्मिन् स्वप्नदृष्टि 'विचित्रा' अनेकाकाराः सृष्टयः पश्यन्ते, "न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पत्न्यानी भवन्त्याय रथान् रथयोगान् पथं सृजते" (बृह० ४।३।१०) इत्यादिना ।

28 *For in the self too various such creations are seen* And it must not be objected in this matter how in the same Brahman various kinds of creation are possible, for in the same self, in its dreaming state, various such creations are spoken of in texts like, "There are no chariots, no chariot-drawers, no roads in it, but the self creates chariots, chariot-drawers and roads" (*Br* 1v. 3 9)

२९ । स्वप्नदोषाच्च ।

२९ । परेषाम् अपि एष समान स्वप्ने दोषः । प्रधानवादिनः अपि निरवयवम् अपरिच्छिन्नं शब्दादिहीनं प्रधानं सावयवस्य परिच्छिन्नस्य शब्दादिमतं कार्यस्य कारणम् इति स्वप्नः । तत्र अपि कृतज्ञप्रसक्तिः निरवयवत्वात् प्रधानस्य प्राप्नोति निरवयवत्व-
कोपः वा ।

29 *And because of objections to the opponent's own view* The same objection may be urged against the view

of our opponents. They the Sāṅkhyas, also teach that the incorporeal unlimited Pradhāna, devoid of sound and other qualities, is the cause of an effect that is the world which is corporeal limited and endowed with sound and other qualities. To this view also the objection applies that the Pradhāna, because it is incorporeal is wholly changed into its effects, or that the doctrine of its incorporeality must be set aside.

३० । अश्वपेता च दर्शनात् ।

१ । इतश्च ब्रह्मणा प्रपञ्चयुक्तं उत्पत्त्यर्थं यत् सा परा ईशता अश्वपेता सर्व-
शक्तियुक्ता इति दम्बयति श्रुतिः । तदपि "सर्वशक्तो सर्वज्ञान सर्वशक्तः सर्वशक्तः
सर्वसिद्धमभ्यासवाञ्छनस्तत् (क ११४११) "यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्यमानमर्थ-
तपः" (सु १११८) "एतस्य वा चक्षुष्यं श्रोत्रं गान्धर्वं कर्णोच्चमसौ विदुः
तिष्ठतः (उ ११८) इत्यादि ।

30 And the Supreme Deity is endowed with all powers for it is seen. And the creation of the world by Brahman is reasonable also for this that scripture teaches that the Supreme Deity is endowed with all powers. For instance, Having all actions, having all desires having all odours, having all tastes, pervading all this, without speech without partiality " (Ch iii 14 2.) Who is all knowing all perceiving whose austerity (or meditation) consists in knowledge (Mund i 1 9) Under the control of this Immutable Being O Gārgi the sun and the moon exist upheld. (Br iii 8. 9)

३१ । विकारणत्वान्नेति चेत् तदुक्तम् ।

३१ । 'विकारणत्वात्' परदेवताया निर्गुणत्वात् 'न इति चेत्' न सा काश्चाय प्रभवितुं इति यदि भाष्यकृत, तदा यत् पक्षे वक्तव्य 'तत् उक्तम्' पश्चात् एव एकादशतमसूत्रे. परं ब्रह्म न तर्कावगाह्यम् इति । तथाच च शास्त्रं,—

“अपाणिपादौ जघनौ ग्रहीता

पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः ।” (श्वेत० ३।१८)

इति विकारणस्यासि ब्रह्मण सर्वसामर्थ्ययोग दर्शयति ।

31 If it be said 'No, because Brahman has no organs,' then we say we have already answered that objection. If it be objected that as the Supreme Deity has no organs he is unable to act, then we say that we have already said in our eleventh aphorism what has to be said on the matter. The Supreme Brahman is not comprehensible by reasoning. And texts like the following speak of Brahman as capable, even though without organs, of doing everything,—“He is without hands or feet, yet he walks and handles, he sees without eyes and hears without ears” (Svet III 19)

३२ । न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् ।

३२ । पूर्वपक्ष,—‘न’ परमात्मा जगत् रचितवान्, प्रवृत्ते ‘प्रयोजनवत्त्वात्’ । न हि परित्यक्त्य परमात्मनः प्रयोजनाभावात् प्रवृत्तिः सम्भवति ।

32 *Purvapaksha*, No, because action requires motive. The Supreme Self did not create the world, for action

requires a motive. As the Supreme Self is self-satisfied and has no motive it is not possible for him to act.

३३ । लोकावसु लीलाकैवल्यम् ।

३३ । 'तु शब्देन चापि चरितं । यदा भावे च अपि चारवणस्य राज्ञः स्वतिरिक्तं निश्चितं प्रयोजनम् अनभिमतस्य क्षेत्रं लीलाकया प्रकृत्य लीलादिदृष्टिं भवन्ति एवम् ईश्वरस्य अपि जनयेत्यु निश्चितं प्रयोजनान्न भवितुम् एव क्षेत्रं लीला कया प्रकृतिं भविष्यति ।

33 *But creation is only sport as in the world*
But sets aside the objection. As in the world a king whose desires are satisfied does certain deeds without wishing to gain some end but only for the sake of sport or amusement so God also may be conceived as acting not out of any need but simply out of his own nature as a matter of sport.

३४ । वैषम्यनैर्दृष्ट्यै न सापेक्षत्वात् तथाहि दर्शयति ।

३४ । जयतः मुक्तः स्यादिति वचनम् तत्कारणोद्भूतं भवत्यस्य दूरत्वं च 'न ईश्वरस्य प्रथम्येति । सापेक्षत्वात् वत ईश्वर इति वचनमात्रादिना प्राप्तमपेक्षान्वी चपेक्षते । 'हि वतः श्रुतिं तथा जल सापेक्षं दर्शयति ।

34 *Differences and cruelty are not to be ascribed to him on account of dependence as scripture shows*
The differences of pleasures, pains &c. in the world and even their cause, cruelty are not to be ascribed to God. On account of dependence,—for God's creation depends on

the good or bad deeds done in their past incarnations by the creatures to be made For scripture speaks of this dependence

३५ । न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नाऽनादित्वात् ।

३५ । प्राक् सृष्टे 'अविभागात्' विभागस्य अभावात् न' नास्ति तत् 'कर्म' यदपेक्ष्य विषमा सृष्टि स्यात्, 'इति चेन् न' न युक्तम् एतत् 'अनादित्वात्' यत ससार अनादिः ५५ ।

35 If it be said, 'There is no deed on account of absence of distinction', then we say 'No, on account of there being no beginning' If it be objected that as there was no distinction before creation, there could then be no deed on which differences in creation might depend, then the reply is that this objection is not reasonable on account of the absence of beginning, as creation has no absolute beginning

३६ । उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च ।

३६ । ससारस्य अनादित्वम् 'उपपद्यते' युक्त्या सिध्यति, 'अपि च' 'उपलभ्यते' श्रुतिस्मृत्यो दृश्यते ।

36. It is proved and seen That creation has no beginning is proved by reasoning and is seen from *Sruti* and *Smriti*

३० । सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेय ।

३० । इत्यत्र ब्रह्मकारणत्वात् युक्त एव यस्मात् सर्वधर्मो ब्रह्मणि सन् सर्व-
धर्मोपपत्ति-सर्वव्यक्तिभूतान् एव उपपद्यते ।

37 *And as all causal characteristics are found in Brahman* For this reason also is the theory of Brahman as the cause of the world reasonable that in him are to be found all the characteristics of a true cause namely omniscience omnipotence and the like.

अविरोध-नाम-द्वितीयाध्याये

द्वितीयः पादः नात्य-वैशेषिक-वैद्यादि-मतस्य ण्डनम्

-

१। रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नागुमानम् ।

१। अपि 'च' 'नागुमानम्' न अचेतन जगत्कारणम् अनुमतम् भवति । कुत ?
'रचनानुपपत्ते' यत तात्पर्ये रचनाप्रयोगानुरूप स्वयम-विन्यास न उपपद्यते ।

1 And an unconscious cause is not to be inferred, for orderly arrangement is impossible for it. And further, an unconscious cause of the world is not to be inferred, for under its agency the arrangement of parts according to needs is not possible

२। प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

२। अचेतन-कारणस्य 'प्रवृत्ते' अनुपपत्ते च न तादृश कारणम् अनुमातव्यम् ।

2 And on account of activity And as it is not possible for an unconscious cause to act, such a cause should not be inferred

३। पयोऽम्बुवच्चेत् तत्रापि ।

३। 'चेत्' यदि एवम् उच्यते,—यथा चीरम् अचेतन स्वभावेन एव पक्षविषय

प्रकृतं दद्यात् न जन्मं चरितं न मारुत एव श्रीकृष्णायाम् अदन्तं एवं प्रमाणम् अपि
अत्रान्न समान एव पदार्थविद्वद्भिर्प्रतिपद्यते इति । न एतन् माधु उच्यते एत
त्तत्र अपि पदोऽप्युक्तो न चैतन्नाभिहितम् । एवमग्निं चतुर्मिमीमहे ।

3 *If it be said that it acts like milk and water then we say—even there (consciousness is necessary) If it be said—as milk though unconscious naturally acts in nursing the calf as also water though unconscious naturally flows for the good of the world so Pradhāna too may be supposed as acting for the good of man,—then we must say that such argumentation is not valid for in these cases also we may infer that milk and water act under conscious guidance*

४ । व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेयामपेक्षत्वात् ।

४ । साक्षाच्चरितं प्रधानं चात्मनोऽव्यतिरेकेण न अवतिष्ठति । पुरुषस्य
उत्तमोक्तं—न प्रकृतश्च न निवक्तव्यः । एतत् प्रधानम् अपेक्षकम् । अपेक्षकत्वात्
न कदाचित् प्रधानं भवेत् । आकारिणो यदि सन्त, कदाचित् न पश्चिन्नते इति एतन्
अपुनम् ।

4 *As Pradhāna has nothing beyond it and as it depends on nothing (it cannot be cause) The Pradhāna imagined by the Sāṅkhyas can exist without any external support Their Puruṣha is indifferent he neither impels nor restrains. Pradhāna therefore is not dependent on anything As its activity depends on nothing it is not reasonable to think that it sometimes changes into the forms of *māhat* and other things and sometimes does not so change*

५ । अन्यत्वाभावाच्च न तृणादिवत् ।

५ । यथा तृणपात्रवोटकादि निमित्तान्तर-निर्गमेष स्वभावात् एव चीराद्याकारं परिणमते, एव प्रधानम् अपि सद्भूत्याकारिणं यस्मिन् स्यत्, इति न वक्तव्यं, यत् शरीर-सम्बन्धात् अन्यत्वं तृणादि न चीरीभवत् । वेगी एव व्युत्पत्ता तृणादि चीरीभवति ।

5 *The case is not similar to the turning of grass &c into milk, for they do not so turn elsewhere (than in animals)* It must not be said that as grass, leaves, water &c naturally turn into the forms of milk and other things independently of other causes, so Pradhāna too may be supposed to change into the forms of *mahat* &c, for it is only in relation to organisms and not elsewhere that grass and such other things become milk. It is only when taken by a cow that they take that form

६ । अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात् ।

६ । यद्यपि स्वाभाविकम् एव प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिम् अभ्युपगम्येति तथापि दोषः अनुपज्येत एव । कुत ?—‘अर्थाभावात्’ यथा एव प्रधानं सहकारि किञ्चित् न अपेक्षते, एव प्रयोजनम् अपि किञ्चित् न अपेक्ष्यते इति, अतः प्रधानम् पुरुषस्य भवं सावधितुं प्रवर्तते, इति द्वयं प्रतिज्ञा स्वीयेत ।

6 *Even if spontaneous activity were admitted (the doctrine would be objectionable) on account of the absence of a purpose* Even if we were to admit that the Pradhāna can act spontaneously, yet the Sāṅkhya doctrine would be objectionable. How? On account of the absence of a purpose. As the Pradhāna is independent of

a helper or co agent, so must it be supposed to have no reference to a purpose and therefore the doctrine that it acts in order to effect the good of man must be pronounced untenable.

८। पुरुषागमवदिति चेत् तथापि ।

[illegible]

7 *If the case were considered similar to that of a man or of a stone even then (the doctrine would be open to objection) — It may be sought to re establish the Sankhya doctrine by citing parallel instances like the following — As a lame man, having the power of seeing but without that of moving mounts upon another man having the power of moving but without that of seeing and makes him move or as a magnetic stone though itself unmoving yet moves iron so may the Purusha be supposed as making the Pradhāna act. To this we reply Even this does not make the doctrine free from objection For this supposes the Pradhāna to be active by itself and denies that it is the Pnrusha that makes it act Besides, how can the*

indifferent Purusha make the Pradhána act ? Even a lame man makes a blind man move by means of his words and such other things. But the Purusha, inactive and devoid of *gunas*, cannot put forth any activity. And it cannot be said that like the magnet it induces activity by mere proximity, for if the proximity of the Purusha were supposed constant, the Pradhána would have to be considered as constantly active.

८ । अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च ।

८ । सत्त्वगजनिताम् अन्योन्यगुण-प्रधानभावम् परस्परं प्रति 'मङ्गाङ्गिभावम् उत्पद्यमान्येन स्वरूपसाधेयं यत् अवस्थानम् सा प्रधानावस्था । तस्याम् अवस्थाया गुणानां स्वरूपनाशमयोत् 'अद्वित्वं परस्परं' प्रति संभकारित्व 'न उपपद्यते' । 'अङ्गित्वस्य अनुपपत्ते च' प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्ति न अवकल्प्यते ।

8 (*It is objectionable*) because the mutual relation of the *gunas* as principal and subordinate is impossible.

The state of Pradhána means that in which the *gunas* give up the mutual relation of principal and subordinate and exist in equipoise in their respective natures. In that state it is not possible for the *gunas* to be principal and subordinate to one another, that is, to help one another, for in that case their respective natures would be destroyed. And because the mutual relation of principal and subordinate is impossible, therefore it is unreasonable to think that the Pradhána can act.

९ । अन्यथानुमितौ च प्रवृत्तिवियोगात् ।

९ । 'अन्यथा अनुमितौ च' यथा यथा कार्योत्पाद उपपद्यते तथा तथा गुण-

ଅନ୍ୟତ୍ରାପି ସମ୍ଭବଃ । ଯଦିଽପି ସମ୍ଭବଃ । ତଥାପି ସମ୍ଭବଃ ।
 ଯଦିଽପି ସମ୍ଭବଃ । ତଥାପି ସମ୍ଭବଃ । ଯଦିଽପି ସମ୍ଭବଃ ।
 ଯଦିଽପି ସମ୍ଭବଃ । ତଥାପି ସମ୍ଭବଃ ।

9. Even on another supposition (the objections remain in force on a count of the *Pradhāna* being devoid of the power of knowing — I say if another supposition be made if the nature of the *gunas* be supposed so as to make action possible — if it be supposed that even in the state of equipotence the *gunas* remain capable of being unequal to it (being superior or inferior to) one another — the objections arising from such arguments as the impossibility of an unactionous principle causing an orderly arrangement would remain as before.

୧୦ । ବିମତିତ୍ଵେପାସାମଧ୍ୟମମ୍ ।

୧ । ପାଞ୍ଚାଙ୍ଗୁଳିକାଂ ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ — ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ । ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ । ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ ।
 ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ । ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ । ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ । ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ ।
 ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ । ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ । ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ । ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ ।
 ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ । ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ । ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ । ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ୍ ।

10. And the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine is conflicting on account of its contradictions. And the *Sāṅkhya* doctrines are mutually contradictory. Sometimes they say there are seven senses, sometimes eleven. Sometimes it is taught that the *tanmātras* or elementary substances proceed from the *mahat* and sometimes from *ahankāra* or egoity. Some

times they speak of three *antahkaranas* or internal organs, and sometimes of one Besides, it is well-known that the doctrine is in conflict with the *Śruti*, which teaches that God is the cause of the world, and with the *Smṛiti* that follows it For this reason also the Sankhya system is conflicting

११ । महद्दीर्घवद्वा ऋक्षपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् ।

११ । अथ वैशेषिकानाम् अभ्युपगम — कारणद्रव्यसमवायिन गुणा, कार्यद्रव्ये समानजातीय गुणान्तरम् आरभन्ते, युक्तेभ्य तन्तुभ्य युक्तस्य पटस्य प्रसवदर्शनात्, तद्विपर्ययादर्शनात् च । तच्चात् चेतनस्य ब्रह्मण्य जगत्कारणत्वे अभ्युपगम्यमाने कार्ये अपि जगति चेतनं समवेद्यात्, तद्वद्दर्शनात् तु न चेतनं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणं भवितुम् अर्हति इति । इमम् अभ्युपगमं तदीयथा एव प्रक्रियया व्यभिचारयति । यथा परमाणौ परिमण्डलात् परिमाणात् सत, अणु ऋक्षश्च द्रव्यकं जायते, महद्दीर्घश्च त्रयणकादि, न परिमण्डल, यथा वा द्रव्यकात् अणौ ऋक्षात् च सत महद्दीर्घश्च त्रयणक जायते, न अणु, न उत ऋक्ष, एव चेतनात् ब्रह्मण्य अचेतनं जगत् जनियते ।

11 *The origin of the world from Brahman is quite as justifiable as the origin of the great from the minute and of the long from the spherical atom* This is the argument of the Vaiseshikas "Qualities inherent in a causal substance give rise to other but *similar* qualities in the substance that constitutes its effect For instance, we observe that from white threads white cloth is produced, and never the contrary Hence, if one assumes the intelligent Brahman to be the cause of the world, one should expect to find intelligence also in the effect, viz the world But as this is not the case, the intelligent Brahman cannot

be the cause of the world" This argument the Sūtra kārta refutes taking his stand on the Vaiśeṣhikas own ground. Just as from atoms that are spherical and minute binary compounds, minute and short as well as ternary compounds big and long are produced none of which are however spherical and just as from binary compound which are minute and short ternary compounds are produced which are big and long not minute and short so from Brahman which is intelligent may be produced the world which is non intelligent

१२। उभययोऽपि न कर्मात्मकमाय ।

११। इदमोपरमा वा चरत् निराक्षरीति । स च वाद इत्येव मसृजितति ।
 पट्टादीनि हि जीवे कारयन्ति इत्यान भ्यानुदत संदीप्तकद्रुत सम्बन्धिं दृष्ट्वा
 चारयमानानि दृष्टानि । तद्वासायन कारयु विचिन्तु ॥१५६॥ आनुदत एव संदीप्त
 कद्रुत तं हि दृष्ट्वा चारयम् इति स्थितिः । स च चरम् अवयवावयवविभागे इत्य-
 निवर्तते स चरकवयव्यनन्दत परमाणुः । मूल च इदं विविक्तमुद्रादिज जगत् सा पर-
 मावयवत्वात् चाऽनवयु । न च अकारणत आद्येय भवितव्यम् इति अतः पलायन
 जगतः कारणम् इति अवादाभिप्रायः । तत्र इत्युच्यते — विभावावभावा-
 तादत्त एव तां संदीप्तः अकारयय चरुपयव्यन्तः कर्षणता तन्मादीनां मया दृष्टान्ता ।
 कर्मण च आद्यत्वात् निमित्तं किम् अपि अमुप गम्यम् । अतः अदृष्टम् आद्यतः कर्मण
 निमित्तम् इति उच्येत तन् पुनः आत्मसमवायि वा स्यात् अगम्यत्वात् वा । उभयभा-
 वपि न च दृष्टनिमित्तं अतः 'कर्म' अवयवतः अदृष्टतः पक्षेनान्वयः । अन्वयितुं अतः
 निमित्तस्य अभावान्न अगस्त आद्यं कर्म स्यात् । अतः कर्मोभावात् तद्विनिवृत्त संदीप्त-
 न स्यात् । संदीप्तोभावात् च तद्विनिवृत्त 'तदभावे' दृष्टत्वादिकार्यमभावात् अभावः स्यात् ।
 तस्यात् अनुपपन्नः अयं परमाणुकारणवादः ।

12 *The action of atoms is not possible in either of the two cases viz whether adrishta inheres in the self or in the atom Hence follows the absence of that (that is creation and pralaya)* The Sutrakâra now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause of the world. This doctrine arises in the following manner — Substances which consist of parts, such as pieces of cloth, etc, are seen in the world to originate from co-essential substances as threads, etc, in a state of combination From this may be drawn the general conclusion that *all* substances which are wholes consisting of parts originate from co-essential substances in a state of combination. And, the particular substance at which this distinction of whole and part comes to a termination, and which sets a limit to the division of things into smaller constituent parts, is the atom Now, the whole universe, with mountains, oceans, etc, is composed of parts, and being formed of parts, it has a beginning and an end And there can be no effect without a cause Therefore, the atoms are the cause of the universe This, in substance, is Kanâda's doctrine Against the above doctrine the following is asserted by the Sutrakâra —It must be admitted that atoms, when in a state of isolation, depend on action for their combination, for we perceive that the combination of threads, etc, is brought about by action Action being an effect, a cause to bring it about must be assumed If, now, the unseen principle (adrishta) is assumed to be the cause of the original motion in the atoms, we answer This unseen principle may inhere either in the self or in the atom But, in both cases, it is equally impossible for the unseen principle to be the cause of motion in the atoms,

reasoning would lead to a regressus ad infinitum For, just as a binary compound, though absolutely different from the two constituent atoms, is connected with them by Kanâda by means of a relation of Samavâya, so the relation of samavâya itself, being absolutely different from the things to be connected, would require a second relation of samavâya to connect it with them, 'absolute difference' being a common characteristic of both the cases For the connection of the second, third, etc., relations of samavâya, further such relations would have to be assumed, and so on, involving a regressus ad infinitum.

૧૪ । નિત્યમેવ ચ ભાવાત્ ।

૧૫ । અપિ ચ અથઽ પ્રવૃત્તિસ્વભાવા વા નિવૃત્તિસ્વભાવા વા ઉભયસ્વભાવા વા અનુભયસ્વભાવા વા અમ્યુપગમ્યેન્ ગત્યન્તરાભાવાત્ । ચતુર્થા અપિ ન સ્પષ્ટયતે । પ્રવૃત્તિસ્વભાવત્વે 'નિત્યમ્ એવ' પ્રવૃત્તે 'ભાવાત્' પ્રલયાભાવપ્રસક્તઃ । નિવૃત્તિસ્વભાવત્વે અપિ નિત્યમેવ નિવૃત્ત ભાવાત્ સર્ગાભાવપ્રસક્તઃ । ઉભયસ્વભાવત્વં ચ વિરોધાત્ અસમન્વિત્તમ્ । અનુભયસ્વભાવત્વે તુ નિમિત્તવશાત્ પ્રવૃત્તિનિવૃત્ત્યો અમ્યુપગમ્યમાનયો અદૃષ્ટાદિઃ નિમિત્તસ્થ નિત્યસન્નિવાનાત્ નિત્યપ્રવૃત્તિપ્રસક્તઃ । અતન્ત્રત્વે અપિ અદૃષ્ટાદિ નિત્યાપ્રવૃત્તિપ્રસક્તઃ । તસ્માત્ અપિ અનુપપન્ન પરમાર્થકારણવાદઃ ।

14 And on account of the permanent existence of activity or non-activity in the atoms Further, consider the question whether the atoms should be assumed to be essentially active (moving), or essentially inactive, or essentially both active and inactive, or essentially neither active nor inactive There can of course be no more alternatives But none of these four alternatives can be supported. If

the atoms are essentially active their activity is permanent and hence *pralaya* becomes impossible. If essentially inactive their inertia is permanent and creation is impossible. Their being essentially both active and inactive is inadmissible, because involving a self-contradiction. If the atoms are essentially neither active nor inactive and if it is assumed that their activity or inactivity is due to some operative cause such as *adrishta* etc., then on account of the permanent proximity of such an operative cause permanent activity in the atoms has to be admitted. And if *adrishta*, etc. are not assumed permanent inactivity in the atoms has to be admitted. On these grounds also the doctrine of atomic causation is to be rejected.

१५ । रूपादिमत्ताय विपर्ययो दग्गतात् ।

१५ । आद्यपयानां इत्याद्याम् अवयवस्य विमल्यमानतां यतो परं विभागो न भवति ते चतुर्विधाः क्वात्मिका परमादयश्चतुर्विधस्य क्वात्मिका भूतमीतिवत् । अथवा, निर्याच इति यत् वैमर्षिका, अभ्युपगच्छन्ति, स तेषाम् अभ्युपगम निरालम्ब एव । यतो क्वादिमत्तात् परमाच तात् अगल निराल विपर्ययो प्रसज्यत । परमाच च विषया भूतत्वम् अनित्यत्वं च तेषाम् अभिमत विपरीतम् आपद्येति इत्ययम् । कुतः ?— दग्गतात् एव भाषि दृष्टत्वात् । यत् हि भोके क्वादिमत्तात् यत् तान् अकारणविषया अभ्युपगमिष्ये च दृष्टम् । तत् यदा यत् तान् अभ्युपगमिष्यन् अनित्यं च भवति, तन्मात्रं च यत् चरेत् तन्मात्रं अनित्यं च भवति, तथा च यत् परमाच क्वात्मिका ते अभ्युपगम्यन्ते, तस्यात् ते यत् कारणवन्तः तद्विषया अभ्युपगमिष्यन्ते च प्राप्नुवन्ति ।

15 And from the atoms having colour etc (as held by the *Vaisesikas*) the opposite conclusion to theirs

follows , as it is thus observed The Vaiseshikas assume that when substances composed of parts are continuously divided and sub-divided into parts, the limit beyond which such sub-division cannot go is constituted by the atoms, which are eternal, and which, being themselves of four different classes (corresponding to the four elements), and possessed of the qualities of colour, etc , are the origins of the whole material universe, which too, is composed of four different elements, and is possessed of the qualities of colour, etc This assumption is groundless, as from the circumstance of the atoms possessing colour and other qualities, the opposite of their minuteness and permanency would follow , i e , it would follow that compared with the ultimate cause, they are themselves gross and non-permanent, which is a conclusion opposite to what the Vaiseshikas intend to establish Why so ? Because it is observed that whatever objects in this world are possessed of colour and other qualities, are, compared with their causes, gross and non-permanent A piece of cloth, for instance, is gross and non-permanent compared with its threads, and the threads again are gross and non-permanent compared with their filaments Now, the atoms are admitted by the Vaiseshikas to be possessed of colour, etc , Therefore, they too must have causes, compared with which they are gross and non permanent

१६ । उभयथा च दोषात् ।

१६ । गन्ध-रस-रूप-स्पर्श-गुणा स्थूला पृथिवी रूप-रस-स्पर्शगुणा सूक्ष्मा आप,
रूप-स्पर्श-गुण सूक्ष्मतम तेज, स्पर्शगुण सूक्ष्मतम वायु, इति एवम् एतानि चत्वारि

भूतानि सूक्ष्म सूक्ष्म गुणानि लोके लक्ष्यन्त । तद्वत् परमाणवः अपि सूक्ष्म सूक्ष्म गुणा-
 वन्त्येव न वा । उभयथा च लोपानुपपन्नं अपरिहाय एव स्यात् । कल्पमाने
 तावत् सूक्ष्म-सूक्ष्म-गुणैः सूक्ष्मगुणानां भूतानुपपत्तौ अपरमावृत्त प्रसङ्गः । न च अन्तरि-
 च अपि भूतानुपपत्तौ भूतानुपपत्तौ भवति इति चेद्वि-
 श्वस्यते । अल्पगुणानां तु सूक्ष्म-सूक्ष्म-गुणैः परमाणव-प्रसिद्धि-
 यदि तावत् सम्य-
 एककगुणा, एव कल्पेन ततः तिजसि गम्य-
 उपपत्ति- न स्यात् अपि कल्पेन-
 विधि- च एव-कल्प-सम्य-
 कार्य-
 चतु-
 एव कल्पेन-
 ततः अपि-
 गम्य-
 उपपत्ति-
 स्यात्-
 तिजसि-
 गम्य-
 सम्य-
 वापि-
 न च-
 एव-
 दृश्यते-
 तस्यात्-
 अपि-
 भूतानुप-
 परमाणव-
 प्रसङ्ग-
 १

16 *And as difficulties arise in both cases* Earth has the qualities of smell taste colour and touch and is gross. Water has the qualities of colour taste and touch and is fine. Fire has the qualities of colour and touch and is finer still. Air has the quality of touch only and is the finest of all. Thus, in the world, the four elements are observed to have the qualities of grossness and fineness. Now the question arises whether the atoms constituting the respective elements should or should not be assumed to have the corresponding qualities of grossness and fineness. Either assumption leads to unacceptable consequences. If they are assumed to differ as gross and fine, the grosser atoms, having greater size, will cease to be atoms. That an increase of qualities cannot but be attended with an increase of size, we affirm from our observation of material bodies produced by causes. If on the other hand, we assume, in order to maintain the equality of all atoms, that they do not differ as gross and fine, we may

either suppose that they all have only *one* quality each, in which case we should not perceive touch in fire, nor colour and touch in water, nor taste, colour and touch in earth, since all qualities existing in effects must have, as antecedents, the same qualities in their causes Or, we may suppose all atoms to have *all the four* qualities, in which case we should perceive smell in water, smell and taste in fire, and smell, taste and colour in air, which we never do On these grounds also the doctrine of atomic causation is to be rejected

१७। अपरिग्रहाच्चाल्यन्तमनपेक्षा।

१७। परमाणुकारणवाद न कस्यिदपि शिष्टं केनचिन् अपि अग्नेन परिगृहीत, इति अत्यन्तम् एव तस्य 'अनपेक्षा' अनादरं कर्तव्यं वेदेवादिभिः ।

17 *And as the doctrine of atomic causation is not accepted by any authoritative persons, it is to be disregarded altogether* The doctrine of atomic causation has not been accepted by any persons of authority in any of its parts It therefore merits entire disregard at the hands of those who take their stand on the Veda

१८। समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः।

१८। 'अयं बौद्धमत-खण्डनम् । बौद्धा वयं वादिनः भवन्ति । केचित् सर्वज्ञत्ववादिनः, केचित् विज्ञानास्तिलभाववादिनः, अन्ये पुनः सर्वशून्यवादिनः इति । अथ ये सर्वज्ञास्तिलवादिनः' बाह्यम् आन्तरञ्च वस्तु उपगच्छन्ति भूतं भौतिकं चित्तं चैतज्ज, तान् तावत् प्रतिब्रूय । अथ भूतं पृथिवी-वातादयः, भौतिकं रुपादयः, चक्षुरादयः च ।

(1) the aggregate of the elements and of the derivatives of elements, whose cause are the atoms, and (2) the five aggregates caused by the internal groups, are recognised by our opponents. But even if the two classes of aggregates supposed by them to proceed from the above two causes be admitted, the actual formation of aggregates cannot be proved (on the theory of our opponents). Why so? Because the parts constituting the aggregates are devoid of intelligence (and hence unable to combine of their own accord), and also because the Buddhists do not admit any other permanent intelligent being, such as a percipient self or a ruling Lord, who could effect the aggregation of the parts.

१६। इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादि चेन्नोत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वात् ।

१६। अविद्या, संस्कार, विज्ञानं, नामरूप, षडायतन, स्पर्श, वेदना, तृष्णा, उपादानं, भव, जाति, जरा, मरण, शोक, परिवेदना, दुःख, दुर्मनसा च, इति एव जातीयका इतरेतरहेतुका बौद्धतन्त्रे क्वचित् सच्चिन्ना विनिर्दिष्टा, क्वचित् प्रपञ्चिता । एवम् अविद्यादि-कालापि अपि परस्पर-निमित्त-नैमित्तिक-भावेन घटीयन्भवत् अनिशम् आवर्तमाने अर्थाचिन्ता उपपन्ना संहति 'इति चेत्, तत् न' । कस्मात् ?—'उत्पत्तिमात्र-निमित्तत्वात्', यत् 'इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वे' अपि अविद्यादीनां पूर्वपूर्वम् उत्पत्तीत्यस्य उत्पत्ति-मात्रनिमित्तं भवत् भवेत्, न तु संघातोत्पत्तेः किञ्चित् निमित्तं सम्भवति । भीक, अभावात् संहति न सिध्येत् इत्यभिप्रायः ।

19 If (the formation of aggregates be sought to be explained) through the cycles of nescience, idea etc., standing in the relation of mutual causality, we say, 'No, because each link is merely the cause of the origin of the

immediately succeeding link and not of any aggregation—nescience, idea, perception, name and form, the support of the six senses, touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction and the like are spoken of as a chain of mutual causes in the Buddhist system, sometimes cursorily, some times at length. It is the contention of the Buddhists that as the cycles of nescience etc. forming chains of mutual causes and effects, revolve unceasingly like water wheels, therefore the existence of aggregates proved by implication. But this contention we cannot accept. Why so? Because this argument can explain only the origination of the members of the series and nothing more. For even if we admit the theory of mutual causation, each antecedent would merely be the cause of each subsequent member, there would be nothing to stand as the cause of the formation of aggregates. We mean that in the absence of a permanent percipient self it is impossible to establish the formation of aggregates.

२० । उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् ।

१ । बोद्धव्यमत्रादिना चक्षुः चक्षुषदत्त—उत्तरादिम् चक्षुः उपपन्नानि ब्रह्मचक्षुः निवर्त्यते इति । न च एवम् चक्षुषदत्तता पूर्वान्तरयोः चक्षुः शृङ्खलमात्रं स्यादस्यिगुं गच्छते । निवर्तमानस्य निवर्तनं वा पूर्वोपपत्त्य अपावदत्तत्वात् उत्तराद्य-
शृङ्खलं न उपपद्यते ।

20 As, according to the Buddhists on the origination of the subsequent moment the preceding one ceases to be

causal relation cannot be established The Buddhists who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only, say that when the second moment comes into being, the first ceases to be. On this admission, it is impossible to establish a relation of cause and effect between the antecedent and the consequent moments. The former, which ceases or has ceased to be, and is therefore non-existent, cannot be the cause of the latter.

२१ । असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा ।

२१ । अथ 'असति' एव हेतौ फलोत्पत्तिं ब्रूयात् । 'प्रतिज्ञोपरोध' स्यात् । चतुर्विधान् हेतून् प्रतीत्य चित्तचैता उत्पद्यन्ते इति इयम् प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत । निर्हेतुकाया च उत्पत्तौ अप्रतिबन्धात् सर्वं सर्वत्र उत्पद्येत । अथ उत्तर-क्षणीत्पत्तिं यावत् अवतिष्ठते पूर्वक्षणे इति ब्रूयात्, ततः यौगपद्यं हेतुफलयोः स्यात् । तथा अपि 'प्रतिज्ञोपरोध' स्यात् । "क्षणिका सर्वे सक्तारा" इति इयं प्रतिज्ञा उपरुष्येत ।

21 *Non-existence of cause, while the effect takes place involves contradiction of admitted principle, otherwise, simultaneity of cause and effect* Should it now be urged in reply to our last argument, that even in the absence of a cause the effect may arise, there would be the contradiction of an admitted principle. It would mean the abandonment of the principle that mind and things mental originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes. Moreover, if origination without cause be admitted, there would be nothing to prevent *anything* from originating at *any* place or time. If, on the other hand, it should be said that the antecedent continues until the

consequent has come into being that would imply the simultaneity of cause and effect which also would be the contradiction of an accepted principle viz that all impressions are momentary

२२ । प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्या निरोधामाप्तिरविच्छेदात् ।

२२ । अपिच वेदान्तिनां ज्ञानवन्ति “बुद्धिराद्यं लभादन्तत् संज्ञतं चचिबन् ।
अथाह—प्रभात् तत्त्वभावात् ‘प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधात्’ अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधात् आकाशत्
च अन्तत् सर्वं बुद्धिराद्यं बुद्धिमहात्मितम् ‘संज्ञतम्’ अन्तत्त्वम् ‘चचिबन्’ चचिबन्
स्यादि च । भावत्वाद् बुद्धिपूर्वकं विनाह—‘विनाहमाप्ति इति बुद्धे’ कीदृशभावात्
विनाह—प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधं भावते । तद्विपरितोस्तत् विनाह, अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः ।
आकाशम् आवरणाभावात् । इदानीं निरोधद्वयं प्रत्याचटे—अप्रतिसंख्या अप्रति
संख्या निरोधयोः अमाप्ति, अमन्त्रव न प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधस्य सम्भवत्,
इत्यत्र । अथाह ?—‘अविच्छेदात्’ भावभावात् अविच्छेदात् न हि कार्यकारण
प्रवादात् निरोधं दृश्यते इत्यत्र ।

22. The two Buddhistic doctrines of cessation dependent on and cessation independent of acts of the mind are alike untenable there being no real interruption Besides, the Nihilists imagine “Excepting the three principles, all that is the object of knowledge comes into being and is transient The three principles are (1) Cessation dependent on an act of the mind which means such destruction as is preceded by an act of thought, in other words, destruction by an effort of the thinker with the thought I will destroy (2) Cessation of the opposite kind that is spontaneous cessation without an act of the

mind. (3) Space, that is mere absence of covering or occupation. Now, the two kinds of cessation are being refuted, - Cessation which is dependent on an act of the mind, and cessation which is not so dependent, are both impossible. Why so ? Because of the absence of interruption. The flow of existences is never interrupted, i.e., the current of causes and effects is never observed to be arrested.

२३। उभयथा च दोषात् ।

२३। य. अविद्यादिनिरोधः यौक्षमतेन प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधान्पातौ, स सम्यक् ज्ञानात् वा स्वयम् एव वा भवति ? पूर्वमिह कस्मै निर्हेतुका विनाशप्रतिज्ञा-
हानि प्रसज्येत, उभयमिह तु ज्ञानसाधनोपदेशस्य आनयक्यं प्रसज्येत । एवम् 'उभयथा'
उभयविकल्पे,—बुद्धिपूर्वक-विनाशे, अबुद्धिपूर्वक-विनाशे च,—दोषप्रसङ्गात् असमञ्जसम्
इदं दर्शनम् ।

23 *And because both alternatives are open to objection* The question arises, whether the cessation of *avidyā*, etc., which must be included in the two kinds of cessation discussed above, is to come through perfect knowledge, or of its own accord. The former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Buddhist doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause. The latter alternative would involve the uselessness of instruction for the acquisition of perfect knowledge. Hence both alternatives, that of the cessation of ignorance through knowledge or that of its cessation without knowledge, being equally objectionable, the Buddhist doctrine is unreasonable.

२४ । आकाशे चाविधिपात् ।

२४ । आकाशे च विनश्यत्त्वानाम् अवशुन्नादीयं अयुक्तः, अविधिपात् यतः पूर्वाभावे निरीक्षणी इव आकाशस्य अपि अविधिविषय बन्तुलम् उपपद्यते ।

24 And in the case of Space also (the doctrine of its non-existence is untenable) because it does not differ (from the two other non existences, viz. the cessations)

In the case of Space also the ascription of non-existence by the advocates of universal and ceaseless destruction is unreasonable, because substantiality can be established in the case of Space no less than in the case of the two cessations

२५ । अनुधुतीय ।

२५ । अपिच वेदादिषु सर्वत्र चतुर्न चरित्वताम् अनुपपन्नं उपपन्नम्, अपि चरित्वताम् अनुपीयम् । न च सा संभवति,— अनुधुती अनुभवम् अनु उपपद्यमानात् आरब्धात् । अनुभववतो आरब्धवतो च एव एव स्यात् । “अ” एव अर्थं पूर्वम् इदम् अद्यापि सा एव इदम् इदानीं भावमि इति अनुभव-आरब्धी एव अस्मिन् एव अस्मिन् एव प्रत्ययः संभवति । ततः अनुभव आरब्धी एव अस्मिन्नात् अनुभवस्य अनुभवाप्रत्यय आत्मनः च अस्मिन्नात् एव प्रतिपद्यते, न चरित्वता ।

25 And on account of remembrance (the theory of momentariness breaks down)

The advocate of the doctrine of destruction, assuming all things to be momentary is bound to extend that assumption to the perceiving person also. But this is impossible from the fact of remembrance which succeeds percep-

tion The person perceiving and the person remembering the perception must be one and the same. This conviction, viz, "The 'I' that saw this thing sometime ago, is identically the same 'I' that am now remembering it" is possible only when the perception and the subsequent remembrance arise in one and the same person. From the fact that the perception and the subsequent remembrance are functions of one and the same person, the legitimate conclusion is the *permanency* of both the perception and of the person who is the subject of the perception, and not their *momentariness*.

२६ । नास्त्योद्दृष्टत्वात् ।

२६ । "अभावात् भावीत्पत्तिः" इति यत् वैनाशिका मन्यन्ते, तत् न उपपद्यते । 'नास्त्य' न असत् अभावात् भावानाम् उत्पत्तिः सम्भवति । 'उद्दृष्टत्वात्' यत् जगति अभावात् भावीत्पत्तिः न दृश्यते ।

26 *Existence cannot arise out of non-existence, as it is never observed*

The theory that entity springs from non-entity, as held by the philosophers of destruction, is untenable. The origination of something from nothing is impossible. Existence is never in the world observed to spring from non-existence.

२७ । उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः ।

२७ । यद्वि च अभावात् भावीत्पत्तिः अभ्युपगम्येत, 'एवं' सति 'उदासीनानाम्

अपि कर्कशतायाम् अपि विधिः अभिमत-साधनं भवति । न तु एतत् दुष्करी भव्य-
य मयि वा शिथिलम् ।

27 *On that assumption success (would automatically come) to the inactive also*

If it be admitted that from non entity entity can spring then people would obtain their purposes without going through any activity This is absurd and not maintained by anybody

२८ । नामाव उपलब्धे ।

२८ । शिथिल बोद्धाः “न विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तो बाह्यार्थोऽस्ति इति मनसि । यत्र तं
विज्ञानवान् निवसति तत्र वा । नामाव बाह्यत्वं यद्यपि यथाव न उपपद्यते ।
उपलब्धे यतः प्रतिभयर्थं तत्र कुत्र च यत् इति बाह्यं यद्य एव उपलब्धं
न च उपलब्धमानं न यथाव भवितुम् शक्यम् । भाष्ये तु विधीय विचारः इत्यर्थः ।

28. *The non-existence (of external objects) cannot be maintained on account of (our) consciousness (of them)*

Some Bauddhas (the Vijnānastitvamātravādin) hold that no outward things exist apart from consciousness. The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute that doctrine. The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because in every act of perception we are conscious of an external thing such as a post, a wall, a jar a piece of cloth etc. and that of which we are conscious cannot but be existent. This is discussed at length in Sankarāchārya's Bhāṣhya.

३८ । वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ।

२८ । यदुक्तं बौद्धेन “स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययवत् जागरितगोचरा अपि स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययाः विनैव बाह्येनार्थेन भवेयुः” तत् प्रतिवक्तव्यम् । अत्र उच्यते, ‘न स्वप्नादिवत्’ न स्वप्नादि-प्रत्ययवत् जाग्रदप्रत्यया भवितुम् अर्हन्ति । ‘वैधर्म्यात्’ यतः स्वप्नजागरितयो वैधर्म्यं विरुद्धस्वभावः भवति । स्वप्नीपलब्धं वस्तु प्रबुद्धस्य बाध्यते मिथ्यामयम् उपलब्धं भवति, न च एव जागरितोपलब्धं वस्तु कात्याजित् अपि अवस्थाया बाध्यते ।

29 And (waking perceptions) are not like dreams, because different in nature from them

Let us now examine the statement made by the Bauddhas that the ideas of posts, etc., of which we are conscious in the waking state may arise in the absence of external objects, like the ideas of a dream. We maintain that it is wrong to describe waking perceptions as similar to the ideas of a dream, as the dreaming and the waking states are essentially dissimilar. The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness, and are perceived to be false. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, are never negated in any state.

३९ । न भावोऽनुपलब्धः ।

२९ । यदपि उक्तं वैनाशिकेन “विनापि अर्थेन ज्ञानवैचित्र्यं वासनवैचित्र्यात् एव अवकाशयते” इति, तत्प्रतिवक्तव्यम् । अत्र उच्यते, ‘न भावः’, वासनानां भावः उत्पत्ति एव न उपपद्यते तद्धेतुभूतानां बाह्यानां अर्थानां अनभ्युपगमात् । तथाहि, वासनां नाम मङ्गारविशेषाः । मङ्गारा च न आश्रयम् अन्तरेण अवकाशयन्ते । आश्रयस्तु अनभ्युपेती

बोद्धः । अस्मिन् सर्वोपपत्तिनिमित्ताद् हि प्रत्येकं भावोत्पत्तिः । अतएव भवति ।
अत्र प्रत्येकभावेऽपि सर्वेषु विनिमित्ता विविधा वासनाः सन्ति १ । अत्र प्रत्येकं यत्
अर्थोत्पत्तिं विना वसनात्पत्तिं न उत्पद्यते । तत्तु निवृत्त्यवस्थानात्पत्तिं न वसनात्पत्तिः ।

30 *The existence (of mental impressions) is not (consistent with the Buddha view) on account of the non perception (of external things)*

We now address ourselves to the examination of the statement of the Bauddhas that the variety of perceptions can be explained from the variety of vāsana (preceding mental impressions) without any reference to external things. We remark that on the Buddhist view the origination of vāsana (preceding mental impressions) itself is impossible — external objects, which are their origin not being admitted. Again a vāsana (mental impression) is a kind of modification and modifications cannot take place unless there is a substratum to be modified, which the Bauddha does not admit. And it is only because external things are perceived that mental impressions become various in kind corresponding to the various objects of perception. How indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things were perceived? As mental impressions are never observed to arise except through the perception of external objects, so we conclude that the Bauddha hypothesis of an independent series of mental impressions is inadmissible.

३१ । अपि कत्वाय ।

३१ । यदपि वाच्यं ज्ञानम् (अज्ञानभ्रान्तीर्ष) नाम वासनाऽवस्थेन बोद्धेत्

परिकल्पित, तदपि 'कणिकत्वात्' न वासनानाम् अधिकरणं भवितुम् अर्हति । 'न हि कालवयसमन्विनि एकधिन् अन्वयिनि असति कट्प्ये वा सञ्चार्यदृग्निनि देगकाल-निमिषापेक्ष-वाभनाधीन-स्मृति-प्रतिमन्वानादि-स्वप्न-सम्भवति" इति ग२९ ।

31. *And on account of (the Buddhist doctrine of general) momentariness, (the ālayavijñāna conceived by that doctrine also comes to nothing)*

The so called *ālayavijñāna* (sum total of ideas corresponding to the ego) that has been conceived by the Buddhists as the support of mental impressions, cannot constitute the permanent substratum of impressions, because that *vijñāna* also is admittedly momentary. As Sankarācharva says, "Unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future, or an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time and cause" (Thibaut's translation)

३२ । सर्वथानुपपत्तेः ।

३२ । यत् 'सर्वथा' सर्वप्रकारेण वैनाशिका सत 'अनुपपन्नः', तत् सर्वथा अयम् अनादः शीथ, इत्यभिप्रायः ।

32 *And (the Buddhist doctrine is to be rejected) because of failure of proof on all sides*

As the Buddhist doctrine proves inconclusive from all points of view, so it is to be entirely disregarded.

non-soul, as the others are included in them. They also recount another set of five categories different from the above two, under the name 'astikāya' (a term literally meaning 'existing bodies,' and denoting categories). These 'astikāya' categories are—jīva (soul), pudgala (material body), dharma (merit), adharma (demerit), and ākāśa (space). They also set forth various fanciful inner sub-divisions of all these categories. Moreover, they apply to all things the following peculiar process of reasoning which they call the saptabhangīnaya. It may be that it is, it may be that it is not, it may be that it both is and is not, it may be that it is indescribable, it may be that it is, and is also indescribable, it may be that it is not and is also indescribable, it may be that it both is and is not, and is also indescribable. Thus they ascribe contradictory attributes, such as being and non-being, simultaneously to one and the same thing, and maintain that one and the same thing is on the one hand existent and on the other non-existent, on the one hand permanent and on the other non-permanent.

To this we reply as follows. Your doctrine is unreasonable, because it is impossible that such contradictory attributes as existence and non-existence etc. should inhere in one and the same thing at the same time.

३४ । एवञ्चात्माऽकार्त्तम् ।

३४ । यथा एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विषयधर्मासम्भवी दोषः स्यादादेः प्रसङ्गात्, 'एवञ्चात्मान' अपि 'अकार्त्तम्' असर्वगतत्वम् परिच्छिन्नत्वम् इति यावत् अपरः दोषः, अतश्च यथादिवत् आत्मनः अनित्यत्वम् प्रसज्येत । शरीरपरिमाणं हि जीवः इति जैना-

सम्बन्धे । अत्र न भिन्नः । उक्तपरिमाणः । अत्र नाना जन्मसु, एकस्मिन् अपि जन्मनि
जीवन्-जीवन्-स्वादिभिः कथं भिन्न परिमाणं गरीरे सन्धीयते तत् सम्यक् ।

अथ पर्थ्यादिः । इहन्दोऽप्यतिपत्तौ च केचित् जीवावस्था उपपद्यन्ति, तदुक्तरी-
तिरतिपत्तौ च केचित् उपपद्यन्ति, इति उच्यते तत्र अपि उच्यते परस्परम् ।

34 *And similarly (the Jaina doctrine leads to) non universality of the self*

We have discussed one objection against the Syādvāda (the Jaina doctrine) viz. the impossibility of contradictory attributes co existing in the same thing. Another objection is that according to that doctrine the soul is not universal (not omnipresent i e., of limited extension) whence it follows that the soul is non eternal like jars etc. The Jainas maintain that the soul is of the size of the body. How can the soul we ask the size of whose body is liable to change in different births as well as in the stages of infancy youth and old age in one and the same birth fit in with all these different sizes of bodies?

The Jaina may say that as the soul enters by turns a large and a small body some particles accede to or withdraw from it. To this hypothesis the next sūtra furnishes a reply

३५ । न च पर्थ्यायादव्यविरोधो विवादादिभ्यः ।

३५ । 'न च पर्थ्यायात् न च द्विद्वि जीवन्जीवमात् द्विद्वि अवन्वापनमात्
'अपि विविध' अपि विविध जीवन् द्विद्विपरिमाणम् उपपादयति गच्छति । कुतः ?—
'विवादादिभ्यः यतः' अवन्जीवमापनमात्मा अपि न च आपूर्वमात्रम् अपजीवमात्रम्

जीवस्य विक्रिप्रावच तावत् मरिणाद्यम् । विक्रिप्रावचत्वे च चर्मादिवत् अनित्यं प्रसज्येत ।

35 *Nor (can the Jain doctrine) attain self-consistency through (the hypothesis of alternate (accession and withdrawal of particles), for (such hypothesis involves the soul in a liability to) change etc*

Nor can the hypothesis of the accession and withdrawal of particles corresponding to the increase and decrease of bodily size consistently prove the co-extensiveness of the soul with the body. Why so? Because it involves the soul's liability to change etc. If constant repletion and depletion through the accession and withdrawal of particles be admitted with respect to the soul, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the soul is liable to change. If liable to change, it follows that it is non-eternal, like the skin etc

३६ । अन्त्यावस्थितेक्षीमयनित्यत्वादविशेषः ।

३६ । जैनै 'मन्त्यास्य' नीचावस्थाभाविन जीवपरिमाणस्य 'अवस्थिति' नित्यत्वम् इच्छन्ते । 'अन्त्यावस्थिते' अन्त्यास्य जीवपरिमाणस्य अवस्थिते नित्यत्वात् 'उभयनित्यत्वात्' आगमध्यमयो अपि जीवपरिमाणयो नित्यत्व-प्रसङ्गात्, 'अविशेष' जीवपरिमाणे सर्वदा एव अनेकप्रसङ्गः स्यात्, जीवः सर्वदा अवस्थाम् अनेकेन अणु, सहान् वा स्यात्, न कदापि अक्षीरपरिमाण, इत्यर्थः ।

36 *As (the size of the soul is held by the Jainas to be) unalterable in the final (liberated) state, its permanency in the other two (initial and medial) states also*

follows Hence (the theory of the) variability (of the soul's size) is not (admissible)

The Jains maintain the unalterability of the size of the soul in its final (released) state. From the attribute of unalterability inherent in the size of the soul in its final state follows unalterability in its initial and medial states also. Hence the soul must be considered as having always one and the same size, whether minute or great and not having the (varying) sizes of its bodies.

इति । पत्न्युत्पत्तिश्चत्वात् ।

१० । इदानीं ईश्वराधिष्ठित-ईश्वरात् प्रतिविधत्ते । ईश्वराध्यायः भाष्येनैव
नैवाधिक्यं प्रतिविधत्ते मज्झिमुत्पत्तिं मित्र ईश्वराधिष्ठित-ईश्वरात् न तु तत्पदागतत्वात्
ईश्वरं कल्पयति । न तु 'यस्य' ईश्वरस्य लक्षणात्त्वात् तत्पदयति । अत्रात् ?—
अध्यायश्चात् इति ईश्वर-सत्त्वमसीनं प्राविशेदात् विदधत ईश्वरस्य सत्त्वमसीनं
मज्झिमुत्पत्तिं पत्न्युत्पत्तिं प्रयच्छते ।

37 *Īśvara (cannot be the cause of the world) on account of the inappropriateness (of that doctrine)*

The Sūtrakāra now proceeds to refute the doctrine which says that Īśvara having the attribute of a general ruler only is the cause of the world. Those Sāṅkhyas that admit Īśvara, the Māheśvaras, the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣika and others, teach that Īśvara is different from Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, and is only the operative cause and not the material cause also of the world.

The Sūtrakāra remarks that the doctrine of the Īśvara (of these theories) being the cause of the world is in

admissible. Why so? On account of inappropriateness, because, if Īsvara be supposed to ordain for various classes of creatures unequal positions, some low, some middle, and some high, then it follows that he is subject like us to bias and prejudice, and is no real Īsvara

૩૮ । સંવત્સાનુપપત્તેષ્વ ।

૩૮ । इतथ केषान-नियन्तृ-ईश्वरवादस्य असामञ्जस्य यत् प्रकृति-पुरुष-व्यतिरिक्तस्य ईश्वरस्य ताभ्या सह संवत्स न उपपद्यते, संवत्स विना च ईशित्व न उपपद्यते ।

38. *And because no connection (of Īsvara with souls and with Pradhāna) can be established.*

The doctrine of Īsvara as only a ruler presents this further difficulty that Īsvara being entirely distinct from nature and souls, can have no connection with them Being unconnected, it is impossible to establish that he is their ruler.

૩૯ । અધિષ્ઠાનાનુપપત્તેષ્વ ।

૩૯ । इतथ तार्किक-कल्पितस्य ईश्वरवादस्य असामञ्जस्य यत् प्रत्यक्षे श्रदादौ कुम्भकारस्य अधिष्ठानवत् श्रमत्यत्रे रूपदिहीने प्रधाने ईश्वरस्य अधिष्ठान न उपपद्यते ।

39. *And because the rulership (of Īsvara) cannot be established*

The doctrine of Īsvara held by the argumentative philosophers is untenable on the following ground also That the potter can control the clay etc., which are all

प्रधानस्य पुरुषाणाम् आत्मनश्च इयत्ता निर्दिष्टा न वा निर्दिष्टा ?” उभयथापि दोषः अनुभूत एव । यत् हि लोके इयत्तानिर्दिष्ट वस्तु घटादि दृश्यते तत् अत्यवत् दृष्टम् । तथा प्रधान-पुरुषेश्वर-त्रयम् अपि इयत्तानिर्दिष्टत्वात् अव्यवत् स्यात् । अनिर्देशं सति ईश्वरस्य असर्वज्ञता प्रसज्येत ।

41 (The doctrine of Ísvara leads to the dilemma that Ísvara is) *either of limited magnitude or of limited knowledge*

The doctrine of Ísvara held by the argumentative philosophers is invalid for this reason also, that from their doctrine follows either finitude or want of omniscience on the part of Ísvara. The Sāṅkhyas etc maintain that the Pradhána is unlimited, and the souls which are different from the Pradhána are also unlimited. Now the question arises, does the omniscient Ísvara define the measure of the Pradhána, the souls, and himself, or does he not define it? Both alternatives are objectionable. All things in this world that are observed to be defined in extent, such as jars, etc. are also observed to be limited. Therefore, if, on the one hand, we say that the measures of the Pradhána, of the souls, and of Ísvara have been defined, it follows that they are all limited. If on the other hand we say that their measures have not been defined by Ísvara, it follows that Ísvara is not omniscient.

४२ । उत्पत्तिसम्भवात् ।

४२ । अथ भागवतानां चतुर्व्यूहवाद् प्रत्याख्यायते । ते मन्यन्ते भगवान् एव

एषः बाहु^२श्च निश्चय-मानस्य परमावतलम् । स चतुर्धा आकारं प्रविभज्य
प्रतिष्ठितः बाहु^२श्च चतुर्धेयः सप्तधश्च चतुर्धेयः प्रद्युम्नश्च चतुर्धेयः
च । बाहु^२श्च नाम परमात्मा तत्पदं सप्तधश्च नाम श्रीः प्रद्युम्नश्च नाम मनः
चतुर्धेयश्च नाम चतुर्धात् । त्रिंशद् बाहु^२श्च पञ्च प्रकृतिः इति सप्तधश्चाप्युच्यते ।
बाहु^२श्चात् सप्तधश्च उत्पद्यते सप्तधश्चात् च प्रद्युम्नः प्रद्युम्नात् च चतुर्धेयः । अत्र
ब्रह्म—न बाहु^२श्चैवमेषात् परमात्मनः सप्तधश्चैवमेषात् जीवस्य तत्पदि भवति ।
चतुर्धेयश्चैवमेषात् । उत्पत्तिमन्त्रे हि श्रीस्य चतुर्धेयः । ईशत् प्रसज्यते ।
तथात् चतुर्धेयः भाववताम् च ।

42 (The doctrine of the Bhāgavatas is unsatisfactory) on account of the impossibility of the origination (of individual souls from the highest Lord)

Now we are going to refute the doctrine of the four Vyūhas (or forms assumed by the Lord) held by the Bhāgavatas. They maintain that the one holy (Bhagavat) Vasudeva is of the essence of pure knowledge and he it is that really exists. He, dividing himself fourfold appears in four forms (vyūhas) as Vāsudeva, Sankarshana Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vāsudeva is the Highest Self Sankarshana the individual soul Pradyumna the sensorium (*manas*) and Aniruddha the principle of egoity (*ahankāra*). Of these four Vāsudeva is the ultimate causal essence and the other three, Sankarshana etc., are his effects. Sankarshana springs from Vāsudeva, Pradyumna from Sankarshana, and Aniruddha from Pradyumna.

On this system we remark that it is not possible that Sankarshana, the individual soul should be produced from Vāsudeva, the Highest Self for in that case it would follow that the individual soul is finite in duration. From

the very fact of being originated, non-permanency and other imperfections would cling to the soul. The theory of the Bhāgavatas is therefore unreasonable.

४३ । न च कर्तुः कारणम् ।

४३ । इत 'च' भागवताना कल्पना असङ्गता यत 'कर्तुः कारणम्' उत्पद्यमान लोके 'न' दृश्यते । वर्णयन्ति तु भागवता कर्तुः जीवात् सङ्कर्षणसञ्ज्ञात् कारणं मनः प्रद्युम्नसञ्ज्ञकम् उत्पद्यते, तस्मात् च अहकारः अनिरुद्धसञ्ज्ञकः उत्पद्यते इति । न तु एतस्य दृष्टान्तं श्रुतिप्रमाणेष्वप्यलभ्यमानम् ।

43 *Nor is the origination of the instrument from the agent (tenable).*

This fact also renders the theory of the Bhāgavatas indefensible that in this world an instrument (such as a hatchet, etc.,) is never observed to spring from an agent. But the Bhāgavatas teach that from an agent, *viz* the individual soul termed Sankarshana, there springs its instrument *viz* the internal organ (*manas*) termed Pradyumna, and from that again *its* instrument the ahamkāra, named Aniruddha. But we meet neither with observed instances nor with scriptural passages in favour of such a statement.

४४ । विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः ।

४४ । यदि वा मन्येत, न सङ्कर्षणादथ जीवा, सर्वे एव एते विज्ञानादि-ऐश्वर्य-

धर्मो भवितुः वासुदेवात्, एवं सङ्गपक्षादी विमानादिभारि अपि तन्मतिपक्षः पूर्वोक्तस्य
 उत्पत्तिरसम्भव-दीवस्य अप्रतिपक्षः भावीति एव एव दोषः भवति । तत्रैव प्रसज्यते
 उपर्य । अयम् ?—अदि तावत् अभिमतः परम्परभिन्ना एव एते वासुदेवादिभ्यः
 चत्वा ईदृशाः गुणवर्त्तमाना एवाम् पञ्चाभासत्वं अस्ति ततः अनेकेषु चत्वा
 “अस्यपक्षेही वासुदेवः इति सिद्धान्तः स एतदपि आदत्ति । अयं अयम् अभिमतः एवम्
 एव भवन्त एते चत्वा व्युत्पादः गुणवर्त्तमानः, ततः कार्यका क्वी सत्त्वात् अतिमया
 भावात् उत्पत्तिः न सम्भवेत् ।

44 *The objection (that Sankarahana etc. cannot be produced from Vāsudeva, etc.,) is not removed even if the existence of supreme knowledge etc. (be assumed in all the four vyāhṛas)*

It may be asserted that Sankarahana and the other vyāhṛas are not the individual soul the sensorium etc., but that each and everyone of them is Vāsudeva himself possessed of all the characteristics of a Ruler (*viz* supreme knowledge etc.) Even on such a hypothesis the objection previously raised (against the origination of the vyāhṛas) persists it applies still only in another form. How so? If in the first place, it be meant that the four Īśvaras distinct from one another *viz* Vāsudeva etc. have the same attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self then it would amount to the assumption of more than one Īśvara, and the abandonment of the principle of One holy (Bhagavat) Vāsudeva. If in the second place it be meant that from the one Highest Being have arisen the four forms, all having equal attributes, then it would place cause and effect on an equal footing and there would remain no super eminence in the cause to make the causation of effect possible.

४५ । विप्रतिषेधाच्च ।

४५ । 'विप्रतिषेधात्' विरुद्धातिदग्गनात् 'च' भागवत-मत, उपेत्य, । गुण-गुणित्व-काल्पनादि-लक्षण बहुविध वचनविरोध तेषां शास्त्रं उपलभ्यते,—ज्ञानैश्वर्य-शक्ति-यल-वीर्य-तेजांसि गुणा, 'आत्मान एव एते भगवन्त आमुदेवा', इत्यादि । वेद-प्रतिषेधश्च भवति,—चतुर्षु वेदेषु परं श्रेयोऽलम्बू ग्राह्यित्य इदं शास्त्रम् अधिगतवान्, इत्यादि-वेदनिन्दादग्गनात् । तथात् असङ्गता एषा कल्पना, इति सिद्धम् ।

45. *And on account of contradictions also (the Bhāgavata system is unacceptable)*

Further, the Bhāgavata doctrine is to be disregarded because there are various contradictions in it. Many contradictions are met with in their authoritative books in respect of attributes and the beings possessing those attributes, e g, knowledge, ruling capacity, strength, valour, and spirit are spoken of, sometimes as qualities, and sometimes as selves, holy Vāsudevas, etc. Moreover, there is contradiction of the Vedas also. The following passage, which disparages the Vedas, is to be found in their books,—“Having failed to obtain the highest bliss from the four Vedas, Sāṅdilya studied this Śāstra.” For this reason the theory of the Bhāgavatas is unreasonable.

अविरोध-नाम द्वितीयाध्याय

तृतीयं पाद—सहभूतवियथाणां जीववियथाणां च

श्रुतिवाक्यानां विरोध परिहार



१। न वियदश्रुते ।

१। सर्वत्रदत्तस्य सृष्टिस्तुल्यं निर्देयम् सृष्टिस्तुतीनाम् आद्यतविरोधं भवनाय
एव दातुं शक्यते । तत्र प्रथमं तावत् आद्यतम् आदिप विनाश — किम् दातुं
उत्थतं सृष्टि, उत नास्ति इति । तत्र तावत् पुनश्च प्रतिपद्यते न विद्युं न
आद्यतम् उत्पद्यते । अद्यात् १—अश्रुते न हि उत्पत्ति प्रकाशं चान्न भवतम् सृष्टि,
यदा वाक्यान्त्ये वचनम् ३६ ब्रह्मसामर्थ्यम् ।

1 The Pūrvapakṣin says that *ākāśa* (space or ether) *has no origin as there is no scriptural passage* (stating the origination of *ākāśa*)

The object of this pāda is to clear the meaning of and remove the apparent contradictions in the passages bearing on creation in Vedānta texts. In this connection we shall first consider the question whether *ākāśa* (space or ether) has an origin or not and as usual first hear the Pūrvapakṣa.

The Pūrvapakṣa maintains that *ākāśa* has no origin. Why so? Because in the scriptures it is not mentioned

in the sections which treat of origins, e g , the *Chhandogya* Upanishad, first prapāthaka, sixth khanda

२ । अस्तितु ।

२ । 'तु'-शब्द पचान्तर-परिग्रहे । सा नाम आकाशस्य छान्दोग्ये सूत्र उत्पत्तिः, श्रुत्यन्तरे 'तु अस्ति' । तैत्तिरीयका द्वितीयवक्षारम्भे समामनन्ति,—“सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म” इति उपदिश्य,—“तस्माद् वा एतस्मादाकाशं सम्भूतं” इति ।

2 But, it may be said, *there is* (another scriptural passage, which mentions the origination of *ākāśa*)

The word 'but' here indicates that the Pūrvapaksha is going to introduce a possible objection against his own position, with a view to controvert it. It is true, the objector may say, that the origination of *ākāśa* is not mentioned in the *Chhāndogya* , but it is mentioned in other scriptural passages. For the Upanishad of the Taittirīyakas, at the commencement of the second Valli, after teaching that “Brahman is the truly existent, intelligent, and infinite,” goes on to say, “From that same spiang *ākāśa* ”

३ । गौण्यसम्भवात् ।

३ । पुनरेव पूर्वपक्षः । नास्ति विद्यदुत्पत्तिश्रुतिः या तु इतरा विद्यदुत्पत्तिवादिनी श्रुतिः उदादिता, सा 'गौणी' भवितुम् अर्हति । यथा लोके “आकाशं कुत्र,” “आकाशं जातं” इति एवञ्जगतीयका गौण्यप्रयोगा अस्ति, एवम् इयं श्रुतिरपि गौणी द्रष्टव्या । कस्मात् ?—‘असम्भवात्’ यतः कारणसामग्र्यसम्भवात् आकाशस्य उत्पत्तिः न सम्भवति ।

कपालमत्त समवायि चममवायि विनितकालयिष्य हि हिम सम्यक् चपचपनात् समुत्पद्यते । द्रव्यस्य च पञ्चजातीयकम् अनेनैव द्रव्यं समवायिकारणं भवति । समवायि कारणात् संकीर्णं अममवायिकारणम् । यन्त्रकारादि विनितकारणम् । आकाशस्य विविधस्य एव कारणस्य अभावात् उत्पत्तिः न सम्भवति । उत्पत्तिमतां च निरूपयतीनां पूर्वोक्तं कालं विनितं सञ्जायते, प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्रकाशनादि कार्यं न बभूव, यदात्तं च भवति इति, यं कामं न पुनः न पूर्वोक्तं कारणं विवशं सञ्जाययितुं शक्यं । किं हि प्रागुत्पत्तेः अनवरतं तद् अगुपितम् अस्ति न बभूव इति मतांश्च अभ्यवसागम् ? तच्चात् विमुक्तदिनचक्रात् च आकाशस्य सञ्जायमिह ।

3 (That scriptural passage, however must be taken to have) *a secondary sense because (the origination of dkdśa) is impossible*

The Pūrvapakṣa now refutes the objection raised in the last Sūtra.] In reality there is no scriptural passage mentioning the origination of *dhḍsa*. The passage quoted as referring to the origination of *dhḍsa* must be taken as having only a secondary (i.e. figurative) significance. Just as amongst common people a secondary (figurative) use of the word is met with in such expressions as "make room *dhḍsa*" "room (*dhḍsa*) has been made" and so forth, similarly these scriptural expressions also have only a secondary meaning. Why so? On account of impossibility i.e. because it is impossible to prove the existence of the necessary conjunction of causes in the case of *dhḍsa*. According to Kāṇḍa whatever is originated is originated from three kinds of causes, viz. inherent causes, non-inherent causes, and operative causes. The inherent cause of a substance consists of several substances of the same kind. The non-inherent cause is the conjunction of the substances.

constituting the inherent cause Machines, instruments, etc , constitute the operative cause In the case of *ākāśa*, none of the three causes exist , therefore the origination of *ākāśa* is impossible Further, it is possible for things which are caused, such as fire etc , to have differences between their earlier and later stages , e g , before the origination (of fire), light and the other effects of it did not exist, while they appear after its origination But about *ākāśa*, it is not possible to conceive such difference between the earlier and the later conditions Is it possible to maintain, we ask, that before the origination of *ākāśa*, there were no spaces, no apertures, no holes ? Or this reason, as well as from the characteristic qualities of *ākāśa*, such as all-pervadingness etc , it follows that it is unoriginated

४ । शब्दाच्च ।

४ । पुनरपि पूर्वपक्षे च । न केवलं तर्कात्, 'शब्दात् च' श्रुतिवचनात् च आकाशस्य अजत्व-सिद्धिः । यत आह,—“वायु-वातरिचर्चैतदमृतम्” (बृह० २।३।३) । न हि अमृतस्य उत्पत्तिः उपपद्यते । “आकाशवत् सर्वगतं नित्यं” इति च आकाशेन ब्रह्म सर्वगतत्व-नित्यत्वाभ्यां चर्म्माम्नाम् उपमिमान् आकाशस्य अपि तौ घर्म्मौ सूचयति । न च तादृशस्य उत्पत्तिः उपपद्यते ।

4 From the Vedas also (the non-origination of *ākāśa* follows)

(The Pārvaṇakṣa continues That *ākāśa* is uncaused follows not only from logical reasoning, but also from the words of the scripture. It says, “Air and this mid-region

are immortal, (*Bri* II 3 3) What is immortal can not have an origin. Another passage Omnipresent and eternal like *ākāśa* by comparing Brahma to *ākāśa* in respect of omnipresence and eternity intimates that the same two qualities belong to *ākāśa* also in which case origination cannot be attributed to it.

५ । व्यापकेकस्य ब्रह्मस्यद्वयम् ।

५ । पूर्वपक्षे वहीयन्तीत्याम् आसदात् नारयति । आसदात् नु—अयं पुनः
‘तस्यैव वा एतस्या’ आसदात् अकारम्, सम्भूतम् (ते १।१) इत्यादिषु सुप्तिषु एकस्य
‘सम्भूतम्’ इत्यस्य विभक्तिप्रवृत्तिषु चतुर्वचनमात्रस्य मुख्यत्वे सम्भवति आकारम् च सीमात्मम्
इति । अतः उक्तम् उच्यते,—‘एकस्य अपि’ ‘सम्भूतम्’ इत्यस्य विभक्तिप्रवृत्तिषु
गौचं मुख्यस्य प्रतीयं ‘स्यात्’ सम्भवत्यर्थम् । यथा तत्त्वतीक्ष्णीयनिषिद्धिं वहीयन्तीत्याम्
‘ब्रह्म’ इत्यस्य चतुर्वचनं तद्वति च गौचं प्रतीयं आसदात् आदिकारणं च मुख्यं प्रयोगं
तद्वत् ।

5 (A secondary as well as a primary sense) of one and the same word (*sambhūta* & *sprang*) is possible just as in the case of the word *Brahman*

The Pūrvapakṣa replies to an objection that may arise out of his statement in the third sūtra. The objection is this—How can one and the same word *sambhūta* (*sprang*) be used in the scriptural texts commencing with “From that Self sprang *ākāśa* (*Taittī* II 1) once in its primary meaning with regard to fire etc., and again in its secondary meaning with regard to *ākāśa*? The reply of the Pūrvapakṣa to this objection is—The one word

sambhūta (sprang) may, according to the different subjects to which it refers, have primary as well as secondary uses, like the word 'Brahman'. In the third Valli of the same *Taittiriya* Upanishad the word 'Brahman' is used in its secondary sense with regard to food etc., and to austerities, and also in its primary sense with regard to the First Cause, whose essence is bliss. Similarly with respect to '*sambhūta*'

६ । प्रतिज्ञाऽहानिरव्यतिरेकाच्छब्देभ्यः ।

६ । सिद्धान्तपक्षोऽयम् । “आत्मनि खल्वरे दृष्टं भुते मते विज्ञाते दृष्टं सर्वं विदितम्” (बृह० ४।५।६) एवञ्च प्राप्तिविदानेन ‘प्रतिज्ञा’ विज्ञायते । तस्या प्रतिज्ञायाः एवम् एव ‘अहानि’ अनुपरोधः स्यात्, यदि ‘अव्यतिरेक’ अस्मिन् कृतस्त्वस्य वस्तुजातस्य विज्ञेयात् ब्रह्मणः स्यात् । व्यतिरेके हि सति “एकविज्ञानेन सर्वं विज्ञायते” (छान्दोग्ये ६।१।३) इति द्वयं प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत । स च अव्यतिरेक एवम् एव उपपद्यते यदि कृतस्त्वस्य वस्तुजातम् एकस्मात् ब्रह्मण उत्पद्येत । ‘शब्देभ्यः च प्रकृतिविकाराव्यतिरेक-न्यायेनैव प्रतिज्ञासिद्धिः अवगम्यते । “सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तदेकत्वं तत्तेजोऽष्टजत्वं” इति (छा० ६।२।१-३) एव कार्यजातं ब्रह्मणः प्रदर्श्य अव्यतिरेकं प्रदर्शयन्ति “एतदात्मानमिदं सर्वम्” (छा० ६।८।७) इत्यादिभ्यामप्राप्तक-समाप्तिः । तद्वद्वि-आकाशः न ब्रह्मकार्थः स्यात्, न ब्रह्मणि विज्ञाते आकाशः विज्ञायेत । तस्य प्रतिज्ञाहानिः स्यात् ।

6 (In reply to the foregoing statements of the Pūrva-paksha, we say that) *according to the words of the scriptures propositions once affirmed therein for establishment remain confirmed (lit. unabandoned) only on the admission of the non-difference (of the entire world with Brahman)*

This is the reply from the standpoint of the Sūtrakāra. Throughout the Vedāntas, propositions like this are constantly found affirmed. When the Self has been seen heard perceived and known then all this is known" (*Bṛ* IV 5 6.) Such affirmations remain unabandoned (i. e. uncontradicted) only if everything in the world is held to be non-different from (i. e., identical with) Brahman the object of (Vedantic) knowledge. Only in the event of admitting a difference between them would the proposition "By the knowledge of one thing every thing is known (*Chh* VI 1 3) be contradicted. That identity (i. e. the identity of the entire world with Brahman again) is possible of affirmation only if everything in the world originates from Brahman. And it is understood from the words of the scriptures that that affirmation can be established only through the theory of the identity of the material cause and its effects. Thus the passages Sat (the truly existent one only O dear (disciple) was all this in the beginning—one only without a second "it thought, — it sent forth fire etc. (*Chh* VI 2 1 3) after declaring in the first place, that all effects are produced by Brahman, proceed to declare, in the second place, that everything is identical with Brahman viz. in the passages commencing with In It all that exists has its Self' (*Chh* VI 8 7) to the end of the prapāthaka. Now if *ākāśa* be not an effect of Brahman then it cannot become known by Brahman being known, and such a supposition would involve the abandonment of propositions previously affirmed.

७ । यावत् विकारन्तु विभागो लोकावत् ।

७ । 'तु'-शब्द आकाशस्य उत्पत्तौ असम्भवाशङ्काया निवृत्त्यर्थः । न खलु आकाशोत्पत्तौ असम्भवाशङ्का कर्तव्या, यत् 'यावत्' किञ्चित् 'विकार'जात दृश्यते तावान् एव 'विभाग लोके' लक्ष्यते, न तु अविद्वत् किञ्चित् कुतश्चित् विभक्तम् उपलभ्यते । विभागश्च आकाशस्य पृथिव्यादिभ्यः अवगम्यते, तस्मात् सोऽपि विकारी भवितुम् अर्हति ।

7 But, as observed in the world, there is division (i e separation of one thing from another) only so far as (things {are} modifications (of other substances, i e. are effects, and not causes)

The word 'but' is meant to exclude the doubt that the origination of *ākāśa* is impossible. We should not suppose that the origination of *ākāśa* is impossible. For in this world, division (i e, separation of one thing from another) is observed only in so far as modifications (i e, things produced, as effects, from other substances, such as jars, pots, etc,) are observed, and nothing that is not an effect is anywhere seen to be divided. Now, *ākāśa* is perceived to be divided (distinct) from the earth, etc. Hence *ākāśa* also must be an effect.

८ । एतेन मातरिश्वा व्याख्यातः ।

८ । एतेन विद्युत्त्याख्यानैर्मातरिश्वा विद्युदायय वायु अपि व्याख्यातः । यो जित् रीतिस्त्वं भवन्त्या आकाशस्य उत्पत्तिपक्षे सशयः, पूत्रपक्षः, सिद्धान्तश्च कृत्वा, चाशेषोत्पत्तौ अपि न एव योजनीया इति वाक्यशेषः ।

8 By the above, air (also) is explained

The above explanation of (the origination of) *ākāśa* (from Brahman) serves also for air of which *ākāśa* is the support. The same steps as have been employed in the discussion about the origin of *ākāśa* viz. the preliminary doubt, the *Pārvapakṣa*, and the establishment of the hypothesis, should be applied in the case of the origin of air also

८। असम्भवस्य सतोऽनुपपत्तेः ।

८। विद्युत्पद्मवत् सत्त्वं विद्युर्भवति इति स्यात् समविद्मतिः । ताम् चामहाम् अपरितुम् इदं उच्यते । न खलु सतः सदाभवत्तु तद्वत्त्वं कुतश्चित् च्यवत् सत्त्वं चत्पत्तिः प्रागुक्तस्याः । अस्याः ?—अनुपपत्तः यतः चासत्त्वात्तदा आभासं विद्यमानायां सत्त्वविद्युत्तदा न उपपद्यते । न अपि सत्त्वं सदा आभासं विद्युत्तदा चत्पद्यमानं इत्यत्र नदादि प्रसिद्धं । न तु विद्युत्तदा आभासं । न अपि च्यवत् निरावृत्त्यात् अयमस्य सम्पत्तिः (वा दाशः) इति पाप्यपत्तवत्त्वं ।

9 *But the Sat (the truly existent One : i. e. Brahman) has no origin for that is impossible*

Here some one might think that like *ākāśa* and air Brahman too might have an origin in something else. The purpose of the present Sūtra is to remove such doubt. It is unreasonable to imagine that Brahman whose essence is Being itself may have his being from something else. Why so? Because it is impossible. Because, the condition in which one thing becomes an origin and another its product never arises unless the cause and the

effect are distinguishable as general and particular (as clay and a jar). Nor, again, can the Sat spring from anything particular, because it is observed that particular forms of existence are produced from what is general, (as jars etc from clay etc) and never the general from the particular. Nor, further, can the Sat (Being) spring from asat, 'non-being', because the asat has no self (and therefore cannot be a cause), and further, there is this reproachful passage in scripture, "How could that which *is*, spring from that which *is not*?" (*Chh* VI 2, 2)

१० । तेजोऽवस्तयाह्वाह ।

१० । 'तेज' 'अत' सातस्मिन् जायते । कस्मात् ?—'तथाहि आह' "वायोऽग्नि" (तै० २।१) इति ।

10 Fire proceeds from that, *i e* air, for such is stated (in scripture)

Fire proceeds from that, *i e*, air Why so? For, it is thus said, viz, in the passage "Fire (proceeded) from air" (*Taitti Up* II, 1)

११ । आपः ।

११ । "अतस्तयाह्वाह" इति अनुवर्तते । 'आप' 'अत' तेजस जायन्ते । १ कस्मात् ?—'तथाहि आह' "तदधीऽसृजत" (का० ६।२३) इति "अग्नेराप" (तैत्ति० २।१) इति च ।

11 Water (proceeds from fire)

The words proceeds from that (i. e. fire) as declared in scripture have to be supplied from the previous Sūtra. Water proceeds from that, i. e. fire. Why so? For it is thus said viz., in the passages It sent forth water (*Chh* VI 2 3) and From fire water (*Taitt* II 1)

१२। पृथिव्यधिकाः रूपमप्यदास्तरेभ्यः ।

११। 'ता आर पृथग्वदन्त्याम प्रसादितरीति ता अपमद्यन्ता (वा ६।१।४) इति सूत्रे । तत्र संग्रहः—अम् अनेन 'अपम मन्त्रेन ग्रीहिषणादि अपमपदाब्धे' च 'चोदनादि तत्रापि, वि वा इविषी इति । सर्वं ब्रूमः—पृथिवी एव 'अपम'मन्त्रेन विवक्ष्यते । अस्यात् १—एवञ्चकारात् कदात् सत्त्वानात् च । अविचारः तावत् 'तत्त्वब्रह्म' इत्यत्र (वा ६।१) इति च महाभूत विवर्था वक्ष्यते । तत्र अपममार्गा पृथिवी महाभूत विवर्था न पठन्त्यान् प्राच्याणि परिपक्वा भव्यः । तथा कपम् अपि बाह्यरूपे पृथिव्यनुसृत्य कल्पते—'यत् कृत्वा तत्त्वमिति (वा ६।१) । भूयिष्ठं हि पृथिव्याः स्वरूपं कर्म । सुपत्नम् अपि समानाविद्यमानम् 'अपम' पृथिवी (तेति १।१) 'तद्वदपमं मा आसीत् तत् समकल्पत सा पृथिव्यमवत् (इह १।१।१) इति च ।

12. (In the scriptural text declaring the origin of food from water) food is to be taken in the sense of earth because of the subject matter the colour and other passages

We read in the scripture, That water thought May I be many may I grow forth It sent forth food, (*Chh* VI 2, 4 Here doubt arises, whether the word 'food' denotes

rice, barley, and such other eatables as cooked food, etc., or, the earth We say it is the earth that is intended to be meant by the word 'food' Why so? On account of the subject matter, on account of the colour 'of earth', and on account of other passages In the first place, the subject matter of that passage is "the elements," as seen from the preceding passages, "It sent forth fire, it sent forth water" (*Chh* VI II) In the enumeration of the successive elements, the next turn (after fire and water) is that of 'earth', and it would be improper to pass it over and to assume without a reason that the meaning of the word 'food' is 'rice, barley' etc. In the second place, the colour of 'food' too, as mentioned in a complementary passage, viz, "The dark colour is the colour of food" (*Chh* VI, 3, agrees with that of earth. The predominant hue of earth is dark In the third place, other scriptural passages dealing with the same subject declare that "what was there as the froth of the water condensed and formed earth" (*Bri* I, 22)

१३। तदभिध्यानादेव तु तल्लिङ्गात् सः ।

१३। किम् इमानि वियदादीनि भूतानि स्वयमेव स्वविकारान् सृजन्ति, आक्षेपित्वं परमेश्वर एव तेन तेन आत्मना अवतिष्ठमान अभिध्यायन् त त विकारं सृजति, इति सन्देहे "तप्तेन ऐक्षत", "ता आप ऐक्षन्" (का० ६।२।४) इत्यादि श्रवणात् भूतानां स्वात्मना चैत् अवकाशेन, तत्र उच्यते, 'स एव, तदभिध्यानात्' 'स' परमेश्वर एव तेन तेन आत्मना अवतिष्ठमान अभिध्यायन् त त विकारं सृजति । कुत ?—'तल्लिङ्गात्' यत् सृष्टिप्रकरणे तस्य एव लिङ्गं निधत्तृत्वादिलक्ष्यं कथयन्ति । तथाहि शास्त्रं, -

‘यः पृथिव्यां सिद्धन् इष्टिष्या चक्री यं इष्टिरी न केन दत्त इष्टिरी मरी। यः इष्टिरीम्
चक्री यमदत्त न चाभावात्सिद्धत (इष्ट ३।०) “तद्वत्त वत्त द्याम् (वा ६।१।१)
इत्यादि। यत् तु ईश्वरस्य चक्री यत्तस्यैव तत् परमेश्वरस्यैव यत्त एव दत्तम्।
एव तस्यैव महानि। ॥५५॥

13 (Now the elements do not produce other elements of themselves) *but it is he (i. e., the Lord who produces them) through his creative thought because he has been mentioned (in the scriptures as the Creator)*

Here a doubt may arise Do *akasa* and the other elements themselves send forth their effects, or does the Highest Lord abiding as the selves of those elements, produce those effects by his creative thought? If the independent action of the elements should be imagined from such scriptural passages as "the fire thought" "the water thought" (*Chh* VI 2 3 and 4) etc., we say in reply that it is the Highest Lord, who abiding as the selves of the various elements, produces, by his creative thought the respective effects Why so? Because in the section on creation it is his characteristics as Ruler etc. that are mentioned, e g., "He who dwelling in the earth is yet distinct from the earth, whom the earth cannot know to whom the earth is as a body and who controls the earth from within,—he it is who is thy Self thy inmost Ruler the Immortal (*Bri* V 7) It thought, may I be many" (*Chh* 2 3) etc. The thinking and hearing attributed (in certain texts) to water fire etc., must be viewed as due to the fact of the Highest Lord having entered them (and not their independent thinking

and hearing.) It is to exclude the possibility of this doubt that the word 'but' is used in this *sūtra*

१४ । विपर्ययेण तु क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते च ।

१४ । भूतानाम् उत्पत्तिक्रमं चिन्तित । अतः इदानीम् अप्ययक्रमं चिन्त्यते । 'तु'-शब्दः पूर्वपक्षनिरासे । 'अतः' उत्पत्तिक्रमात् 'विपर्ययेण' विपरीतेन क्रमेण प्रलयक्रमः भवितुम् अर्हति । स एव क्रमः 'उपपद्यते च' युक्तः च भवति । यतः लोके दृश्यते येन क्रमेण सोपानम् आरुढं तत् विपरीतक्रमेण अवरोहति । अपि च दृश्यते 'सद' जातं घटशरावादि अप्ययकाले भङ्गावम् अभ्येति, अग्नयः जातं हिमकारकादि अद्भावम् अभ्येति । अतश्च उपपद्यते एतत् यत् पृथिवी अन्नं जाताः सती स्थितिकालातीते अपि, अप्रीयात्, आपश्च तेजसी जाताः सत्यं तेजः अप्रीयुः । एव क्रमेण सूक्ष्मं सूक्ष्मतरश्च अन्तरम् अन्तरतरश्च कारणम् अप्रीय सर्वं कार्यजातं परमकारणं परमसूक्ष्मञ्च ब्रह्म अभ्येति इति वेदितव्यम् ।

14. *The order (of dissolution), however, is the reverse of this (i.e., of the order of creation) Such is also proved (by experience.)*

The order of creation of the elements has been discussed hitherto. Now we proceed to consider the order 'of their retraction (into Brahman)'. It is reasonable to assume that the order of dissolution should be the reverse of the order of creation. Such a (reverse) order 'is also proved (by experience,)' for it is observed in the world that a man, when ascending a stair, takes the steps in a particular order, which he has to reverse when he descends. It is also observed that things made of clay, such as jars, platters, etc., on being destroyed, pass back into clay, and things produced from water, such as snow, hail-stones, etc., pass

Doubt may be thrown on the order of creation of the elements as detailed in the previous Sûtras. Thus, The intellect and the sensorium should be admitted to have places somewhere in the succession between the elements and Brahman, because these two have been indicated, *i e*, enumerated as steps in creation, in the *Mundakopanishad* (11 1) The Sutrâkâra says that if this view be held, and if thence it be doubted that the order of the elements (in creation etc) as described above is thereby subverted, we say, No, such doubt is not to be entertained, because as far as the successive steps of creation and dissolution are concerned, there is no difference whatsoever between the elements (akâsa, air, fire, etc) and the organs, (the intellect, the sensorium, the eye, the ear, etc) Now, if, (as held by us), the organs are made up of the elements, then their origination and dissolution are identical with the origination and dissolution of the elements, and hence we have not to look for any alteration of order on account of these two, *viz*, the intellect and the sensorium. If, however, it be supposed that the organs are not made up of the elements, still the order of the origin of the elements need not be affected by the organs, for under that supposition, the organs may all have been produced first and the elements last, or else the elements may have been produced first and all the organs last

१६ । चराचरव्यपाश्रियस्तु स्यात् तद्व्यपदेशो मातस्तद्वैव-
भावित्वात् ।

२६ । न भूतकारणवत् जीवस्य उत्पत्तिप्रलयौ स्तः । 'तद्व्यपदेश' जीवस्य जन्म-

[illegible]

16. (The words birth and death) belong properly to (the bodies only of) moving and non moving beings. Is the very existence (of these two words) depends on the existence of the body their application to it (the self of the individual) can only be metaphorical.

The individual self has neither beginning nor dissolution such as the elements and the organs have. Birth and death popularly ascribed to it have a proper application to the bodies only of non moving and moving beings. The application of these two words to it is only secondary (or metaphorical) and cannot be taken in their primary senses. Because the individual self appears only when the body is born and disappears when the body is dead so the words birth and death have come to be used metaphorically with reference to the individual self.

१०। माताऽनृतेनित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः ।

୧୦। 'ନି' ବାକ୍ୟା' ଉତ୍ପତ୍ତି ଓ ଉଚ୍ଚିତ ବାକ୍ୟରୂପ । 'ସନ୍ତୁ' ବାକ୍ୟ: ଉପର ଉପାଦାନିତୁନି
ନାମି । 'ନାମ' ବିଧିବାକ୍ୟ ଓ ଉପର 'ସନ୍ତୁ' ବିଧି ବାକ୍ୟରୂପ ପ୍ରାପ୍ତ (ଉପ ୧।୧୮)
ଉପାଦାନିତୁନି ବାକ୍ୟ ବିଧିବାକ୍ୟ ଉପରାଧିକାରୀ ।

17 The Self is not (originated) as there is no scriptural text to the effect and also as it is eternal according to them: (if e.g. scriptural texts.)

The self is not originated , because there is no scriptural text which says so And also because from such scriptural texts as "It (the self) is unborn, eternal, the ancient" (*Kath* II 18), etc , the eternity of the self is known

१८ । ज्ञोऽतएव ।

१८ । अयम् आत्मा 'ज्ञः' नित्यचैतन्य । 'अत एव' यतः परम् एव ब्रह्म उपाधि-सम्पर्कात् जीवभावेन अवतिष्ठते, ब्रह्मण्ययं "सर्वं ज्ञानमनन्तम्" (तैत्ति० २।१) इत्यादिभ्यः श्रुतिभ्यः चैतन्यस्वरूपत्वम् अवगम्यते तथात् हेतो जीव चैतन्यस्वरूपः एव ।

18 *For this very reason (the self is) intelligent* This self is eternally intelligent 'For this very reason', i.e., because it is the highest Brahman himself that exists as the (individual self) through its contact with limiting adjuncts (upâdhi), and also because the intelligent character of Brahman is known through such scriptural texts as "Brahman is true, intelligent, and infinite" (*Taitti* II, 1), etc , therefore the individual self is intelligent in character

१९ । उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम् ।

१९ । इदानीं किपरिमाण जीवः, इति चिन्त्यते । तत्र पूर्वपक्षः,—'उत्क्रान्ति-गत्यागतीनाम्' उत्क्रान्ति शरीरात् वह्निर्गमनं, गति लोकान्तरगमनम्, आगति लोकान्तरात् अत्र आगमनम् । तासां श्रुतिप्रमाणात् परिच्छिन्न अणुपरिमाण जीवः, न विभुः, न च देहपरिमाणः । न विभो चलनम् अवकल्प्यते, देहपरिमाणत्वं च जैनमतपरीक्षायां निरस्तम् ।

19 (The Pûrvapaksha says that the individual self is

of atomic size, on account of the mention in the scriptures)
of its passing out going and returning

We now pass on to the consideration of what size the individual self is. First as usual we have the Pūrva pakṣha, (in Sūtras 19 to 28) As the self is said in the scriptures to pass out of the body, to go to other worlds and to come back from other worlds to this, so it must be of limited and atomic size and it can neither be all pervading nor of the size of the body. Passing from place to place is impossible in the case of an all pervading body and the theory of the self being of the same size as the body has already been refuted in course of the examination of the Jaina doctrine.

२० । स्वात्मना चोत्तरयो ।

१ । पुनरपि पूरयत् । उत्तरादिः स्वार्थिन् अपरतीक्ष्णं चर्चयेत्
 चरचरेत्, उत्तरं तु भेदादती नाचरति, एवमत्र, स्वात्मना चोत्तरयोरेव एव
 उत्तरादीं स्यादयो उत्तरा मरति इति वाच्येति ।

20 *And on account of the two latter (going and returning) being connected with the self (it is a moving thing and hence of atomic size)*

The Pūrva-pakṣha continues. We concede that passing out does not necessarily indicate motion for passing out may be attributed even to a self whose *karma* has been exhausted and which ceases thenceforth to move. But the two latter *viz.*, going¹ and returning² are not possible in the case of something that does not move.

These two latter, viz, 'going' and 'returning' can have connection with (i e, application to) self-activities only, (i e, their application to selves indicates that selves move, and consequently must be atomic in size

२१ । नाप्युरतश्च्युतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात् ।

२१ । एतच्च पूर्वपक्ष-सूत्रम् । 'अतश्च्युते.' अणुत्वविपरितीतश्रुते, यतः "स वा एष महान् अज" (बृह ४।४।२२), "आकाशवत् सर्वगतश्च नित्य." एवञ्जातीयका श्रुति आत्मन अणुविपरितीतत्व महत्वम् इति यावत् कथयति, तत आत्मा 'न अणु इति चेत् न' । कस्मात् ?—'इतराधिकारात्' यत एवञ्जातीयका श्रुति इतराधिकारेः ब्रह्मप्रकरणे कथिता, न जीवप्रकरणे ।

21 If it be said that (the self) is not atomic, on account of there being scriptural texts stating the contrary, we say, No, for (in those texts) the subject matter is different (viz Brahman)

The Púrvapaksha continues. If it be objected that from scriptural texts which deny the above statement (i e, the statement of the atomic size of the self), such as "He is that great, unborn" (Bri IV 4 22) "Like *ákāśa* he is omnipresent and eternal" and the like, the opposite of atomic size, i e, a great size, is to be inferred in respect of the self, we say, No Why so? Because such scriptural statements are made in connection with another subject-matter, that is Brahman, and not the Jīva

२२ । स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्याम् ।

२२ । एतत् च पूर्वपक्ष-सूत्रम् । अणुत्व दृढयति । 'स्वशब्द' साक्षात् अणुत्व-

वाची मयः "एवीश्वरात्मा चेतसा विदितव्यः (सुख १।१।८) इत्यादि । उभयानाम्
उद्भूतमालम् ।

वाचाप्यवतमानस्य यतसा कल्पितम् च ।

भाषी श्रीरः स विदितः स वागव्यायः कल्पते ॥ (चेता ४८)

"वाचापादुक्तवः यतवतमानस्यदपि यतवतादुक्तवः यतवती मायः इति वदिदम्
वागम् इति भाषयती । तावतां प्रमाणावतां च जीवस्य अज्ञानम् यतवत्यते इति
वाचयतीति ।

22. And (the self is proved to be atomic in size) from the identical word being mentioned and the self's measurement by division being given (in the scriptures)

The Pūrvapakṣa continues. The atomic size of the self is further corroborated by the two following facts. First, the very word meaning atomic size is used in the scriptures, as for example in the passage "This subtle (i.e. atomic) self is to be known by the mind &c. (*Mund* III 1 9) Secondly the *unmāna* or measurement by division (of the self) is given in the following scriptural text — "The self is to be known as a hundredth part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair and yet it is worthy of obtaining infinitude. (*Svet* V 9) The commentary named 'Bhāmati' thus paraphrases the above scriptural text — "From the point of a hair is first divided its hundredth part. From that hundredth part again is divided its hundredth⁷ part. Then that is the measurement spoken of — From these two corroborative evidences also follows the atomic size of the individual self."

२३ । अविरोधचन्दनवत् ।

२३ । पूर्वपक्ष-सूत्रम्,—आपत्तिखण्डनम् । अणवे सति एकदेशस्य जीवस्य सकलदेशगतोपलब्धिं विरुध्यते, इति न गृहणीयं, यतः, 'चन्दनवत् अविरोधः' स्यात् । यथा हरिचन्दनविन्दुः शरीरैकदेशसम्बन्धोऽपि सन् सकलदेहव्यापिनम् आह्लाटं करोति, एव जीवोऽपि देहैकदेशस्य सकलदेहव्यापिनीम् उपलब्धिं कारिष्यति । त्वक्-सम्बन्धात् च अस्य सकलग्रहीरगता वेदना न विरुध्यते, त्वक् च हात्त्रशरीरव्यापिनी ।

23 *There is no incompatibility (between the self's atomic size and its perceptions extending over the entire body), as in the case of sandal-paste*

The Pūrvapaksha refutes an objection. If the self's size were atomic, then it could reside only at one point of the body, and perceptions extending over the entire body would be inconsistent with such a size—This doubt need not be entertained, because there is no incompatibility, 'as in the case of sandal-paste'. Just as a drop of sandal-paste, though in actual contact with one spot of the body only, yet produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body, so the soul, abiding at one point of the body only, may cause perceptions extending over the whole body. As the self is connected with the skin (the seat of sensations), the extension of the self's sensations throughout the whole body is not contrary to reason, for the skin extends over the whole body.

२४ । अवस्थितिवैशेष्यादिति चेन्नाभ्युपगमाद्धृदि हि ।

२४ । पूर्वपक्षे आपत्तिखण्डनम् । चन्दनविन्दोः 'अवस्थितिवैशेष्यात्' प्रत्यक्षात्

एकदेशवर्तिन्यस्य जीवस्य तु एकदेशवर्तिन्यस्य अक्षय्यत्वात् अपि ह्यत्र च न चन्दनविन्दु जीवस्य हृत्प्राग्वत् प्रवितुम् अर्हति इति चेत् न । अनुपपन्नमात्रं हि हिं यत् “इदि हि एव चास्या” (ब्र० १।६) इत्याद्याः यतो जीवस्य अपि चन्दनविन्दुवत् अवस्थिति वैशिष्ट्यम् अनुपपद्यते ।

24 *If it be objected (against the last Sûtra) that the (sandal paste has n) specific location (which the self has not) we say No For there is a statement (of specific location for the self in the scriptures) viz within the heart*

The Purnvapaksha refutes another objection It may be again objected that the spot of sandal paste has a specific location for we actually observe its position in one part of the body but as regards the self its position in one part of the body can neither be observed nor inferred.—This objection too should not be raised. For in such scriptural passages as ‘The self is in the heart (Pras ill 6) etc. specific location has been admitted in the case of the self as distinctly as in the case of the spot of sandal paste

२५ । गुण्यादाः स्वीकृतम् ।

११ । पूर्वोपदिष्टत्वात्प्राग्वत् दर्शयति । यथा स्वीये अद्वैतवैश्वानरिणा भविष्यद्वैत-प्रवर्तनीनां प्रमा अक्षय्यविनी सती ह्यत्रैव यद्वै चान्ये चरति तदा जीवीऽपि अद्वैतवैश्वानरी अक्षय्यविनीम् उपलब्धिं करोति ।

25 *Or on account of its quality (of pervasiveness)*

just as in the world (the light of a lamp pervades a whole room)

The Púrvapaksha refutes another objection Just as in the world, the light of lamps or gems placed in one part of a room illuminates the whole room, and thus produces an effect in the whole room, similarly the self, though abiding in one part of the body only, may produce perceptions throughout the entire body

૨૬ । વ્યતિરેકો ગન્ધવત્ ।

૨૬ । પૂર્વપક્ષે આપતિસ્વહનમ્ । કથમ્ પુનઃ ગુણ ગુણિવ્યતિરેકેય અન્યત્ર વર્તમાન વર્તેત ? इति न आशङ्कनीय, यत 'गन्धवत्', यथा कुसुमादि-गन्धवत्द्रव्य-व्यतिरेकेण एव गन्धस्य अन्यत्र वृत्ति भवति, तथा अणो अपि सत जीवस्य चैतन्यगुणस्य 'व्यतिरेक' विशेष भविष्यति ।

26 *Extending beyond (is possible) as in the case of odour*

The Púrvapaksha refutes still another objection : "How can a quality extend beyond that in which it inheres, and abide elsewhere?" This doubt is not to be entertained Because just as odour may exist in (i.e. extend to) a place beyond where the odoriferous objects, such as flowers etc., are, similarly the quality of intelligence may extend beyond the self, although the latter should be atomic

૨૭ । તથા ચ દર્શયતિ ।

૨૭ । પૂર્વપક્ષે સ્મૃતિપ્રમાણમ્ । સ્મૃતિ 'ચ તથા' જીવસ્ય ચૈતન્યગુણેન સમસા-

शरीर व्यापितं 'वा शरीरम् वा नमस्तस्मै' (इह १।४।० ; शीरो ३।१० ; शान्ती ८।८।१)
इत्यादि-शक्तिभिः 'इवैवर्तितम् ।

27 *And thus (the scripture also) declares*

The Pārvaṇpakṣhin quotes scripture to support himself. Scripture also declares that the self pervades 'the entire body by means of its quality viz intelligence in such passages as 'Up to the hairs, up to the tips of the nails (Bṛi 1.4.7 Kau 13.20 Chh viii 8.1 etc.)

२८ । पृथगुपदेगात् ।

२८ । पृथगप्युपदेगात् । "उच्यते शरीरं व्यापयन् (शीरो ३।१०)
"यदिवा शरीरम् विभक्तं विज्ञानम् आरुह्य (इह १।४।१०) इत्यादि-शक्तिभिः
व्यापयन् । अतः व्यापयन् 'इवैवर्तितम्' शरीरम् अतस्त्व-मन्वेन एव शरीरव्यापितम्
अवयव्यति ।

28 *On account of separate statement (of self and intelligence as agent and instrument, in the scriptures)*

The Pārvaṇpakṣhin quotes scripture again to support himself. The self and its intelligence have been clearly distinguished as agent and instrument in such scriptural passages as "Having taken possession of the body by consciousness (Kau 13.6) and "Then (the intelligent self) having absorbed all intelligence through the intelligence of the senses (Bṛi 11.1, 17) etc. whence it is to be understood that the self pervades the body only through intelligence, which is its quality

२८ । तदगुणसारत्वात् तु तद्व्यापदेशः प्राज्ञवत् ।

२८ । सिद्धान्त-सूत्रमेतत् । 'तु'-शब्द पूर्ववत् व्यावर्तयति । न जीव वस्तुतः अपरिमाणः । कथं तर्हि अणुत्वादि-व्यपदेशः ? इति, अत आह, जीवस्य 'तद-गुणसारत्वात्' उपाधिगुण-सारत्वात् बुद्धिगुणप्रधानत्वात्, अत्यर्थं — यत बुद्धेः गुणा इत्यादिषु सुख दुःखम् इत्यादयः एव जीवस्य संसारिणि प्रधान कारणं ततः, तस्य 'तद्व्यापदेशः' अपरिमाणकयनम् । 'प्राज्ञवत्', यथा प्राज्ञस्य परमात्मनः सगुणोपासनेषु उपाधि-गुणसारत्वात् अपरिमाणत्वादि-व्यपदेशः, "यनीयान् हृदिवां यवादा" (छा ३।१।४।२) "मनोमय प्राण-शरीर" (छा ३।१।४।२) "सर्वगतं सर्वरसं सर्वकामं सर्वसकल्पं" (छा ३।१।४।२) इति एवम्प्रकारः, तद्वत् ।

29 But it is to the predominance of its quality (i.e. its limiting adjunct, viz. buddhi or intelligence), that the ascription of that (i.e. atomicity) to it is due, as in the case of the Intelligent Self (i.e. Brahman)

Now begins the reply of the Sutrakara. The word 'but' denotes the rejection of the position of the Pūrva-paksha. In reality, however, the self is *not* of atomic size. Then, how is it that atomicity etc. have been attributed to it (in the scriptures)? Because of the predominance of its quality, that is of *buddhi*. It is the qualities of *buddhi* (such as desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, etc.), that constitute the main cause of the transmigratory existence of the individual self. Hence the (secondary or figurative) ascription to it of atomic size (the size of 'buddhi') 'as in the case of the Intelligent Self' (i.e. Brahman). Just as in those sections of the scriptures whose topic is meditation on the qualified Brahman, the Highest Self is spoken of as possessing relative minuteness

of its quality, i.e. *buddhi*. From this it follows that the conjunction of *buddhi* and the self, they being different entities, must necessarily come to an end, and the self, when disjoined from the *buddhi*, will become unsupported, and hence non-existent." To this we reply that this objection is not to be entertained, because the conjunction of the self with *buddhi* lasts just as long as the individuality of the self lasts. The self's connection with *buddhi* is true only in its state of (fictitious) transmigratory existence, and not in its real existence. But how is it known that the self's connexion with *buddhi* lasts just as long as its individuality lasts? Because that is seen in the scriptures, which declare, "The Person of light, whose essence is knowledge, dwelling within the heart, surrounded by the *prāṇas*, he remaining identical, wanders along the two worlds, as if thinking, as if moving" (*Bṛi.* IV 3 7), etc. Here the expression "whose essence is knowledge" means "whose essence is *buddhi*" Again with regard to the words "remaining identical" we may ask "identical with what?" The evident answer, based on the proximity of words, is "with *buddhi*" Further, by the expressions "as if thinking", "as if moving", it is meant that the self does not think and move on its own account, but thinks as it were, and moves as it were, because the *buddhi* to which it is joined really thinks and moves. Hence the self's transmigratory (individual) existence is due only to connexion with *buddhi*.

३१ । पुंस्त्वादिवत् तस्य सतीऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् ।

३१ । आपत्यन्तर-खण्डनम् । ननु सुषुप्तिप्रलययो, न शक्यते आत्मन बुद्धिसम्बन्धः

अन्तरम् एतत् तदीयं कर्मविवादिनश्च अभ्युपगच्छे, तन्निवृत्तं समाप्तं वाचि च
 न ह्येव एतत्, "कदा चैव तदा कदाचि भवति भवति (वा. १५२) ।
 तत् कदा बुद्धिमन्तश्च वा अभ्युपगच्छे, अथा कदाचि वाचि—बुद्धिमन्तश्च
 वाचि अभ्युपगच्छे एव बुद्धिः । "तुल्यं दिव्यं वा वाच्यं अभ्युपगच्छे वाचि
 तत्तुल्यं तदा बुद्धिमन्तश्च वाचि बुद्धिः दीप्तं वाचि विद्यमानं अभ्युपगच्छे
 वाचि अभ्युपगच्छे एव बुद्धिः न तु तदा अभ्युपगच्छे बुद्धिः ।

31 Because it is reasonable that what exists (potentially afterwards) manifests itself like virile power &c

The Sūtrakāra refutes another objection. In the states of deep sleep and *pralaya* (the absorption of created things in Brahman) no connection of the self with *buddhi* can be affirmed for in those states according to the scriptures, all modifications pass away and an unqualified state is reached, as seen in the passage, He becomes then O dear (disciple) reunited with the True he is gone to his own (Chh. VI 8 1). Then how can it be said that its connection with *buddhi* lasts as long as the self exists?" To this objection we reply that it is reasonable to suppose that the self remains connected with *buddhi* as long as it lasts. Like virile power &c." As the vital seed and moustaches potentially exist in childhood and are afterwards manifested, so it is reasonable to hold that during sleep the self's connection with *buddhi* continues to exist in a potential state and it is manifested during the waking state and not that it suddenly and unaccountably emerges again after cessation during sleep.

३२ । नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धि-प्रसङ्गोऽन्यतर-नियमो वाऽन्यथा ।

३२ । चिदात्मस्य दृष्टीरुगेति । 'अन्यथा नित्योपलब्धिं अनुपलब्धिं वा प्रमज्जेत इन्द्रियविषयाणां सन्निधाने सति नित्यम् एव उपलब्धिं स्यात् । अथ हेतौ वर्तमाने सति अपि फलाभावे, ततः अपि नित्यम् एव अनुपलब्धिः स्यात्, न च एव दृश्यते । अथ 'वा अन्यतर-नियमः' आत्मन इन्द्रियस्य वा शक्तिप्रतिबन्धे अभ्युपगम्य, । न च आत्मन शक्तिप्रतिबन्धः सम्भवति, तस्य अविवक्षितत्वात् । न अपि इन्द्रियस्य, यतः पूर्वोक्तस्योपलब्ध्यौ अप्रतिबद्धशक्तिकस्य तस्य शक्तिः एकस्यात् न प्रतिबध्येत । तस्मात् युक्तम् एतत्—'तदगुणसारत्वात् तदव्यपदेशः' (२८तमे सूत्रे) ।

32 Otherwise, there would be either constant perception or constant non-perception, or else a limitation of either of the two (*viz* the self and the senses)

The Sutrākāra strengthens his position Otherwise, *i e*, supposing we did not acknowledge an internal organ (*buddhi* or *manas*) through whose attention and non-attention perception and non-perception took place, we should have to admit either constant perception or constant non-perception There would result perpetual perception whenever there would be the conjunction (of the self) with the senses and the objects of sense, or else, even if the cause having been present, the effect did not arise, there would follow perpetual non-perception Neither of these is actually observed. Or else, we should have to assume 'a limitation of either' *i e*, that there are obstacles in the way of energy, either of the self or of the sense-organs But the former is not possible, as the self is not capable of any modification or limitation, nor the latter, as there is no reason why the energy of the sense-organ which is non-

obstructed in the preceding and the following moments should without any cause, be obstructed (in the intervening moment.) Hence the explanation (given in Sūtra 29) of the attribution of minuteness to the self (owing to its connexion with *buddhi*) is reasonable.

३३ । कर्ता माभ्यार्यवत्वात् ।

३३ । तदेवमात्रादिभिरपि एव अपरीक्ष्य जीवकम् प्रपञ्चते । 'कर्ता च सर्वं जीवः स्यात् । कर्त्तव्यम् ?—माभ्यार्यवत्वात्' यत् एव च धर्मेण तुल्यत्वात् दृष्टम् इति एवमित्यर्थं भाव्यम् अवश्यम् भवति, कर्त्तव्यं तत् सत्त्वकं स्यात् । तथा इदम् अपि शास्त्रम् अवश्यम् भवति,—'एव हि द्रष्टा श्रुता श्रुता प्राप्ता रक्षिता मत्ता शोढा कर्ता विद्यायाः पुद्गलः' इति (प्रश्ने ३८) ।

१

33 *The self is an agent for* (it is on that admission that *the words of the scripture acquire a meaning*

By the section on the predominance of the quality of *buddhi* another attribute of the individual self is set forth. The individual is an agent. Why so? Because it is only thus that meaning can be given to such scriptural texts as "He should perform sacrifices, make fire oblations, give donations" and the like otherwise the texts become meaningless. Similarly a meaning attaches to this text also on the same supposition:—Verily this person who is the seer the hearer the smeller the taster the perceiver the thinker the agent, and who has knowledge for his essence &c." (*Pras* IV 9)

३४ । विद्वागोपदेशात् ।

३४ । इतथ जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं यत् शास्त्रे अभ्यासव्यायां तस्य विद्वागम् उपदिशति,—
“स ईयतेऽव्यतो यत्र कामम्” इति (बृह ४।१।१२), “स्त्रे शरीरे यद्याकाम परिवर्तने”
इति च (बृह २।१।१८) ।

34 (And) on account of the teaching about the self's wandering about

The self is proved to be an agent, also because scriptural texts mention its wandering about in the state of sleep, e g, “The immortal one goes wherever he likes” (*Bri* IV 3, 12), and also, “He moves about, according to his pleasure, in his own body”, (*Bri* II 1, 18)

३५ । उपादानात् ।

३५ । इतथ जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं यत् जीवप्रकरणे श्रुति कारणाणाम् ‘उपादानं ग्रहणं’
सङ्कीर्तयति, यथा, “तदेवा प्राणानां विज्ञानेन विज्ञानम् आदाय” इति (बृह २।१।१७)
“प्राणान् गृहीत्वा” इति च (बृह २।१।१८) ।

35. (And) on account of the teaching about the self's taking.

The self is proved to be an agent, also because the scriptures in the section dealing with the individual self speak of it as taking its instruments, e g, “Having taken the intelligence of the *prānas* through its own intelligence” (*Bri.* II. 1, 17), and “Having taken the *prānas*” (*Bri.* II. 1, 18)

३६ । व्यपदेशाच्च श्रियायां न चेन्निर्होमविपर्ययः ।

३६ । इतश्च जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं एतत् च तस्य लोबिक्यो वदिक्यो च श्रियायां कर्मस्य व्यपदिशति कृत्तिः, अथ, “विद्यानं यद्यं तदुक्तं कर्मस्य तदुक्तं च (वेदिः १।३) । ननु विद्यानमप्यं दुही उपविशतः, अथम् यदेतद् जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं नृपते इति चेत्, न । जीवस्य एव ‘निर्होमं, न कुहे’ । न चेत् जीवस्य ज्ञात् ततः ‘निर्होमविपर्ययः’ स्यात् “विद्यानेन इति निरदिश्यत न “विद्यानम्” इति ।

36. Also because it is described (in the scriptures as an agent) with regard to action. If (the soul were) not (meant as the agent these would have been a different description

The self is proved to be an agent also from this, that the scripture speaks of its being an agent both in secular and in Vedic actions, e g., ‘The *viñāna* performs the sacrifices, it performs all acts *Taittī* II 5) If it be objected that the word *viñāna* here applies to *buddhi* so how can it indicate the agency of the self?—we say No. The self is meant here, not the *buddhi*. If the self were not meant, then the description would have been different. The language would then have been *Through viñāna* it performs not *Viñāna* performs. (See also Sūtra 38

३७ । उपलब्धिवदनियमः ।

३७ । अथाह यदि बुद्धिश्चेतिरिक्तं जीवः कर्ता स्यात्, सः स्वतन्त्र एव नियं हितस्य एव आत्मनः नियमिनः सत्त्वावधीत् न विपर्येतम् । विपर्येतम् अपि तु सत्त्वावधत्

उपलभ्यते । न च स्वतन्त्रस्य आत्मन ईदृशी प्रवृत्ति अनियमेन उपपद्यते, इति अत उत्तरं पठति,—‘उपलब्धिवत् अनियमः’ । यथा अयम् आत्मा उपलब्धिं प्रति स्वतन्त्रोऽपि अनियमेन इष्टम् अनिष्टं च उपलभते, एवम् अनियमेन एव इष्टम् अनिष्टञ्च सम्पादयिष्यति ।

37 *There is absence of restriction (in regard to the self's action as agent) just as in regard to perception*

An objection may be raised here “If the self, as distinct from the *buddhi* were the agent, then it would, because independent, do exclusively what is pleasant and useful to itself, and never the opposite. But it is observed to do the opposite also. It is not reasonable that the independent self should act thus unrestrictedly (i. e., do what is pleasant and what is unpleasant indiscriminately)” To this objection we reply. Just as the self, though free with regard to perception, perceives unrestrictedly both what is pleasant and what is unpleasant, so does it perform unrestrictedly both what is pleasant and what is unpleasant.

३८ । शक्तिविपर्ययात् ।

३८ । इतश्च विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तं जीवः कार्ता भवितुम् अर्हति । यदि पुन विज्ञान-शब्दाया बुद्धि एव कार्ता स्यात्, ततः ‘शक्तिविपर्ययः’ स्यात्, कारणशक्तिं बुद्धिं हीयेत, कार्ताशक्तित्वं आपद्येत, तत् च अन्याय्यम् ।

38 *On account of the reversal of power*

The self as distinct from *vijnāna* has to be admitted as an agent for the following reason also. If *buddhi* were

denoted by the word *vijñāna* and were the agent there would take place a reversal of power *Buddhi's* power as instrument would have to be denied and its power as agent would have to be affirmed which is unreasonable.

८ । अभाष्यभाषायाः ।

३८ । इत्यत्र चात्मनः षष्ठ्यन्तमिति स्यात् विज्ञानस्य षष्ठ्यन्तं समाधिः—“आत्मा वा चरं द्रष्टव्यं श्रोतव्यं मनसा विदित्वावित्तव्यं (इह १।३।३) ‘छात्रोऽपि स विदित्वावित्तव्यं’ (ब्रा ८।८।१) “अमित्येतं व्याख्येयं आत्मानम्” (मु १।१।६)— इति पूर्वपक्षे च आत्मनः षष्ठ्यन्तं न शक्यमिति ।

39 And on account of the impossibility of samiddhi

That the self is an agent follows from this also that the meditation taught in the Vedānta, as characterised in such texts as the following is possible only if the self is an agent — “The Self is to be seen heard, thought and meditated upon (Br II 4 5) “The Self we must seek out the Self we must try to understand” (Chh VIII 7 1) Meditate on the Self as Om (Mund II 2 6)

४० । यथा च तत्त्वोभयथा ।

४ । ‘च’ द्वयं ब्रह्मविद्यायाः । आत्मनः षष्ठ्यन्तं न आभाषितं मतम् । यथा ‘तथा कृतं च तत्त्वोभयथा’ इति स्यात्, विमुक्त्यादिदिशोऽपि निष्ठायाः भवति एवम् आत्मा अपि जननादीनि कर्तव्यानि चरिष्ये इति स्यात् आत्मनः षष्ठ्यन्तं एव एवम् उभयथा षष्ठ्यन्तं षष्ठ्यन्तं न भवति ।

40. *And as the carpenter (is an agent when working with his tools, and a non-agent at other times) so is the self both (agent and non-agent)*

The word 'and' here is used to remove a doubt. The self's activity is not to be supposed as inherent in its nature. Just as a carpenter, with his adze and other tools in hand, is an agent, but when he has laid aside the adze and other tools, is a non-agent, similarly the self is an agent only in relation to its instruments, but is a non-agent by its own fundamental nature. It exists in the states both of activity and inactivity.

४१ । परात् तु तच्छ्रुतेः ।

४१ । जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं 'परात्' एव भवति, न 'तु' तत् ईश्वर-निरपेक्षं, यत्, 'तत्' ईश्वरापेक्षया श्रुति एव उपदिशति, यथा, "एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति त यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनियते एष ह्येवासाधु कर्म कारयति त यमघो निनीयते" इति (कौषी ३।८), "य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् आत्मानम् अन्तरो यमयति" (बृह ३।७।२३) इति च ।

41 *But (the self's activity is) from the Supreme Being, because scripture teaches that*

The activity of the individual self is due to the Supreme Being, and not independent of Īśvara. Because 'that', i.e., its dependence on Īśvara, is taught in the scriptures, thus, "And it is he who makes that individual do virtuous deeds whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds. And it is he who makes that individual do vicious deeds

who is desirous of 'heaven should' perform sacrifices" and prohibitions such as "A Brāhmaṇa must not be killed", etc become significant. Otherwise, they become meaningless. The words "et cetera" are meant to include "the significance of human efforts, etc."

४३ । अथो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दाशकितवादिच-
मधीयत एके ।

४३ । जीव ईश्वरस्य अथ भवितुम् अर्हति, न तु स एव । कस्मात् ?—'नाना-
व्यपदेशात्' यतः शास्त्रे "सोऽन्वेष्टव्यं स विजिज्ञासितव्य" (छा ८।७।१), "एतमेव
विदित्वा मुनिर्भवति" (बृह ४।४।२२), "य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् आत्मानम् अन्तरो
यमयति" (बृह ३।७।२३) इति च एवञ्जातीयक भेदनिर्देश अस्ति । अन्यथा च अपि
व्यपदेश अस्ति अनानालस्य प्रतिपादकः । तथाहि 'एके' शास्त्रिनः ब्रह्मण्य 'दाशकित-
वादित्वम्' दाशकितवादिभावम् 'अधीयते' उपदिशन्ति । आथर्वणिका ब्रह्मसूक्तं "ब्रह्म
दाशा ब्रह्म दासा ब्रह्मैवेमे कितवा उत" इत्यादिना । दाशा ये एते कौवर्ता प्रसिद्धा,
ये च अमी दासा स्वामिनि आत्मानम् उपचिपन्ति, ये च अन्ये कितवा द्यूतकृत, ते
सर्वे ब्रह्मैव, इति हीनगण्यदाहर्ण्येण सर्वेषाम् एव जीवानाम् ब्रह्मत्वम् आहुः । अतः
भेदाभिदावगमाभ्याम् अशत्त्वावगमः ।

43 (The individual self is) a part (of Brahman),
because, their difference is taught (in certain texts), and
because, contrariwise, some (schools teach) his identity
with fishermen, gamblers, etc

The individual self is to be considered a 'part' of
Īśvara, not Īśvara himself Why so ? First 'on account
of the declaration of difference', i e, because the difference

(between the Highest Self and the individual self) is indicated in such scriptural passages as "The Self we must seek out the Self we must try to understand" (*Chh* VIII 7 1) He who knows him becomes a *muni* (*Bri* IV 4 22) He who dwelling within the self rules the self from within" (*Bri* III 7 23) and the like. And secondly because there are texts teaching otherwise : e g. declaring the non-difference (of *Īsvara* and the individual) e g. some members of a certain Vedic School speak of Brahman as becoming fishermen gamblers etc. The *Ātharvans* in their *Brahmasukta* say "Brahman is the fishermen Brahman is the slaves, Brahman is these gamblers" etc. By mentioning the instances of such low class beings as the fishermen who are commonly known as *kaivartas*, the slaves, who give themselves away to their masters, and the gamblers, and by stating that they are all Brahman, the *Ātharvans* have declared that all individual selves are identical with Brahman. From these two views of difference and non-difference there results the view of the *jīva* being a part of Brahman.

४४ । मन्त्रवर्णनम् ।

४४ । श्रीव ईश्वरस्य चक्षु एव, यतः सत्त्ववत्त्वं विद्वत्त्ववत्त्वं एतत् चक्षुः
चक्षुःसमर्थति, यथा, "तावत्सत्त्वमहिमा तयोः ज्ञानाय पूज्यम्" । पार्श्वेऽप्येव मूर्त्तिं मृतादि
विधादभ्यासतः दिशि (अथ १ । १ । १ वा १ । १ । १) ।

44 And on account of the Mantra,

Jīva is a part of *Īsvara*, because a *mantra* (Vedic text)

also intimates the same view, e g , “Such is its greatness , greater than it is the Person One foot of it are all beings, three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven” (Rik X. 30, 3 , Chh. III, 12, 6’

४. । अपि च स्मर्यते ।

४५ । भगवन्गीतायाम् ‘अपि च’ जीवस्य ईश्वराश्रयत्वम् ‘अप्यते’, यथा, “समैवांशी जीवलोके जीवभूत सनातन” (१५।७), तस्मात् अपि अशावगमः ।

45 *Moreover, it is so stated in the Smṛiti*

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* also jīva is spoken of as a part of Īśvara, e g , “In the world of living beings an eternal portion of me becoming the individual self &c” (XV 7).

४६ । प्रकाशादिवन्नैवं परः ।

४६ । आपत्तिखण्डनम् । ननु जीवस्य ईश्वराश्रयत्व-स्वीकारे तदीयेन दु खेन अशित ईश्वरस्य अपि दुःखित्व म्यात्, इति चेत् शङ्कते, तदा उच्यते,—‘न एव पर’ यथा जीव संसारदुःखम् अनुभवति, न एव पर ईश्वर अनुभवति । ‘प्रकाशादिवत्’ यथा प्रकाश सौख्यं, चान्द्रमस वा विद्यत् व्याप्य अवतिष्ठमान अङ्गुल्याद्युपाधिसम्बन्धात् तेषु ऋजु-वक्रादिभाव प्रतिपद्यमानेषु तत्तद्भावम् इव प्रतिपद्यमान अपि न परमार्थत तत्तद्भाव प्रतिपद्यते, यथा च आकाश घटादिषु गच्छत्सु गच्छन् इव विभाव्यमान अपि न परमार्थत गच्छति, यथा च उदयरागादि-कम्पनात् तद्गते सूर्यप्रतिबिम्बे कम्पमाने अपि न तद्वान् सूर्य वस्तुत कम्पते, एव बुद्ध्याद्युपहिते जीवाख्ये अग्नि दुःखायमाने अपि न तद्वान् ईश्वर दुःखायते ।

46 (The individual self is liable to pleasure and pain but) not so the Supreme Being like light etc

An objection related. "If we admit that the self is a part of Īvara, then on the self's being afflicted by pain Īvara too whose part it is, would be afflicted by pain"—
To this objection we reply "Not so the Supreme Being" i.e., the Supreme Īvara does not feel the pain of the worldly state as the individual does. Like light etc. i.e. just as the light of the sun or the moon which fills all space appears to assume the straight and curved form with the assumption of such and such forms by the limiting adjuncts e.g. fingers etc. with which it is in contact but does not really do so and just as *akāśa* although appearing to move when (the containing) jars etc. are moved does not really move and just as the sun although its image appears to tremble when the cup of water reflecting it is shaken does not really tremble—similarly Īvara, although the part of him limited by *buddhi* and other adjuncts, and named the individual self be affected by pain is not so affected

४७ । अत्रापि च ।

४७ । अत्रापि च व्यापारस्य यथा क्षेत्रेन कुक्षयेन न परः स व्यापक इति यथा,

तत्र वा परमात्मा हि स निर्यो निवृत्तः स्रुतः ।

न विद्यते कर्षणं हि परमबलिन्यात् ॥

अर्थात्मा अपरी मीर्यो मीचयन्ते स प्रकृतेः ।

स समवर्तमानसि यस्मिन् प्रकृतेः प्रकृतेः ॥

‘अत्रापि’ ‘समाप्तमिति च इति वाक्येन । “अतीत्या” विपक्षे आत्मनः प्रकृतेः

इमिवाकाशीति" (ऋक् १।२६४।२१, मुण्ड ३।१।१, श्वेत ४।६) इति, "एकतया सर्व-
भूतात्मेरात्मा न लिप्यते लोकादु खेन वाद्य (कठ ५।११) इति च ।

47 *The Smritis also* (teach that *Īsvara* is not subject to pain).

Vyāsa and others state in their *Smritis* that the Highest Self is not affected by the pain of the individual,
e g —

"The Highest Self that dwells there is eternal and
devoid of qualities,
He is not stained by the fruits of actions, any
more than a lotus-leaf by water
But that other self who is active in character,
is subject to bondage and liberation
He is bound again and again with the seventeen-fold
aggregate "

Here, 'the seventeen-fold aggregate' means the subtle body consisting of the ten sense-organs, the five *pranas*, *manas*, and *buddhi*] From the word 'also' we are to understand that the scriptures too teach the same, e g, "One of the two enjoys the sweet fruit, while the other looks on without eating" (*Rik* I 164. 21, *Mund* III 1 1, *Svet* IV 6), and "So the one Inner Self of all creatures, beyond all objects, is not mixed up with the sorrows of the world" (*Katha* V 11).

४८ । अनुज्ञापिहारौ देहसखस्याज्जोतिरादिवत्

४८ । आपत्तिखण्डनम् । आत्मनः एकत्वे अपि वैदिकौ लौकिकौ च अनुज्ञा-

परिहारी विविन्विधी अथ ॥३॥१॥ आत्मन ईदमन्मत्वात् । अतिविशेषतः
यदा अतिव एवमे अपि इव संप्रिष्ट अपि परिहिते न इतर.. यदा च यदविहाराः
वसवर्षादयः उपशोषन्, नदविहारा अपि सन् नतर्हस्यय परिहिते, तदा
वदतामसि ईदोपादय माव ॥ अपि शिरोभूतामावा ॥ अपि तदा ईदमन्मत्वात् एव
अतः अपा वदन्त, स्यात् ।

48. (Though the one Highest Self appears in all things yet) *permissions and prohibitions* (have arisen) *on account of the connexion (of the Self) with bodies as in the case of fire etc*

An objection refuted How do permissions and prohibitions, both Vedic and secular become possible though the Self is one only ? — On account of the Self's connexion with bodies, as in the case of fire etc Just as fire is one only yet we shun a fire which has had contact with flesh (i.e. has burnt a corpse) but not any other fire just as such things consisting of earth as diamonds, beryls, etc. are esteemed while corpses etc though equally consisting of earth are shunned — so although to the one Self without a second there are no things to be either avoided or accepted and consequently no obligations to be fulfilled yet on account of its connexion with bodies, certain actions become enjoined and certain others prohibited

४८ । अथ तिस्राध्यायिकम् ।

४८ । आत्मन अथनम् । एतावत्याद्युपपत्ति एवकर्तृत्वात् आत्मन सर्ववस्तु-
सम्बन्ध अतिशयोक्तेः शीघ्रतः सर्ववस्तु अतीत्यनिमित्तं स्यात् — पापकारी सुखी

भवेत्, पुण्यकारी च दुःखी भवेत्,—इति एतत् न शङ्कनीयम्, यत 'अमनसि' उपाधि
अमनानात्, अव्याप्ते, बुद्धिभेदेन भोगाभेदात्, कर्माफलस्य 'अव्यतिकारः' अभिप्रायः
स्यात् ।

49 *And on account of the non-extension (of individual selves) there is no confusion (of the results of actions)*

Another objection refuted "If we admit the unity of the Self, there will be only one undivided activity of that one Self, and so confusion may arise in connecting individual selves with the fruits of their respective actions Their fruits of actions may get mixed up amongst themselves Doers of evil may secure happiness, and doers of good misery " This doubt is not to be entertained, because there is no extension of adjuncts, i.e. because, through the 'buddhi' of individual selves keeping distinct from one another, the enjoying selves also remain distinct from one another and therefore no mixing up of fruits of actions can possibly take place

५० । आभास एव च ।

५० । इत्यत्र कर्मफलस्य अव्यतिकारः यत जीवः परमात्मन आभास एव, न स
एव साक्षात्, न अपि वस्तुतः ।

50 (And because the individual self is) *only a reflection* (of the Highest Self)

There can be no confusion of the results of actions of various selves also for this reason, that the individual self

is only a reflection of the Highest Self and is neither directly that (the Highest Self) nor a reality different from it.

५१ । अदृष्टानियमात् ।

५१ । सर्वज्ञ-आद्यादीनां पञ्चाभादीं सर्वकृत्तृणां अतिव्याप्य प्रसङ्गान् अदृष्टम् अनिवारम् । तत्र सर्वकर्मण्यस्यम् अदृष्टम् साधारणं अक्षितमे च आरब्धं भवति अतः अत्र एव आत्मनः इदम् अदृष्टम् इति निश्चये द्वैतभावात् एव एव दाव ।

51 *There being nothing to limit adrishta i.e., the unseen results of action within the limits of particular selves confusion would follow)*

The theory of many selves as held by the Sāṅkhya and Kāṇāda, leads to the confusion of the results of actions, because there is nothing to limit them to particular selves. In their doctrines, adrishta, which is of the nature of religious merit or demerit inheres in non particular and non intelligent causes. As thus there is no limitative reason for any particular adrishta belonging to any particular self the theory is open to the objection referred to.

५२ । अभिसम्भ्यादित्यपि चेदम् ।

५२ । यदि त्वेते 'यदम् इदं सर्वं मात्रवानि इदं परिहृयन्ति, इत्य प्रपद्ये इत्य आरब्धम्, इति एवंविधाः अभिसम्भ्या न प्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षमात्रम् अदृष्टम् आत्मनः न स्वप्नानिर्भावं निर्वृत्तानि' इति न एतत् बुद्धम् यत् अभिसम्भ्यादेव अपि साधारणं

सन मयीतेन सर्व्वात्मसमिधो क्रियमाणा अतः तेषां नियमहेतुत्वं न उपपद्यते 'तेषां अपि च एव' दीपानुपद्रव एव ।

52 *The same (objection holds) with respect to resolutions etc.*

It may be said that such resolutions as "Let me secure that end," "Let me avoid this," "Let me strive for this," "Let me do this," etc, which arise in each particular self, are sufficient to determine which particular self stands to which particular *adrishta* in the relation of ownership—This is not, however, tenable, because the resolutions also (according to the above theorists) are made through the non-particular conjunction of *manas* with the self in the proximity of all selves. Hence the same objection applies also to resolutions, etc

५३ । प्रदेष्टादिति चेन्नान्तर्भावात् ।

५३ । अयं उच्येत, "आत्मन विभुत्वे अपि शरीर-प्रतिष्ठेन मनसा सधीगं शरीरावच्छिन्ने प्रदेष्टे एव भविष्यति, अतः अभिप्रव्याडोनाम् अट्टस्य सुखदुःखयो च प्रदेष्टृशक्ता व्यवस्था भविष्यति" इति, तत् अपि न उपपद्यते । कस्मात् ?—'अन्तर्भावात्' यतः विभुत्वाविशेषात् सर्व्वे एव आत्मन सर्व्वशक्तिरेव अन्तर्भवन्ति । तत्र वैशेषिकादिभिः शरीरावच्छिन्नं अपि आत्मन प्रदेष्टुं कथयितुं न शक्यं । शरीरम् अपि सर्व्वात्म सन्निधौ उत्पद्यमानम् "अस्य एव आत्मन न इतरेषाम्" इति न नियन्तुं शक्यम् । तस्मात् एकात्मपक्षे एव सर्व्वदीपाभावः, इति अभिप्रायः ।


53 If it be said that the differentiation of the results of actions of different selves is effected *by the difference of*

place (of their different bodies then we say) *No because the self is within* (all things)

An objection refuted. "Although all selves are all pervasive, yet their conjunction with the *manas* which is placed in the body takes place in that part of the self which is limited by the body and thus the necessary differentiations among the resolutions, and the *adrishta*, and the pleasures and pains resulting from actions, may all be secured through differences of locality"—This explanation too is not tenable. Why so? Because the self is within all things. There being no distinction between selves as regards their all pervading nature *all* selves are within *all* bodies. The *Vaiseshikas* and others, therefore cannot reasonably assume any part of the self to be limited by the body. Moreover the body too originates in proximity to all selves, and consequently it is impossible to limit it as belonging to any one particular & if to the exclusion of all others. Hence we conclude that the only doctrine free from all objections is the doctrine of the unity of the Self

अविरोध-नाम-द्वितीयाध्याये

चतुर्थः पादः प्राणैन्द्रियविषय-श्रुतिवाक्यानां विरोध-परिहारः



१ । तथा प्राणाः ।

१ । विषयदादिविषयः श्रुतिप्रतिषेधः तृतीयेन पादेन परिहृतः, चतुर्थेन इदानीं प्राणविषयः परिह्रियते । यथा लोकादयः परम्भात् तद्वत् चतुपद्यन्ते, 'तथा प्राणाः' अपि तस्मात् चतुपद्यन्ते । "एतस्मादात्मनः सर्व्वे प्राणाः सर्व्वे लोकाः सर्व्वे देवाः सर्व्वानि भूतानि च व्युत्स्रन्ति" (ऋह २।१।२०) एवञ्जातीयकः श्रुतिवचनः प्राणोत्पत्तौ प्रमाणम् ।

1 So are the *pranas* (produced directly from Brahman)

In the third páda it has been shown that there is no conflict of scriptural passages on the subject of *akáśa* etc. The same will now be done in the fourth páda on the subject of the *pránas*. The first Sūtra says that as the worlds etc., are produced from the Highest Brahman, 'so are the *pránas*' also produced from him. Such scriptural passages as "From that Self issue forth all *pránas*, all worlds, all gods, all beings" (*Bṛ* II 1 20), etc. support the origination of the *pránas* (from the Highest Brahman)

२ । गौण्यसम्भवात् ।

२ । नहि प्राणानाम् उत्पत्तिश्रुतिः गौणी भवितुं सम्भवति प्रतिज्ञाहानि-प्रसङ्गात् ।

"इदं तु भार्वा विद्याय समन्वि" इत्येतं भवति । (मु १।१।१) इति हि पद-विद्येत्यत्र सर्वविद्येत्येत्यत्र तद्वत्त्वात् इदम् आयादते 'एतन्नामायते प्रायः भक्तः सर्वोन्मत्तश्च' (मु १।१।४) इत्यादि । सा च इतिहासादपि समष्टय इत्यत्र इदं विद्यायान् निश्चिति, कीदृशी तु प्रायशः प्रवृत्तिरुच्यते इति चेत् ईदृशः ।

2. *Because a secondary sense (of the scriptural text on the origin of the prdnas) is impossible*

The scriptural texts on the origin of the *prdnas* from Brahman cannot be taken in a secondary sense (i.e. they are not figurative statements nor do they mean that the *prdnas* are produced from Brahman indirectly through something else.) Otherwise, propositions previously asserted would become contradicted. The passage 'What is that venerable Sir through which when it is known everything else becomes known?' (*Mund* I 1 3) after having first asserted that the knowledge of everything may be obtained from the knowledge of one proceeds to substantiate that assertion by such statements as 'From him are born *prdnas* the sensorium and all the sense-organs' (*Mund* II 1 3) etc. Now the assertion can be substantiated only if the whole world, including the *prdnas* etc. is an effect of Brahman but it becomes contradicted if the texts on the origin of the *prdnas* are taken to have only a secondary sense.

॥ तत् प्राक्-सुतेयम् ।

१ । इत्यत्र आचार्यजीनाम् इव प्राचार्याम् अपि मुखा एव जन्म-सुति यतः तत्

“जायते” इति एकं जन्मवाचि पदं प्राणेषु ‘प्राक्’ पूर्वं दत्तं सत् उत्तरेषु आकाशादिषु अनुवर्तते । “एतथाज्जायते प्राणी भवे सत्येन्द्रियाणि च खं वायुं ज्योतिरापि पृथिवी विश्वस्य धारिणी” (सु २।१।३) इति अत्र आकाशादिषु मुख्यं जन्म इति प्रतिष्ठापितं । तत्सामान्यात् प्राणेषु अपि मुख्यम् एव जन्म भवितुम् अर्हति ।

3 Also because that (the word ‘jáyate’ = is born) is used in a scriptural text first (with reference to *prana*)

It is clear that the scriptural statement about the origin of the *pranas* is to be taken literally, just like the statements about *ākāśa* etc., because the identical word indicating origination, (*viś*, ‘jáyate’ = is born) is used in a certain text first about *prāṇa*, and then successively about *ākāśa*, etc. For it is a settled matter that in the passage “From him are born *prāṇa*, the sensorium, all the sense-organs, ether, air, fire, water, and the earth, the container of all” (*Mund* II 1 3), the origin (‘birth’) is to be taken in a literal sense with reference to *ākāśa* etc. From parity of reasoning, it follows that the origin is to be taken in a literal sense in the case of the *prāṇas* also

४ । तत्पूर्वकत्वात् वाचः ।

४ । ‘वाच’ इति वाक्प्राणमनसाम् उपलक्षणम् । छान्दीग्ये (६।२।३) ‘तत्तेजोऽष्टजत’ इति एतस्मिन् प्रकरणे प्राणानाम् उत्पत्तिं न पठ्यते, तेजोऽवन्नानाम् एव तथाशास्त्रेभ्यः सूत्रानां ब्रह्मण उत्पत्तिं श्रूयते । तत्र एव पुनः (६।३।४) तेजोऽवन्नेभ्यः वाक्प्राणमनसाम् उत्पत्तिं कथिता । अतः ‘वाच’ वाक्प्राणमनसाम् ‘तत्पूर्वकत्वात्’

પદાદ્વતા, વિરોધાત્ તુ અન્યતમા સંખ્યા અધ્યવસાતવ્યા । 'તત્ અલ્પકલ્પનોપગોષાત્
અમસંખ્યાઅધ્યવસાનં હતિમેદાપિચ ચ સંખ્યાન્તરવચનમ્ ઇતિ ગમ્યતે । અતઃ ઉચ્યતે,

5 (The Pūrvapaksha maintains that the *prānas* are seven, because that (number) is both understood and specified

The apparent conflict of scriptural passages regarding the origin of the *prānas* has been removed. The same will now be done with respect to their number. As usual, we have the Pūrvapaksha first. Scriptural passages disagree about the number of the *prānas*, which are mentioned in various places as seven, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, and thirteen. What should we take to be their correct number? They are seven. Why so? *First*, because that number 'is understood' in such passages as "The seven *prānas* spring from him," (*Mund* II 1 8) etc. *Next*, because that number 'is specified also' in the passage "Seven, indeed, are the *prānas* of the head." If, (continues the Pūrvapakshin,) it should be objected that the *prānas* have been stated to be eight in number in other scriptural passages, so how under the circumstances can they be seven only? our reply is True, the number eight is also mentioned. But as the different enumerations (*viz.*, seven and eight) are mutually contradictory, we have to decide in favour of one number. And we decide in favour of the number seven, following the principle that a smaller conjecture (simpler hypothesis) is always to be preferred. We also consider that the other (*i e.*, larger) enumerations result from the inclusion of the various modifications 'of the fundamental seven).

६ । इत्यादयस्तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम् ।

६ । सिद्धान्तमिति । इत्यादयस्तु अपरं सप्तमः अभिरिक्तः प्राणा दूयन्ते (इह १।१।८ इत्यादौ) । समतिरिक्ते प्राणि स्थिते अवधारिते अपि सप्तत्वं न कर्माणां सम्भावितम् अस्ति । शीनापिच-संख्या विधितपचो हि अभिवा संग्रहा संख्या भवति तस्या शीना अन्तर्भवति न तु शीनायाम् अभिवा । 'यतः' न एवं मन्त्रायाम् अन्तर्भवतीति प्राणात् सप्त एव प्राणाः स्युः इति । चतुर्धन्यागुपीयात् तु एका स एव ति प्राणाः स्युः । अत एवाद्वयत्वात् अपि पचिद्धे इत्यस्य मयी मते उदाहृते । सप्तम् उदाहृते न तु एका । अथ कार्यजातेषु पचिद्धे द्वादशानाम् अपि पदपम् पचिद्धे चतस्रः कल्पेता । अथ सप्तै-रुप-रम गन्ध-विषयाः पचद्विभिदाः तदस्यानि पच द्वादीन्द्रियाणि चतस्रानि विषयानामुपनिषदाः पच कल्पभिदाः तदस्यानि च पचचक्षुर्द्विधाणि । समोपनिषयं वेदन्त्यस्ति मन्त्रः तु एवम् अनेकवर्तिष्वं तदेव इतिभिदात् कल्पितं निप्रवत् अपदिशत "मनीषुद्विर्द्विधापिपतं च इति ।

6 (In reply to the Pārvaṇpakṣa the Sūtrakāra says.—) *But* (in addition to the seven prāṇas scripture mentions) *the hands etc* This being a settled matter therefore, (we must) not (conclude) thus (i.e. that the prāṇas are seven only)

To the above the Sūtrakāra replies that —In addition to the seven prāṇas scripture mentions other prāṇas also such as the hands, (*Bṛi* III 2, 8 etc.) The existence of prāṇas in excess of the number seven must be accepted as a settled fact. The number seven may however be reconciled with this fact for it is contained within the greater number. Whenever there arises a dispute as to number between a greater and a less, the greater number has to be accepted for the smaller number is contained

within the greater, but not the greater within the smaller 'Hence', we say, 'not thus', i.e., it is unreasonable to argue for the sake of a smaller conjecture (i.e., a simpler hypothesis) that the number of *prāṇas* is seven only. Rather we should conclude, in deference to the larger number, that their number is eleven. It may be objected that scripture mentions numbers higher even than eleven, e.g., twelve and thirteen. To this the Sūtrakīra replies: True, such numbers are, indeed, mentioned. But no additional functions over and above the eleven (enumerated below) exist, for the performance of which it would be necessary to assume additional organs. Intellectual activities are of five kinds, having for their objects sound, touch, colour, taste and smell respectively, for which there are the five organs of perception. Actions, too, are of five kinds, viz., speaking, taking, going, evacuation and procreation, for which there are the five organs of action. And finally, there is *manas*, which has all things for its objects, and whose activity extends to the past, the present, and the future, and which is one only, though having various functions. On account of the plurality of its functions, it is sometimes variously designated as '*manas*' or '*buddhi*,' '*ahankāra*' or '*chitta*'

७ । अथवच्च ।

७ । अथना प्राणानाम् एव स्वभावान्तरम् अभ्युचितीति । अथव च एते प्राणाः प्रतिपद्यन्त्या । अथत्वं च एषां सौख्यपरिच्छेदौ, न परमाणुगुण्यत्वम्, अन्यथा तेषां क्षणभेदेह्यापि कार्यं न व्यपपद्यते । सूक्ष्मा एते प्राणाः । स्थूला चैत् स्युः मर्यादाले

शरीरात् निर्गच्छन् विनात् पश्चि इव अन्तर्धानम् विधत्मानं पादयोः । परिच्छिन्ना च एव प्राणाः । सर्ववता चैव तु चतुर्दिगन्तव्यमिति सुशब्दाद्योपपत्त्या तस्य न त्वं च जीवस्य न निश्चयः ।

7 And (the *prāṇas* are) minute

The Sātrakīra adds another characteristic quality of the *prāṇas*. They must be viewed as minute. Their minuteness comprises the qualities of subtilty and limited extent but not atomic size as otherwise they would be incapable of producing effects all over the body. The *prāṇas* must be subtle had they any magnitude they would be visible as issuing out of the body of a dying man at the moment of death to persons watching by like snakes issuing out of holes. The *prāṇas* must be limited had they been all pervading scriptural statements about their passing out of the body going and coming would be contradicted thereby and it could not be established that the essence of the individual self consists in the qualities of that (i.e., its limiting adjunct or *buddhi*). Vide Sātra II 3 29)

८ । श्रेष्ठयः ।

८ । मुख्यप्राना इत्यप्यन्यत् ब्रह्मविद्या । “आनन्दमोक्षं हि ब्रह्ममवाप्तिं सूते (सूक्त १. १. १९८) “आनीदवात् सर्वेषां सुखम् इति भाग्युत्पत्तेः समन्विता प्राणा दृश्यन्ति । तस्यान्वितं प्राणं इति चक्षुषिणो मतिः जायते । “आनीत् मन्दं तु न भाग्युत्पत्तेः प्राप्यगमनं दृश्यति “अवातम् इति विमर्शनात् । “अवाचां यमना यथा (सु १. १. १२) इति च भूतमज्ज्ञे प्राणादि-मनस-विद्वद् इति तस्य दृश्यते । तस्यान्वितं प्राणमवाप्तं सर्वेषां एव ययम् “आनीत् मन्दं इति ।

८ । न वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेगात् ।

८ । न पुन सूक्ष्मप्राणं किमप्य इति इत्यर्थे प्रोक्तम् । तत्र प्राणं तावत्
 सूक्ष्मं वायुं प्राण इति । एवं हि श्रूयते — 'यं प्राणं स एव वायुः पञ्चविधः प्राणीन्द्रिया-
 ज्ञान उदयन समानः' इति । अथवा सामानाभिप्रायात् समानकर्मरूपि प्राण इति
 प्राप्तम् । एव हि सामाना आपन्नत,—'सामान्या करणरूपि प्राणोऽग्रा वायवः पञ्च'
 इति । अत उच्यते,—'न वायु' प्राण, न अपि करणत्वापारः । कत — पृथगुप-
 देगात् वायो तावत् प्राणस्य पृथगुपदेगः भवति — 'प्राण एव त्रयोविधगुह्यं पादः स
 वायुना ज्योतिषा भासि च तपति च' इति (षा ३।१८।८) । न हि वायु एव मन
 वायो श्रवक उपदिशते । तथा करणरूपो अपि पृथगुपदेगो भवति । न हि करण-

कदा एव यत् कार्यं इदं यदि ज्ञेयं । तदा "एतच्चान्यत्र प्राणो नान्यत्रोपनिषि च यो प्राणः" (मु १।१।१) इति एवमाह "अपि प्राणो ह्यन्यत्र च प्राणो इत्युक्तं" अनुवर्तते ।

9 (The chief *prāṇa* is) *neither air nor the function* (of an organ) *be cause* (in the scriptures) *it is mentioned separately* (from both)

The discussion now turns upon the nature of that chief *prāṇa*. It may be argued by the Pūrvaapakṣhin that the chief *prāṇa* is nothing but air according to the scripture which says, "Breath is the same as air which assumes five forms viz. *prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, *vyāṇa*, *udāna* *samāna*" or following the Sāṅkhyas, it may be said that the *prāṇa* is the combined function of all the organs for the Sāṅkhyas teach that "The five airs *prāṇa* etc. are the common function of the organs." The Sūtrakara replies that the *prāṇa* is neither air nor the function of an organ. Why not? On account of separate mention in the scriptures. From air *prāṇa* is distinguished in the passage "Breath indeed is the fourth foot of Brahman. That foot shines and burns with air as its light" (*Cih* III 18 4). If *prāṇa* were air itself it would not have been mentioned separately from air. Again *prāṇa* is also mentioned separately from the functions of the organs in the scriptures. If it were a mere function of an organ it would not be mentioned separately from the organs. Further we have to consider that in certain passages such as "From him are born *prāṇa* *manas* all the organs *akāśa* air" (*Mund* II 1 6) etc., *prāṇa* is mentioned separately from both air and the organs.

१० । चक्षुरादिवत् तु तत्सहश्रिष्टादिभ्यः ।

१० । किं प्राणः जीववत् अस्मिन् शरीरे स्वातन्त्र्यं प्राप्नोति ? न । 'तु'-शब्दः प्राणस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं व्यावर्तयति । चक्षुरादीनि जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं भोक्तृत्वं च प्रति उपकरणानि, न स्वातन्त्र्याणि । तथा मुख्य प्राणः अपि जीवस्य सर्वार्थकारत्वेन उपकरण-भूतः, न स्वातन्त्र्यः । कुत ?—'तत्सहश्रिष्टादिभ्यः' अतः तत्सह चक्षुरादिभिः सह प्राणः प्राणसंवादादिषु (प्रश्ने २) शिष्यते । समानधर्माणाम् एव सहशासनं युक्तम् । 'आदि'-शब्देन सहतत्त्वाचेतनत्वादीन् प्राणस्य स्वातन्त्र्य-निराकरण-हेतून् दर्शयति ।

10 *But* (the chief *prāṇa* is not independent in the body like the self It is subordinate to the self,) *like the eye etc , because the scripture treats of it along with them, and also for other reasons*

Is the chief *prāṇa* to be considered independent in this body, like the self ? No The word '*but*' sets aside the independence of the chief *prāṇa* The eye and other organs are subservient instruments of the self in respect of its activities and enjoyments, and are not independent Similarly the chief *prāṇa* is also a subservient instrument of the self in respect of the fulfilment of all its objects, and is not independent Why so ? 'Because the scripture speaks of the chief *prāṇa* along with them' in the colloquy of the *Prāṇas* (*Pras* II) and in similar other passages It is appropriate to impart instruction on two things in conjunction only when their attributes are similar. The words '*and other reasons also*' denote that there are other reasons that impugn the independence of the chief *prāṇa*, such as its being composed of parts, its being non-intelligent, etc

११ । अकारणत्वाच्च न दीपश्चाद्यादि दमयति ।

११ । यदि अणुपदिवत् प्राणस्य कीदं प्रति कारणमात्रं अनुपपद्येत, तदा तस्य अणुपदिवत् विवक्षान्तरं प्रसज्यते । न तु वादस्य अणुपदिवत् कार्यस्य अनुपपत्तिरिति दमयति । अयं वादः प्राणं प्रतिपादयति इति । अयं वादः—न तावत् विवक्षान्तरं दीपः, प्राणस्य अकारणत्वात् । न हि अणुपदिवत् प्राणस्य विवक्षान्तरं दीपस्य अकारणत्वात् अनुपपद्येत । न च अयं एवावता कार्यमात्र एव । अथा—तदा हि श्रुतिः प्राणान्तरं अनुपपत्त्यर्थं मुख्यप्राणस्य वैशिष्ट्यं कार्यं दमयति । प्राणस्येति (प्रश्ने १) भावनिमित्तं एव श्रौतस्य अणुपदिवत् प्रतिज्ञा दमयति ।

11 *The objection (of the chief prāṇa not having an object) is not valid because it is not a sense-organ for thus (the scripture) declares*

An objection may be urged here. If the chief *prāṇa* is admitted to be an instrument in relation to the *Jīva*, like the eye etc., then it will follow that we must assume a sense-object also for it just as we have colour for the eye. But there is no twelfth function (over and above the eleven enumerated in the sixth Sūtra) for which a twelfth *prāṇa* could be assumed. To this objection the Sutrakāra replies. The objection that another *sense* object would have to be assumed is not valid, for the chief *prāṇa* is not a sense-organ. We never assume that the chief *prāṇa* is, like the eye etc., a sense-organ by virtue of its determining a special sense-object. But the chief *prāṇa* is not on that account, devoid of function. Why so? Because the scripture declares that the chief *prāṇa* has a specific function which cannot be performed by the other *prāṇas*. In the colloquy of the *Prāṇas* (*Pras II*), and other

passages, it has been shown that the self's departure from and continuance in the body depend on the chief *prāna*

१२ । पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनीवद् व्यपदिश्यते ।

१२ । इतश्च अस्ति मुख्यप्राणस्य वैशेषिकं कार्यं यत् 'पञ्चवृत्ति' अथ व्यपदिश्यते श्रुतिषु,—प्राणोऽपानी व्यान उदान समान इति (भ्रमे ३) । 'मनीवत्' यथा योवादि-निमित्ता शब्दादि-विषया मनस पञ्चवृत्तयः प्रसिद्धा, एव प्राणस्य अपि ।

12 (In scripture the chief *prāna*) is designated as having five functions, like the sensorium

That the chief *prāna* has its specific function is proved by this also that in scripture it is designated as having five functions, viz *prāna*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna* (*Pīas* III) 'Like the sensorium', i.e., just as the sensorium has five well-known functions, which have sound, etc for their objects, and ear, etc, for their causes, so has the *prāna*

१३ । अणुश्च ।

१३ । अणु च अथ मुख्यप्राण प्रत्येतव्य इतरप्राणवत् । क्वचित् तु आधिदैविकेन समष्टिरूपेण हेतुव्यगर्भेण प्राणात्मना प्राणस्य विस्तृतम् आत्मायते, न व्यष्टिरूपेण ।

13 And (the chief *prāna* is) minute

Like the other *prānas* the chief *prāna* too is to be considered minute In certain scriptural passages, indeed, the all-pervasiveness of *prāna* is spoken of But that

quality belongs only to its universal aspect i.e., to the active principle in creation provided over by a deity appearing as Hiraṇyagarbha whose essence is *prāṇa* or life and not to its individual aspect

१४ । ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानस्तु तदामममात् ।

१४ । तेषु न प्रज्ञता एव किं स्वस्वद्वयं वा स्व स्व आत्मा प्रभवन्ति चात्राभिन्ने देवताधिष्ठिता प्रभवन्ति इति विचार्यते । तत्र उच्यते — ज्योतिरापचितानं तु । अत्र 'तु' मदनं स्वस्वद्वयं प्रज्ञतां प्रज्ञां प्रभावयति । ज्योतिरादिभिः अन्त्यादिभिः अभिज्ञानिनीभिः देवताभिः अधिष्ठितं वायुदिग्गजस्वभावं आत्मात्मा प्रभवत इति प्रतिज्ञायते । ईदृशं अन्त्यादि 'तदामममात्' तदादि आत्मनि — 'अभिज्ञानमुत्पन्ना मृतं प्रविशन्' (टीका ११४) इत्यादि । अत्र च वायुमात्रं मुख्यप्रत्ययं देवतात्मना अधिष्ठायकम् अङ्गीकृत्य उच्यते । न हि देवतात्मनो प्रभावोऽयं अत्र भावि मुनि वा आदिन् विमलं सम्बन्धं दृश्यते । तथा 'वायु' आत्मा भूत्वा अग्निं प्रविशन् (टीका ११४) इति उच्यते अपि दीर्घवितम्बम् ।

14 But (the *prāṇas* are) presided over by (the deities) fire etc., because it is thus declared by scripture

Here arises a dispute as to whether the *prāṇas* about which we have been discussing are able to produce their respective effects by their own power or by virtue of their being presided over by divinities. The Sūtrakāra says But the *prāṇas* are presided over by Fire etc. Here the word 'but' sets aside the independent activity of the *prāṇas*. The Sūtra declares that the different organs, viz. speech etc. enter on their respective activities, by being presided over by the divinities animating fire etc. The reason for

saying so is, 'Because it is thus declared by scripture', *viz* in the passage "Agni, having become speech, entered the mouth" (*Aita* I 4), etc. The statements about Agni's becoming speech and entering the mouth are made on the assumption of his acting as a presiding deity, (not as a mere element) For if we deny the connexion of fire with a divinity, we cannot see why it should have a special connexion either with speech or the mouth. Along with the above passage, we have others about air etc. to take into account, such as, "Vayu, having become breath, entered the nostrils" (*Aita* I 4), etc.

१५ । प्राणवता शब्दात् ।

१५ । सतीषु अपि प्राणानाम् अधिष्ठात्रीषु देवतासु 'प्राणवता कार्यकारण-संघात-स्वामिना शरीरेण एव एषा प्राणानां सम्बन्धं द्युते अवगम्यते, न देवताभिः । तथा हि श्रुतिः,—“अथ यत्र एतत् आकाशमनुविषणं चक्षुः स चाक्षुषं पुरुषो दर्शनाय चक्षुःस्थो वेदेदं जिब्राणीति स आत्मा गन्वाय ब्राह्मम्” (छा. ङा. १२।४) इति एवञ्जातीयका शरीरेण एव प्राणानां सम्बन्धं श्रावयति ।

15 (The connection of the *prāṇas* themselves is, however, not with those presiding divinities, but) *with that to which the prāṇas belong* (i.e., with the embodied self, as we learn) *from the scriptures*

Although there are those divinities presiding over the *prāṇas*, yet, we learn from the scriptures that it is with the owner of the *prāṇas*, i.e., with the embodied self, which is the master of the aggregate of working organs, that the

pranas have connexion (and not with those divinities) Such scriptural passages as 'Wherever the eye is fixed on *ākāśa* there is the person of the eye' the eye itself is the instrument for the purpose of seeing 'He who knows (i.e. resolves) 'Let me smell this' is the self' the nose itself is the instrument for the purpose of smelling (Chh VIII 12. 4) and similar other passages declare the connection of the *pranas* with the embodied self only

१६ । तस्य च मित्यत्वात् ।

१६ । इतः प्राणैरेव एव प्राणानां मुख्यं यतः तस्य च स्थितिः च अस्मिन् शरीरे भोक्तृत्वेन 'मित्यत्वं' व्याख्यातं न हि यत्नम् ।

16 And because that (i.e., the embodied self only) has a fixed place in the body

From this also follows the connection of the *pranas* with the embodied self and not with the presiding divinities that it is the former that has a fixed place in the body as the enjoyer (of pleasure and pain) and not so the gods.

१७ । त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशादभ्यस्येच्छात् ।

१७ । मुख्यं एव इतरे च पक्षेऽपि प्राणा अनुमानाः । तत्र इदम् अपरं सन्दिग्धं किं मुख्यं एव प्राणस्य इति हिदा इतरे प्राणा आक्षेपितुं तत्त्वानुसारेण इति । यत्र सत्यं — 'त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशात्' इति प्राणं अक्षेपितुं अस्मिन् ।

एकादश प्राणा इन्द्रियाणि उच्यन्ते । 'तदोपदेगात्' यत "एतस्माज्जायते प्राणी मन
सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च" (सु १।१।३) इति एवञ्जातोयकेषु श्रुतिप्रदेशेषु पृथक् प्राण. व्यभिचिष्यते,
पृथक् च इन्द्रियाणि ।

17 *They (the prāṇas) are sense-organs, besides the chief (prāṇa), because so designated 'in the scriptures'*

One chief *prāṇa*, and the other eleven *prāṇas* have been discussed in due order. Here arises another doubt, *viz*, whether the other *prāṇas* are merely different functions of the chief *prāṇa*, or are they different entities? The *Sūtrakāra* says 'They (the *prāṇas*) are spoken of as eleven sense-organs, distinct from the chief *prāṇa*' 'Because so designated', *i e*, because in such scriptural passages as "From that are born the *prāṇa*, *manas* and all the organs" (*Mund* II 1 3) etc, the *prāṇa* and the sense-organs are mentioned separately

१८ । भेदश्रुतेः ।

१८ । इतश्च इतरे प्राणा सुख्यात् प्राणात् तत्त्वान्तरभूता, यत मुखं प्राणं श्रुतौ
सर्व्वं वागदिभ्य भेदेन उच्यते । बृहदारण्यकम् १।१।२, १।५।३ द्रष्टव्यम् ।

18 *On account of the scriptural statement of difference (between the chief prāṇa and the other prāṇas)*

Another reason why the other *prāṇas* are to be viewed as different entities from the chief *prāṇa* is that the chief *prāṇa* is everywhere in the scriptures spoken of as different from speech etc, as in *Bri*. I 3, 2 and I. 5 3.

१८ । वैश्वस्यैव ।

१८ । एतच्चात् अपि भुक्तात् प्राणात् वाऽदीन्द्रियाणां तज्जानादिति यच्चात् तत्र तेषां च वैश्वस्यैव स्वयमेव भवति । सुषुप्तौ वागान्द्रियं मुख्यं एव जागृति । स एव एव स्वप्ना भगता, आता तु इतरः । तदा एव प्राणस्य अवस्थित्या चतुर्गुण्यं च दिङ्मात्रव्यापार इतुलं, न इन्द्रियाणाम् । विषयाश्रयण इतुलं च इन्द्रियाणां न प्राणस्य । इति परब्रह्मातीयक मूल्यान् स्वयमेव प्राणैन्द्रियाणाम् ।

19 And on account of the difference of characteristics (between the chief *prāṇa* and other *prāṇas*)

Another reason why the organs such as speech etc., are to be viewed as different entities from the chief *prāṇa* is this,—that there is a difference of characteristics between them. When speech etc. are asleep the chief *prāṇa* alone is awake. The chief *prāṇa* alone is beyond the reach of death, while the other *prāṇas* are subject to death. It is the abiding and departing of the chief *prāṇa* (and not of the sense-organs) that cause the maintenance and destruction respectively of the body. On the other hand, the sense-organs are the causes of the perception of the sense-objects, and not the chief *prāṇa*. Thus there are manifold characteristics distinguishing the chief *prāṇa* from the sense-organs.

२० । संज्ञाभूतिक्लृप्तिसु विवृत्तुर्व्यत उपदेयात् ।

१ । आन्दीप्ति (१।१।१) प्रक्रमणस्य तिस्रोऽवधानां पटित्प्रसिद्धाय उप-
दिश्यते —“सर्वं ईश्वरीयं जगत्प्रसिद्धिर्वा ईश्वरा यन्मिन् श्रीशिवोऽन्तर्गुह्यविद्यया नामकप

व्याकरवाणीति । तासां द्विवत् द्विवत्तमैकैका करवाणीति । तत्र सश्रय किं जीवकर्तृकम् इदं नामरूपव्याकरणम् आहोस्वित् परमेश्वरकर्तृकम् इति ? अत्र उच्यते,—परमेश्वर-कर्तृकम् इति । ‘तु’-शब्देन पूर्वपक्षं व्यावर्त्यति । ‘सञ्ज्ञामूर्त्तिकल्पति’ नामरूप-प्रकाशनम्, ‘द्विवत्कुर्वन्त’ मूलभूतवय-रचयितु मिश्रणकर्तृकं परमेश्वरस्य एव क्रिया भवितुम् अर्हति, न जीवस्य । ‘उपदेशात्’ यत् “सिध देवता” इति उपक्रमस्य ‘व्याकरवाणि’ इति उत्तमपुरुषप्रयोगेण परस्य एव ब्रह्मण्य व्याकर्तृत्वम् इह उपदिश्यते । ननु “जीवेन” इति विशेषणात् व्याकरणस्य जीवकर्तृकत्वम् अध्यवसितुं युक्तम्, न एतत् एवम् । “जीवेन” इति एतत् पदम् ‘अनुप्रविश्य’ इति अनेन सम्बध्यते आनन्तर्यात्, न ‘व्याकरवाणि’ इति अनेन । तेन हि सम्बन्धेन “व्याकरवाणि” इति अयं देवताविषय-उत्तमपुरुष औपचारिक कल्प्येत । न च गिरिनदीसमुद्रादिषु नानाविधेषु नामरूपेषु अनीश्वरस्य जीवस्य व्याकरणसामर्थ्यम् अस्ति ।

20 *But the evolution of names and forms is due to him who makes things tripartite (i.e. to Ísvara), because it is so taught (in scripture)*

The section of the *Chhândogya Upanishad* which treats of (*Brahman* VI 3 2 and 3), after describing the creation of fire, water and earth, goes on to say, “That divinity thought, ‘Having entered those three entities in the form of this living self, let me evolve names and forms, let me make each of these three tripartite’” Here the doubt arises whether the agent in the evolution of names and forms is *jíva* or *Ísvara*. The *Sutrakára* says, it is *Ísvara*. The word ‘but’ is intended to set aside the view that the *jíva* is the agent. ‘The evolution of names and forms’ can only be the action of ‘him who makes things tripartite’ i.e., of *Ísvara*, who creates and blends together in various combinations the three primordial elements and never of *jíva*. ‘Because, it is so taught in the scripture’, i.e., because the

above scriptural text begins with the words that divinity and by using the first person in let me evolve teaches that the Supreme Brahman and no other is the evolving agent. If it be urged that from the qualifying expression in the form of this living self' it may be inferred that the agent in the evolution is jiva, we say No not so. The connection of the phrase in the form of this living self' is with the words having entered which are proximate to it and not with the words let me evolve. Should that expression be connected with the words let me evolve it would be necessary to assume that the first person used with reference to the Divinity in let me evolve is only metaphorical. But really no self other than the Lord can have the power of evolving the multiplicity of names and forms such as mountains, rivers and seas.

२१ । सांसादि भौमे यथागन्धमितर्योय ।

२१ । भूमिः विहृतृज्जातः पृथ्वीयः लघुमुखमाश्रया सांसादिकार्यम् अवागन्धं तिपद्यत । तथा हि सुति — 'अवममितं तथा विधीयते । तस्य वा स्पृष्टिरी वागुचत् पृथ्वी भवति की मध्यममन्त्रासं यीतिविद्यमान (वा ६।३।१) इति । विहृतृज्जातं भूमि एव एषा श्रीहृदयवाचकः चयते इत्यभिप्रायः । एवम् इतर्यो अपृष्टिरी अवागन्धम् सुतिवचनामुपरीच काव्यम् अवगन्धम्—मुखं लीकितं प्राचय चपां वाय्वम् अन्वि सत्या वाक् तीक्ष्ण इति ।

21 According to scriptural statement flesh &c (proceed) from earth and (other things) from the other two (i.e., fire and water)

From tripartite earth (i.e., food) when assimilated by

man, proceed flesh etc , as effects, according to scripture For the scriptural text says, "Food, when eaten, becomes threefold Its grossest portion becomes foeces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion *manas*," (*Chh* VI 5 1) , which indicates that it is the tripartite earth that is consumed by man in the shape of rice, barley, etc Similarly we have to learn from the scriptures the effects of the other two elements, water and fire, *viz* , that urine, blood and breath are the effects of water, and bone, marrow and speech those of fire

२२ । वैशेष्यात् तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः ।

२२ । अथ 'तु'-शब्देन दोषम् अपगुदति । यदि सर्वम् एव निवृत्कृत भूत-भौतिकम् अविशेष्यते "तासां निवृत्त निवृत्तमेकैकानकरीत्" (छा ६।१।४) इति, कुत तर्हि अयं विशेषव्यपदेशः, इदं तेजः, इमा आपः, इदम् अन्नम् इति ? अथ उच्यते, सति अपि निवृत्कारणे, क्वचित् कस्यचित् भूतधातो आधिक्यम् उपलक्ष्यते, अग्रे तेज-आधिक्यम्, उदकस्य अवाधिक्यम्, पृथिव्या अन्नाधिक्यम् इति । तस्मात् 'वैशेष्यात्' स्वस्मिन् स्वभागस्य आधिक्यात् एव 'तद्वाद' तेजोऽवन्न-विशेषवाद भूतभौतिकविषय उपपद्यते । 'तद्वादस्तद्वाद' इति द्विवक्ति अध्ययपरिसमाप्ति द्योतयति ।

22 But on account of distinctive characteristics they have their various designations

The word 'but' here repels an objection Now, if all elements and things composed of them are alike tripartite, as mentioned indifferently in the scriptural text, "He made each of them tripartite" (*Chh* VI 3 4), then why are things differently named, as when we say 'this is fire, this is water, this is earth' ? The *Sūtrakāra* replies Though all

things have alike been made tripartite, yet we observe in different things a preponderance of different elements in flames a preponderance of fire in liquids of water in earthy solids of earth. It is on account of these distinctive characteristics i.e., the preponderance in them of their own characteristic portions, that they have their various designations i.e. it has been possible to have these special designations with reference to the elements and their products, viz., fire water and earth. The repetition of the last word of the Sūtra indicates the termination of the chapter

साधन-नाम-तृतीयाध्याये

प्रथमः पादः जीवस्य संसारगतिः

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१ । तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति सम्भरिष्वक्तः प्रश्ननिरूपणाम्याम् ।

१ । अथ प्रथमे पादे छान्दोग्योक्त्या पञ्चाग्निविद्याम् आश्रित्य जीवस्य संसारगति-
प्रमेदं प्रदर्श्यते । स “तदन्तर-प्रतिपत्तौ” देहात् देहान्तरप्रतिपत्तौ देहान्तर-ग्रहणार्थं
देहबीजं भूतसूक्ष्मं ‘सम्भरिष्वक्तः’ परिवेष्टितः ‘रंहति’ गच्छति इति अवगन्तव्यम् । कुत ?
प्रश्ननिरूपणाम्याम्, तथाहि प्रश्नं श्वेतकेतुः प्रति प्रवाहयस्य, “वेत्थ यथा पञ्चम्यामाहुता-
वाप पुरुषवचसो भवन्ति” इति ? (छा ३।१।३) ‘निरूपण’ च प्रतिवचनं द्यु-पर्जन्य-
पृथिवीपुरुष-योषित्सु पञ्चसु अग्निषु अङ्गा-सीम-वृष्ट्यन्त-रेतीरुषा पञ्चाहुती दर्शयित्वा,
“इति तु पञ्चम्यामाहुतावाप पुरुषवचसो भवन्ति” इति (छा ३।१।१) । तस्मात् अङ्गि-
परिवेष्टितः जीव ‘रंहति’ प्रजति इति गम्यते ।

1 (The self), in obtaining another (body), goes enveloped (by the subtle parts of the elements), for so say a question and (its) answer (in the scriptures)

The first páda of this Chapter explains the different modes of the self's passing through its worldly state on the basis of the Panchágni-vidyá (the knowledge of the Five Fires) as taught in the Chhândogya Upanishad We must understand that “it” (i.e. the self) “in obtaining

another i.e. in passing from one body to another) goes enveloped by the subtle parts of the elements, which are the seeds of the body in order that it may assume a new body. How do we know this? From a question and its solution" is given in the scriptures. The question referred to was put by Prāśhana to Śvetaketu — Do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man? (Chh V 3 3). The answer is given by the entire passage which after having explained how the five libations in the forms of Sraद्धा, Soma, rain, food and seed are offered in the five fires i.e. heaven, purjanyā, the earth, man and woman concludes with the words. For this reason is water in the fifth oblation called man (Chh V 9 1). From this we are to understand that the passing self goes enveloped by water.

२। त्रिधात्मकत्वात् तु भूयस्त्वात् ।

१। अप्समन्त्रस्य-आत्मर्थात् प्राक् ईदमस्मि अहिं मन्त्रविष्णवे इदंति इति न चार्हादित्यम् यत् त्रिधात्मकत्वात् अपरां हिंसा च त्रिधात्मकत्वात् तिस्रोऽवयवमिदमित्यत्र हिंसा तिस्रु अपर च भूयस्त्वात् बाहुभ्याम् कुपी "बाप इति उच्यते। यत् अप मन्त्र मन्त्र वाप एव ईदमस्मिन् मृत्युत्वात् कर्तुं विदुम् ।

2 But because (water itself is) of tripartite nature (water alone is mentioned in the scripture) on account of its preponderance

If we take the literal meaning of the word used in the above scriptural text, *viz.*, water a doubt may arise that the self goes enveloped by water *alone*. This doubt

however, is not to be entertained "Because of the tripartite nature" of water as well as of the body, which are composed of the three elements fire, water and earth, and also "because of the preponderance" of water in the seed of the body, the word 'water' (alone) has been made use of in the scriptures Hence by the single word 'water' is to be understood the mention of the subtle parts of all the elements which constitute the seed of the body

३ । प्राणगतेष्व ।

३ । इत्यथ अवगम्यते यत् भूतसूक्ष्मं सम्परिवृत्तं जीवः देहांतरग्रहणार्थं गच्छति, यतः देहांतर-प्रतिपत्ती प्राणानां गतिः श्राव्यते (बृह ४।४।२) । सा च प्राणानां गतिः आश्रयम् अन्तरेण न सम्भवति इति, अतः प्राणगतिप्रयुक्तानां तदाश्रयभूतानाम् अपांम् अपि भूतान्तरोपस्थापनां गतिः अवगम्यते । न हि निराश्रया प्राणाः क्वचित् गच्छन्ति तिष्ठन्ति वा जीवतः, अदर्शनात् ।

3. And because of the going of the *prāṇas*

That the self, when going to assume a new body, is enveloped by the subtle parts of all the elements, is seen from this also,—that the scriptures state that when a new body is obtained, the *prāṇas* too go from the old body to the new (*Bri. IV 4 2*) Now this movement of the *prāṇas* is not possible without an abode or vehicle of the *prāṇas* Hence, we have to infer that water also, mixed with parts of the other elements, goes (from the old body to the new) serving the purpose of a vehicle for the moving *prāṇas* For the *prāṇas* cannot, without such a vehicle, either move or abide anywhere, as we observe in living beings.

५ । प्रथमेऽववणादिति चेन्न ता एव ह्युपपत्तेः ।

५ । 'प्रथमेऽववणात्' यत प्रथमे अग्नौ अपा अरण नास्ति, परन्तु अज्ञाया, तत पञ्चम्याम् आहुती आप पुरुषवचस भवन्ति इति एतन् निर्धारयितुं न शक्यते इति 'चेत्' आशङ्कते, तत् 'न' आशङ्कितम्, 'हि उपपत्ते ता एव' यत तव अपि प्रथमे अग्नौ अज्ञाशब्देन ता आप एव अभिप्रेयन्ते इति एतत् उपपद्यते सन्दर्भस्य पूर्वापरम् आलोच्य ।

5 If the objection be raised that water) *is not mentioned in the scripture with reference to the first* (of the five fires), we reply *No There also, water and nothing else (is meant), as appears from the fitness of things*

Here a doubt may arise, *viz*, that it cannot be concluded that 'in the fifth oblation water is called man,' because water is not mentioned in the scripture with reference to the first of the five fires, 'which are, in order, heaven, parjanya, the earth, man and woman', *vide* Sutra 1), but sraddha (faith) is said (to be the offering for that fire) But such doubt is not to be entertained We declare that by the word sraddha, it is water that is meant, "on the ground of fitness," *i e*, when we consider the passage in its entirety, it appears to be in the fitness of things to conclude that in the case of the first fire also, water is meant by the word sraddha

६ । अश्रुतत्वादिति चेन्नेष्टादिकारिणा प्रतीतिः ।

६ । 'अश्रुतत्वात्' यत अव प्रकरणे अपाम् इव जीवानां आवृथिता कश्चित् शब्द नास्ति, तत न ते अपपत्तिव्युत्पत्तिः, इति चेत्, इष्टादिकारिणा प्रतीतिः', एतत्

न आह्वितान्यम् अतः 'अथ य इमे एतान् इटापूर्णे दत्तमिष्टुपायते ते वनमभि
सम्भवन्ति (ऋ ३।१ ।३) इत्यपक्रम इटादिचारिण्यं सूत्रादिना निवर्तकं यथा अत्र
प्राप्तिं ज्ञापयति, "आवासावद्भूमयमेव छात्री राजा (ऋ ३।१ ।४) इति । ते एव
इष्टं यमि प्रतीकान्ते, 'तद्विघ्नैस्तद्विघ्नघ्नी देवा' 'श्रद्धां कुर्वन्ति तस्या आर्तं सोमा राजा
सम्भवन्ति (ऋ ३।४।१) इति सुति-आवासात् ।

6 Should it be objected that (selves are) *not distinctly mentioned in (that particular) scriptural passage* (and consequently they do not pass enveloped by water) we say No because the performers of sacrifices (i. e., their selves) are understood

An objection refuted Granting that water is referred to under the word *araddhā* as contended in the last Sūtra, there is, yet no word in the scriptural passage which may be taken to refer to the selves. Hence, not being stated by scripture, we cannot allow that selves, when moving from one body to another are enveloped by water To this objection we say No This doubt should not be entertained because the performers of sacrifices etc. are understood For in the passage beginning 'But they who living in a village practise sacrifices works of public utility and almsgiving go to smoke (Chh V 10 3) It has been described that those persons who perform sacrifices reach the moon by passing along the path of the Pitris e. g. 'From Akāsa they go to the moon that is Soma, the King' Chh Up V 10 4) Now these same persons (i. e., performers of sacrifices &c.) are doubtless meant in the above scriptural statement about the Five Fires also as we conclude from the parallelism of expression in the passage In that fire the devas offer araddhā

as an oblation. From that oblation rises Soma, the King"
(*Chh* V 4 2)

७ । भाक्त वाङ्मात्मविश्वात् तयाहि दर्शयति ।

७ । कथं पुन इदम्, इटादिकाग्निं स्वकर्म्मकलीपभोगाय वह्ण प्रतिजायते यावता
तेषा धुमप्रतीकेन वर्त्मना चन्द्रमसनधिष्ठितानाम् अन्नभाव दर्शयति "एष सोमो राजा
तद्देवानाम् अन्न तद्देवा भक्षयन्ति" (*श* ५।१०।४) इति ? अत्र उच्यते 'भाक्त वा'
औपचारिकम् एव एषाम् अन्नत्वम्, न सुखम् । इटादिकाग्निं यत् सुखविहग्य
देवानां तत् एव एषा भक्षणम् अभिप्रेतम् । 'अनात्मविश्वात्' इटादिकाग्निं आत्म-
ज्ञानाभावात् तेषा देवोपभोग्यभाव उपपद्यते । 'तयाहि दर्शयति तयाहि श्रुति
नात्मविदा देवोपभोग्यता दर्शयति,—“अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपासीतऽन्योऽसावन्योऽक्षमस्मीति
न स वेद यथा पयरेव स देवानाम्” इति (*बृह* १।४।१०) ।

7 (The statement about selves becoming the food of the gods is) *metaphorical*, because they do not know the Self ; for thus the scripture declares

An objection answered But how can it be maintained that the performers of sacrifices etc should proceed towards the enjoyment of the fruit of their works, considering that they are declared to become the food (of the gods) on reaching the moon by the path leading through smoke, as in the passage "That is Soma the King That is the food of the gods, the gods eat it" (*Chh* V 10 4) ? To this we reply The conversion into food is to be understood in a metaphorical, not in a literal sense The fact that the gods *rejoice* with the performers of sacrifices, is meant to be conveyed by the statement that the gods *eat* them. 'Because they do not know the Self', i.e., from the want of

a true knowledge of the Self in the performers of sacrifices, it follows that such performers are objects of enjoyment for the gods. For thus the scripture declares i.e. the scripture declares that those who do not know the Self are objects of enjoyment for the gods, as in the passage Now if a man worship another deity thinking that the deity is one, and he himself is another that man is devoid of knowledge. He is like a beast for the devas. (Br I 4 10)

८ । कृतात्ययेऽनुग्रहवान् दृष्टश्रुतिभ्यां यद्येवमनेवम् ।

८ । इहादिपरिवा चूमादिवत्तया च-नरमुमविहतावा मुञ्चभोगां ततः प्रचरीह आवापते — तस्मिन् यावत् चूमादमुपि नृपतमैवाभान् पुननिवृत्तये भवितुम् (आ ३।१।१३) इत्या अ यावत् एवमीयवत्ता आहवादि-मीनिमापयते अप्युपचर्या आदिशीमिम् इति (आ ३।१।१०) । तत इदं विचार्यते किं निरुपमया मुक्तकृत्य चूमाच चरीहन्ति, चाशीस्तिन्नु सानुमया इति ? अत्र उच्यते — कृतात्यये कृतज्ञ इहादि' कार्ये च प्रतीपमोक्षेन चरये उपचये इति 'अनुग्रहवान्' मुक्तप्रसादमिव पुनः प्रचरीहति पुनः पुनः प्रवपयते भवितुम् यथा स्तम्भ, 'चनेव' तद्विपर्यये च । चरयेहि पञ्चादे उपसंहराणम् विपर्यय प्रतीवते । दृष्टश्रुतिभ्याम् श्रुतिश्रुतिप्रमाणाभ्याम् इहम् चरन्वते ।

8. According to both Sruti and Smriti when the karma has run its course the self (re-descends) with a residuum (of karma to another body) along the same way but in the inverse order

Scripture has it that the selves of the performers of sacrifices etc., ascend to the sphere of the moon, through the path of smoke etc., and after having enjoyed

the fruits of their works on that plane, re-descend thence e.g., the words beginning with "Having dwelt there till the falling off, they return again by the same way by which they came" (*Chh* V. 10 5), up to the words, "Those of good conduct obtain the birth of Brahmanas etc, those of evil conduct the birth of dogs etc" (*Chh.* V 10. 7) Now the question arises Do they descend after *exhausting* the fruits of all their works, and consequently without any remainder (of works), or do they descend with a residue (of unrequited works) ? To this question we reply "When the *karma* has run its course", i.e., when the works performed by them such as sacrifices etc, have been depleted by the enjoyment of their fruits, and "with a residuum" (i.e., of *karma*) yet left after such enjoyment of fruits, "they re-descend" (to obtain a new birth), by the same path "by which they came", but "not thus," i.e., in the inverse order The inverse order we infer from the mention of clouds etc, during descent "According to scripture and *smṛiti*", i.e., this is proved on the authority both of *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*

६। चरणादिति चेन्नोपलक्ष्यार्थेति कार्ष्णाजिनिः ।

६। 'चरणात्' 'रमणीयचरणा' इत्याद्या श्रुति 'चरणात्' आचरणात् एव योनि-
प्राप्तिं दर्शयति, न अनुश्रयात्, 'इति चेत् न', यत् 'कार्ष्णाजिनि' आचार्यः मन्यते यत्
चक्षा श्रुति 'उपलक्ष्यार्थी', श्रुतिस्त्व-"चरण"शब्द लक्षणेन अनुश्रयशोषक, इत्यर्थः ।

9 Should (the assumption of a residuum of karma)
'be objected to because of (the word) 'conduct,' we say,

११ । सुकृतदुष्कृते एवेति तु वादरि ।

११ । 'वादरि तु' अत्रार्थः 'सुकृतदुष्कृते एव' "सकृत्"-उच्यते प्रकाशयते, इति मन्त्रे । तथाच "सकृत्तेवमन्त्र" समस्तमन्त्रं, "सकृत्तमन्त्र" विहितमन्त्रं, इति निर्णयः ।

11 But *Badarī* (holds that "conduct" means) the good and evil works themselves

But the teacher *Bīdarī* holds that by the word "conduct" are meant the good works and evil works themselves. Hence we conclude that men "of good conduct" are the performers of praiseworthy works and those "of evil conduct" are the performers of blameable works

१२ । अनितादिकारिणामपि च श्रुतम् ।

१२ । पूर्वपक्षः । 'अनित्यादिकारिणामपि' चन्द्रमण्डल गन्तव्यत्वेन 'श्रुतम्' । तथाहि अविशिष्टा कौषीतकिन समामनन्ति—“ये वै के चाप्याक्षीकात् प्रयन्ति चन्द्रमन्मेव ते भव्ये गच्छन्ति” (कौषि १२) इति ।

12 (The *Pūrvapakṣin* says that ascent to the moon is stated in the scripture about those also who do not perform sacrifices &c

The *Pūrvapakṣa* Scripture speaks of the sphere of the moon as a place of resort for those also who do not perform sacrifices &c, e g, the *Kaushītakin*s make this unspecified statement, "All who depart from this world go to the moon" (*Kau* I 2)

१३। संयमने त्वनुभूयेतरि यामारोहावरोहो तदतिदर्मनात् ।

१३। 'तु यन्मा' पूर्वपक्ष आगत्यति । इदकारिण एव भीमाय चन्द्रमणम्
पारिदम्, न इतरि । न तत्र अगिदकारिणा भीमा अणि । ते संयमने यमान्
स्यदुष्कृतागुण्या यामी यान्ते । अनुभूय पुन एव इमं लोचं प्रति अवरोहति ।
इतिवाम् अगिदकारिणाम् एवभूतो पारीद अवरोहो भवतः । तदतिदर्मनात्
यतः यमवचनरूपा कृतिः भवताम् अगिदकारिणा यमव मता इत्यति —

“न सत्यस्य प्रतिमाति वाचं

ममाद्यन्ते विगभीर्हि मूढम् ।

अयं लोको नास्ति पर इति ज्ञानी

पुन पुनवममापयति मे ॥ (अठ १।१।६)

13 (The Sūtrakāra says) *No For those others (i e non performers of sacrifices) ascent and descent take place through the enjoyment (of fruits of actions) in Samyamana the city of Yama for them) such a course is declared (in the scriptures)*

The word 'but discards the Pūrvapakṣa. It is only the performers of sacrifices who ascend to the moon going there for the enjoyment (of the fruits of their good works) not others. For those who do not perform sacrifices, there is no enjoyment in the moon. These latter suffer in Samyamana, the abode of the god of death, the torments provided by Yama in accordance with their evil deeds, and then they re-descend to this world. Such are the ascent and descent of the others, (i e the non performers of sacrifices) as we maintain on the ground of such a course being declared by scripture. For a scriptural passage embodying Yama's own words declares that non performers of

११ । सुकृतदुष्कृते ऽवेति तु वादरिः ।

११ । 'वादरि तु आचार्यं 'सुकृतदु-कृते ऽव' "वर्म"-शब्देन प्रकाशयते, इति मन्यते । तथात् "रमणीयवर्णा" प्रशस्तवर्माणां, "कृप्यवर्णा" निन्दितवर्माणां इति निर्णयः ।

11 *But Bādari (holds that "conduct" means) the good and evil works themselves*

But the teacher Bādari holds that by the word "conduct" are meant the good works and evil works themselves. Hence we conclude that men "of good conduct" are the performers of praise-worthy works and those "of evil conduct" are the performers of blameable works

१२ । अनिष्टादिकारिणामपि च श्रुतम् ।

१२ । पूर्वपक्षः । 'अनिष्टादिकारिणामपि' चन्द्रमण्डल गताव्यत्वेन 'श्रुतम्' । तथाहि अविशिष्टेषु कौषितकिणु समामनन्ति—“ये वै के चाध्याप्नोषात् प्रयन्ति चन्द्रमसमेव ते सर्वे गच्छन्ति” (कौषि १।२) इति ।

12 *(The Pūrvapakshin says that ascent to the moon) is stated in the scripture about those also who do not perform sacrifices &c*

The Pūrvapaksha Scripture speaks of the sphere of the moon as a place of resort for those also who do not perform sacrifices &c, e g, the Kaushītakinu make this unspecified statement,—“All who depart from this world go to the moon” (*Kau* I 2)

१३ । संयमने त्वनुभूयेतरेषामारोहायरोहो तद्वतिदर्मनात् ।

१३ । 'तु' इत्या धूमपय आगत्यति । इतकारिण एव भीताय चक्षुममम्
 कारिणि न इति । न तत्र अनितकारिणो भोगः क्वचि । न संयमने ज्ञानो
 मनुष्यता अपरं यमो पातना अनुभूय पुन एव इमं मोक्ष इति चररीर्त्तन ।
 इतिवाम् अनितकारिणाम् एवमुक्तो 'चररी' चररीर्त्तनी भवति । तद्वति नाम्ना
 यतः समवचनसम्बन्धेन कृतिः कथिताम् अनितकारिणो यमव द्वाता इत्यति —

"न भ्रातृप्राय प्रतिभाति वार्त्तं

अमापनी विपरीतिन मूढम् ।

अयं मोक्षा नास्ति पर इति ज्ञानी

पुन पुनवममापयति मे । (अठ १।१।६)

13 (The Sâtrakâra says) No For those others (i. e., non performers of sacrifices) ascent and descent take place through the enjoyment (of fruits of actions) in Samyamana the city of Yama for them) such a course is declared (in the scriptures)

The word but discards the Pûrvapaksha It is only the performers of sacrifices who ascend to the moon going there for the enjoyment (of the fruits of their good works) not others. For those who do not perform sacrifices there is no enjoyment in the moon. These latter suffer in Samyamana, the abode of the god of death the torments provided by Yama in accordance with their evil deeds and then they re-descend to this world. Such are the ascent and descent of the others, (i. e. the non performers of sacrifices) as we have said "on the ground of such a course being declared by scripture. For a scriptural passage embodying Yama's own words declares that non performers of

sacrifices, when they die, fall into Yama's power, thus, "The future life is not revealed to a man without understanding, thoughtless and deluded by the fascination of wealth. One who thinks that this world alone exists and there is no future world, comes under my sway again and again" (*Kath* I 2, 6,)

१४ । स्मरन्ति च ।

१४ । अपि च मनु-व्यासीदयः स्मृतिकर्तारः सद्यमने पुरे यमायत्तं कर्तव्यकर्मविपाकं कथयन्ति ।

14 *The smritis also (declare) this.*

Moreover, authoritative writers of Smṛiti, like Manu, Vyāsa, etc., declare that in the city of Samyamana evil works are requited under Yama's rule.

१५ । अपिच सप्त ।

१५ । अपिच सप्त नरका रौरवप्रमुखा दुष्कृतफलोपभोगभूमित्वेन पौराणिके अर्थन्ते । तान् अनिष्टादिकारिणः प्राप्नुवन्ति, न चन्द्रलोकम् ।

15 *Further, there are the seven hells (for the non-performers of sacrifices)*

Further, the Purana-writers mention seven hells named Raurava etc., where the fruits of evil deeds have to be suffered (by their doers). Non-performers of sacrifices go to them, and not to the lunar regions.

साधनेन देवस्थाने पथि अधिष्ठता नापि कामेणा पितृयात्रे, तेषाम् एष, तृतीयं पन्थां
अवति इति । तस्मात् अपि न अग्न्यादिकारिणि चन्द्रमा प्राप्नोति ।

17 (Not all) *but* (only those who follow the paths) of knowledge and works (reach the moon) For, these two are the subjects of discussion (in the scriptural passage)

The word 'but' is meant to discard the idea sought to be established on the strength of the scriptural text of another Sâkhâ (*viz*, the *Kaushîtaki*, see Sutra 12), that "all departed go to the moon" The word "all" there is to be taken as referring to those qualified (by knowledge or works) In the section of the scriptures known as "The Knowledge of the Five Fires," in course of reply to the question "Do you know why that world never becomes full?" (*Chh. V 3 3*), we have the text, "Small creatures which repeatedly come and go, (*i e*, are constantly being re-born), do not pass along either of those two ways For them (the law is) 'Live and die' There is a third place Therefore that world never becomes full" (*Chh V 10 8*) Here by the expression "two ways" we are to understand knowledge and works Why so? Because "they are the subjects under discussion", *i e*, only "knowledge" and "works" are under discussion as the means for entering "the path of the gods" and "the path of the fathers" respectively. The meaning is, that for those who are neither entitled by knowledge to have access to the path of the gods, nor by works to have access to the path of the fathers, there is this third path From this consideration also we infer that non-performers of sacrifices etc, do not reach the moon

१८ । ७ ऋतोये तयोधनञ्चे ।

१८ । न ऋतीयं व्याप्ति ईदृशभावात् आश्रयिणाम् पञ्चसंख्यानिबन्धं आदत्तम् । तयोधनञ्चे यत् तथा आ ति संख्यानिबन्धम् अत्रापि एव वञ्चितम् प्रकाशितं ऋतीयं तन्मासि उपपन्नम्,—“जायते म्रियते इति एतम् ऋतीयं व्याप्तम् इति ।

18. *With regard to the third place (the rule of five oblations for securing a new body) does not apply for thus is it perceived*

With regard to the third place the rule of the oblations being five in number for the purpose of obtaining a new body need not be attended to. For thus is it perceived : because it is seen that the third place is reached in the manner described in the words, Live and die theirs is a third place without any reference to the fixing of the number of oblations as five

१८

१८ । अर्धैतेऽपि च श्लोके ।

१८ । अपिच अर्धैते श्लोके द्रोचष्टचतुष्टयप्रवर्तीनां सीताद्रीपदी प्रवर्तीनां च अभीनिगतम् । तत्र द्रोचदीनां धानित्वविषया एका आहुति गच्छति । षट्चतुष्टयादीनां तु क्षीयितृपुत्रविवर्धने हि अपि आहुती न क्षा । यदा च तत्र आहुति-संख्यानाम् अनादयं भवति एवम् अत्रापि भविष्यति । अत्रापि अपि रित-सीमां च अत्रापि एव म्रिये म्रियते सुखा भवे चचे इति श्लोके चङ् । [अत्र अत्रापि च सुखा भवे म्रियते म्रियते च ।]

19 *There is, moreover, the tradition in the world (of births without all the five oblations being offered)*

Moreover, there are traditions in the world of the birth of Drona, Dhrishtadyumna, Sítá, Draupadī, etc., without mothers. In the case of Drona etc., one oblation, *viz.*, that offered into the woman, is wanting. In the case of Dhrishtadyumna etc., even two oblations, *viz.*, those offered into the man and into the woman, are wanting. As in these cases the number of oblations was set aside, so may it be in others too. It is also well-known in the world that the female crane conceives without a male, on hearing the rumbling of thunder.

[Note by Editor. Here, as elsewhere, I have followed the meaning of the Sūtra and the trend of the Bhāṣya. But in my personal opinion, the birth of animals or men except through mothers and fathers is contrary both to fact and reason.]

२० । दर्शनाच्च ।

२० । अपिच चतुर्विधे भूतधामे जराजगण्डज-स्वेदजोन्निज-लघणे स्वेदजोन्निजयो ग्रास्यधर्ममन्तरेण एव उत्पत्ति-‘दर्शनात्’ च’ आहुति-संख्यानादपि भवति । एवम् अन्यत्र अपि भविष्यति ।

20 *Further, this is observed also*

It is, further, observed that of the four classes of organic beings, *viz.*, viviparous animals, oviparous animals, animals born of heat, and vegetables, the last two classes are born without the union of the sexes. In their case

the number of oblations is set aside. So may it be in others too

२१ । तृतीयगन्दावरोध संशोकाजस्य ।

२१ । ननु “तेषां मन्त्राणां भूतानां बीजाणि भवन्ति—अण्डं जीवस्य
उद्भिस्त्वम् इति (ऋग्वेदी ६।१।१) । अथ द्विरिह एव भूतपात्रं दूयते, अथ भूतपात्रस्य
अण्विषयं प्रतिपाद्यम् (ऋग्वेदी १।१।१) ? इति अथ उच्यते—“अण्डं जीवस्य
उद्भिस्त्वम् इति अथ तृतीयेन उद्भिस्त्वमन्त्रेण एव संशोकाजस्य स्वेन्द्रा अरोधं संशो-
का इति मन्त्रेण यत् सन्नाहिस्यथ। उभयोः अपि तुल्येन भूत-बीजैर्द्वयम् ।

21 (In scriptural texts which enumerate only three classes of organic beings) *the third term is meant to cover also (the class) which springs from heat*

An objection refuted It may here be questioned that in the scriptural text Of all these beings there are only three kinds of germs, viz., that springing from an egg that springing from a living being, and that springing from earth : *e.*, vegetables (Chh VI 3 1) only three kinds of organic beings are admitted how then can it be assumed (as has been done in the *Aitareya Upanishad* III 3) that there are four classes? To this we reply The third class in the above passage viz., that springing from earth must be understood to include, by implication the class of that which springs from heat because both these classes have this characteristic in common, viz., that they spring by shooting from earth and water

२२ । सामान्यापत्तिरूपस्ये ।

२२ । अथ अण्विषयं अण्विषयत्वात् पठ्यते । इयम् अण्विषयि भवति —

“अथैतमेवाध्वान पुनर्निवर्तन्ते यथेतलाकाशमाकाशाद्वायु वायुर्मूला घृमी भवति घृमी मूलाऽपि भवत्यमं मूला मेघी भवति मेघी मूला प्रवर्षति ।” (का प्र० १०५, ६) इति । तत्र संशयः,—किम् आकाशादिस्वरूपम् एव अवरोहन् प्रतिपद्यन्ते किंवा आकाशादि-साम्यम् इति ? अत्र उच्यते, ‘सामान्यापत्ति’ आकाशादि-साम्यप्राप्ति भवति, न स्वरूप-प्राप्ति । ‘उपपत्ते’ यत साम्यप्राप्ति एव उपपद्यते । आकाशस्वरूपप्राप्तौ वाय्वादिक्रमेण अवरोहः न उपपद्यते, आकाशस्य विमुक्तात् ।

22 (During descent from the moon, the self) *enters into similarity*, (and not identity, with ākāśa etc), *because this (only) is possible*

The mode of descent from the moon is now the subject of investigation Here is a scriptural text regarding the descent, “They return again, by the way they came, to ākāśa, and from the ākāśa to air (The sacrificer then), having become air, becomes smoke ; having become smoke, he becomes mist , having become mist, he becomes a cloud, he rains down ” (*Chh* V 10 5 and 6) Here a doubt arises, whether the descending selves pass into a state of identity with ether etc , or into a state of similarity ? We reply that it is a state of similarity, and not that of identity “Because this only is possible”, i e , a similarity only is possible If the self were to become identical with ākāśa, it would not be possible for it to descend through the series of air etc , (for ākāśa is all-pervading)

२३ । नातिचिरं विशेषात् ।

२३ । अत्र संशयः,—किं दीर्घं कालम् अवरोहन् आकाशादिसाम्येन अवतिष्ठन्ते उत अन्यम् इति । अत्र उच्यते,—‘न अतिचिरं अगतिविलम्बेन आकाशादिसाम्येन

चक्षुष्यस्य ते इमां मृतम् आपवन्ति । कुत एतत् चक्षुष्यस्य ?— विविधात् युतो विविचर्षन्नात् । तथाहि व्रीह्यादिभाषापर्ये चक्षुष्यस्य युति विविचर्षन्ति — “चक्षुषी ये खलु दुर्मिष पतनम् (का ३।१।६) इति । दुर्मिष पतनम् दुर्मिष मतरं, दुःखतरम् चक्षुष्यात् व्रीह्यादिभाषात् निःसरणं भवति इत्यर्थः । तत् पत्रं दुःखं निष पतनं भवत्येवम् पूर्वोऽपि दुःखं निष पतनं दर्शयति । सुखनिष पतनं च अविनिष पतनं पृथग्वति, इतः तद्विषयं चक्षुषी मरीचमसि सुखदुःखमीश न भवन्ति ।

23 (The descent takes) *not a very long time* (as appears) *from a special statement*

A doubt may arise as to whether the descending selves remain in a state of similarity to *dēdsā* etc. for a long or for a short time. We reply they descend to this earth after remaining in a state of similarity to *dēdsā* etc. for a not very long period. How is this known? From the fact that a special statement is made in the scriptures in this connection. After having mentioned the entrance of selves into the states of rice etc. scripture makes this particular statement — From thence the escape is more difficult (*Chh. V 10 6*) meaning that the escape from the state of rice etc. is more painful. Here the scripture, by mentioning the subsequent escapes as comparatively more painful implies that the preceding escapes are comparatively more pleasant. Now a more pleasant escape here can only mean a quicker escape for at that stage the body is not yet formed, and consequently the experiencing of pleasure and pain is impossible.

२४। अन्याधिष्ठिते पूर्ववदमिच्छापात् ।

२४। अन्याधिष्ठितं चक्षुषी नोरे अविष्ठितं व्रीह्यादी संसर्गमात्रम् अपरीक्षन् ।

अपि प्रसम् अन्नमस्यत इति अतः सुप्रसम् एव अग्नयदिनां शीघ्रादिजन्म अतः तत्र
 मोक्षी कल्पना अनधिक इति, तत् परिकीर्तते—'त' अयम् अयम् एव विदिक
 कर्म मन्त्रात् अतः शास्त्रेण,— अग्नीषोमीयं पञ्चमन्त्रमिति इत्यादिना विहितम् ।
 अतः अन्ननाम्ना वाणिज्यागो शीघ्रादि सन्निवेशमात्रं तद्वत् इति उपचर्यते ।

25 *If it be said (by those who hold that selves are literally born as plants etc. that the performance of sacrifices is) sinful we deny that on the ground of scripture*

It may be held by some that sacrificial works are sinful involving as they do the killing of animals etc., and that such works may even have undesirable results. The statement that selves with an unrequited residuum of *karma* are born as rice etc., should therefore, be taken literally. It is unnecessary to imagine that the statement may have an indirect meaning. To this we reply. No the work enjoined by the Veda is not sinful but holy.

On the ground of scripture : c because scripture sanctions it by such texts as Let him offer an animal to Agni and Soma. Hence we conclude that the statement about selves in their descent from the moon becoming rice etc. only means that they come into contact with the plants (and not that they actually become the selves of those plants)

२६ । इति सिङ्ग-योगोऽयम् ।

२६ । इत्यत्र शीघ्रादि-सन्निवेशमात्रं तद्वत् अतः 'अय' शीघ्रादिसामान्य अन्तरम्
 अग्नयदिनां रित-वि (मान, आवायते) — "दी यो हि अयम् अति यो रितं विवर्ति तदमृतं"

એવ ભવતિ" (છા પ્રા ૧૦૬) ક્ષતિ । ન ચ અત્ર સુખા. રેત-સિંગ્માવ સમ્ભવતિ । ચિરજાતો હિ પ્રાપ્તયૌવનો રેત સિક્ ભવતિ । કથમ્ અન્નગત અનુશયી રેત સિક્ ભવિષ્યતિ ? અત્ર તાવત અવશ્યે 'રેત સિંગ્યોગ' એવ પુશ્ચરોયોગ એવ રેત,સિંગ્માવ અમ્યપ્રગત્યન્થ । તદ્વત્ત્રીહ્યાદિભાવ. અપિ ત્રીહ્યાદિયોગ એવ ક્ષતિ અવિરોધ. ।

26 (Another ground for the above statement is that according to scripture), *after that* (i.e., after becoming plants, the self enters into) *conjunction with one that performs the act of generation*

That "becoming plants etc " means nothing but mere contact with plants etc , is seen from this also that according to scripture selves to which a remainder clings, after becoming plants etc , become beings who perform the act of generation, as seen in the passage, "For whoever eats the food, whoever performs the act of generation, that again he (the self) becomes" (*Chh V 10 6*) Here, it is clear that the statement about "becoming beings who perform the act of generation" cannot be taken in a literal sense , for, it is a long time after birth, viz , on the attainment of youth, that one becomes capable of generation. How should the self that has passed into the food eaten become a generator ? Here we are constrained to interpret the expression "becoming a generator" by "entering into conjunction with something that generates, i.e. with a male body " Similarly, we infer, consistently with the above interpretation, that the self's "becoming a plant" merely means its "entering into conjunction with a plant".

२०। योने ग्रहीरम्।

१०। यत् तत्तन्मिदं नानां दीप्ती निर्विषे ईतसि योने चरि चरमन्ति
 चरन्त्यनेनैवमीयाय प्रीतिं ज्ञान इति वाह यत्तम्—“तत्तं य इह एतन्नेष्टवत्त
 (वा १।१।१०) इत्यादि। तच्चान् चरि चरन्त्यनेन न चरतीष्टीतिदि भाषावन्ति
 तन्मगीम् एव सुखदुःखान्तं भवति इति। तच्चान् श्रीकृष्णं संश्लेषमात्रम् च यत्तं
 तन्मन् इति विदम्।

27 And a new body (for the migrating self is produced still later) from some female body

It is only after “becoming a generator (i.e., being connected with a male and after passing through a female womb that the self with a residuum of *karma* first obtains a body in which to enjoy the fruits of that residuum as declared in the scriptures (*Chh* V 10 7 From this also it appears that descending selves during the stage in which they “become” plants etc., do not form the bodies of plants with their attendant pleasures and pains. Thus, the “birth” of selves as plants etc. is proved to be merely the state of entering into conjunction with them and nothing more.

सार्धन-नाम-तृतीयाध्याये

द्वितीयः पादः जीवेश्वरयोः सम्बन्धः

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१ । सन्धेर् अष्टिराह हि ।

१ । इदानीं जीवस्य अवस्थामेदः प्रपञ्च्यते । इदम् आनन्ति “स यत्र प्रसृज्यते” इति उपक्रम्य “न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पत्न्यानि भवन्ति अथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथं सृजते” (बृह ४।३।८, १०) इत्यादि । तत्र संशयः, किं प्रबोधे इव स्वप्ने अपि पारमार्थिकी सृष्टि आहोस्वित् मायामयी इति । तत्र तावत् पूर्वपक्ष ‘सन्धेर्’ जाग्रत्-सुषुप्तिस्थानयोः सन्धौ, स्वप्ने इत्यर्थः, तत्पक्षपा एव सृष्टिः भवति । ‘आह हि’ यत् पूर्वोक्ता श्रुतिः एवम् एव आह ।

1 (The Pûrvapakshin says that) *in the intermediate state* (between waking and sleep), *creations* (of the mind are real), *for scripture says so*

In this pâda the different states of the living self, waking, dreaming, sleeping etc, will be discussed. We have, on this subject, the scriptural texts commencing with “When he falls asleep” up to “There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads. He himself creates chariots, horses, roads.” (*Bri* IV. 3 9 and 10). Here a doubt arises whether the creation in dreams is real, like that in the waking state, or illusory. The Pûrvapaksha maintains that “in the intermediate state”, where the

waking and sleeping states coalesce, i.e. in dreams there is a real creation. Because "scripture says so", as seen in the passage referred to.

२ । निर्मातारं चेके पुत्रादयः ।

१ । पूर्वपक्षं द्रष्टव्यम् । अपि च 'एवं' अस्मिन् अस्मिन् एव सञ्ज्ञे स्थाने कामानां निर्मातारम् आत्मानं चामनन्ति—“य एव सुतेषु जायते कामे कामे पुत्रश्चो निर्दिष्टाश्च (ऋ १।१।८) इति । पुत्रादयश्च तव कामा अभिप्रेयन्ते । तस्मात् सत्यत्वा एव सञ्ज्ञे सृष्टिः ।

2. And some (have stated the self to be) a creator (in the intermediate state) Even sons etc (are said to be created in that state, as things longed for)

The Pârvaṇakṣha strengthens its position. Moreover the members of one Vedic school declare the self in that very intermediate state to be the maker of objects of desire, e.g., He, the Person who is awake in us when we are asleep shaping one object of desire after another" (*Kath.* II. 2. 8) Even sons etc. are there mentioned as objects of desire Hence the world created in dreams is real.

३ । मायामात्रं तु कार्त्तृस्थेनानभिध्यत्तक्षरूपत्वात् ।

१ । विद्यामयम् एतत् । तु-सद्वत् पूर्वपक्षं निरसति । सञ्ज्ञे सृष्टिः 'मायामात्रं' मायामयी, न परमाभिष्टो । 'जातु स्येन अनभिध्यत्तक्षरूपत्वात्' सत्त्वं साधिका सृष्टिः 'जातु स्येन' सर्वपरमात्मनोऽप्यर्थे, द्वैतवादिनिमित्त-सम्पत्त्या । अनदिन च अभिध्यत्तक्षरूपत्वात् न सत्यम् ।

3 But (says the Sûtrakâra, the dream-world) is merely illusory, because its nature does not manifest itself with the totality (of the attributes of reality)

The Sûtrakâra's view. The word 'but' discards the Purvapaksha. The creation in the dream-state is a mere illusion, it is not real "Because it does not manifest itself with the totality of the attributes" (of real things) The nature of the dream-creation does not manifest all the attributes of real things, viz, consistency in relation to space, time, and causality, and non-contradiction of actuality

४ । सूचकश्च हि श्रुतेराचक्षते च तद्विदः ।

४ । भाषाभाष्यत्वात् तर्हि न कश्चित् स्वप्ने परमार्थगन्ध इति ? न, इति च्यते 'सूचकश्च' यत् स्वप्न. सूचकश्च भवति भविष्यतो साध्याधुनो । 'श्रुते,' "यदा कर्म कर्म्येषु स्थितं स्वप्नेषु पश्यति । सद्यश्चिं तत्र जानीयात् तस्मिन् स्वप्ननिदर्शने ॥" इत्यादे 'आचक्षते च तद्विद' स्वप्नविज्ञानविदश्च मन्यन्ते, "कुञ्जरोद्दृष्टादीनि स्वप्ने धन्यानि खरयागादीनि अघन्यानि" इति । [सर्वत्राख्येतानि अप्रमाण्यानि वाक्यनामावाणि, इत्येवमन्ये ।]

4 (The dream) is indicative (of the future) according to *Sruti*. Experts also say so.

Here one may question If dreams are nothing but illusions, does it not follow that they can have no connection whatsoever with reality? Not so, we reply For dreams are also indicators, i e, are prophetic of future good or evil. This follows from scripture, which has this

If a man actively engaged for the realisation of some object happens to dream of a woman he may infer success from the omen of that dream, and other similar texts. "Experts also say so i.e. those who have mastered the science of dreams also say — 'Riding on elephants etc. in dreams is lucky, and riding on dokeys is unlucky' (Note by the Editor—My personal opinion however is that all this (dream interpretation) is groundless and imaginary)

५ । परमिथ्यानात् तु तिरोहितं ततो ज्ञाय यन्मविपद्यो ।

१ । पूर्वपक्षो ब्रूय मयरे यन् जीवदृष्टी, परमात् परमिथ्यानात् परमिथ्यानात् तत्त्वज्ञानाद्विधी गतिं म दृष्टम् अस्ति । २ किन्तु जीवेत्यादि परमात् वचनात् अपि तन् 'तिरोहितम्' आच्छादितम् इव अविद्यानिवृत्त्यात् । 'तत ईदृशं द्वितीं येन हि ज्ञाय जीवस्य 'यन्मविपद्यो' वस्तुभाषो भवतः ।

5 (If it be contended that dream-creations may be real) *through the creative thought of the Supreme Self* (the Supreme Self and the individual self being really one we say No. The knowledge of such oneness is *hidden* (from the individual self) *and hence its states of bondage and release are due to him*

The Pūrvapakshīo may say that as Jīva and Īsvara are fundamentally one, therefore the creations of dreams may be real through the power of the creative thought of the Supreme Self. The word 'but sets aside this supposition. The oneness of Jīva and Īsvara though true, is yet hidden

or covered, as it were, by the veil of *avidyā* (nescience) And Jīva's bondage and release also are from him, *i e* , God, due to ignorance or knowledge of his true nature.

६ । द्रष्टव्योपाक्षा सौऽपि ।

६ । 'स. अपि' जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्यतिरोभावः 'द्रष्टव्योपात्' शरीरसम्पर्कात् एव भवति । 'वा'-शब्दः जीवेश्वरयोः अन्यत्वाशङ्का-व्यापन्नार्थः ।

6 Or, *that (the veiling) is due to* (the individual's) connection with the body

"That" (meaning the concealment of the self's knowledge and lordship) is due to connection with the body. The word 'or' is meant to discard the suspicion that Jīva and Īsvara may be separate entities.

७ । तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च ।

७ । स्वप्नावस्था परीक्षिता, इदानीं सुषुप्तावस्था परीक्ष्यते । 'तदभावः' स्वप्नावस्थास्य सुषुप्तम् इत्यर्थः, 'नाडीषु आत्मनि च' भवति । 'तच्छ्रुतेः' यतः तत् एव श्रुतिभिः अवगम्यते (छां ६।८।१, २, ८।६।३, बृह ४।३।२ इत्यादीषु) । नाडीकथनस्य व्यवहारिकम् इति मन्यते भाष्यकारः, परमार्थतः, "ब्रह्म एव अनपायि सुमिस्थानम्" । (प्रश्नोपनिषत् ४।६-११ द्रष्टव्या) ।

7 The absence of that (*i e* , of dreams, in other words the state of dreamless sleep) takes place in the arteries and in the self, for the scripture says so

The dreaming state has been discussed. We shall now discuss the state of dreamless sleep "The absence of

that, i.e., of dreams, in other words the state of profound sleep takes place "in the arteries as well as in the Self"

Because this is mentioned in the scriptures (e.g., in *Chh* VI 8. 1 & 2, and again in VIII 6 3 in *Bri* IV 3 21 etc.) Sankara holds that the mention of arteries is only the popular uncritical view of the matter while in reality Brahman is the lasting abode of the individual in dreamless sleep. (*Vide* *Pras.* IV 6-11)

८। अतः प्रबोधोऽस्मात् ।

८। अस्मात् अस्मात् एव सुषुप्त्यायाम् 'अतः' एव आत्मान् प्रबोधः जायतेत्युक्तम् । अस्मात् अस्मात् अस्मात् । "अतः एतत् अस्मात् ? (इह १।१।१६) इति अत्र प्रश्नस्य प्रतिपत्त्यावर्तते । अतः एतत् विन्यसितम् । सुषुप्त्यावर्ततेत्यात्मानं एव अतः प्रबोधः इति दूषते (इह १।१।१६) ।

8. Consequently awakening (is due to) that (i.e. the Self)

As the Self is the place of deep sleep consequently awakening is also due the Self. Thus we see that in the *Brihadāranyaka* Upanishad in course of answer to the question "Whence did it come?" (II 1 16) it has been said that "as minute sparks rush out from fire so all *prāṇas* come forth from that Self" (II 1 20)

९। स एव तु कर्मागुच्छ्रुतियद्विधिभ्यः ।

९। किं स एव सुषुप्तः स एव प्रबोधोऽस्ति एतत् अतः वा, इति विन्यसितम् । 'स' एव तु अतः पुनः उच्यते, न अन्यः, यतः कर्मेभ्यः अगुच्छ्रुतम् अद्वैतम्, विविधं च तत् अगुच्छ्रुतम् । पूर्वेषु अगुच्छ्रुतम् अद्वैतम् अपरिच्छिन्नं द्वैतम् अगुच्छ्रुतम् इत्यतः ।

अतीते अहनि “अहम् अदः अद्राचम्” इति पूर्वानुभूतस्य अनुस्मरणम् अन्यस्य उत्थाने न उपपद्यते । “सः अहम् अस्मि” इति च आत्मानुस्मरणम् एकस्य उत्थाने एव उपपद्यते । शब्देभ्यः श्रुतिभ्यः च सुप्तस्य उत्थानम् अवगम्यते (बृहदारण्यके ४।३।१६, छान्दोग्ये ६।१।०२, पाशर) । तथा अन्योत्थान-पक्षे सुषुप्तमात्रं मुच्यते इति आपद्यते, अतः कर्म-विद्या-विधयः अनर्थका स्यः ।

9 (The awakened person) is the same (as the person that slept), as is known from works, from remembrance, from scriptural texts, and from precepts

Here we have to discuss whether the self that had been profoundly asleep and the self that has awakened from sleep are identical or are different. We reply that the same self that had been asleep arises from the sleep, and no other, as is evident from works, from memory, from scriptural texts, and from precepts. A person who did (i.e., began) some work on the previous day is observed to continue the remaining portion of the work the next day. And such remembrance of past perceptions as is conveyed by the words “I saw this on the preceding day” cannot take place if the person arising (from sleep) is a different one. Such consciousness of personal identity as “I am the same person as I was before” is possible only if the identical person arises (from sleep). The arising of the same person is known from scriptural texts also, (e.g., Bri IV 3 16, Chh VI 10 2 and VIII 3 2). Further, the hypothesis of a different person arising (from sleep) would lead to the inference that whoever falls asleep obtains final release, this would make precepts about work and knowledge useless.

१० । सुखेऽहंमय्यति परिगीयात् ।

१ । 'मुग्धे मूर्खाणां ज्ञेयत्वं' इति-अभि. अर्थेण सुप्रसिद्धे अर्थेण न
निरूप्यते गच्छता भवति । 'परिमितान् दत्तं वा चरन्त्या कल्पं मात्रं सुप्रसिद्धं सर्वथा
विशेष्यम्' भवति ।

10 In the unconscious state there is a half and half contact for this is the only remaining (explanation of that state)

In the unconscious state (i.e. in a swoon) the self is in a state of half union i.e. it is united half with the qualities of deep sleep and half with those of death. This being the remaining state i.e. a state which is different from the states of waking dreaming deep sleep and death.

११। न स्थानतोऽपि परम्योभयसिद्ध मध्येष हि ।

११। धनं ब्रह्मणा सृष्टं सुतुभादिषु श्रीरं कथाप्रथममाह सत्यं च तस्य इन्द्रादीं
महर्षं सुतिमरेण निर्वाच्यते । न सता 'न ध्यातव्यं' इति श्रुत्यापुपाधिष्वेवाह 'अपि
'परस्य च ब्रह्मण्य' 'उभयपक्षिद्वयम्' 'उभयपक्षिद्वयम्' 'सदृशनिगुणत्वम्' उपपद्यते । 'सर्व्वेव
हि यता' परब्रह्म प्रतिपादनपरिदु सत्यं च सुतिमरेषु अपाता-समस्त विविधम् एव ब्रह्म
उपदिश्यते ।

11 Dual characteristics (i.e. being both saguna and nirguna) cannot belong to the Supreme Being—not even through (contact with) place. Because everywhere (scripture describes the Supreme Being to be unconditional)

Let us now try to ascertain what, according to the scriptures, is the nature of that Brahman with which the self becomes united, through loss of limiting adjuncts, during deep sleep etc. Certainly, by itself, the Highest Brahman cannot have double characteristics. Nor can it possess double characteristics 'through contact with place' i.e. with limiting adjuncts like the earth &c. 'Because everywhere' in those scriptural passages whose subject matter is the Brahman, it is taught to be free from all qualifications

१२। न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतवचनात् ।

१२। 'न भेदात्' सुती 'ब्रह्मणः' भेदकथनात् न तत् केवलं निर्गुणम्, 'इति चेत् न' । 'प्रत्येकम्' अतवचनात् यत् 'प्रत्येकम्' एकैवां भेदकथनं प्रति 'अतवचनं' तद्विपर्यय-वचनम् अभेदं च श्रूयते । "यश्चायमस्या पृथिव्यां तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषो यश्चायमध्यात्म-शरीरस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषोऽयमेव स योऽयमात्मा" (बृह २।५।१) इत्यादि ।

12. If (it be objected that the above view is) *not tenable, because differentiation* (also is found to have been mentioned in the scripture about Brahman) *we say, No, because with each such (declaration of difference) there is a statement that Brahman is not so, i.e. not differentiated)*

An objection refuted If it be contended that Brahman cannot be wholly and solely unconditioned, because scripture declares different attributes of Brahman as well, we say, No. Because with reference to each such declaration of difference, there is also a statement that Brahman

is not differentiated e.g. in the passage, "He that is this radiant and immortal Person within this earth he that is this radiant and immortal Person incorporated in the body—he indeed is the same as this Self (Br II 5 1) etc.

१३। अपि वैधमेके ।

१३। 'अपि च एवं मे भगवन्निर्गुणैकम् अमरममेव 'एके मास्मिन् लोके भगवन्—'अनर्कवेदमायत्तं विद्वांसादि विवर्तः। एकी च यत्तु कथंति य इह वासि पश्यति' (कठ १।१।११) इति ।

13 *There are some (teachers) again (who teach the same that we say)*

Again this very doctrine of ours viz., the acceptance of the doctrine of non-difference, and censure of that of difference, is taught by the members of one school, e.g. It (Brahman) is to be attained by the mind alone. There is no plurality in it. He who thinks it to be many goes from death to death (Kath II 1 11.)

१४। अरूपमदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।

१४। अथाप्याचार-रहितम् एव हि ब्रह्म च न पारमिषत् न कथादिभ्यः । अज्ञात् ? —तत्प्रधानत्वात् यत्तु विद्या-परात्मनि निपत्य-ब्रह्मात्मतत्त्व-प्रधानाणि न चर्या-पर-प्रधानाणि ।

14 *Certainly (Brahman is) formless (as we*

conclude) *from the preponderance* (in the scriptures) *of such* (texts as teach this doctrine)

Brahman is certainly to be conceived as devoid of all form, shape etc , and not as possessing form etc Why so ? because Vedantic texts preponderately teach the doctrine of Brahman being devoid of the qualities of created things and not that of its being of a different nature ~

१५ । प्रकाशवच्चावैयर्थ्यात् ।

१५ । 'प्रकाशवत् च' यथा प्रकाश सौर' चान्द्रस वा विद्यद्व्याप्य अवतिष्ठमान' अङ्गुल्याद्युपाधिसम्बन्धात् तेषु ऋजु-वक्रादिमात्रं प्रतिपद्यमानेषु तन्मात्रम् इव प्रतिपद्यते, एव ब्रह्म अपि पृथिव्याद्युपाधि-सम्बन्धात् तदाकारम् इव प्रतिपद्यते । 'अवैयर्थ्यात्' यत' एवम् एव आकारवद् ब्रह्मविषयाणाम् अपि वाक्यानाम् 'अवैयर्थ्यम्' सार्थक्यं भविष्यति ।

15 *And 'Brahman is' like light, for texts teaching his differentiations' are not meaningless*

The light of the sun or the moon, diffusing itself through space, comes into contact with human fingers or other limiting adjuncts, and as they become straight or curved, becomes itself straight or curved, as it were. Similarly Brahman also assumes the shape of the earth etc on coming into contact with the earth or other limiting adjuncts It is only on this view that the Vedic texts which treat of Brahman as having a form are saved from being meaningless.

१६ । आह च तन्मात्रम् ।

१६ । 'आह च' श्रुति 'तन्मात्रं' चैतन्यमात्रं निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म, "स यथा सैश्वर्यधनी-

ज्ञानपीडायां लक्ष्यो रसवत् एवैकं वा चरितुमाशङ्कन्तीत्याद्यः । तत्त्वं मयात्मन एव" (३३ भा. ११) इति ।

16 And (scripture) declares (Brahman) to consist wholly of that (i. e. intelligence)

And scripture declares that Brahman consists of intelligence alone, and is without any qualifying characteristics.

Just as a lump of salt has neither any inside nor any outside, but is wholly and solely a mass of taste, similarly the Self has neither any inside nor outside, but is wholly and solely a mass of knowledge. (Br IV 5 13)

१३ । दर्शयति चाथो अपि अर्ह्यते ।

१३ । दर्शयति च श्रुतिः ५१७५ प्रतिपक्षेन एव ब्रह्म निश्चि यिष्यम् । 'अथ अपि अर्ह्यते श्रुतिषु अपि परमैतिषिधेन एव उपदिशते — 'तैयं तत् वात् मन्त्र्याणि बन्ध्यानि वामानि वामानि । चनादिमत् परं ब्रह्म न उपपाद्यते ।' (मयवहीतायाम् ११।११) इति एवमाद्याः ।

17 This is shown by Sruti and also declared by Smṛiti

Scriptural texts thus expressly declare Brahman to be unconditioned, by denying all statements to the contrary. The Smṛitis too make the same declaration and they too deny the contrary view. Thus, I will now clearly declare that which is to be known (i. e. the sole object of knowledge) and knowing which one attains immortality. That beginningless Supreme Brahman is said to be neither *sat* (gross) nor *asat* (subtle) (Gita XIII 12). Similarly in other Smṛiti texts.

१८ । अतएव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत् ।

१८ । यत एव च अयम् आत्मा चैतन्यस्वरूपः निर्विशेषः वाङ्मनसातीतः पर-
 प्रतिपेक्षेन उपदेश्य, 'अत एव च' अस्य उपाधिनिमित्तात् अपारमार्थिकी विशिष्टवत्ताम्
 अभिमित्य जल-'सूर्यकादिवत्' इति उपमा उपादीयते मोक्षशास्त्रेषु,—“यथा ह्ययं
 ज्योतिरात्मा विषस्नानपो मित्रा बहुधैकोऽनुगच्छन् । उपाधिना क्रियते मेदरूपो देवः
 क्षेपेष्वेवमजोऽयमात्मा” इति ॥ “एक एव तु भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः । एकाधा
 बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥” इति च एवमादिषु ।

18 *It is for this reason that similitudes, such as that of images of the sun (in water), and the like, (have been used to explain the nature of Brahman)*

Because this Self is intelligent in nature, unconditioned, transcending speech and the sensorium, and describable only by the negation of opposite qualities, therefore in order to convey the truth that all differentiations in Brahman are due to limiting adjuncts only, and are not real in themselves, the scriptures dealing with liberation have recourse to the similitude of water and the 'solar images' in it and the like, as in the passages, "Just as the one bright sun, when entering different waters, is rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts, so also this Deva, (the Divine Being), the unborn Self, is made multiform by his various forms of manifestation", and "The one Self of all beings, by abiding separately in individual beings, appears both as one and as many, like the moon in water," and in similar other passages.

१८ । अभ्युपगमकथात् तु न तथात्वम् ।

१८ । पूर्वोपगत—अनुगत व्यवस्थात् यत् अभ्युपगमात् सत्यं न गच्छति, विवर्तयिष्यति न चापि अभ्युपगमस्य सत्यमतात् सत्यमन्तात् इत्यनुसृतं विमर्शयिष्यति । तथा च अत्राने, यतः इह न तथात्वम् न नित्यस्य विवर्तयित्वम् उपपद्यते ।

19 [An objection] (As no substance) like water can be apprehended the similarity spoken of does not exist

[An objection stated] '(As no substance) like water can be apprehended—As the Self not being a material thing cannot be made an object of perception like the sun nor can we apprehend any limiting adjuncts as different from the Self and occupying a different place from it, because the Self is in all, and is also identical with all, hence the comparison with water and solar images is unreasonable.

२० । ब्रह्मिष्ठसमाद्यन्तर्मावाहुमय-सामान्यस्यादेवम् ।

१ । तत्र उच्यते—ब्रह्मिष्ठसमाद्यन्तर्मावाहुमय-सामान्यस्यादेवम् । एष इत्यनेन पाटीनिर्दिष्टो विवर्तित सामान्यं न तु सर्वसाध्यं विवर्तितम् । अत्रयत् किं सूर्य प्रतिबिम्बं न ब्रह्मैव वर्तते, अत्रापीति उच्यते, अत्रयत्ने यच्छति अत्रमिदं मिथ्यते इति एवं अत्रयत्नादुपनिषदि भवति न तु परमार्थेन सूर्यस्य तथात्वम् अस्ति । एवं परमार्थेन, अत्रयत्नम् एकवचनम् अपि ब्रह्म ईशानुपाधि परमात्मनो ब्रह्मिष्ठसादीन् उपविषयकान् यजते इव । एवम् उच्यते इत्यनेन पाटीनिर्दिष्टो सामान्यस्य अपि विवर्तितः ।

20. [The objection refuted] (Brahman) being inside

(of the limiting adjuncts) it participates in their increase and decrease. This (participation) makes the two (cases) parallel.

To the above objection we reply thus: "Participation in increase and decrease" is the only point of similarity which we intend to assert between the example (the solar image) and its analogue (Brahman), we never mean to assert complete similarity between the two. The solar image in the water expands when the water swells, contracts when the water shrinks, trembles when the water is moved, becomes more than one when the water is divided, thus partaking of all the varying attributes of the water. But in reality the sun does not vary in this way. Similarly Brahman, which in reality is unmodified and unvarying, partakes, as it were, of increase and decrease, which are characteristics of its limiting adjuncts, viz., the bodies, within which it abides. The two, the example and its analogue, being thus parallel, the comparison holds good.

२१ । दर्शनाच्च ।

२१ । दर्शयति च श्रुतिः परस्य एव ब्रह्मणः देहादिषु च पाषाणेषु अन्तरगुप्तेषु, "पुरुषको हि पद. पुरुषको चतुषद. । पुर. स पची भूत्वा पुनः पुरुष आविश्यत्" इति च । (बृह २।५।१८) इति । "अनेन जीवेनात्मनागुप्तेषु" (का ६।१।३) इति च ।

21 And because scripture also declares this

Further, scripture distinctly declares that the highest Brahman enters into the bodies and other limiting adjuncts,

c.g. He made bodies with two feet he made bodies with four feet. Having first become a bird, he entered the bodies as Purusha. (Bri II 5 18) and again 'Having entered into them in the form of this individual self &c. (Chh VI 3 3)

२२ । भक्तैतावस्थ हि प्रतिपेक्षति सतो ब्रवीति च भूय ।

११ । ब्रह्दारण्यके (१।१।१) "इ वाच ब्रह्मकी करे मूर्तार्थैर्बभूव स नमःवायवस्य स्मितस्य यस्य मुखं स्य स्य इति उपक्रम्य पुनः पठ्यते (ब्रह् १।१।६) अथात आर्क्षी मेति मेति । न ह्येतन्मादिति शेषात् परमसि" इति । अत्र उच्यते भक्ततावस्थ हि प्रतिपेक्षति भक्तवत् उक्तं यत् एवायत् इत्यत्र परिशिष्टं भूमीमृचवचनं ब्रह्मण्यं यत् एव ब्रह्म प्रतिपेक्षति न तु ब्रह्मास्तिभ्यम् । 'ततः ब्रवीति च भूय' इति एतत् कामपेयविषयं बोधयितव्यम् । अत्र नामपेय उच्यते सत्यमिति प्राणा वे इत्यं शिवामेकं सत्यम् (ब्रह् १।१।६) इति हि ब्रवीति ।

22. *Because the scriptural text (containing the expression Not so not so) denies the suchness (of Brahman) which forms the topic of discussion there, and also asserts something further*

In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (II 3 1) we have a passage which begins with the words 'Of two kinds indeed are the forms of Brahman material, as well as immaterial, mortal as well as immortal static as well as dynamic, manifest as well as unmanifested' and which afterwards (in II 3 6) reads thus,—“Further instruction about Brahman consists only of Not so not so. There is no other (instruction) higher than this viz Not so ! ”

About this passage the Sūtrakāra remarks, "Because it denies the such-ness which is the topic of discussion" He means to say that the negative statement 'Not so', in the above text is intended only to deny the reality of the forms of the Brahman, material as well as immaterial, which necessarily possess specification (such-ness), i. e., which are defined by limits, (this being the topic of discussion therein), and is not intended to deny the reality of Brahman itself. The words of the Sutra, "And also asserts something further" are to be understood about the very next sentence of the text, the subject of which is 'the name of Brahman,' and which runs thus, "Now, the name (of Brahman) is 'The True of the 'True'. The prānas are 'the True', and he, 'the True' of them" (*Bṛi* II 3 6).

२३। तदव्यक्तामाह हि ।

२३। तत् ब्रह्म अस्ति चेत्, कथं न गृह्यते ? 'तत् अव्यक्ताम्' अनिन्द्रियमाह सर्वदृश्यमाचित्वात् । 'आह हि' एव श्रुतिः,—“न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा नान्यैर्देवैस्तपसा कर्मैषा वा” (मुण्डके ३।१।८) इत्याद्या ।

23 *Scripture expressly declares that Brahman is unmanifested*

If that Brahman really exists, why is it not apprehended ? Because it is unmanifested, i. e., because it is never itself an object of apprehension for the organs, being the witness of all objects of perception. This is declared by the scripture in the passage, "He cannot be perceived by the eye, nor by speech, nor by the other senses. It

cannot be obtained, by austerities and deeds. (*Mund* III 1 8) as well as in other passages

२४ । अपि च संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ।

२४ । अपि च एवम् परमात्मानं संराधने उपासनायां प्रति ध्यानं प्रविशन्नाप्य-
नुमाने दीर्घकं परावृत्तिः इति 'प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां' कृतिश्रुतिभ्याम् चरन्त्यते । तथा हि
श्रुतिः—“अविहीतः प्रयगाभ्यामैव । इगवः प्रत्यक्षमिच्छन् (कठ ३।१) इति,
“अलम्बादिना विप्रेषणालतस्तु तं परावृत्तिं निवृत्त्य आध्यातम्” (मु १।१।८) इति च
एवमाद्याः । श्रुतिः अपि—“पुष्टमेवं भगवतां दीर्घां विगतकल्पवः । नृदिनं ब्रह्म
संस्मर्यन्मरणं सुखमवतः ॥ (मन् ६।१८) इत्याद्याः । [भाष्यकारस्तु अत्राप्यत्र
उद्धतिः ।]

24 And (he is apprehended) in devotions (as we learn from) both *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*

Further, the fact that yogins in their devotions, i.e., when engaged in worship—in the practice of piety, meditation concentration &c.—see the Highest Self is known both from *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*. As we find in *Sruti*, Some wise men with eyes averted from objects, and wishing Immortality see the Self that is directly seen. (*Kath* IV 1) and When one's heart is purified through pure knowledge he perceives that indivisible One by meditation (*Mund* III 1 8) and similar other passages. *Smṛiti* also has this, “Thus always fixing his mind (in God), the yogin freed from sin easily attains the supreme bliss of touching (i.e. directly realising) Brahman (*Gītā* VI 28) and other similar passages. (The *Bhāṣyakāra* quotes not this but a different passage from the *Smṛiti*).

२५ । प्रकाशादिवच्चावैशेष्यं प्रकाशश्च^१ कर्मण्यभ्यासात् ।

२५ । ननु संराध्य-संग्रहक-भावाद्यपगमात् परापरात्मनो अन्यत्वं स्यात् इति । न, इति उच्यते, 'प्रकाशादिवत् च अवैशेष्यम्' । अथा प्रकाशाकाश-सर्वित्प्रभृतयः अद्भुत-करकोदक-प्रभृतिषु उपाधिभूतेषु सविशेषा इव अवभासन्ते, न च स्वाभाविकीम् अविशेषात्मकता जहति, एवम् उपाधिनिमित्त एव अयम् आत्मभेदः, स्वतः तु ऐकात्म्य एव । 'प्रकाश च' चिदात्मा अपि 'कर्मणि' ध्यानादिकर्मणि उपाधौ भिद्यते इव 'अभ्यासात्' यतः वेदान्तेषु अभ्यासेन असकृत् जीवमाश्रयो, अस्मिन् प्रतिपाद्यते ।

25 And, as in the case of light etc, there is non-difference (between the Universal and the individual) The Supreme Light, too, (appears to be multiform) in practice (This we know) from repeated declarations (in the scriptures)

It may be objected that by admitting the distinction between the object of devotion and the devotee, we assume that the Highest Self and the lower are different from each other To this we say, No, "as in the case of light etc, there is non-difference" Just as light, âkâsa, the sun, etc, though they appear to be multiform through the intervention of limiting adjuncts such as fingers (which make the light appear sometimes as curved, sometimes as straight), vessels (which divide the one omnipresent âkâsa into many parts), waters (which show many images of the one sun), yet do not really abandon their essentially non-differentiated character, similarly the difference of various selves is due to limiting adjuncts only, while essentially the Self is one only/ 'The Supreme Light' too, i.e., the Intelligent Self, (appears to be multiform) in practice, i.e.,

in devotional exercises like meditation which are its limiting adjuncts. "This we know from repeated declarations", i.e., because in Vedānta texts the identity of the individual and the Universal Self is inculcated over and over again

२६ । अतोऽनन्तेन तथाहि निद्रम् ।

१६ । 'पादः समेदस्य आभाविद्यतात् मीदस्य च अविद्याज्ञतात् विद्यया अविद्या विभूय जीवः अनन्तेन सह एवात्मतां गच्छति । 'तथा हि निद्रम् सुतिथमाच — "स यो ह वै तत् परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति" (मु ३।१।८) । "ब्रह्मैव सत् ब्रह्मार्थसि" (उह ३।३।६) इत्यादि ।

26 Hence (the finite ultimately attains unity) with the Infinite For the indication in the scriptures is) in favour of such (attainment of unity)

Hence : e because the identity of the individual with the Universal Self is essential while the difference is only due to nescience, the individual after divesting itself of nescience through true knowledge attains unity with the Infinite. Such is the indication in the scriptures, e g in the passages, "Verily he who knows the Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman in truth" (*Mund* III 2. 9) and Becoming Brahman itself he attains Brahman (*Br* IV 4 6)

२७ । उभयव्यपदेशात् त्वहिकुण्डलवत् ।

१७ । उभयव्यपदेशात् सुती मीदमिदयोः उभयोः वचनात् ह अहिकुण्डलवत्

जीव-ब्रह्म-विषयं तत्त्वं सवितुम् अर्हति । यथा अहि, इति जमेद, अहि कुण्डलानि इति तु मेदः, एवम् इह अपि इति ।

27. *As both doctrines (viz., those of identity and difference) are taught in the scriptures, (the relation between the finite and the Infinite is to be thought of) as that between a snake and its coils*

“As both doctrines are taught” : *e.*, both identity and difference between Brahman and the individual self are mentioned in the scriptures, the relation between Brahman and the individual self must be “like the relation between a snake and its coils” Looked at as a snake, there is unity, while looked at as so many coils, there is multiplicity So also in the subject under discussion.

२८ । प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा तेजस्यैवात् ।

२८ । अथवा प्रकाशाश्रयवत् एतत् प्रतिपत्त्यम् । यथा प्रकाश, सावित तदाश्रय च सविता न अत्यन्तभिन्नौ, उभयो अपि तेजसोविशेषात्, अथच मेदव्यपदेशमाजौ भवत, एवम् इह अपि इति ।

28. *Or else, like that between light and its source, (both) being essentially fire*

Or else this (the relation) is to be thought of as that between light and its source Just as the solar light, and its source, *viz.*, the sun, are not quite different, because both are essentially fire, and yet they are mentioned as different, so also in the subject under discussion

२८ । पूर्ववत् । ~

२८ । यदा वा पूर्वम् उपपत्तौ 'प्रत्यक्षदिशम् च ब्रह्म' इति तदा एव एतत्
महिम् चक्षति ।

29 Or else as described before

Or else this, i. e., the relation between the two may
be thought of as suggested previously — As in the case of
light there is non-difference." (See Sūtra 25)

३० । प्रतिपेक्षाय ।

३० । एतत् एव एव विदित्वा एतद्व्याप्य परमात्मा चात्मन एवम् चित्तम्
मतिर्विनि मास — "अन्वेषितोऽसि इति" (३३ १०१११) इति एवमादि ।

30 And on account of (explicit) denial (in the
scriptures, of any other self)

The above conclusion follows also from the fact that
any other intelligence besides the Highest Self has been
explicitly denied in scripture e. g. in such passages as
'There is no other seer than he (Bri III 7 23)

३१ । परमत सिद्धान्त-संयम्य भेद उपदेशोऽयम् ।

३१ । 'एतत्' अत्रात् इत्यत्र 'परम्' अत्रात् तत्रम् औः अत्रात् च इति महिम्
चक्षति — इति पूर्ववत् । अत्र सिद्धान्त — सिद्धान्तस्य परमात्मा 'सम्बन्ध
स्य परमात्मा', भेदस्य परमात्मा च । सिद्धान्तस्य परमात्मा — 'यद्यपि चात्मा स चित्तमिति'
(वा १०१११) इति चात्मन्यभिहितस्य इत्यत्र सिद्धान्तं सहीर्षयति । इह सिद्धान्तः

आत्मनि प्रयुक्तः, इति लौकिकसेतु इव आत्मसेतो, अन्यस्य वस्तुन अस्तित्वं गमयति । “सेतु तौर्त्वा” इति ‘तरति’शब्दप्रयोगात् यथा लौकिक सेतु तौर्त्वा जाङ्गलम् असेतुं प्राप्नोति इति गम्यते, एवम् आत्मानम् सेतु तौर्त्वा अनात्मानम् असेतु प्राप्नोति इति गम्यते । चन्मानव्यपदेश च भवति, “तदेतत् ब्रह्म चतुष्पाददशकं षोडशकलम्” इति । यत् च लोके चन्मितम् ‘एतावत् इदम्’ इति परिच्छिन्न कार्वाणशादि तत् अन्यत् वस्तु अस्ति इति अस्ति, तथा ब्रह्मण अपि चन्मानात् तत् अन्येन वस्तुना भवितव्यम् इति गम्यते । तथा सम्बन्धव्यपदेश भवति,—“सता सीम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति” (छा ६।८।१), “अथ पुरुष (शरीर आत्मा) प्राप्नोनात्मना सम्परिष्वक्त” (बृह ४।३।२१) इति च । मितानाञ्च मितेन सम्बन्ध दृष्ट यथा नगराणां नगरेण । जीवानां च ब्रह्मणा सम्बन्ध व्यपदिशति सुष्ठुभौ । अत तत् परम् अन्यत् अमितम् अस्ति इति गम्यते । भेदव्यपदेश च एनम् अर्थं गमयति । तथाहि “अथ य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्यं पुरुषो दृश्यते” (छा १।६।६) इति आदित्याधारम् ईश्वर व्यपदिश्य तत् भेदेन अद्वयाधारम् ईश्वरम् व्यपदिशति, “अथ य एषोऽन्तराक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते” (छा १।७।५) इति । एवम् एतेभ्य सेलादिव्यपदेशेभ्य ब्रह्मण परम् अस्ति इति एवम् प्राप्तम् ।

31. (The Pûrvapaksha) *Beyond that (i e, besides Brahman, there must be other existences), because (in the scriptures) Brahman is described (a) as an embankment, (b) as measurable, (c) as being connected, and (d) as distinguishable*

The Pûrvapaksha says that beyond Brahman other entities, such as finite selves and the world, too, must be admitted as possible. The reason is, that the scriptures describe Brahman as an embankment, declare that it has measures and connections, and also distinguish it from other entities. The statement about an embankment is the following passage, “Now, that which is the ‘Self’ is an embankment, a restraining boundary.” (Chh VIII 4 1).

This passage declares that Brahman designated here as the Self is an embankment. Here the word embankment being applied to the Self indicates, (just as a material embankment would indicate), the existence of something beyond that embankment (that is beyond the Self). Further the verb to pass has been used in this connection in the expression "having passed the embankment" (*Chh* VIII 4 2). One who passes a material embankment reaches something which is not the embankment itself, as for example a country. Similarly it is to be understood that after passing the embankment of the Self it is possible to reach something which is not the embankment. In other words, which is not the Self. The statement about Brahman's measure is found here—"This Brahman therefore consists of four quarters (literally feet) eight cloven hoofs, and sixteen parts. Now in this world with regard to every object which is defined as to its quantity as being exactly so much e.g. a *kāśhāpana* (a coin of the weight of 16 *māśhās*) it is well known that other objects beyond it exist. Similarly it is to be understood that beyond Brahman which is limited there exist other objects which are not Brahman. The statements about connections are these—"At that time, O dear disciple, he becomes united with the True (*Chh* VI 8.1) and 'This person (the embodied self) being embraced by the Omniscient Self &c. (*Bri* IV 3 21). Now in this world connections are observed to exist only between limited objects, on the one hand, and something else that is also limited on the other e.g. between men and a town. Therefore as selves are men

tioned to have connection with Brahman during deep sleep, we have to conclude that beyond Brahman (which is thus limited by the connection) something else exists that is unlimited. The same sense is conveyed by the scriptural passages which teach that Brahman can be distinguished e g, the text "Now, this golden person that is seen within the sun" &c. (*Chh* I 6 6), first refers to a divinity who abides in the sun, and then goes on to mention one, distinguished from the same, who abides in the eye, by the words "Now, this Person that is seen within the eye" &c (*Chh* I 7 5). Thus, from the scriptural statements about embankment etc., we conclude that there exist things other than Brahman.

३२ । सोम(न्यात् तु ।

३२ । पूर्वपक्ष' प्रत्युच्यते । 'तु'-शब्देन प्रदर्शिता प्राप्ति निराशङ्कि । न ब्रह्मण्य-
अन्यत् कश्चित् भवितुम् अर्हति, प्रमाणाभावात् । सेतुसामान्यात् एव सेतुशब्द आत्मनि
प्रयुक्तः, इति स्मियते । जगतः तन्मय्यादानां च विधारकत्वं सेतुसामान्यम् आत्मनः । "सेतु-
तीर्त्वा" इति अपि तस्मै अतिक्रमासम्भवात् प्राप्नोति इति अर्थः एव वर्तते । यथा
"व्याकरणं तीर्थं" इति प्राप्तः इति उच्यते, न अतिक्रान्तः, तद्वत् ।

32 But (Brahman has been called an embankment etc., not because he is actually such, but only) *because there are points of similarity*

The Sūtrakāra answers the Pūrvapakshin. The word 'but' rejects the position just set forth. We hold that nothing other than Brahman can exist, for want of proof to

the contrary The word 'embankment' has been used in the scriptures with reference to the self because it has a certain resemblance to an embankment (and not because it is actually one) The self's resemblance to an embankment consists in supporting the world and all boundaries within it (just as an embankment keeps back the water and maintains the boundaries between fields) In the expression "having passed the embankment" (quoted in the last sūtra) the verb "to pass" has the sense of attaining, because going beyond is impossible. It is similar to saying he has passed the science of grammar" when we mean that he has attained or mastered it not that he has gone beyond it

३३। बुद्ध्याः पादवत् ।

३३। यथा मन्त्र-वाक्यादयो ब्रह्मण्यन्तर्बुद्धिर्वैदित्तं ब्रह्मप्राप्तिकयो वाच्यस्योक्तौ वाच्यत्वं, सन्-सम्बन्धितं पादाः चान्यत्वे, चत्वारः च चान्या य वाक्याः सम्बन्धितः ब्रह्मण्यन्तर् (वाच्यस्यैव ३।१८) तद्वत् ब्रह्मण्यन्तर् बुद्ध्याः चत्वारः पादवत्त्वार्थं तस्य चान्यत्वापत्तिर्य, भवति न ब्रह्मवदिति चत्वारि-मतिर्यन्तर् । नहि चत्वारि चत्वारो ब्रह्मणि चत्वारं पुंमि ब्रह्म बुद्धिः व्यापितुम् सन्दम्यन्तीत्यन्तर्बुद्धिः चत्वारं पुंमि ।

33 (The statement about the measure of Brahman) is meant as an aid to apprehension (in meditations etc.) like (the ascription to him of four) feet

In *Chhândogya* III. 18 the mind and the *ākāśa* are mentioned as the personal and cosmic manifestations respectively of Brahman and as an aid to contemplation speech etc. (speech, breath, sight and hearing) are conceived as the four feet of the mind and fire etc., (fire, air, the sun

and the cardinal points) are conceived as the four feet of *ākāśa*. Similarly, the ascription of measure to Brahman is meant as an aid to apprehension, to meditation, and not as an argument for establishing other existences besides Brahman. The aid is necessary, because all men are not equally capable of fixing their minds on the infinite and changeless Brahman, the intelligence of some persons being of a low order, of others of a middling order, and of others of a high order.

३४ । स्थानविशेषात् प्रकाशादिवत् ।

३४ । 'प्रकाशादिवत्' यथा एकस्य प्रकाशस्य सौर्यस्य चान्द्रमसस्य वा उपाधिभेदात् एव भेदव्यपदेशः, न तु वस्तुभेदात्, यथा वा सूच्याकाशादिषु उपाध्यपेक्षया एव भेदकथनं न तु वस्तुविशेषात्, तद्वत् परमात्मनः अपि 'स्थानविशेषात्' उपाधिभेदात् एव सम्बन्धव्यपदेशः भेदव्यपदेशः च भवति, न तु परमार्थतः ।

34 (The statements about Brahman being connected and being distinguishable are) *due to particular places, as in the case of light etc*

"As in the case of light etc", i.e., just as one and the same light of the sun or of the moon is said to be different in different instances on account of the variety of the limiting adjuncts and not because of any variety in the light itself, and just as the *ākāśa* in the eye of the needle and the *ākāśa* in other places are said to be different from one another owing to differences in the limiting adjuncts and not to differences in *ākāśa* itself, similarly in the case of the Highest Self also, the ascription of connection

and distinction is due to the particular places i.e. to the limiting adjuncts only and not to any real differences.

४५ । उपपत्तेयः ।

११ । उपपत्तेयं च यत्त ईदृशं एव सम्बन्धं न भवति । यथा क्षमपौरी मवति (वा दान्तर) इति हि सम्बन्धस्य एतन्म आमर्शति । सम्बन्धस्य च चरणाधिक्यात् न नरनर आदिन सम्बन्धं द्यति । उपपत्तिरूपं लक्षणं विरोधाभावात् तु क्षमपौरी मवति इति उपपत्तेयं । तथा मीदं अपि न भवति सम्बन्धं ननुतर बुद्धिबिम्बैश्चरन् विरोधात् ।

35 *And because (only such connection between the soul and Brahman, and such distinction about Brahman, as have been described above) can be inferred*

Further only such a connection between the individual and Brahman as has been explained above, and no other can be inferred from scriptural texts. This kind of connection viz. one in essential nature is declared in the passage "He is gone to his Self" (Chh. VI 8 1). The essential nature (of everything) is imperishable, therefore the above relation cannot be like that of man to the town they dwell in (which is not an unalterable relation). Hence we infer that the expression "He is gone to his Self" means that (before such going) the true nature (of the self) was obscured by the limiting adjunct viz., nescience. Similarly about "distinction" its ascription to Brahman can be explained only as has been done above, and in no other way i.e. all distinction with

regard to Brahman is due to nescience only ; it can never be real. Such a view would run counter to numerous scriptural texts which declare that there is only one Lord

३६ । तथान्यप्रतिषेधात् ।

३६ । तथा 'अन्यप्रतिषेधात्' अपि न ब्रह्मण पर ब्रह्मत्वरम् अस्ति, इति गम्यते । तथाहि "ब्रह्मेवेदं सर्वम्" (सु ३।२।११), "आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्" (का ७।२।५।२) इत्याद्याः ।

36 *And because other entities (besides Brahman) have been expressly denied (by the scriptures).*

Again, because other existences besides Brahman have been denied in the scriptures, we have to infer that nothing apart from Brahman exists e.g., in the texts "Brahman, indeed, is all this" (*Mund.* II 2. 11), and "The Self, indeed, is all this" (*Chh.* VII. 25. 2), etc.

३७ । अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः ।

३७ । 'अनेन' सेवादिव्यपदेश-निराकरणेन, अन्य-प्रतिषेध-समाश्रयेण च 'आत्मनः' 'सर्वगतत्व' सिद्धं भवति । अन्यथा हि तत् न सिध्येत् । 'आयामशब्दादिभ्यः' यत् आयामशब्दादयः ब्रह्मव्याप्तिवचन-शब्दादयः 'आत्मनः' सर्वगतत्वम् अवबोधयन्ति । आयाम-शब्दादिदृष्टान्तः, "ज्यायान् दिवो ज्यायानाकाशीत्" (शतपथब्राह्मणे १०।६।३।२), "नित्यं सर्वगतं स्थानुरचलोऽयं सनातनः" (भगवद्गीतायाम् २।२४) इत्यादि ।

37. *From this view (only can follow) the omnipresence of Brahman, as (taught) in scriptural texts about (Brahman's) extent.*

"From this view i.e. if we admit that the statements about embankment etc. are not literal and that other existences besides Brahman are denied in the scriptures) 'follows the omnipresence' of the Self. If we take the contrary view omnipresence cannot be proved. As taught in scriptural texts about Brahman's extent" i.e. because all texts which treat of the extent of Brahman proclaim that the Self is all pervading. Examples of texts about Brahman's extent are — He is greater than the heavens, greater than Akāśa (*Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* V 6 3 2) It is eternal all pervasive of a stable nature and everlasting" (*Gītā* II 24) etc.

३८। फलमत उपपत्तेः ।

३८। एतत् परमेश्वरात् एव 'फलम्' कर्मफलं भविष्यम् अस्ति न तु कर्मफलं विनाशिकं कर्मफलम् । उपपत्तौ यदा सा हि ईश्वरादिनिमित्तमभिप्रेत्यात् अस्ति चेत् फलं नृपं फलं भव्यादपत्तिः, इति उपपत्तौ न तु कर्मावधिच. कर्मच फलोत्पत्तिः ।

38 *Fruits (of works also proceed) from him because (this is the only possible) conclusion*

'From him' i.e., from the Lord alone, can the fruits of human act come issue and not from the actions themselves, which pass away as soon as done. "This is the only possible conclusion, i.e., the only conclusion that follows from reason is that the Lord who knows all particulars about space and time, is alone capable of producing the results of actions in accordance with the merits of their agents and not the view that actions, which (being evanescent) are of the essence of nothingness, themselves produce the fruits.

૩૯ । અતત્વાત્ ।

૩૯ । “મ યા યા મહાનજ આત્માનાદો વતુગ્નન.” (ઘૃહ ૪।૪।૨૪) એતિ એવ જાતીયકાશ્રુતિવચનાત્ ચ દેવશ્વરમ્ એવ ફલદેહુમ્ મન્યામહૈ ।

39 And because this has been declared in the scriptures

That fruits of actions proceed from the Lord alone, we assume also from such scriptural texts as the following :

“This, the great unborn Self, is indeed the giver of food, the giver of wealth” (Br. IV 4 24).

૪૦ । ધર્મ્મં જૈમિનિરત એવ ।

૪૦ । આચાર્યઃ ‘જૈમિનિ’ ‘અત એવ’ હેતો શ્રુતે ઇપપત્તે ચ ‘ધર્મ્મ’ ફલદાતાઃ મન્યતે । શ્રુયતે તાવત્ અગમ્ અર્થ ‘સ્વર્ગકામો યજેત’ એતિ એવમાદિષુ વાક્યેષુ । ઇપપત્તિ ચ દેહદેશો, કિન્ અપિ અપૂર્વમ્ અનુત્પાદ્ય વિનશ્ચત્ કર્મ્મ કાલાન્તરિત ફલં દાતુ ન શક્નોતિ । અત કર્મ્મણ વા કાચિત્ સૂક્ષ્મા ઇતરાવસ્થા ફલસ્ય વા પૂર્વાવસ્થા અપૂર્વ્ય નામ અસ્તિ, એતિ તર્ક્યતે । દેવશ્વર તુ ફલં દદાતિ, એતિ અનુપપન્નમ્, યત અવિચિત્તસ્ય કારણસ્ય વિચિત્ત કાર્ય ન ઇપપદ્યતે । ફલદાતરિ દેવશ્વરે ચ વૈષમ્ય-નૈષ્ટણ્ણે પ્રમન્યેતે । કર્મ્માનુષ્ઠાનવૈયર્થ ચ ઇપપદ્યતે, તસ્યાત્ ધર્મ્માત્ એવ ફલમ્, એતિ સિદ્ધમ્ ।

40 From the same considerations Jaimini declares the religious merit (of actions to be the cause of their fruits).

From the same considerations, viz., scriptural statement and reasoned conclusion, Acharya Jaimini holds the view that the religious merit of actions is the cause of

their fruits. Scriptural statements in support of his view are such as the following — He who is desirous of attaining heaven should perform sacrifices. The reasoning in support of his view is like this — An action cannot produce a result at a distance of time unless before passing away it gives rise to some *apūrvā* (literally an *unseen* result an intermediary between the action and the actual result both of which are *seen*). We therefore have to assume an intermediary named *apūrvā* which may be considered either as an after state of the action or as an antecedent state of the result. On the other hand it is inadmissible that the Lord should produce the fruits of actions. In the first place he the Cause being one and homogeneous cannot give rise to a variety of effects. In the second place the admission that the Lord is the giver of the fruits of actions would impute partiality and cruelty to him. In the third place actions would be rendered useless (if unable to produce fruits.) Hence the inference that the results of actions proceed from their religious merit (or demerit).

४१। पूर्वस्तु सादराय धो हेतुव्यपदेशात् ।

४१। आचार्य सादराय धो तु 'पूर्वम् पूर्वोक्तम् ईदृशम् एव प्रवर्तितं' इत्यव्यपदिशत् इति 'एव च द्वेव मध्यमस्य कारणति तं यतोऽपि कीदृशं प्रवर्तितं' एव च द्वेव मध्यमस्य कारणति तं यतोऽपि निवर्तितं' (श्रीपरी ३।८) इत्यादिषु सुनिश्चितेषु ईदृश एव ईदृश' चर्चावर्कषी कारणित्वेन प्रसङ्ग च दाहनेन व्यपदिशते । विचित्रकार्यानुपपत्त्याश्च यदि कीदा ईदृश्यं कृतप्रवर्तयिष्यताम् न प्रवर्तयति ।

41. *Bādarāyaṇa*, however, (holds that the former *i e*, the Lord, is the cause of the fruits of actions,) *because the scriptures declare him to be the cause* (of actions themselves)

Achārya Bādarāyaṇa, however, considers the former, *i e*, the Lord, as explained above, to be the cause of the fruits of actions "Because the scriptures declare him to be the cause" *i e*, the scriptures represent the Lord to be the ultimate source of all human actions They declare that it is he who makes human agents perform deeds whether of religious merit or demerit, and he who dispenses the fruits of actions, in such passages as the following "It is he who makes that individual do virtuous deeds whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds And it is he who makes that individual do vicious deeds whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds" (Kau III 8) And, such objections as the impossibility of a variety of effects flowing from the Self which is one and homogeneous, *etc*, are groundless, because the Lord, in dispensing the fruits of actions, keeps an eye to the merits and demerits of individuals

‘साधन-नाम-तृतीयाध्याये तृतीय पादः—उपासनाभेद-भूतसंभवश्च

* *

१। सर्व्ववेदा प्रत्ययं चीदनायविशेषात् ।

१। इदानीं प्रतिवेदान्तं विद्यानामि मियन्ते, न वा, इति विचार्य्यते । सर्व्ववेदान्त
अन्वयानि विद्यानामि तन्निम् तन्निम् वेदान्तं तांति तांति एव भवितुमश्नति । कुत ?
चीदनायविशेषात् यतः तेषां संकीर्ण-कथ-चीदनायान्ते निपद्यते न विविधा भेदः अस्ति ।
एषा पञ्चविंशति अधिप्रीति आश्रयिणी अपि पुष्पप्रभव तादृश एव चीदते ‘सुतयात् इति’
एवं “यो ह वेदो ह्येव वेदः” (ऋ १।१।१) इति वागसमिधिनो बन्दीयानो न
तादृशी एव चीदना (वा १।१।१) । प्रकीर्ण-संकीर्ण अपि अविच्छिन्न एव — “ह्येव
वेदस्य स्तानां भवति इति । कथम् अपि उभयत्र तदीय विद्यागम्यं सत् तत् ह्येव वेदोऽस्ति
गुणविशेषात्तं प्राचतस्म । अथा य द्रष्टुं इति यादव्य कथम् एवं विवेकं कथं विद्यागम्यं ।
तेन हि तत् कथ्यते । उभाभ्या अपि सा एव,— ‘प्राचविद्या इति । तस्मात् उभयत्र ।
प्रत्यक्ष विद्यानामम् । एवं पञ्चाधिविद्या वैश्वानरविद्या शारिङ्गविद्या इति एवमादिषु
वीक्षितव्यम् ।

1 Those vidyās which are established by all the Vedānta texts are harmonious on account of the identity of injunction etc

We shall now deal with the question whether the various vidyās which are set forth in all the Vedānta texts

are different from one another, or are identical. We affirm that while each one of the various cognitions is appropriately set forth in its particular Vedānta text, each is to be taken as established by *all* the Vedāntas. Why so? "On account of the identity of 'injunction' etc.", *i.e.*, because there is no difference (amongst these various cognitions) in respect of 'connection', 'form', 'injunction' and 'name'. *e.g.*, in the Agnihotra, a single subject dealt with in several Vedic sūkhās, we find the identical human action enjoined everywhere by the words "He should offer oblations to the fire", and the injunction "He who knows the oldest and the best" is found identically in the text of the Vajasaneyins (*Bṛi* VI 1 1) as well as in the text of the Chhandogās (*Chh* V 1 1). In both cases, again, the connection (of the cognitions) with the objects to be attained by them is identically stated, *viz.*, by the words "He becomes the first and best amongst his kith and kin". Further, both the cognitions have an identical 'form', *viz.*, the true nature of the Prāna possessing the qualities of being the first and best. Just as the 'form' of a sacrifice is determined by its particular divinity and materials, so is the 'form' of a cognition determined by the particular object to be known by it. It is this which gives the cognition its distinctive form. Both the cognitions have the same 'name', too, *viz.*, 'Prāna-vidyā'. From such considerations we affirm that each of these various cognitions is established by all the Vedāntas. A similar course of reasoning applies to the Knowledge of the five fires, the Knowledge of Vaisvānara, the Knowledge ascribed to Sāndilya, etc.

२ । भेदावेति चेन्नैकस्यामपि ।

१ । आपत्तिरत्रानुक्तम् — विद्यानां सर्ववदन्तान्द्रव्यत्वं गुणभेदात् न उपपद्यते । तदा हि वज्रमदीनां पयादिदियां द्रव्यस्य वदन्तं चपरात् अपि च आममन्ति "तन्मादिरेवादिमवति (इह ६।१।१४) इत्यादिना । अन्त्ये ॥ न तं न आममन्ति, पद्ममेकस्या एव च उपमंहरन्ति, "अथ ह य पताम् एवं पताधीन् विद (इह ४।१।११) इति । इति च य एव अपि इति च नामि तेषां कथम् उभयेनाम् एका विद्या उपपद्यते ? इति चेत् न यत् एव एवम् अपि विद्यायाम् उभयभातीत्यत्र गुणभेद उपपद्यते ।

2. *If it be objected that (identity of cognitions is) not tenable on account of difference (in subordinate elements, we say) No Difference in subordinate matters may take place) even in one and the same vidyā*

It may be objected that as the different cognitions vary in respect of their gunas subordinate elements therefore it cannot be maintained that they are without distinction established by all the Vedānta texts. For example, the Vājasaneyins, after propounding the knowledge of the five fires, mention an additional and sixth fire in this text of theirs — The fire of that (i. e., of cremation) is indeed fire (*Bri VI 2. 14*) But the Chhandogas do not mention it they on the other hand conclude with the clear mention of the number five as in the text But he who thus knows these five fires (*Chh V 10 10*) How in the face of this difference can it be maintained that both those who admit and those who do not admit that sixth fire have one and the same cognition ? If this objection be put forward we say No For such differences in gunas (subordinate elements) are quite admissible in one and the same vidyā

३। स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वेन हि समाचारेऽधिकाग्राच्च सववच्च तन्नियमः ।

३। यत् अपि उक्तम् आथर्वणिकानां विद्या प्रति शिरोव्रताद्यपेक्षणात् अन्यथा च तदनपेक्षणात् विद्यामेव इति, एतत् प्रत्यच्यते । स्वाध्यायस्य एव धम्म, न विद्याया । कायम् इदम् अवगम्यते ? 'हि यत् 'तथात्वेन' स्वाध्यायवर्त्मत्वेन 'समाचारे' वेदव्रतोप-
देशपरे ग्रन्थे आथर्वणिका 'इदम् अपि वेदव्रतत्वेन व्याख्यातम्' इति समागमन्ति ।
'अधिकाग्रात् च,'—“नैतदचीर्णं प्रतोऽधीते” (सु ३२।११) इति च अधिकृतविधयात्-
'एतत्'-शब्दात्, 'अध्ययन'-शब्दात् च, स्वीपनिषदध्ययनधर्म एव एव इति निर्धार्यते ।
'सववच्च तन्नियमः' यथा च सवा हीमा नम सौम्यादयः शतौदनपर्यन्ता आथर्वणि-
कानाम् एव नियम्यन्ते, तथा अयम् अपि धम्म स्वाध्यायविशेषसम्बन्धात् तत्र एव नियम्यते ।
तस्मात् अपि अनवद्य विद्यैकत्वम् ।

3 (The Sirovrata rite is a peculiarity) *only* of the study of the Vedas 'by the Ātharvanas, and not of their vidya itself), because in the Samāchāra it is declared as being of that nature This also follows from the general subject matter, and the limitation (of the rite to the Ātharvanas) is similar to that of the libations

It may be objected that the Sirovrata rite (the practice of carrying fire on the head) is associated with the school of Ātharvanas only and not with those of others so, here is a case of the *vidyā* being different in different texts Our reply to this objection is as follows the above practice constitutes a peculiarity not of the *vidyā* of the Ātharvanas, but only “of their method of studying the Vedā” How is this known ? “Because in the book called Samāchāra” in which Vedic observances are dealt with, the Ātharvanas

declare the above practice also as being of that nature *i.e.*, as constituting a peculiarity of their method of studying the Veda. This conclusion follows also from the general subject matter." This portion of the Sūtra refers to the text "One who does not perform the rite should not study this" (*Iund III 2 11* in which (1) the word "this" refers to the subject matter dealt with in the previous mantra (*i.e.*, that the *Ītharvavidyā* of the *Ātharvānas* is to be imparted only to those who have practised the carrying of the fire on the head) and in which (2) the word study also occurs. From this we conclude that the practice is a feature only of the study of the *Upanishads* by the *Ātharvānas*, (and not of their *vidyā*.) [The Sūtrakāra strengthens his position further by mentioning another act which is similarly confined to the *Ātharvānas* only.] The restriction (of the above practice to the *Ātharvānas*) is similar to that of the libations. This means that as the seven libations (from the *śakra* libation up to the *sataudāna* libation) are exclusively enjoined on the *Ātharvānas*, similarly the above practice is limited to the study of their particular Veda only. The doctrine of the identity of cognitions therefore remains uncontroverted.

४ । दग्धयति च ।

४ । दग्धयति च वेदं यदि दग्धयति सप्तवेदोक्तान् वेदेष्वपि पश्चात् सर्वं वेदाय न पदमामनति" (अ० १।१।१५) इति ।

4 (Scripture) also says so

The Veda also declares the identity of *vidyas*, because the object of knowledge is taught in all the Vedāntas to be one, as in *Kath* I 2 15, which says, "The adorable One whom all the Vedas speak of "

५ । उपसहारोऽर्थाभिदाद्विधिशेषवत् समाने च ।

५ । एव विज्ञानानां सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययत्वे स्थिते 'अर्थाभिदात् विद्यायां एक्यात् हेतोः अन्यवैदितानां विज्ञानगुणानाम् अन्यवापि 'समाने' विज्ञाने उपसहार' सिद्धं भवति, 'विधिशेषवत्' यथा विधिशेषाणाम् अग्निहोवाद्विधिशेषाणाम् उपसहार, एवम् इह अपि ।

5 From the identity of knowledge it follows that it is also proper to combine (the particular elements mentioned in several texts) when 'the cognition is) one and the same , as in the case of supplements to injunctions

Now, "from this identity of knowledge" it follows that it is "also proper to combine" the specific elements of a cognition mentioned in one particular text "with those of an equivalent cognition" mentioned elsewhere "As in the case of the supplements to injunctions" about Agnihotra and other sacrificial acts, (the subordinate injunctions given in various texts have to be combined into one whole), similarly here

६ । अन्यथात्वं शब्दादिति चेन्नाविशेषात् ।

६ । 'शब्दात्' श्रुतिवाक्यात् 'अन्यथात्वं' विद्यानाम् अन्यैकत्वम् एव सिद्धम्, 'इति चेत्, न' । "त्वं न उक्ताय" (बृह १।३।७) इति वाजसनेयिन उद्गीथस्य कारत्वेन

प्राप्तम् आनगति, दम्भोदा उद्गीयमेव 'तम् उद्गीयम् उपाधावर्तिर' (ब्रा १।१।७) इति तम् उपाधं विधत्स्व इत्यात् इति चेत् नव दोषः । 'अविधिपान् नहि पतावता स्मिन्विध विधत्स्वम् अपवर्गानि अविश्वस्य अपि न तस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात् सम्यक्तापि ।

6. *If it be objected that the very Vedas make out a vidyā to be different (in different texts we say No because (in essentials it is identical (in both texts)*

If it be objected that from the very Vedas them selves a certain vidyā is known to be different in different texts we say No The details of the objection are these — In the "Udgītha vidyā" as given in (*Bri* I 3 7) the words Do thou sing out for us point out that according to the Vājasaneyins the prāna is the producer of the ūdgītha while (in the same vidyā as given in *Chh* I 2 7) the words "They meditated on it as the ūdgītha point out that according to the Chhandogas the prāna is the ūdgītha itself How then can the identity of vidyā be admitted in these cases? We say No The slight difference (in non essentials) pointed out above cannot disprove the identity of the vidyā in the two cases, since both are observed to agree in a very large number of essential points.

७ । न वा प्रकरणभेदात् परीक्षणीयत्वादिवत् ।

७ । पृथक्च—'न वा' विशेषणम् च न व्याप्यम् विधत्स्व एव च न व्याप्य । व्याप्यम् ?—प्रकरणभेदात् उपलक्षणभेदात् । 'परीक्षणीयत्वादिवत्' यथा आचार्यो द्विवेदी व्याख्यानकामः पृथक्च । स एव परीक्षणीयम् उद्गीय स एवीगुणा (ब्रा १।१।१ २) इति परीक्षणीयत्वादिवत्विमिदम् उद्गीषीपासनम् अस्यादित्यक्त विस्वात्मसुखादि उपविमिदम् उद्गीषीपासनात् (ब्रा १।१।६ ८) मिदम् ।

7. *On the contrary* (the Pūrvapakshin may assert,) *there is no* (unity of *vidyās*), *on account of the difference in subject-matter, as in the case of "the Greater than the great "*

The Pūrvapaksha We maintain, on the contrary, that not the unity but the diversity of *vidyās* is the reasonable conclusion. Why so? "On account of the difference of subject-matter", as shown by the methods of meditation enjoined As in the case of "the Greater than the great " Eg, the meditation of the udgītha containing the attribute of "Greater than the great etc ", enjoined in the "Akāśa is indeed greater than all these, ākāśa is the great support, ākāśa is this udgītha, greater than the great, ākāśa is without end" (*Chh* I 9. 1 & 2) is different from the meditation of the udgītha containing the attributes of abiding in the eye and the sun, having a golden beard and so on (*Chh* I 6, 6 8)

८ । संज्ञातश्चेत् तदुक्तमस्ति तदपि ।

८ । पूर्वपक्ष—अथ उच्येत 'संज्ञात' सञ्ज्ञैकत्वात् विद्वैकत्वम् अत्र न्याय्यम्, "उद्गीथविद्या" इति उभयत्र अपि एका संज्ञा इति, तत् अपि न उपपद्यते । 'तदुक्तम्' उक्तं हि एतत् "न वा प्रकरणभेदात् परीक्षणीयत्वादिवत्" इति । तत् एव च अत्र न्याय्यतरं । श्रुत्यचरानुगतं हि तत् । सञ्ज्ञैकत्वं तु श्रुत्यचरवाक्यम् । 'अस्ति तदपि' प्रसिद्ध-भेदेषु अपि तत् सञ्ज्ञैकत्वम् अस्ति, यथा प्रसिद्धभेदानाम् अग्निहीन-दर्शपूर्णभासादीनां काठकैकग्रन्थ-परिपठितानां काठकसञ्ज्ञैकत्वं दृश्यते ।

8 The Pūrvapakshin continues *If it be stated that* (identity of *vidyās*) *follows from* (identity of) *names, (we*

say that *a reply* (to such statement) *has already been furnished* Moreover *that characteristic* (i.e. identity of names) *is also found* (in clearly different cases)

The Pūrvapakṣa continues. It may be asserted that from the nomenclature, i.e. from the identity of names follows the identity of *vidyās* the name in both cases being *udgīthavidyā*. But this does not follow. Sufficient reason against such an assertion has been adduced in the previous Sūtra viz. that there is a difference in subject matter. That reason applies here with stronger force, because the subject matter is part of the revealed text while the identical name is not a part of the revealed text (being given by others for the sake of convenience only). Moreover "that characteristic (viz., identity of names) is observed even in the case of admittedly different injunctions for instance, such admittedly different ceremonies as the Agni hotra, the Darsapūrnāmāsa, etc., are all comprised under the one name *kāthaka* merely because they are all recorded in the one book named *kāthaka*.

८ । व्याप्तेऽयं समस्तसम् ।

८ । सिद्धान्तस्य । अ मन्दीर्षं तु मन्दीर्षान्तिवशो पश्यन्त्यावरण मन्दीर्षम् ।
‘व्याप्ते ओङ्कारस्य समस्त-साधारण्यम् । समस्तस्यापि अचरम् इह न प्रसूयते, इति
अत उद्गीथमन्तेन अचरम् विजिगर्षते । अथ नाम उद्गीथानवयवम् ओङ्कार, यद्वाति
इति । अतएव व्याप्ते द्वितीयां चरम् इति एतन्म उद्गीथम् इति एतत् विजिगर्षम् इति
समस्तसम् एतत् निरवयवम् इत्यर्थः ।

Veda', the view (that the term udgītha is meant to specialise it) is appropriate

The Sūtrakāra's view The word 'and' in this Sūtra stands in the sense of 'but', and is meant to discard the opposite view presented in the two previous Sūtras "Because the omkāra extends over the whole Veda" This means that with a view to prevent the possibility that the omkāra under discussion may be taken to be that omkāra which pervades the whole of the Vedas, it is in this connection specified by the word udgītha So that only that omkāra which comes under the class (literally, forms a part) of udgītha may be apprehended Thus, on account of the extensive scope of the omkāra, its specialisation by the word udgītha is appropriate

૧૦ । સર્વભેદાદન્યત્રેમે ।

૧૦ । વાજસનેયિના ઇન્દ્રોગાના ચ પ્રાચસવાદે ઐશ્વર્યાગુણાન્વિતસ્ય પ્રાચસ્ય ઉપાસ્યત્વમ્ ઉક્તમ્, વાગાદયે અપિ તત્ત્વ વસિષ્ઠાદિગુણાન્વિતા ઉક્તા । તે ચ ગુણા પ્રાચ્યે પુનઃ પ્રત્યર્પિતા “યદ્વા અહ વસિષ્ઠોઽસ્મિ ત્વ તદ્વસિષ્ઠોઽસિ” (રુદ્ર ૬।૧।૧૪) इत्यादिना । अन्येषाम् अपि तु शाखिना कौषीतकि-प्रभृतीनां प्राचसवादेषु “अथातो नि श्रेयसादानमेता ह वै देवता अहश्चेयसे विवदमाना” (कौषी १।८) इति एवञ्जातीयकेषु प्राचस्य श्रेष्ठम् उक्तं, न तु इमे वसिष्ठत्वादयः गुणा उक्ता । अत्र संशयः, किम् एते वसिष्ठत्वादयः गुणा कचित् उक्ता अन्यत्र अपि अख्येर्न् उत नाख्येर्न् इति । अत्र सिद्धान्तः, ‘इमे’ वसिष्ठत्वादयः गुणाः ‘अन्यत्र अपि’ अख्येर्न् । ‘सर्वभेदात्’ यतः सर्वत्र एव तत् एव एवम् प्राणविज्ञानम् अभिन्नम् उक्तम् ।

10 Those (qualities which are attributed to the subject

of a vidyā in one Sākhā only are to be inserted) in other texts also because in all texts the vidyās are non-different

In the Colloquy of the Prānas as found in the two Vedic Sākhās, viz those of the Vajasaneyios and the Chhandogās, the direction is given that the Prānas are to be meditated on as possessed of the quality of being the best and speech and the other organs are stated to be possessed of various other qualities, such as being the richest etc. These latter qualities are ultimately however attributed to the Prānas also in such texts as 'If I am the richest, thou art the richest' (*Bṛi* VI 1 14 etc. But in the Colloquy of the Prānas of certain other Sākhās e.g. that of the Kaushītākins, the quality of being the best is attributed to the Prānas in such passages as 'Next follows the recognition of the pre-eminence of the vital breath by the other powers. All the powers contending with one another in order to assert their own pre-eminence &c. (*Ānu* II 9) but the latter set of qualities, viz being the richest etc., is not mentioned. Here a doubt arises whether these last qualities (being the richest etc.,) which are mentioned in certain texts only are to be inserted in the other texts or not. On this disputed point the view of the Sutrakāra is as follows "Those qualities (being the richest, etc.,) are to be inserted in the other texts also 'because everywhere the vidyās are non-different : i.e. because the Prānavijōāna is recognised throughout in the Vedas as one and the same.

११ । आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य ।

११ । प्रधानस्य ब्रह्मणः आनन्दादयः सन्नां सन्ने सन्ने प्रतिपद्यन्ते, इति सन्ने तत् एव ब्रह्म एव सन्ने ।

11 (For the same reason), *bliss and other qualities* have to be attributed to *Brahman* everywhere

Bliss and other qualities which are severally attributed to Brahman (in different places) are all of them to be understood in every place, because (following the same line of reasoning as in Sutra 10) in all the passages the subject matter is one only Brahman

१२ । प्रियशिरस्त्वा यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे ।

१२ । 'प्रियशिरस्त्वायप्राप्ति' तैत्तिरीयके (२।५) आस्ताताना प्रियशिरस्त्वादीना धर्माणां नास्ति अन्यत्र प्राप्तिः । 'हि' यतः प्रियः सौन्दर्यं प्रमोदः आनन्दः इति एते परस्पर-पेक्षया भोक्तृस्वगपेक्षया वा उपचितापचितरूपा उपलभ्यन्ते । 'उपचयापचयौ' च भेदे सति सम्भवतः । निर्भेदं तु ब्रह्म, न च एते प्रियशिरस्त्वादयः ब्रह्मधर्माः, कोशधर्माः तु एते ।

12 (On the other hand) *such attributes as "having pleasure for its head", and so on, have no force* (with regard to other passages), *because increase and decrease are possible only where there is plurality*

Certain attributes mentioned in the *Taittiriya* (II 5, e g., "having pleasure for its head", and so on, have no force with regard to other passages treating of Brahman, because the successive terms pleasure, delight, greater delight, and bliss, are understood as having higher and lower degrees with respect to one another and also to the enjoyer who is different from all of them. But higher and lower degrees are possible only where there is plurality,

while Brahman is beyond plurality In fact the attributes of "having pleasure for its head" and so on belong not to Brahman but to the kosha sheath

१२ । इतरैस्त्वयसामान्यात् ।

१२ । 'इतरं तु आनन्दस्य चर्मा ब्रह्मलक्ष्यप्रतिपादनाय एव उच्यमाना अवसामान्यात् प्रतिपादयन् ब्रह्मण एकत्वात् सर्वत्र प्रतीक्षितम् ।

13 *Certain other attributes however (are valid for all passages treating of Brahman) because their significance is identical*

Other attributes (e.g. bliss etc.) are however mentioned in the scriptures for the express purpose of teaching the true nature of Brahman And as their significance is everywhere the same (viz. that Brahman whose nature is sought to be taught is one) those attributes are to be viewed as valid for all passages treating of Brahman

१४ । आध्यानाय प्रयोजनमावात् ।

१४ । काठके दृश्यते—इन्द्रियं परं ज्ञेयं चर्मास्य परं मन इति आरम्भं "पुरुषात् परं विदितं सा काठा सा परा गतिः" (काठ १।३।१ ११) इति । अत्र संसर्ग—विम् इमे सर्वे एव अर्थादयः ततः ततः परस्मिन् प्रतिपादयन्ते ततः पुरुष एव एषा सर्वोऽर्थः परः प्रतिपादयति इति । अत्र शिक्षणम्—पुरुष एव एषा सर्वोऽर्थः परः प्रतिपादयति इति वृत्तं न प्रत्येकम् एषा परमप्रतिपादनम् । कथात् १—प्रयोजनमावात् यतः न इतरैस्तु परस्मिन् प्रतिपादयेत् विदितं प्रयोजनं दृश्यते नृपते वा । आध्यानाय आनन्दपूजकाय सम्बन्धदर्शनाय एव इदं प्रस्ताप्यमासीति ।

14 (The passage *Kath* I. 3 10, 11 is meant to give instruction about the Person only) *for the purposes of meditation*, because there is no use (of information about the relative superiority of objects of sense etc)

There is a passage in the *Kathopanishad* (I 3 10 & 11) which begins thus "The objects are superior to the senses, the sensorium is superior to the objects, the understanding superior to the sensorium", and which then passes on to declare that "there is nothing superior to the Person. He is the end, the highest goal". Here a question may arise. Does this text mean to teach that the objects of sense etc, which are enumerated in it are each superior to the preceding ones? Or does it mean to teach only that the Person is superior to all? The conclusion of the *Sūtrakāra* is that it is reasonable to assume that the passage only means to teach that the Person is superior to all, and not to teach the superiority of each over the preceding ones. Why so? "Because there is no use", i.e., no use is either observed or declared by scripture of a demonstration of the relative superiority of the members of the series. The enumeration of the whole series of successive objects is merely "for the purposes of meditation" i.e., to aid such pious meditation as may lead to perfect knowledge.

१५ । आत्मशब्दाच्च ।

१५ । इत्यत्र पुरुषप्रतिपत्त्यर्थो एव इयम् इन्द्रियादिप्रवाहीति यत "एष सर्वेषु भूतेषु गूढात्मा न प्रकाशते । दृश्यते त्वग्रया बुद्ध्या पृथग्या सूक्ष्मदर्शि" (काठ १।३।१२)

इति प्रकृतं वक्ष्यम् आत्मा इति वादः । अतएव इतरेषाम् अनात्मत्वम् विधायितम् इति
नम्यते ।

15 And also because the word Self has been used
(with reference to the Person)

The conclusion that the enumeration of the series of
senses etc., is only for establishing the supremacy of the
Person is further strengthened by the fact that in the
passage This Self is hidden in all things it is not mani-
fested But subtle seers see him by their keen and
subtle intellects (*kath* I 3 12) the person under dis-
cussion is named the Self From this it also follows
that the text intends to declare that the other objects
enumerated therein are not the Self

१६ । आत्मव्योतिरितिरयदुत्तरात् ।

१६ । इतरव्योतिरुत्तर — “आत्मा वा इत्येव एवाय आसीत् नातात् किंचित् सिधत्
न एवत आत्मात् नु स्यात् इति । स इत्यर्थात् आत्मा पश्यत आत्मा मरीचिमिव आप-
(इत १।१ १) इत्यादि । अत्र संसर्गः—इति पर एव आत्मा इह आत्ममन्त्रेण
अभिप्रेयते उत अना पश्यत् इति । अत्र सत्यं—आत्मव्योतिरिति पर एव आत्मा
इह आत्ममन्त्रेण गच्छत । इतरवत् यथा इतरिण्युत्तरिण्युत्तरं तस्यावा एव आत्ममन्त्रेण
आत्मा, मन्त्रः” (तैत्ति १।१) इति एवमादिषु परम् आत्मनः सत्यं यथा वा
इतरिण्युत्तरिण्युत्तरमर्थमिह अनाया एव मन्त्रेण आत्ममन्त्रेण गच्छत तया इह अपि
मन्त्रिणम् अस्ति । अत्र तु आत्ममन्त्रेण आसीत् (इह १।१।१) इति एवम् आदी
“पुनश्चिन्त (१।१।१) इति एवम् आदि विधेयं नार्थं दूयते अनेत् तत्र विधेयवत् आत्मनः
यद्वयम् । अत्र पुनः परमा मन्त्रेणानुवृत्तम् एव विधेयम् अपि उतारम् उपपद्यते “स

ऐतत् लोकान् तु सृजा इति" (ऐत १।१) "स इमांस्त्रीकानसृजत" (१।२) इति एवम् आदि । तस्मात् तस्य एव ग्रन्थम् इति न्यायम् ।

16 (In the *Aitareya* passage I 1, 2 the word Self) *is meant for the Highest Self, as in other places , on account of the subsequent qualification*

In the *Aitareya* we read "Verily all this was in the beginning the Self only There was nothing that winked He thought, shall I create worlds ? He created these worlds,—Ambhas, Marichi, Mara and Ap" (I 1, 2) Here a question may arise, whether by the word Self is meant the Highest Self, or some other being ? We reply that "the Highest Self is to be understood" by the word Self here, "as in other places" As in other scriptural accounts of creation, such as "Verily from this Self came out ether" (*Taitti* II 1), the Highest Self has to be understood, and as even in cases of the application of the word Self to particular selves the Highest Self has to be primarily understood, similarly here But in other passages such as "In the beginning this was Self alone" (*Bri* I 4 1), where the Self is qualified by some other specialising attribute, e g , 'in the shape of a person', we have to understand that some particular self is meant In the passage under discussion, however, we meet with a "subsequent qualification" which fits in only with the interpretation of the word Self as the Highest Self, viz , "He thought, shall I create worlds ? He created these worlds". (*Ait* I 1) We therefore maintain that by the word Self here the Highest Self alone is to be understood

१०। अन्वयादिति चेत् स्यादवधारणात् ।

१०। अन्वयात् इति चेत् बाधान्वयप्रसङ्गात् न परमात्मप्रत्ययम् इति पुनः यत्
 उक्तम् तत् परिहृतव्यम् इति । यत्र उच्यते स्यात् अवधारणात् भवेत् उपपन्न
 परमात्मनः इह प्रत्ययम् । कथं ?—‘अवधारणात् । परमात्मप्रत्ययं हि मातृपुत्र-
 आदीन्मत्तावधारणम् आद्यप्रत्ययम् अवधारणं तत् परिहृतव्यम् ।

17 *Should (the interpretation of Self as the Highest Self) be objected to for (the preservation of) the unity of meaning (in the whole passage we still declare) It is so on account of (a scriptural) assertion*

Should it be objected that in order to preserve the unity of meaning in the whole passage the word Self should not be taken to mean the Highest Self we say that such objection is inadmissible. It is so : c it is proper to take the passage as referring to the Highest Self. Why so ? On account of a scriptural assertion : c the scriptural assertion that before creation the Self was one and alone gives a consistent sense only if the word Self is interpreted to mean the Highest Self. Any other interpretation would fail to give such consistent sense.

१८। कार्याध्यानादपूर्वम् ।

१८। इन्द्रियाः बाह्यभेदिनः च प्राचसंवादी आदिभ्योऽहं प्राचस्य यत्र आत्म
 तस्य एव आपः वास इति आत्मनि । अदन्तरस्य इन्द्रिया आत्मनि “तस्मात्
 एतद्विज्ञानं, पुरस्तादीपरिष्ठायाहि परिदृष्टि (वा ११।१) इति । बाह्यभेदिनः

च आचमन्ति “तद्विवास ओत्रिया” अश्लिष्यन् आचामन्त्यश्लिष्या चाचामन्त्येतत् एव तदनन्तरम् कुर्वन्ती मन्यन्ते” (बृह ६।१।१४) इति । अत्र आचमनम् अनन्तराचमनं च प्राप्य प्रतीयते । तत् किम् उभयमपि विधीयते, उत आचमनम् एव, उत अनन्तराचमनम् एव, इति विचार्यते । न आचमनस्य विधेयत्वम् उपपद्यते, ‘कार्याख्यानात्’ । प्राप्तम् एव हि इदं कार्यत्वेन आचमनं प्राप्यत्यर्थं स्मृतिप्रसिद्धम् अन्वाख्यायते । अवश्यम्विधेयत्वम् अनन्तराचमनं वास‘कार्याख्यानात् अपा वास सङ्कल्पनम् एव ‘अपूर्वम्’ विधीयते, न आचमनं, पूर्ववत् हि तत् इति उपपादितम् ।

As the mention (of the rinsing of the mouth) is merely that of an act (and not even of a new act) and as (the meditation of water as the dress of Prāna is) something new, (we hold that the latter is meant to be enjoined and not the former)

Both the Chhandogas (V 2 2) and Vajasaneyins (VI 1 14) declare in the Colloquy of the Prānas that everything is the food of the Prāna, even up to dogs etc., and that water is the dress of the Prāna. In addition to the above the Chhandogas say, “Hence, when going to eat food, men surround it before and after with water” (*Chh* V 2 2). The Vājasaneyins say, “Srotriyas who know this rinse the mouth with water when going to eat, and also rinse the mouth with water after having eaten. They consider that by so doing they furnish the Prāna with dress (*Bṛ* VI 1 14). Now, these texts mention two separate things, *viz*, the rinsing of the mouth and the meditation of the Prāna as dressed. Hence the question arises whether here it is the intention of the scripture to enjoin both these things, or the rinsing of the mouth only, or the meditation of the Prāna as dressed only. The rinsing of the mouth cannot

the Vājasaneyins), *the same* (reasoning applies) *because of the identity* (of the object of meditation in both cases)

In the Agni-rahasya of the sākṣhā of the Vājasaneyins there is a vidyā named Sāndilya-vidyā. The particulars mentioned therein are these: "He should meditate on the Self as manomaya, *i e*, as consisting of mind, as having Prāna for its body, and as having light for its form", (Satapatha Brāhmaṇa XC 6 3 2), etc. In the same sākṣhā, in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* Upanishad, we read, "That Person consisting of mind, whose essence is light, is within the heart, (minute) like a grain of rice or barley. He governs all, and is the Lord of all. He rules all this and whatsoever exists", (VI 6 1). A question here arises: Have we here *one* vidyā, in which the particulars mentioned in the Agnirahasya and the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* are to be combined? Or, have we here *two* vidyās between which there should be no combination of particulars? We reply: "The same reasoning applies even in one and the same sākṣhā". We have seen above that texts of different sākṣhās do constitute one vidyā, in which different particulars of the different texts are combined. Similarly here the texts, though belonging to the same sākṣhā, constitute one vidyā only, "because of the identity of the object of meditation" *i e*, because we recognise the same Brahman, which consists of mind and which has other attributes, as the identical object of meditation in both. Now it is the object of meditation that constitutes the distinctive character of a vidyā. As long as that character remains unchanged, we cannot maintain that the vidyās are different. Hence, in the present instance, even in one

and the same *sākhā* the two passages constitute one *vidyā*, and their particulars have to be combined

२० । सम्बन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि ।

१ । पूर्वपक्षः । ऋदशरम्भे “सत्यं ब्रह्म (१।१।१) इति उपस्य ‘तद् यत् सत्यमसौ स आदित्यो य एव एतद्विन्दन्त्यसी पुब्वी यदायं दक्षिणाय च पुब्वः’ (३३ १।१।१) इति तस्य एव सत्यस्य ब्रह्मस्य अपिर्देवतम् अध्यात्मा च आपतनविधेयम् उपदिश्य आहति तदीयत्वं च भन्त्याय हे उपनिषदी उपदिशते तन्मीपनिषदकारिण विदेवतं तन्मीपनिषदकारिणवाक्यम् (३३ १।१।१ ३) । तत्र संशयः—किम् अपि भावेन एव तस्मि अपि उपनिषत्तौ उभयत्र अनुसन्धातव्ये सत विभागेन एवाभिर्देवतम् एवाभ्यासम् इति । तत्र सूत्रेण एव उपश्रमते—यदा शब्दित्यभिधायी विभागेन अपि ज्योतिषां ऽभीपस्यतः सन्तः एवम् एतान् अपि एवञ्चातीत्ये विषये भविष्यु न इति, एवमिदं च सम्बन्धात् ।

20 *The same thing is true in another case also because (both are) connected (with one and the same vidyā)*

[The Pūrvapaksha.] There is a passage in the *Bṛhadāranyaka* (V 3 1) beginning with ‘The True is Brahman and passing on to ‘That which is the True that is also the Āditya, who is the Person that dwells in yonder orb and who is the Person in the right eye (V 5 2.) The passage thus declares two different abodes, viz., one with reference to the gods and another with reference to the human body of one and the same Brahman that is the True. The passage then goes on to establish that the sacred syllables (*bṛhāh* etc.) constitute the body

of Brahman Finally, the passage teaches the two secret doctrines, "His secret name is 'ahar' with reference to the gods, his secret name is 'aham' with reference to the body", (V 5 3 & 4) A question here arises Are both the secret names to be conjointly applied to both the abodes? Or, is each to be separately applied, one to the deva-abode only, and the other to the bodily abode only? The opinion put forward by this Sūtra (the opinion of the Pūrvapaksha) is this In the Sāndilya-vidyā, particulars, though found in two detached texts, had to be combined "The same thing is true in another case also" (i.e., in the present case), "because both (the secret names) are connected with one and the same vidyā "

२१ । न वा विशेषात् ।

२१ । सिद्धान्तः । न एव उभयोः उभयत्र प्राप्तिः । कस्मात् ?—'विशेषात्' उपासन-स्थान-विशेषोपनिषत्वात्, इत्यर्थः । "य एष एतस्मिन्मण्डले पुरुषः" (बृह ५।५।२) इति हि अग्निदेविक-पुरुषं प्रकृत्य "तस्योपनिषद् अहम्" (बृह ५।५।३) इति आवयति । "योऽयं दक्षिणेऽक्षन् पुरुषः" (५।५।४) इति च आध्यात्मिक पुरुषं प्रकृत्य "तस्योपनिषद् अहम्" (बृह ५।५।४) इति । "तस्य" इति च "एतत्" सन्निहितालम्बनं सर्वनाम । तस्मात् आयतन-विशेष-व्यप्राययेण एव एते उपनिषदौ उपदिश्येते, कुत उभयोः उभयत्र प्राप्तिः ?

21 But (we hold² that it is) not so, because there is a difference (of place)

[The Sutrakāra's view] The two secret names cannot both apply to both the persons Why so? Be-

cause the abodes in which the persons are to be meditated are mentioned as different By the words 'The Person that dwells in yonder orb the Person with the deva abode is referred to and about him it is said that His secret name is ahar while by the words "The Person in the right eye the Person with the bodily abode is referred to and about him it is said that His secret name is aham Now the pronoun 'his (tasya)' always has a reference to something proximate. The inference therefore is that the secret names are meant to belong to the distinctive abodes with which they are connected How then can both names be applicable to both ?

२२। दमयति च ।

११। अपि च एवञ्जातीयकानां पञ्चाचां अवस्थितिलिङ्गदर्शनं भवति तस्यैतत् तद्वत् रूपं यदमुष्य रूपं भावमुष्य गीतो तौ देवौ यन्नाम तन्नाम (ब्रा १।७।३) इति । कथमस्य लिङ्गत्वम् ? तदुच्यते — यस्यादित्यभ्यागमेवमिन्द्रात् पद्मात् अग्नीश्वरिण् अश्वत्थामिण् पद्मत् इत्येवमिन्द्रात् अदित्यपुत्रपत्न्यात् कपादीन् अश्विपुत्रम् उपसंहरति "तस्यैतत् तद्वत् रूपम् इत्यादिना । तस्मात् अवस्थिते एव एते उपनिबदी इति निश्चयः ।

22. Scripture also indicates this

Further there is a clear indication in scripture that attributes of this class are to be understood as distinct *vis.*, in the passage "The form of this person is the same as the form of that other person the two singers (or two joints) of this person are the same as the two singers (or

two joints) of that other person, the name of this person is the same as the name of the other" (*Chh* I 7 5) How does this passage convey such an indication? We reply, because the passage admits by implication that the attributes of the two persons are differentiated by their abodes, *vis*, the eye and the sun, and are in consequence uncombinable, and then by a distinct act of mental transfer identifies the form etc of the person in the sun with those of the person in the eye by the words "the form of this person is the same" etc The conclusion therefore is that the two secret names are to be understood as distinct

२३। सम्भृति-द्युव्याप्तपि चातः ।

२३। "ब्रह्मग्येष्टा वोय्या सम्भृतानि ब्रह्माय्ये ज्येष्ठ दिवसाततान्" इति एव रागायनीयानां खिलेषु वीर्यसम्भृति-दुग्निवेशप्रभृतयः ब्रह्मण्य विभूतयः पठ्यन्ते । तेषाम् एव च उपनिषदि शाण्डिल्यविद्याप्रभृतयः ब्रह्मविद्या पठ्यन्ते । तासु ब्रह्मविद्यासु ता-ब्रह्मविभूतयः उपसङ्क्रियेरन् न वा इति विचारणाया पठति, 'सम्भृति-द्युव्याप्ति'प्रभृतयः-विभूतयः शाण्डिल्यविद्या-प्रभृतिषु न उपसङ्कर्तव्याः । 'अत' एव 'च', आयतनविशेष-योगात् । तथाहि शाण्डिल्यविद्यायां हृदयायतनत्वं ब्रह्मण्य, उक्तम्, "एष आत्मान-हृद्दये" (३।१४।३) इति । तद्वत् एव दह्रविद्यायाम् अपि "दह्रः पुण्डरीकां वेश्म दह्रोऽ-भिन्नत्वाकाश" (छा ३।१।१) इति । उपकोशलविद्यायां तु अक्षयायतनत्वं "अ-प्योऽचिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते" (छा ४।१।५।१) इति । एवं तत्र तत्र तत् तत् आध्यात्मिकम् आयतनम् एतासु विद्यासु प्रतीयते । आधिदैविक्यं तु एताः विभूतयः सम्भृतिदुग्निवेश-प्रभृतयः । तासां कुत एतासु प्राप्तिः ?

for a similar reason, (not to be inserted in the Brahma vidyās)

Virya sambhṛita (holding together of powers) *dyāv nivesa* (entering the sky) etc. are mentioned as varieties of energy (*vibhūti*) of Brahman in the following passage which occurs in the supplementary texts of the Rāṇāyanīyas — “The powers of whom Brahman is the greatest are held together in the beginning Brahman who is the greatest stretched out the sky. Now we find that in the Upanishad of the same Rāṇāyanīyas the Sāṇḍilyavidyā and other Brahma vidyās too are to be met with. A question therefore arises whether the above energies of Brahman mentioned by the Rāṇāyanīyas should or should not be inserted in the Brahma vidyās. The view of the Sutrakāra is Holding together pervading the sky and other energies are not to be inserted in the Sāṇḍilyavidyā etc. And for the same reason i. e., on account of their connection with different abodes. Thus, in the Sāṇḍilya vidyā Brahman is said to abide in the heart ‘This Self is within the heart (Chh III 14 3) Similarly in the Dahara vidyā we find Within the body there is an obode shaped like a small lotus in it again there is a small ākāśa (Chh VIII) Again in the Upakośala vidyā Brahman is said to abide in the eye ‘The Person that is seen in the eye (Chh IV 15 1) Thus in these several vidyās several abodes of Brahman are described, and they are all bodily abodes. But the energies above mentioned viz. holding together of powers, pervading the sky etc. are connected with the deva abodes of Brahman. In the face of such difference of abodes, how can the energies be inserted in the Brahmavidyās ?

२४ । पुरुषविद्यायामिव चैतरेषाभनान्नानात् ।

२४ । अस्ति ताण्डिनां पैङ्गिनाञ्च रहस्यब्राह्मणे पुरुषविद्या, तत्र पुरुषो यत्र कल्पित । तैत्तिरीयका अपि कश्चित् पुरुषयत्र कल्पयन्ति । तत्र सम्य', किन्तु ये इतरत्र उक्ता पुरुषयत्रस्य धर्मो ते तैत्तिरीयकेषु उपसंहर्त्तव्या किं वा न उपसंहर्त्तव्या' इति । न उपसंहर्त्तव्या इति आह आचार्य । 'पुरुषविद्यायामिव' यथा एकेषा ग्राहिना ताण्डिना पैङ्गिनाञ्च पुरुषविद्यायाम् आभनान्न न एवम् इतरेषा तैत्तिरीयाणाम् आभनान्नम् अस्ति ।

24 (There should be no combination of Purusha-vidyās) *because there are no such statements in the other books.*

There is a Purushavidyā in the Rahasya-brāhmaṇa, a fanciful identification of man with the Vedic sacrifice in the Tāndins as well as of the Paingins. And again there is another Purushavidyā in the books of the Taittirīyakas. Hence arises the question whether the particulars of the man-sacrifice mentioned in the former books should or should not be inserted in those of the Taittirīyakas? The Sūtrakāra says, They are not to be inserted. There should be no combination, because there are no statements in the latter sākhās (viz., the Taittirīyakas) corresponding to the Purusha-vidyā of the former sākhās, viz., those of Tāndins and Paingins.

२५ । वेधाद्यर्थभेदात् ।

२५ । अस्ति आद्यर्वणिकानाम् उपनिषदारम्भे मन्त्रसमानाद्य', "सर्वं प्रविध्य हृदयं प्रविध्य धमनीं प्रवृण्य शिरोऽभिप्रवृण्य विधा विप्रुक्त" इत्यादि । स ताण्डिना "देव उचित प्रभुव यज्ञम्" इत्यादि । शाल्याधनिना "श्वेताश्वी हरितनीलोऽसि" इत्यादि ।

वाजसनेयिनां तु उपनिषदाश्चैव प्रवर्त्यन्ताम् पश्यति 'देवा च वै सत्रं निषिद्धं' इत्यादि ।
 कौषीतकिनाम् अपि अपिटीमन्त्राश्च "ब्रह्म वा अपिटीमी ब्रह्मैव तदवर्त्मन्मन्त्रैश्च ते
 ब्रह्मोपवन्ति तेषु तत्त्वमाश्रयन्ति य एतदवर्त्मन्मन्त्रं इति । किम् इमे "सर्वं प्रविध्य"
 इत्यादयः मन्त्राः प्रवर्त्यन्ति च कर्त्याणि विद्यासु उपसंक्रियन्तु किं वा न उपसंक्रियन्तु
 इति नीमोक्षानुसारे । न एवाम् उपसंक्रियन् विद्यासु इति । अथान् ?—"वेधादायमिवात् ।
 'इदं सर्वं प्रविध्य' इति एवंजातीयकानाम् हि मन्त्राणां ये अर्था उदयविवादस्य मित्रा
 चगमिसम्भवा ते उपनिषद्विदितानि विद्यानि न तेषां ताभिः संयन्तु सामर्थ्यम् अस्ति ।

25 "*Piercing and other mantras of a similar type being different in subject matter (from the vidyās of the Upanishads, cannot be combined with the latter)*"

The commencement of an Upanishad of the Ātharvāni has consists of the following mantras — Pierce (the enemy) wholly pierce his heart crush his veins crush his head thrice crushed— etc. That of the Tāndins consists of Deva Savitah generate the sacrifice That of the Sātyāyanins 'Thou art the possessor of a white horse, and art green as grass &c.' That of the Vājāsaneysins is a Brāhmana passage about the Pravargya ceremony — 'The gods sat down to a sattra &c. That of the Kaushītakinis a Brāhmana passage about the Agnishtoma, Brahman is Agnishtoma, Brahman is that day through Brahman they enter Brahman those who observe that day attain immortality Now the point to settle is, whether these mantras such as Pierce wholly etc. and the ceremonies such as Pravargya etc. are to be combined with the Upanishad vidyās or not. The answer is, they are not to be combined with the vidyās. Why so? 'Because their subject matter viz. piercing etc., is different This means that

the subject matters of such mantras as "Pierce the enemy's heart" etc are entirely different from, and have no connection with, the vidyas taught in the Upanishads, and consequently it is impossible to combine these mantras with the vidyās

२६ । हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात् कुशाच्छन्दः स्तुत्युप-
गानवत् तदुक्तम् ।

२६ । अस्ति ताण्डिना श्रुतिः, "अश्व इव रोमाणि विधूय पाप, चन्द्र इव राहो-
र्मुखात् प्रमुच्य, घूत्वा शरीरमकृत कृतात्मा ब्रह्मलोकमभिसम्भवामि" (का ८।१३।१)
इति । तथा आथर्वणिकानां, "तदा विद्वान् पुण्ड्रपापे विधूय निगूञ्ज परम साम्यमुपैति"
(सु १।१।३) इति । तथा शाखायनिनः पठन्ति, "तस्य पुत्रा दायमुपयन्ति सुहृद साधु-
कृत्या क्षिपन्त पापकृत्याम्" इति । तथैव कौषीतकिनः, "तत् भुक्तदुष्कृते विधूयते
तस्य प्रिया ज्ञातयः सुकृतमुपयन्तः प्रिया दुष्कृतम्" (कौषी १।४) इति । तदिह क्वचित्
सुकृतदुष्कृतयोर्हान् श्रूयते क्वचित् तयोरेव विभागेन प्रियैरप्रियैश्चोपायनः क्वचित्भूय हान-
मुपायनश्च, इति । तद् यदीभ्यं श्रूयते तत्र न किञ्चित् वक्तव्यम् अस्ति । यत्वायुपायन-
मेव श्रूयते न हानम्, तत्रापि अर्थादेव हानं सन्निपतति । यत्र तु हानदेव श्रूयते, न तु
उपायनं तत्र उपायनं सन्निपतेत् वा न वा इति विचिकित्तमायाम् पठति,—'हानौ तु'
एतस्या केवलायाम् अपि श्रूयमाणायां उपायनं सन्निपतितुम् अर्हति इति पुरणीयः ।
'उपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्' यत्र 'उपायन'शब्दः 'हान'शब्दशेषः 'हान'-शब्दापेक्षितः इति
समधिगतः कौषीतकि-रहस्ये । तस्मात् अन्यत्रापि केवल-हानशब्द-श्रवणं उपायनानुवृत्तिः ।
'कुशाच्छन्दः स्तुत्युपगानवत्' इति उपसर्गोपादानम् । तद् यथा साङ्ख्यिनां "कुशा वान-
स्यत्वा स्य ता मा पात" इति अग्निं निगमे कुशानाम् अवशिष्टेषु वनस्पतियोनित्वावर्णे,
शाठ्यायनिना "औदुम्बरा कुशा" इति विशेपवचनात् औदुम्बरे कुशा आश्रीयन्ते ।
यथा च क्वचित् देवासुरच्छन्दसाम् अवशिष्टेषु पौर्वापर्यप्रसङ्गे "देवच्छन्दासि पूर्वाणि"
इति पैङ्गान्दानात् प्रतीयते । यथा च षोडशित्वे केपाञ्चित् कालविराजामासौ "समयायु-

पितृ ल्ये" इति चावसुते कालविशेषमतीति । यथा एव च चरित्रपिच उपान
 विचिन्तु समामगन्ति विविचि मातृविन । यथा एतेषु कुशादिषु सुखानन्दत विविचिमातृ
 एव काली अपि उपायगावत् इत्ययम् । सुखानन्दत वि विविचि सुखान्दरि यन्मय
 एवम् । सर्वत्रैव विचिन्तु स्तात् स च चरित्र सदा गती । तदुक्तम् तत् सत्तम्
 पूर्वमेवमावसुते इति मिव ।

26 *And where the riddance (of the illuminated man from his good and evil deeds) is mentioned (in various texts the obtaining of those deeds by others has to be supplied) because the statement about obtaining (by others) is a necessary supplement (to the statement of his own riddance) as in the cases of the Kusas the Chhandas the Stuti and the Upagāna (The reason for this has already been stated (in the Purva Mimamsa)*

The following passage occurs in the text of the Tāndins — "I shake off sin as a horse shakes his hair I shake off the body as the moon gets released from the mouth of Rāhu. With soul satisfied I enter the uncreated Brahma loka (Chh VIII 13 1) This occurs in the text of the Ātharvanikas,—He (the wiseman) is freed from merit and demerit, becomes spotless and attains the highest equanimity (Mund III 1 3) The Sātyayanas have this passage,— His sons inherit his property his friends the results of the good done by him his enemies the results of the evil done by him The Kaushitakins have He gives up his merits and demerits. His dear kinsmen obtain his merits, and his enemies his demerits. (Kau I 4) Of these texts, then one class mentions that the man who has gained true knowledge attains entire freedom

from his merits and demerits. A second class mentions the obtaining of those by his friends and enemies respectively. A third class mentions *both* these facts. Now, we have nothing to say about the third class which mentions both. The second class which only mentions their obtaining by others, admits by implication that the person himself is freed from his merits and demerits, but does not mention the obtaining of these by others, leaves room for the doubt whether these merits and demerits shaken off by the person himself, are or are not transmitted to friends and enemies. This doubt the Sūtrakāra resolves thus "Where the riddance only" is mentioned, the obtaining by others should be added, "because the statement about obtaining (by others) is a necessary supplement to," *i.e.*, is necessary to complete the sense of, the statement about the person's own riddance, as is clear from the passage of the Kaushītakins above quoted. For this reason, in other texts also, wherever the riddance only is mentioned, the obtaining by others should also be supplied. Four analogous instances of supplementing one text by another are introduced into this Sūtra by the words "Like the Kusas, the Chhandas, the Stuti, and the Upagāna." These analogous instances are as follow (1) On the one hand, this mantra of the Bhallavins mentions Kusas as produced by trees in general without any specification, "You Kusas are the offspring of the trees, do you protect me!" On the other hand, this mantra of the Satyayavins mentions Kusas as produced by Udambara trees by a particularising statement, "You Kusas are the offspring of the Udambara tree" (2) On the one hand, in certain

texts the metres of the devas and asuras are mentioned with perfect indifference about their order of succession. On the other hand this mantra of the Prajāpatis fixes a definite order of priority. The metres of the Devas come first" (3) On the one hand in certain texts the time of the stotra of the Shodasin ceremony is left unsettled. On the other hand a definite time is fixed for it in the following mantra of the Rikvedins. When the sun has half risen. (4) On the one hand in certain texts no definite mention is made of what classes of priests have or have not to join in the singing. On the other hand a mantra of the Bhāṣṭavins gives definite instruction in the matter. Now as in each of the above four instances (husas etc.) a general statement in one text is combined with a particular statement in another so in the present instance, "riddance has to be combined with obtaining by others." If the particularising statements from other texts were not thus applied and added to the general statements, the result would be universal vikalpa (uncertainty or scope for optional procedure) a thing which must always be avoided wherever possible. The reason for this has already been stated viz., in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.

२०। साम्प्रदाये तर्तव्याभावात् तया ह्यन्ये ।

१०। दीव्यमिह पद्या पर्यङ्क्यं ब्रह्म अभिप्रश्नितञ्च विदुषः अज्जलि वृत्ततदुच्च तवी विदीप्तं बोधीतवित्ता (बोधी १।३ इत्यादिदु) आभनलि । तत् किं अज्जलि एव विदोवचनं प्रविपचनं, उत आदौ एव दीव्यपद्यमि इति विचार्यायां ब्रवीति विदुषः

‘साम्प्रदाये’ देहात् भवसर्पणे एव सुकृत-दुष्कृतहान भवति इति प्रतीयम् । ‘तर्क्ष्या-
भावात्’ प्रातःस्थितायात्, यत तदवस्थायाम् विदुष न सुकृत-दुष्कृताभ्यां किञ्चित् प्राप्त्यम्
अस्ति । ‘तथाहि अन्ये’ अन्ये शाखिनः, तार्क्षिणः शाव्यायगिनः च—तदवस्थायाम् एव
सुकृत-दुष्कृतहानम् आभनन्ति, इति शेषः ।

27 ‘The enlightened self) on departure (from the body gives up its merits and demerits) *there being nothing else to be reached* (by such a self through *kaïma*) Thus others too declare

The Kaushîtakins declare (*Kau* I 3 and following sections) that the enlightened self, when proceeding along the path of the gods towards Brahman seated on a couch, obtains, somewhere on the way, release from his merits and demerits The question therefore arises Is the enlightened self’s release from his merits and demerits to be taken to happen when proceeding on the way, or immediately on departure from the body ? The Sutra says, Immediately on departure from the body “There being nothing else to be reached” by the enlightened self in that state (*viz*, of the dissolution of the body) by his good or evil deeds “Thus others, too, declare”, e g, the Tândins and Sâtyâyanins declare that the release from merit and demerit happens in that state (*i e*, immediately on the dissolution of the body)

२८ । कृन्दत उभयाविरोधात् ।

२८ । साम्प्रदाये एव, न अर्धपथे, सुकृत-दुष्कृत-हानम् भवति, यत देहपातात्
प्राक् एव ‘कृन्दत’ इच्छात प्रयत्नात् यमनियम-विद्याभ्यासात् सुकृत-दुष्कृत-हानि सम्भवति,
न तु मध्यपथे यत काम्ययज्ञेन न विद्यते । ‘उभयाविरोधात्’ यत एवम् एव काथ्य-
कारण्योः, तार्क्षि-शाव्यायगिभ्यो च ‘अविरोध’ सङ्गतिः स्यात् ।

29 Release from merits and demerits happens) *through the will* (and therefore does not happen *after* departure from the body) *because (only) on this supposition do both become consistent*

It is at the departure from the body and not on the midway that freedom from merit and demerit takes place for even before death by his will i.e. by his efforts (consisting of self restraint, voluntary penance and the pursuit of knowledge etc.) freedom from merit and demerit is possible. It is meaningless to suppose it as happening on the midway when there is no further cause for the cessation of karma. "Because (only) on this supposition do both become consistent, i.e., the effect arises as soon as the cause becomes operative and no conflict occurs with the texts of the Tāndina and Śātyajitins."

३८ । गतरद्वयस्यमुपपत्त्याऽप्यत्र द्वि विरोधः ।

३८ । गत द्विजात्यस्य पदं चतुर्विधम् आचरन्तु प्रसक्त्या विभर्तिषु पञ्च भवितुम् अर्हति । द्विषन् अद्वयती इति द्विषन् न इत्ययं । द्वि पदं अद्वयता अविर्भूतं चतुर्विधं विधीयते पञ्च व्याप्तम् । "द्विजात्यस्य विषयं निरुद्धतां पञ्च न भवति । (मु. ३.१.१३) अत्र द्विजात्यस्य प्रायशो मतिः विद्यते । अतः द्वि निरुद्धतां अद्वयतां प्रायशो दत्तम् । अतः च चतुर्विधं न भवितुम् न द्विजात्यस्य प्रायशो दत्तम् ।

29 (We must admit) *two kinds of significance for the word gati* for otherwise there would be a contradiction (of scripture)

The significance of the expression *gati* (i.e., going along the path of the devas) must be twofold. In

some cases it has the meaning of actual going, in some cases not "For otherwise", i e, if we apply "gati" to all cases without distinction, there would be a contradiction of scripture "Going" in the sense of "proceeding to another place" would evidently be contrary to reason in connection with this text, "He is freed from merit and demerit, becomes spotless and attains the highest equanimity" (*Mūṇḍa* III 1 3) How can a spotless self, which is non-moving, proceed to another place? And the goal to be reached by him is "the highest equanimity" which cannot certainly be attained by moving to another place

३० । उपपन्नस्तत्त्वार्थोपलब्धिलोकवत् ।

३० । अयम् उभयव्याभावः,—कचित् अर्थवती गतिः, कचित् न, इति 'उपपन्न' युक्तियुक्तः । 'तत्त्वार्थोपलब्धि' यतः तत्त्वार्थार्थं गते कारणभूतं अर्थं पर्यङ्क-विद्यादिषु सङ्गणेषु उपासनेषु उपलभ्यते । तत्र हि पर्यङ्कारोहणं पर्यङ्कस्थेन ब्रह्मण्यः सह सम्बन्धेन विशिष्टगन्वादिप्राप्तिः च, इति एवमादि बहु देशान्तरप्राप्तयस्तत्र फलं श्रूयते । तत्र अर्थवती गतिः । न तु आत्मैकत्वदर्शिना तादृशं किञ्चित् अपेक्षितव्यम् अस्ति । तत्र अनर्थिका गतिः । 'लोकवत्' च एष विभागो द्रष्टव्यः । यथा लोके ग्रामप्राप्तौ देशान्तरप्रापणं पन्था अपेक्ष्यते, न आरोग्यप्राप्तौ, एवम् इह अपि इति । भूयश्च एनं विभागं चतुर्थोऽध्याये नियुक्ततरम् उपपादयिष्यामः ।

30 *This twofold significance is reasonable, for it is observed (both in the case of life after death and) in ordinary life*

This two-fold significance of "gati" i e, having the sense of actual going in certain cases, and not so in others,

is reasonable. For the literal meaning of *gati* is seen in such *saguna* worship as the *parjanya vidyā* (*hous 1*). For there the texts mention various results such as mounting a couch holding a conversation with Brahman seated on a couch experiencing various odours etc., which are all attainable by going to various places. In such a context the word "going" has a sense. But no purpose of such a character is ever entertained by illuminated souls who have attained a vision of the unity of Self for such souls the expression going has no meaning whatsoever. The distinction (between purpose which involve and which do not involve going) is to be seen in ordinary life also. A path along which places are reached becomes necessary when one has to go to a village but not when one has to attain freedom from disease. Similarly here. This distinction will be established with greater fullness in the fourth chapter.

३१ । अनियमं सर्वानामविरोधं मन्दातुमानाभ्याम् ।

३१ । सर्वानाम् एव नानाविधानाम् 'अनियमं' चरित्रैव एव दिव्यानाम्ना चरितं भवितुम् अस्ति । 'अविरोधं' न प्रवृत्तचरित्रैश्च अस्ति । मन्दातुमानाभ्याम् कृतिवृत्तिरुक्त्याभ्याम् । (श्रौतौ १ ; वा ३४८ ; गीता ८) ।

31 (Going along the path of the Devas) applies to all (*saguna vidyās without restriction*). There is agreement (in respect of subject matter) according to both *śruti* and *smṛiti*.

The path named *Devayana* applies equally without restriction, to all *saguna vidyās*. There is agreement in

respect of subject-matter, according to both sabda (revealed scripture) and inference that is the two-fold proof of sruti and smṛiti *Kaus I (Chh V 93 Gītā viii)*

३२ । यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् ।

३२ । विदुष वर्त्तमान-देहपातानन्तर देहान्तरम् उपपद्यते, न वा, इति चिन्त्यते । 'आधिकारिकाणां यावत् अधिकारम् अवस्थिति' । व्यास-वसिष्ठ-भृगु-नारद-प्रभृतय परमेश्वरेण तेषु तेषु अधिकारेषु नियुक्ता सन्त्य कर्मसमाप्तिपर्यन्तं ससारे अवतिष्ठन्ते, तदवसानेऽप्यवस्यन्ते ।

32 *There is subsistence (of the body) for those who have certain offices (to perform), as long as those offices last*

The point under discussion here is whether for the illuminated soul a new body originates or does not originate after the destruction of the old body. The Sutra says, "There is subsistence of the body for those who have certain offices to perform as long as those offices last." Vyāsa, Vasishtha, Bhrigu, Nārada, and others, who have been entrusted by the Supreme Lord with their respective offices, have to remain in the body until the duties of their offices are fully discharged, and obtain release only when they are finished.

३३ । अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावास्तन्मौपसदवत् तदुक्तम् ।

३३ । 'तु'-शब्द पूर्वपक्षव्यावर्तकः । 'अक्षरधियां' निर्विशेष-परब्रह्मवाचक-निषेध-

।म् 'अवर्ग' वाच्यं च ईदं एव ईति । नामावतत्वाभावात् यत्
 अत्र एव विवक्षितं । ईदं च ईति वाच्यं । अत्र एव च अत्र ईति वाच्यं
 । अत्र च ईति वाच्यं । अत्र च ईति वाच्यं । अत्र च ईति वाच्यं ।
 अत्र च ईति वाच्यं । अत्र च ईति वाच्यं । अत्र च ईति वाच्यं ।
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 अत्र च ईति वाच्यं । अत्र च ईति वाच्यं । अत्र च ईति वाच्यं ।
 अत्र च ईति वाच्यं । अत्र च ईति वाच्यं । अत्र च ईति वाच्यं ।
 अत्र च ईति वाच्यं । अत्र च ईति वाच्यं । अत्र च ईति वाच्यं ।

33 But the conceptions about the Akshara are all of them to be combined (in all the texts) because of their identity and the common matter of instruction as in the case of the upasads. This has been explained (in the Pāṇva Mīmāṃsā)

The word but here means to discard the opposite view (viz., that all the conceptions about the Akshara are not to be combined in all cases). It is reasonable to admit that the conception about the Akshara is, the negative declarations about the Supremo Brahman who is undifferentiated are all of them to be combined in all the texts "because of their identity and the common matter of instruction" i.e., because both their manner and matter of instruction are identical, the common manner being the negation of all particular attributes the common matter being the one undivided Brahman. As in the case of the upasads. The analogy is this. There is a particular sacrifice named the Jāmadāgnya ahina sacrifice in which the upasad—offerings—consist of puroḍāsas (sacrificial cakes). Now, though the mantras for offering the puroḍāsas originated in the Sāmaveda yet they are in all cases connected with *i.e.* are uttered by a Yajurveda priest

viz , an *adhvaryu* . The principle underlying such connection is that the offering of the *purodāsa* is the work of the *adhvaryu*, and subordinate matters (the mantras) are always governed by the principal matter (the procedure ordained for the offering of the *purodāsa*) . Similarly in the present case, the attributes of the *Akshara Brahman*, in whatever texts they occur or do not occur, are subordinate to the *Akshara Brahman* itself, and hence they must in all cases be connected with the *Akshara Brahman* . This principle has already been explained in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-Philosophy* .

३३ । इयदात्मननात् ।

३४ । मुख्यक-श्वेताश्वरीकं (३।१।१ , ४।६) “द्वौ सुपर्णा” इति मन्त्रे, एकस्य भोक्तृत्वम्, एकस्य च अभोक्तृत्व दृश्यते । कठोके च “ऋतं पिवन्तौ” (१।३।१) एवमादौ मन्त्रे उभयोरपि भोक्तृत्वमेव दृश्यते । किमत्र विद्यैकत्वम्, उत विद्यानानात्वम्, इति वितर्कं ब्रवीति, विद्यैकत्वम् इति । कुत ? यत उभयो अपि एतयो मन्त्रयो ‘इयता’ इत्यनया द्वित्वपरिच्छेदेन अभिन्न वेद्य रूप परमात्मान ‘आत्मनन्ति’ कथयन्ति वेदान्ता । नास्ति वेद्यभेदः, तच्चात् विद्यैकत्वम् ।

34 (The texts “Dvā suparnā &c” and “Ritam pivantā &c , constitute the same vidya) because (in both cases) the (same) number is stated

In the mantra beginning with the words “Two birds of beautiful plumage” which occurs in Mund III 1 1 and Svet IV 6 , of the two, the individual self and the Supreme Self, one only has been stated to be an enjoyer, and the

other a non-enjoyer while, in the mantra beginning with the words "Two are enjoying the fruits which occurs in Kath 1 3 1 both are stated to be enjoyers. The doubt therefore arises whether we have two different vidyās here or one. The sūtra says both constitute one vidyā. Why so? Because in both cases the Vedānta mantras have as their common object of knowledge the Supreme Self as defined by the same number १/३ the number two. And as the object of knowledge is one the vidyā, too is one

३३ । अस्तस्य मूलधामवत् स्वात्मनः ।

३३ । "यत् साचादयोवा इह य आत्मा सर्वानात् (इह १।३।१ १।३।१) इति एव विं उच्यते कहील प्रथमी नृत्तयोऽथ वासुदेविनः समात्मनि । यत्र यथासात् विद्यानात्मात् उत विद्यैकत्वं वा स्यात् इति वितर्कं प्रवीति उभयत्र अपि स्वात्मनः अविशिष्टत्वात् 'अस्तस्य सर्वानात् १/३ इति प्रत्यक्षेण च । ततश्च विद्यैकत्वम् । न हि हि आत्मानो एकस्मिन् दीर्घे सर्वानात् उच्यते । मूलधामवत् इति सुबलं निदर्शयति । यथा "एषो दीर्घः सर्वभूतेषु ब्रूया सर्वभूतानां प्रथमा (इह १।३।१) इति अस्मिन् सन्ने समस्तेषु मूलधामेषु एका एव सर्वानात् आत्मयते, एवम् अन्तर्हीः अपि भन्तर्हीः इत्यपि ।

35 (Though the same passage occurs twice the vidyā in them is one) *because the undifferentiated Self is within all* (and hence cannot be two) *as* (clearly stated in the text about) *all beings*

The Vājasaneyins in their Brihadāranyaka Upanishad record one and the same passage twice in succession in the Questions of Ushasta and Kahola viz in III 4 1 and

III 5 1 The passage is this, "That Brahman which is directly perceived, and is not hidden, the Self who is within all" Here a doubt may arise as to whether there are two different vidyās on account of the repetition, or there is one vidyā only? The Sūtra says In both passages, in the questions and answers, "the undifferentiated Self" is represented as "within", i e, "within all things". Hence the unity of vidyā, because in one body there cannot be two selves each of which is within all things. The Sūtra refers to another text by the words "as in all beings" In the mantra "He is the one God, hidden in all beings, he is all-pervading, the Self within all beings" (Svet VI 11), the one Self within all is declared to be existing in all beings. Similarly in the two questions and answers under discussion

३६ । अन्यथा भेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्नोपदेशान्तरवत् ।

३६ । 'अन्यथा' आत्मानभेदेन विद्याभेदे अगङ्गीकारे, 'भेदानुपपत्ति' आत्मानभेदस्य अनुपपत्ति अयुक्तता भवेत्, 'इति चेत् न' । 'उपदेशान्तरवत्' यथा छान्दोग्योपनिषदि षष्ठाध्याये अष्टनाटिषु खण्डेषु "स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकोटी" इति नवमोऽक्षरं अपि उपदेशे विद्याभेद न भवति, एवम् ३६ अपि ।

36 If it be contended that otherwise separate scriptural statements become indefensible, we say, No ; as in the case of another instruction

If it be objected that unless we admit separate vidyās wherever there happen to be separate scriptural passages, the separate scriptural statements become indefensible,

we say No. As in the case of another instruction viz the passage "That is the Self thou art That O Sveta Letu" which occurs nine times in the eighth and subsequent sections of the sixth chapter of the Chhândogya Upani had As that instruction though repeated nine times does not put on one vidyâ into many so also here

३०। अतिहारो विगिंयस्ति क्षीतवत् ।

३०। "तद्विद्वन् भूमीं दीप्यो भातम्" (ऐतरेय ब्राह्मण ११।३।६) इति ऐतरेयिन् अतिवदुर्द्वयं पश्यन् ब्रह्मसमम् । तदा ब्र। ५ "सं वा ददमसि भद्रं प्रद दत्तं वा न भवति" । तत्र ददम्- विद्विह अतिहारो गृह्यद्वया मतिः कृत्या नत पश्यता एव इति । अत्र इवेति अतिहारः प्रवृत्तयो मिय विषय विनिश्चय एव ज्ञेयः अत्र नहि । वि दत्तं ब्रह्मवातात् गृह्यद्वयादम् (विद्वन्विद्विह अतिवदुर्द्वयः । ३० वदु क्षीतवत्ता एता भूमौदमस्यनतदा एताय आभायन्ते, तद्वत् ।

37 (In the double enunciations I am thou and "Thou art I etc.) a reciprocal statement (is to be understood) because (the texts) clearly distinguish (the two meditations) as others

There is a text of the Aitareyins about the Person in the sun which says What I am that is he. What he is that am I (Aita 1r II 2 4 6) Similarly there is a text of the Jâbhlas which runs I am thou O great divinity and thou art I In such cases of double enunciation the doubt arises whether a two fold meditation is necessary or only a single one is sufficient The Sâtra declares Reciprocity is meant here i.e. both the above statements in which the individual self and the Lord

appear by turns as subject and predicate, are enjoined for the purposes of meditation, "because those uttering the texts here clearly distinguish them" by mentioning both distinctly "As others, *i e*, just as other attributes of the Lord, his all-pervasiveness, etc, are prescribed in scripture for meditation

३८ । सैव हि सत्यादयः ।

३८ । "स यो ह्येवमेव महद् यच्च प्रथमजं वेद सत्यं ब्रह्म" (बृह ५।४।१) इत्यादिना वाजसनेयके सत्यविद्या विधाय अनन्तरम् आम्नायते "तद् यत् तत् सत्यमसौ स आदित्यो य एष एतन्निन् मण्डले पुरुषो यन्नाय दक्षिणेऽक्षन् पुरुष" (बृह ५।५।२) इत्यादि । अत्र 'सा एव' पूर्वोक्ता एव सत्यविद्या परत्र उपदिश्यते । 'हि' यत्र पूर्वोक्ता "सत्यादयः" गुणा परत्र च अभिज्ञायन्ते ।

38 (The vidyā of the True treated of in a later passage is *the same as* (that in an earlier passage,) because "*the True &c* (are recognised as the same)

The text of the Vājasaneyins after imparting the knowledge of the True by the words "He who knows this great glorious First-born as the true Brahman" (*Brī* V 4 1), goes on to declare, "Now, that which is that True, the same is the Aditya, the same is the Person (that dwells in that orb, the same is the Person) in the right eye" (*Brī* V 5 2) Here we are to know that the same vidyā of the True that is taught in the earlier passage is taught again in the later passage Because the words "the True etc", which are treated of in the earlier passage, are recognised in the later passage as the same

३८ । कामादीतरत तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः ।

३८ । “यस्य यदिदमस्मिन् ब्रह्मरूपे ददर्श पुण्यरीतिं विमम ददर्शोऽस्मिन् चत्वारोऽङ्गाः
(वा ८११) इति प्रकृत्य ब्रह्मणा चोदयते “एष आत्मा पश्यतामा विजया विद्या
विमोक्षी विजिघृक्षीऽपिपाम भयकामः स्वयमहम्” (वा ८०१) इत्यादि । तथा
वाचस्पतयिः न वा एष महान्त आत्मा योऽयं विद्यामयः प्रागुक्त एषोऽङ्गादय
आत्मस्वरूपेण चोदयते मय्येव यदी (इह वा ८११) इत्यादि । ‘कामादि’ स्वयमात्मनि
इत्यर्थः । यत् एतत् आत्माय उदयाद्यात्मन्यभ्यासमात्रात्प्राप्तम् उपलभ्यते तत्
इतरम् वाचस्पतये “न वा एष महान्त आत्मा इति चतु मन्वभ्यत । यत् च
वाचस्पतये वदित्वा उपलभ्यत इत् उपि तत्र ब्रह्मस्य “एष आत्मा पश्यतामा
इति चतु मन्वभ्यत । ‘आयतनादिभ्यः’ यत्र उभयत्र समानं उदयायतनं समानं च
वेदोद्भवः समानं च तस्य सितुम् भोवाचम-प्रयोजनम् इति एवमादि बहुतरं
शङ्कायं दहति ।

39 *Desires and other qualities* (of the Self mentioned in different passages have to be combined) *both there and here on account of* (numerous common characteristics such as) *abode etc*

In the *Chhandogya Upanishad* (VIII 1 1) we have the passage “There in that city of Brahman is an abode viz. the small lotus and in it again there is the small inner ākāśa followed later on by the passage “That is the Self free from sin free from decay free from death free from grief free from hunger and thirst his desires are true his imaginations are true (*Chh* VIII 7 1) &c. Again in the text of the *Vājasaneyins*, we find “He is that great unborn Self whose essence is knowledge He abides in that ākāśa within the heart in the midst of the prāṇas. He is

the ruler of all," (*Bṛ. IV. 4 22*) "Desires etc" in the Sutra means "true desires etc" The attributes such as "having true desires", etc, which are predicated about the Ākāśa within the heart in the *Chhândogya* are to be combined "in the other passage" i e, in the passage "He that is the great unborn Self" etc, of the *Vājasaneyins*. And again, attributes such as "the ruler of all" etc, mentioned by the *Vājasaneyins* are to be combined "there", i e, in the passage in the *Chhândogya* "That is the Self, free from sin" etc Why so? "On account of the abode etc", i e, because common to both there are a number of characteristics, such as, the heart being an 'abode', the Lord being the object of knowledge, and also the Lord being described as a bank which prevents the worlds from getting confused together by losing their identities, and so on

४० । आदरादलीपः ।

४० । पूषेपचसूत्रम् एतत् । छान्दोग्ये वैश्वानरविद्या प्रकृत्य दृश्यते तद् यद् भक्त प्रथममागच्छेत् तद्धीमीयं स या प्रथमाहुति जुहुयात् ता जुहुयात् प्राणाय स्वाहा" (छा ३।२।१।) इति । तत्र पञ्चप्राणाहुतयो विहिता । तासु च परस्तादग्निहोत्रशब्द प्रयुक्त "य एतदेव विद्वानग्निहोत्र जुहोति" (छा ३।२।४।) इति,

“यथेह श्रुतिता बाला नातर पर्युपासते ।

एव सर्वान् भूतान् अग्निहोत्रमुपासते ॥” (छा ३।२।४।)

इति च । तत्र इदं विचार्यते किं भोजनलीपे लीपः प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्य उत अलीप इति । ‘अलीप’ तावत् प्राप्त । ‘आदरात्’ तथा हि वैश्वानरविद्यायाम् एव जावान्नाना श्रुति “पूर्वोऽतिथिभ्योऽग्नीयात् यथा वै स्वयमाहुत्वाऽग्निहोत्र परस्य जुहुयादेव तत्” इति अतिथि-भोजनस्य प्राथम्यं निन्दित्वा स्वामिभोजनं प्रथमं प्रापयन्ती प्राणाग्निहोत्रे आदरं करोति ।

40 (The *Pránágnihotra* enjoined on a householder while taking food) *is not to be omitted* (even when he happens not to take any food) *on account of the great importance* (attached to the *Pránágnihotra* in a *Jábála* passage)

The *Párvapaksha* In connection with the *Vaisvá naravidya* the *Chhândogya* has this passage, Therefore the food that has come first is to be considered as *homa* The oblation which he (the consumer of the food) thus offers first, he should offer with the words *Pránáya Sváhá!* (*Chh V 21 1*) Afterwards the text enjoins five several oblations to the *pranas* To these oblations later on the term *Agnihotra* is applied in these two passages — He who knowing this in this way offers the *Agnihotra* oblation (*Chh V 24 2* and Just as hungry children on earth wait upon their mother similarly all beings wait upon the *Agnihotra* (*Chh V 24 4*) Here the doubt arises whether when no food is taken the *Pránágnihotra* is to be omitted or not The *Párvapaksha* says, 'There should be no omission Why so? On account of the importance attached to it In connection with the same *Vaisvá naravidyá*, we have the following *Jábála* passage He (i.e. the householder) should take his meal before the guests have theirs Otherwise it would appear as if the householder without having first offered his own *Agnihotra* oblation was offering that of another So much importance is attached by this passage to the *Pránágnihotra* that (contrary to custom) it objects to the guests having their meals first and enjoins that the householder should eat before them

४१ । उपस्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात् ।

४१ । सिद्धान्तम् । 'उपस्थिते' भोजने 'यत' तस्मात् एव भोजनद्रव्यात् प्रथमोपनिषत्पितात् प्राणायिकोऽहं निर्व्यञ्जितव्यम् । 'तद्वचनात्' तथाहि "तद्वद्वक्त प्रथममागच्छेत् तद्वद्वक्तम्" (छा ५।२।११) इति सिद्धवद्वक्तोपनिषत्-परामर्शेन परार्थद्रव्यसाध्यता प्राणायुक्तोनां विदधाति ।

41 (The Pránágnihotra should be performed) *when the eating is actually taking place and with that* 'i e, with the victuals first presented), *because the text declares thus*

The Sutrakára's view is that the Pránágnihotra should be performed "when the eating is actually taking place", and "with that" 'i e, with the victuals first presented "Because the text declares thus," 'i e, because the passage "Therefore the food that has come first is to be considered as homa" (Chk V 21 1) refers to the presentation of victuals as something already accomplished, and consequently makes out the Pránágnihotra (not as an end in itself, but) as dependent on something (the taking of food) which has another object (the satisfaction of hunger)

४२ । तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्वद्वद्वदेः पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।

४२ । सन्नि कर्मोक्त्यापान्याणि विज्ञानानि "ओमित्येतद्वक्तमुक्तीयमुपासीत" (छा १।१।१) इत्येवमादीनि । किं तानि नित्यानि एव स्युः कर्मसु उत अनित्यानि ? अत्र ब्रूय, — 'तन्निर्धारणानियमः' इति । यानि एतानि उक्तीनां कर्मगुण-याथात्म्य-

निर्वाणानि न एतासि नियतत्वात् न च नियतत्वेन । तदुक्तं तथा हि अनियतत्वम्
 एव एवञ्चातीवकालं दमयति स्तुतिः—“तिसामी हवती वेयेतदिव विद वय न विद
 (भा १।१।१) इति । इत्युभयविषयं फलम् (इत्युक्त्वा हि अतिवचनं फलम्) अपि
 च एवञ्चातीवकालं कालमप्यायस्य विद्यायस्य इत्युक्त्वा एव कर्त्तव्यं फलम् उपलभ्यत
 कालमपि ह्ययमिति च तत्सुप्रसिद्धं अतिप्रसिद्धं कश्चित् “यदेव विदया कुरीति शब्दा
 उपनिषदा तदेव कीर्त्तयन्तं भवति (भा १।१।१) इति ।

42. *Scriptural assertions do not make out (the vidyās) to be constant as seen (in scriptural texts) But they have different fruits —removal of hindrances*

Certain vidyās in the Upanishads are made to depend on minor sacrificial acts, e g the first vidyā of the *Chhândogya* Upanishad introduced by the words ‘The syllable Om is to be meditated upon as Udgîtha (I 1 1) Do these vidyās constitute a constant and essential element of the sacrifice, or are they separable and non essential? On this point the Sūtra says, Scriptural assertions do not make them out to be constant : e the scriptural statements about the nature of such sacrificial functions as the udgîtha etc. are not to be permanently connected with the sacrifices. Because this is seen : e because scripture declares that such functions are not constant elements, e g in this passage which occurs in I 1 10 — ‘Therefore he who knows this and he who knows not both perform the sacrifice ‘They have different fruits,—the removal of hindrances : e the vidyās dependent on such minor functions have fruits of their own different from those of the sacrifice itself viz. removal of hindrances to the attainment of the object of the sacrifice : e a certain additional

success, as in the passage, "The sacrifice performed with knowledge, faith and the Upanishad is more powerful" (Chh I 1 10)

४३ । प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम् ।

४३ । वाजसनेयके "वदिष्याम्येवाहमिति वाग्दध्रे" (बृह १।३।२१) इति अत्र अध्यात्म वागादीनां प्रायः श्रेष्ठ अवधारित अधिदैवम् अन्यादीनां वायुः । तथा छान्दोग्य "वायुर्वायुः सवर्गः" (छा ४।३।१) इति अत्र अधिदैवम् अन्यादीनां वायुः सवर्गः अवधारित, "प्राणो वायुः सवर्गः" (छा ४।३।३) इति अत्र अध्यात्म वागादीनां प्रायः । तत्र सशयः, किं पृथक् वा इमौ वायुप्राणौ उपगन्तव्यौ स्याताम् उत अपृथक् वा इति । अत्र सिद्धान्तः,—पृथक् एव वायुप्राणौ उपगन्तव्यौ इति । कस्मात् ? पृथगुपदेशात् । आध्यानाय अयम् अध्यात्माधिदैव-विभागोपदेशः, स असति आध्यानपृथक्त्वे अनर्थकः एव स्यात् । प्रदानवत् यथा "इन्द्रो यं राज्ञे विपुः शमेकादशकपालनिन्द्रावाऽधिगजावेन्द्राय स्वराज्ञे" (तैत्ति २।३।६) इति अन्याम् विपुः शमेकादशकपालनिन्द्रावाऽधिगजादि-गुणभेदात् प्रदानपृथक्त्वम् भवति, एवम् अत्र अपि तत्त्वभेदेऽपि आध्यानाश्रयत्वत्वात् आध्यानपृथक्त्वम् । 'तदुक्तम्' तत् उक्तम् जैमिनिना पूर्व्वर्णनीमासायाम् ।

43 Vāyu and Prāna, are here to be considered different) as in the case of the offerings This has been shown (in the Purvamīmāṃsā).

In the passage of the Vājasaneyins which begins with the words "The Voice decided, I will speak" (Bṛ I 5 21) Prāna is specified as the best among the bodily organs, viz., Speech etc, and Vāyu is specified as the best among the Devas, viz., Agni etc Again, in the Chhāndogya Upanishad, in the passage "Vāyu indeed is the engulfer" (IV. 3 1), Vāyu is specified as the engulfer of all Devas,

४४ । मित्रभूयस्त्वात् तच्च समीयस्तदपि ।

४४ । वाचस्पतिविरचिते अष्टादश्यां नववाच्ये सूत्रे सप्तमीत् इति अस्मिन् शास्त्रे
नव अष्टादश्यां अष्टादश्यां "वदन्तिनां सप्तमीत्वात् सप्तमीत्वात् सप्तमीत्वात्" इति

इति पृथक् अग्नीन् आमनन्ति । तेषु संशयः,—किम् एते मनस्विदादयः क्रियानुप्रवेशिनः
तत्संशयभूता उत स्वतन्त्रा केवलविद्यात्मका इति ? स्वतन्त्रा इति सिद्धान्तः, 'लिङ्ग-
भूयत्वात्' यतः भूयासि लिङ्गानि एषां विद्यात्मकत्वम् उपोदयन्ति अग्निं
ब्राह्मणं दृश्यन्ते—“तद्वत् किञ्चेमानि भूतानि मनसः सङ्कल्पयन्ति तेषामेव सा कृति”
इति “तान् हैतानेव विदे सर्वदा सर्वाणि भूतानि चिन्त्यन्तपि स्वपते” इति च,
एवञ्जातीयकानि । ‘तत् हि’ लिङ्गम् प्रकरणात् “बलीय” । ‘तत् अपि’ उक्तं
त्रैमिनिना पूर्वमीमांसायाम् ।

44 (The bright mental fires mentioned in the Agnirahasya of the Vājasaneyins are mere vidyās, and separate from the sacrifices, *because there are numerous indications* (in scriptural passages that they are so) *That* (i. e., an indicatory passage) *has greater force* (than the general subject matter) *This too* (has been explained in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā)

A passage about the sensorium is found in the Agnirahasya of the Vājasaneyins in the Brāhmana which begins with the words “This was not existent in the beginning” The passage runs thus, “It (the sensorium) saw 36,000 bright fires of its own, composed of manas built out of *manas* Then the passage goes on to mention several (figurative) fires, different from the actually lighted fires. Now the question is, Are these fires built out of *manas* etc., to be considered as connected with the sacrificial act (*viz.*, actually building a fire-altar with bricks), and so supplementary to it ? Or, are they to be considered as separate from the sacrificial act, and constituting a mere vidyā ? The Sutra says, they are separate, “Because there are numerous indications” in the texts of that Brāhmana confirming the

character of these fires as mere vidyās *i. e.*, Whatever thoughts these beings think in their minds—they go to form those same (mind built fires) and For one who knows this, all beings are always building up their fires (by their thoughts) even when he himself sleeps and similar other passages. And that *i. e.*, an indicatory passage has greater force than the general subject matter This too has been explained in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā

४५ । पूर्वविकल्प प्रकृत्यात् स्यात् क्रिया मानसवत् ।

४५ । पूर्ववत्पूतमेतत् । न एतत् युक्तं स्वतन्त्रं एते अग्रय इति । पूर्वविकल्प प्रकृत्यात् स्यात् पूतस्य क्रियात्मकस्य अग्रय प्रकृत्यात् तद्विषय एव अयं विवक्ष्यविमोक्षीयदीप्तः स्यात् न स्वतन्त्रः । क्रिया मानसवत् एते अग्रय मन कल्पिता अपि प्रकृत्यात् क्रियाविमिन एव सन् । यथा वादशपवसाज्य-यागे शयिष्या पात्रेषु समुद्रस्य भीमस्य यदवादिश्रियापि मानसानि अपि क्रियाप्रकृत्यात् क्रियाविमिषापि एव एवम् एते अग्रय अपि क्रियात्मकाः ।

45 (The mental fire is) a particular form of the preceding fire because of the general subject matter (This fire, too is) an act like the mental (acts of certain Soma sacrifices)

The Pūrvapakṣa. It is not reasonable to say that these (mental) fires are unconnected with the sacrifice.

Because of the general subject matter which is an actual fire, we consider this too to be a particular form of the preceding one the instruction here being about a particular mode of the sacrificial fire itself and not unconnected with it. It is "an act, like the mental acts etc. *i. e.* these fires,

though built of thought, are, on account of the subject matter, to be taken as part of the sacrificial act. Just as in a particular Soma-sacrifice lasting 12 days, in which the earth is viewed as the cup and the sea as Soma, all the acts such as taking the cup etc., though performed in thought only, are considered to be parts of the sacrificial act, because the subject-matter is sacrifice, so also in the present case are the thought-fires to be considered as parts of the sacrificial act.

૪૬ । અતિદેશાચ્છ ।

૪૬ । પૂર્વપક્ષ । ‘અતિદેશાત્’ ‘ચ’ વ્યાખ્યાન અગ્નિના ક્રિયાશિપત્તમ્ । પૂર્વેણ ઉપકા-ચિત્તેન ક્રિયાનુપ્રવેશિના અગ્નિના અતિદેશની શ્રુતિ એવા અપિ ક્રિયાનુપ્રવેશ દ્યોતયતિ । સતિ હિ સામાન્યે અતિદેશ પ્રવર્તતે ।

46 (The same thing is proved) *further by the extension of injunctions*

(The Purvapaksha continued) That these fires too are part of the sacrificial act is proved further by the extension of scriptural injunctions to them. By extending the injunctions relating to the preceding brick-built fires, which are parts of sacrificial act, to these fires, scripture indicates that these too are parts of such acts. Extension of injunctions is possible only where there is similarity of characteristics.

૪૭ । વિદ્યૈવ તુ નિર્ધારિણાત્ ।

૪૭ । સિદ્ધાન્તપક્ષમ્ । ‘તુ’-શબ્દ પચ વ્યાવર્તયતિ । વિદ્યાત્મકા એવ એતે

अतश्च। अनपिदादयः अग्नयः स्युः न हि यन्ममूतः, यतः सृतिः तथा एव निर्वाणवति —
 “तं हेतुं विचारिता एव” इति विद्या हेतुत एव विदितता भवति इति च ।

47 *But really (these fires constitute) a vidyā for there is scriptural assertion to that effect*

The Sūtrakāra's view The word *but* discards the Pūrvapakṣa. These mind built fires etc. are independent and of the character of vidyās, and are not parts of sacrificial acts, as scripture itself declares them to be such in these passages,— ‘These are really built of vidyā and For one who knows these are really built of vidyā

४८ । दर्शनाच्च ।

४८ । दृश्यते च एषां स्वात्मने निहा तत् प्रत्यक्षं दर्शितं ‘सिद्धमूयसात्’ इति च ।

48. *And because (indicatory marks of that) are also seen (in the scriptures)*

Indicatory marks about the independence of these fires are also to be seen in the scriptures, as shown already in the 44th Sūtra by the words *because there are numerous indications*”

४९ । श्रुत्यादिबलौयस्त्वाच्च न दाधः ।

४९ । ननु, अयन्नाम् अन्नात् प्राप्ती सिद्धम् अपि कश्चित् पर्वस्य अथाप्य न बीजकम् इत्यर्थः, इति अपास्त तत् मन्त्रं स्वयम्भूतम् श्रुतिवैतनम् अन्वयविवेकम्,

इति अतः उत्तर पठति, 'न वाच' न एव प्रकरणसामर्थ्यात् क्रियाशेषत्वम् अव्यवसायं स्वातन्त्र्यपक्षं वाधितव्यम् । 'श्रुत्यादिवलीयत्वात्' यतः श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यानि प्रकरणात् वलीयांसि ।

49 (The weakness of unaided indicatory marks) *does not constitute a refutation* (of our position), *because scriptural declaration etc have greater force*

The following objection may be urged When there is no other (*i e*, corroborative) reason, a mere indicatory mark fails to prove anything, hence, that being rejected, the force of the subject matter ought to prevail, and the mental fires are thus proved to be parts of sacrificial acts To this we reply "The weakness of unaided indicatory marks does not constitute a refutation" of our position, *i e*, it would be unreasonable to assume, on the strength of the general subject matter only, that the mental fires are parts of sacrificial acts, and to oppose the view that they are independent "Because scriptural declaration etc have greater force", *i e* because direct scriptural declaration and indirect scriptural indication have greater force than the general subject matter

५० । अनुबन्धादिव्यः प्रज्ञान्तर-पृथक्त्ववत् दृष्टश्च तदुक्तम् ।

५० । इतश्च प्रकरणम् उपपद्य स्वातन्त्र्यं मनसिदादीनां प्रतिपत्तव्यं, यत् क्रियावयवान् मन-आदि-व्यापारेषु अनुवध्नाति,—“ते मनसैवाधीयन्त मनसैवाधीयन्त मनसैव यद्वा अगृह्यन्त मनसाऽस्तुवन् मनसाऽशसन् यत् किञ्चित् यज्ञं कम् क्रियते यत् किञ्चित् यज्ञियं कार्यं मनसैव तेषु तन्मनीमयेषु मनश्चित्सु मनीमयमक्रियते” इत्यादिना । एवम् अनुबन्धात् स्वातन्त्र्यं मनीमयादीनाम् । 'आदि'शब्दात् अतिदेशाद्यपि यथासम्भव

आदिनाम् । बुद्ध्यानि च कारयति इति । एवम् अग्न्यादिभ्यः कारयन्
 भागवत् । ननुदिनादीनाम् । 'मन्त्राणां पदकलत्रम् इत्यादिनाम् विद्यावर्तनीनि मन्त्रा
 नानि एव मेव अग्न्यादिनाम् अग्न्यादिनाम् पदकलत्रम् इत्यादिनाम् । अग्न्यादिनाम्
 मन्त्रा, एवम् इति । इत्येव एवम् अग्न्यादिनाम् अग्न्यादिनाम् कारयति इत्यादिनाम्
 अग्न्यादिनाम् इत्येव । अग्न्यादिनाम् अग्न्यादिनाम् अग्न्यादिनाम् कारयति
 अग्न्यादिनाम् । 'मन्त्राणां पदकलत्रम्' इति ।

50 (The mind built fires etc are independent of sacrificial acts for another reason too viz.) *because of the connection (declared in some texts of actual sacrificial acts with mental activities) and for other reasons as in the case of the separateness of certain other offerings. This is seen (in another case) also and it has already been explained (in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā)*

We have to assume the independence of the mind built fires etc. disregarding the general subject matter for another reason also viz. that there are texts which instead of making the mental activities dependent on sacrificial acts actually do the reverse i. e., connect the very sacrificial functions with activities of the mind etc. thus — By the mind only are they (the fires etc.) to be supported by the mind only are they to be built by the mind only are the sacrificial cups taken by the mind do (the udgātṛis) praise by the mind do the (hotṛis) recite. All that is done at the sacrifice all sacrificial acts whatsoever are done by the mind are done as consisting of the mind and are done on the fire altars made of mind and built with mind etc. On account of such connection and other reasons it follows that the mind built fires etc., are

independent Among the "other reasons" the extension of injunctions etc , too, should be included as far as possible , and we have already seen that direct scriptural declaration etc (Sūtra 49) are other reasons in our favour Thus, by virtue of the connection described above, and the other reasons adduced previously, the independence of the mind-built fires etc is firmly established "As in the case of the separateness of certain other cognitions" Certain other cognitions, e g the Sāṅdilyavidyā etc , though connected with their respective sacrificial acts, are yet separate from these sacrificial acts and from other cognitions, and are independent The same is the case here This (viz independence of the general subject matter) is seen in another case also The offering named Aveshti which occurs in the scripture under the subject-head Rājāsūya, is seen to be raised above that heading The reason for such superiority is that the Aveshti is connected with all the three higher castes, while the Rājāsūya can be performed by Kshatriyas only "This has already been explained" in the Purvāmīmāṃsā

५१। न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्न तु यत् न हि लोकापत्तिः ।

५१। यत् उक्तं "मानसवत्" इति तत् प्रत्यक्ष्यते । 'न सामान्यात् अपि' न मानसग्रह-सामान्यात् अपि मनयिदादीना क्रियाशेषत्वं कल्प्यम् । 'उपलब्धे' यत् पूर्वोक्तेभ्यः श्रुत्यादिभ्यः हेतुभ्यः तेषां केवलपुरुषार्थत्वम् एव उपलभ्यते । न हि किञ्चित् कस्यचित् केनचित् सामान्यं न सम्भवति । न च तावता यथास्वं वैषम्यं निवर्त्तते । 'नत्यवत् न हि लोकापत्तिः' यथा "सा वा एष एव सत्यं य एष एतस्मिन् मण्डले पुरुषः" (शतपथब्राह्मण १०।५।२।३) इति, "अग्निर्वै सत्यः" (तैत्ति ५।१।१०।३) इति च

सम्यक्प्रवृत्तयो ममान् अपि मय्यन्वर्तन्ते न च दण्डोपपत्तिः । यदा च “यस्यो
 वासो वायुः स वायुः स वायुः” (सा. ब्रा. १. १. १) इत्यन्तं न सम्यक्प्र-
 वृत्तयो मय्यन्वर्तन्ते न च दण्डोपपत्तिः ।

51 *Not even from similarity* (can the mental fires be proved to be parts of the sacrifice. From scriptural observation (the opposite conclusion is reached) *Just as* (its things, each of which is compared to) *death* (do not become identical) *nor does a world* (compared to fire) *actually become* (fire)

This Sūtra replies to the Pūrvapakṣa argument based on the similarity to the mental cup (Sūtra 45). Not even from their similarity in the mental cup can the mind built fires be conceived to be parts of the sacrificial act. From scriptural observation, i.e. from both direct scriptural declaration and indirect scriptural indication the mental fires are observed to fulfil certain purposes of men only (and not the purposes of any sacrificial action). Again it is impossible that a thing should not resemble any other thing in some respect or other yet this does not prevent the thing from having such differences from all other things as constitute its individuality. As in the case of death the worlds do not become identical. In the two passages “The same is indeed Death who is the Person in that orb (Satapatha Brahmana V. 5. 2. 3) and Agni indeed is Death (Taittiriya Samhita V. 1. 10. 3) the word death is applied equally to Agni and to the Person in the sun but this does not prove that the two are absolutely identical. Again take the passage “That (heavenly) world is indeed Agni O Gotama the sun is its fuel (Chh-

V 4 1). Here, from the similarity in having fuel etc., it cannot be proved that the world has actually become Agni. So also in the present case

५२ । परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विष्यं भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्धः ।

५२ । 'परेण च' परस्तात् अपि, "अथं वाव लोका एषोऽग्निरिति" इति एतस्मिन् अनन्तरे ब्राह्मणे, 'शब्दस्य' ब्राह्मणवाक्यस्य 'ताद्विष्यं' केवलविद्याविधित्वं प्रयोजनं न दृश्यते । 'भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्धः' भूयस् त्वं अन्यत्रयवा सम्पादयितव्या विद्यायाम्, इति, एतस्मात् च कारणात् अग्निना अनुबध्यते विद्या, न कर्माहत्वात् । तस्मात् मनस्विदादीनां केवल-विद्यात्मकत्वसिद्धिः ।

52 Subsequently also (in the same scriptural passage) the text is of that kind The connection (with sacrifice), however, is due to the multiplicity (of details)

"Subsequently also", i e, in the very next Brāhmaṇa beginning with the words "That world, indeed, is this fire that has been built", it is to be noticed that the drift of "the text is of that kind" i e the text enjoins a mere vidyā (and not a sacrificial act) "The connection, however, is due to the multiplicity" i e the reason why this vidyā (of the mind-built fires) is connected in the text with the sacrificial fire is that several elements of the actual fire have to be (by imagination) combined with the vidyā, and not that the vidyā itself is a part of the sacrificial act From all this it is proved that the mind-built fires etc., are of the nature of a vidyā only

५३ । एक आत्मनः शरीरे भावात् ।

५३ । इह देहव्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनः सद्भावः समर्थ्यते बन्धनोच्चाधिकार-सिद्धये ।

‘एव साक्षात्प्राप्तत्वा’ दृष्टान् आत्मन अप्रतिरिक्तम् पातु । इति च आचर्यते — ‘शरीरे
भावम् यतः शरीरे सति एव अन्तर्बाहि आत्मनश्च भवति असति च न भवति । एवं
प्राप्ते परस्मिन् त्वे दिव्यप्रतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनः सत्तायै प्रतिपादयति ।

53 *Some (maintain the identity) of the self (with the body) because of its appearance when the body exists*

In the present section it will be proved that the self exists even without the body so that its liability to bondage and release may be established. Some viz the Lokāyatikas hold the non-difference of the self from the body. The reason they adduce is this — Because of its appearance when the body exists, i.e. because consciousness and other attributes of the self appear only when the body exists and disappear when the body ceases to exist. Against this position the next Sūtra proves the existence of the Self apart from the body.

५४ । व्यतिरेकस्तद्वाभावभावित्वात् तूपलब्धिवत् ।

५४ । न तु एतत् सति यत उत्तम् अप्रतिरिक्तं दृष्टान् आत्मन इति
‘अप्रतिरिक्त’ एव अस्य दृष्टान् भवितुम् अस्ति । ‘तद्वाभावभावित्वात्’ यतः तद्वायं शरीरे
सति अपि अन्तर्बाह्यात् अन्तर्बाह्यात् आत्मनश्च न भवति । उपलब्धिवत् यथा
एव भूतभीतिकविबवात्, उपलब्धे सति त्वम् च भुपयमते एवं तस्मात् त्वम् व्यतिरेक
अपि अभूय लभ्य । उपलब्धिवत् एव च न आत्मा इति आत्मन दिव्यप्रतिरिक्तस्य
भित्तव्यं च उपलब्ध एव लभ्यते ।

54 *Not so (there is) difference (between the self and the body) because (even) in the existence of that (the*

body) (there may be) *non existence* (of the self) , as in the case of perception

It is not correct to say that the self is identical with the body. On the other hand, "difference" between the two is the reasonable conclusion. "Because even in the existence of the body there may be non existence", e.g. in the state of death, even though the body exists, consciousness, memory and the other functions of self do not manifest themselves. "As in the case of perception," i.e. on the same grounds on which the *existence* of perception (of material objects and material products) is admitted, the *difference* of such perception from the material objects has also to be admitted. To us perception is of the very essence of the self, therefore the self's distinction from the body is evident, and so is its eternality because of the identity of perception (in spite of the variability of its objects)

५५ । अङ्गाववज्ञास्तु न शाखास्तु हि प्रतिवेदम् ।

५५ । सनाता प्रसङ्गिणी इयं कथा । सम्प्रति प्रकृताम् एव अनुवर्त्तमाने ।
 "ओमित्येतद्वचमुक्तीथमुपासीत" (का १।१।१), "लीलेषु नञ्विष सामीपासीत"
 (का १।२।१) "उक्तथमुक्तथमिति वै प्रजा वदन्ति । तद्विदम्वेदोक्तमिदमेव पृथिवी"
 (ऐतरेय आरण्यक १।१।२।१) । "अथ वाव लीक एषोऽत्रिस्थित" (शतपथब्राह्मण
 १०।३।४।१) इति एवमाद्या प्रत्यया 'अङ्गाववज्ञा' उक्तीयादिकन्वाङ्गेन सम्बद्धा
 प्रतिवेद शाखासिद्धेषु विहिता । ते तत्-तत् शाखागतेषु एव उक्तीयादिषु भवेयुः अथवा
 सर्वशाखागतेषु इति सश्रयः । अत्र सिद्धान्तः,— 'न' एते 'प्रतिवेदम्' स्वशाखास्तु एव
 व्यवतिष्ठेरन्, अपि 'तु' सर्वशाखास्तु अनुवर्त्तेरन् ।

55 *But (the injunctions about vidyās, though) connected with (various) members (of sacrificial acts are) not (restricted) to the particular śākhās of each Veda*

The topic incidentally taken up ended in the last Sutra. We now return to the proper matter under discussion. Notice these texts —“One should meditate on the syllable Om as the udgītha (*Chh* I 1 1) One should meditate on the five Sāmans in the five world (*Chh* II 2 1) Uktha Uktha 1 1 i. e., Sāman hymns) people often cry. But the same is the Uktha, which is (also) the earth (*Aitareya Aranyaka* II 1 2 1) That world is indeed this fire which has been built (*Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* V 5 4 1) These scriptural injunctions are connected with various members of sacrificial acts such as the udgītha, etc. and are to be found in different śākhās of each Veda. Now a doubt arises, whether these injunctions about vidyās relate to the udgītha etc. as occurring in one particular śākhā or as occurring to all śākhās? The Sutra says, In each Veda these injunctions are not restricted to their particular śākhās only but apply to all the śākhās.

५३ । मन्त्रादिव्याप्तिविरोधः ।

३६ । 'वा'परिरोधः यथा न एव एव विरोधः आसद्भिन्नम् । मन्त्रादिवत् यथा मन्त्रावा' अथवा' ज्ञाना' च शास्त्रान्तरीयज्ञानां च वि' शास्त्रान्तरं उपलक्षणं दृश्यते तथा च न अपि ।

56 *Or there is no contradiction as in the case of mantras etc*

“Or” (consider the subject in this way) “No contradiction” need be feared “As in the case of mantras etc” We have seen that mantras, sacrificial acts, and their qualities taught in one sákhâ have to be taken over by other sákhás Similarly in the case of the vidyás

५७ । भूतः क्रतुवज्जगत्प्रत्ययः तथा हि दर्शयति ।

५७ । “प्राचीनशाल औपमन्यव” (का ५।१।१२) इति अस्याम् आख्यायिकाया व्यस्तस्य समस्तस्य च वैज्ञानरस्य उपासनं श्रूयते । अत्र संशयः,—किम् इह उभययः अपि उपासनं स्यात् व्यस्तस्य समस्तस्य च, उत समस्तस्य एव ? तत्र अभिधीयते, ‘भूतः’ पदाधीपचयात्मकस्य समस्तस्य वैज्ञानरुपासनस्य ‘ज्यायत्सु’ प्राधान्यम् अस्मिन् वाक्ये विवक्षितं भवितुम् अर्हति । न अवयवोपासनायाः प्रत्येकम् । ‘क्रतुवत्’ यथा क्रतुषु दर्श-पूर्णमास-प्रश्नैः समस्त्येन साङ्गप्रधान-प्रयोग एव एकः विवक्ष्यते, न व्यस्तानाम् अपि प्रयोगः प्रयाजादीनां, न अपि एकदेशाङ्गयुक्तस्य प्रधानस्य, तद्वत् ।

57 (The texts declare) *the superiority* (of the aggregate) *as in the case of sacrifices For scripture shows this*

In the story beginning with “Práchinásála, the son of Upamanyu,” (*Chh* V 1 1) meditations on Vaisvánara both in parts and as a whole are enjoined A question here arises, whether Vaisvánara should be meditated upon both in parts and as a whole, or as a whole only ? The Sùtra replies The text seeks to declare “the superiority” of the “aggregate” *i e*, of the meditation on Vaisvánara as a whole constituted of several things, and not to enjoin each of the special meditations on the several parts of Vaisvanara “As in the case of sacrifices” As in sacrifices, *e g.*, the Darsapúrnamásá, the texts aim at enjoining

only a single thing viz., the entire sacrifice which consists of the main sacrificial action along with its parts but do not seek to enjoy in addition the performance of the several parts, such as the *prayajats* nor again do they seek to enjoy the performance of the chief action along with each single part so also here

५८ । नाना शब्दादिभेदात् ।

५८ । विद्याभिदे अपि विद्या नाना भिदा भवितुम् अहति । शब्दान्भिदात् यतः शब्दाभिद् भवति — 'वि' 'उवाचोक्त' 'न' 'कतु' 'कुर्वति' इति एवमादि । तथा शब्दभिदश्च ।

58 The vidyās may be various because textual words etc., differ amongst themselves

It is quite possible for the vidyās to be separate even when the object of cognition is one and the same. Because textual words etc. differ amongst themselves ; e the words of the Vedic texts often differ such as, 'He knows One should meditate One should form resolutions' etc There are also varieties of qualities

५९ । विदित्वोऽविमिश्रफलत्वात् ।

५९ । उपनिषदाणां 'विदित्व' वाचावाच्यम् अनुष्ठानं भवितुम् अहति न समुच्चयः । अविमिश्रफलत्वात् यतः आर्षा फलम् उपनिषद्विरह-साक्षात्कारश्च अविमिश्रम् अमिश्रम् एवेति च उपनिषदिन साक्षात्कारे उपनिषद्विरहे द्वितीयम् अनर्थकम् । तस्मात् अविमिश्र फलानां विद्यानाम् अन्वयसम् आदाय तत्पटुः स्यात् यावत् उपनिषद्विरह-साक्षात्कारेण तत्फलप्राप्ति इति ।

59' *Option* (amongst the various meditations enjoined, is allowed) , *because there is no distinction in the fruit*

Of the various meditations enjoined in the Vedic texts, it is meant that the seeker after Brahmanidyā may have option to choose one according to his liking and to perform it , and not that he is to perform them all cumulatively "Because there is no distinction in fruit" i.e., the fruit of all of them, without distinction is the direct vision of the object of meditation (the Lord) When the direct vision of the object of meditation has been attained through one meditation, a second one is unnecessary Hence, out of the different meditations which have one and the same fruit, the worshipper should select one, and stick to it, until by direct vision of the object of meditation he has attained success

६० । काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन् न वा पूर्वहेत्व-
भावात् ।

६० । "स य एतमेव वायु दिशा वत्स वेद न पुनरोदं रोदिति" (छा ३।१५।२) ।
"स यो नास ब्रह्मेत्यपस्ते यावन्नास्ते, गतं तवास्तु कामचारी भवति" (छा ७।१।५) इति
एवमाद्या काम्या विद्या 'यथाकामं' यथेच्छं समुच्चीयेरन् न वा, 'पूर्वहेत्वभावात्'
पूर्वहेतौ अविशिष्टफलत्वहेतौ अभावात् ।

60 *But* (meditations) *aiming the fulfilment of some desire may or may not be cumulated, according to one's liking , because the reason stated in the preceding Sūtra is absent* (in their case)

He who thus knows Vāyu to be the young one of the quarters of the horn on his never to weep for his son (Chh III 13 2, He who meditates on Name as Brahman attains the power to reach at will all places to which Name reaches. (Chh VII 1 5)—and similar other texts constituting vidvā's whose aim is the fulfilment of worldly desires may or may not be cumulated by the worshipper at his will for the reason set forth in the preceding Sūtra, namely that the identity of fruits is absent in their case.

६१ । अह्नेषु यथाग्रयमाव ।

६१ । अह्नोऽतिशयं चतुर्ष्वेति दाहम् उक्तानि चत्वारः पूर्वपक्षेऽपि । 'दाहं च तद्दीपादिषु च' आश्रितः प्रत्यक्ष इन्द्रवद्विज्ञानं किं न समुपदीयन् किं वा यथाकामं स्यादिति मर्मसंशयः सदाऽप्यभावा इति दाहं पुनरुक्तम् । यदा उक्तम् 'आ यत् नोक्तं' अह्नोऽतिशयं, एवं प्रत्यक्षा अपि ।

61 (The cognitions connected) with members (of sacrificial acts are to be combined) as their sources

This and the three following sūtras represent the opinion of the Pārvaṇapaksha. Are those cognitions which rest on certain parts of sacrificial actions taught in the three Vedas to be combined or have we any option with regard to them? To this question the reply of the Pārvaṇapaksha is, 'As their sources,' i. e. as the sources of those cognitions, viz. the stotras etc., are to be combined for the performance of the sacrifices, so are the cognitions, too to be combined.

६२ । शिष्टेऽत्र ।

६२ । तथा 'शिष्टे' शासनात् विधानसाम्यात् विद्यानां यथाश्रयभावे उपपद्यते । यथा आश्रया स्तोत्रादयः त्रिषु वेदेषु शिष्यन्ते, एवम् आश्रिता अपि प्रत्यया । अज्ञाना तदाश्रयाणां च प्रत्ययानां न कश्चित् विशेषः अस्ति, इत्यर्थः ।

62 Also because (the stotras etc, and the vidyās which have their source in them are equally) taught (in the Vedas)

Also because of the teaching, i e, equivalence of Vedic injunction, it is to be inferred that the vidyās are to be treated just like their sources. Just as the sources, viz, the stotras etc, are taught in the three Vedas, so also are the cognitions that rest on them. That is to say the members of the sacrificial act and the cognitions occurring therein are on exactly the same footing.

६३ । समाहारात् ।

६३ । 'समाहारात्' अपि सर्ववेदोदित-विद्यासमुच्चये उपपद्यते । 'समाहार' निर्दोषकरणम् । उक्तं छान्दोग्ये, "होतृषदनाञ्चैवाऽपि दुरुक्तीयम् अनुसमाहरति" । (१।५।५) । अस्यार्थः एक-साम-वेदोदितयोः प्रथमोक्तौपथ्योः ऐक्यविज्ञान-माहात्म्यात् उद्गाता स्वकर्म्मणि उत्पन्नं चतुर्होत्रात् कर्म्मणः प्रतिसमादधाति । अत्र वेदान्तोदितस्य प्रत्ययस्य वेदान्तोदित-पदार्थसम्बन्ध-सामान्यात् सर्ववेदोदित-प्रत्ययोपसंहारः सूचितः ।

63 The same conclusion follows from rectification.

The combination of the vidyās taught in all the Vedas follows also from the rectification of slips mentioned in this passage of the *Chhândogya* Upanishad "When he knows

the identity of the Pranava and the Udgîtha, he (i. e. the Udgîta) is able to rectify any error committed in his singing even from the seat of the Hotri (I 5 5) The passage means that such is the power of knowledge of the identity of the Pranava and the Udgîtha, that the Udgîta is able to set right any error he may have committed in his own functions by means of the functions pertaining to the Hotri. Now the relation between two *things* (the Pranava and the Udgîtha) mentioned in different Vedas is on the same footing as the relation between two *vidyās* mentioned in different Vedas. This suggests the conclusion that the cognitions occurring in the different Vedas are also to be combined.

६४ । गुणसाधारण्यश्रुतेः ।

६४ । यत् साधारण्यं तद्विवादस्य मुख्यं वाच्यं वा प्रतीयमानं सत्यं मुख्यं प्रतीयते ।
साधारण्यं वाच्यं, तत् साधारण्यमावाप्तं मुख्यमावाप्तं च उपपद्यते ।

64 *And because scripture declares that the subordinate elements of sacrifices are common to all performances*

Scriptural passages which direct the performance of sacrificial acts, and deal with all their members, declare that the Udgîtha and other subordinate elements of sacrifices are common to all performances. Hence as the sources go together we conclude that the vidyās also go together.

६५ । न वा तत्सम्बन्धमावाप्तं ।

६५ । 'न वा' इति पक्षस्यावयवम् । न सम्बन्धमावाप्तं आश्रितानाम् उपपत्तयाम् ।

भवितुम् 'अर्हति । कुत ?—'तत्सहभावाश्रुते' यत् विवेदविहितानाम् अज्ञाना
सौत्रादीना सहभावश्रवणत् उपपन्नाना सहभाव न दृश्यते ।

65. (The meditations are *rather not* (to be combined ,
as scripture does not explicitly declare them going toge-
ther

The words "rather not" discard the Purvapaksha posi-
tion It is not reasonable to say that the treatment of the
meditations is to be the same as that of their sources Why
so ? "Because scripture does not declare it" Scripture
indeed explicitly declares the going together of stotras and
other members of sacrifices as enjoined in the three Vedas ,
but does *not* declare the going together of the meditations

६६ । दर्शनाच्च ।

६६ । दर्शयति च श्रुति प्रत्ययानाम् असहभाव, "एवविद् ह वै ब्रह्मा यज
यगमान सर्वाय ऋत्विजोऽभिरक्षति" (ऋ ४।१७।१०) इति । सर्वप्रत्ययोपसंहारे
हि सर्वे सर्वविद् इति, न विज्ञानवता ब्रह्मणा परिपाल्यत्वम् इतरथा सङ्कीर्त्तित ।
तस्मात् प्रयत्नासम् उपपन्नानां समुच्चय विकल्प वा इति ।

66 And because scripture shows (that the medita-
tions do not go together)

Scripture also shows that the cognitions do not go to-
gether, c g , "A Brahma priest who knows this protects the
sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the priests" (Chh IV
17 10) If all the cognitions were combined, all the priests
would know all of them , and the protection extended by a
knowing Brahmá priest over others would not be mention-
ed Hence the conclusion is that the meditations may be
combined or omitted according to one's choice.

साधन-नाम-तृतीयाध्याये चतुर्थ पाद—ज्ञानकभणो संवत्स

• •

१। पुनर्पायोऽस्त गन्तादिति वादरायण ।

१। यद्येतादीन् चीपतिरदम् पाप्मनात् किम् अधिकारिणोऽपि ज्ञानि एव
चतुर्थावसति आक्षेपितम् ध्यतन् एव पुनर्पापसाधनं भवति इति भीमसमाप्त
विज्ञानेन एव उपलभ्यते पुनर्पापसाधनं एतत् अस्मात् वेदादिभिर्ज्ञानपाप्मनात्
तन्मन् पुनर्पापं विधत्ति इति 'बान्द्रायण' नामक आचार्ये मन्वते । कुत ?
'अस्मात् एतत् 'स यी इ वेतन्मन् इत्येव इति भवति (मुन् १।१।८) इति
पुनर्पापसाधनं पुनः विद्यापद विद्याया पुनर्पापसाधनं गमयति ।

1 The object of man's life is accomplished) through
it (i e knowledge of Self) Thus (declares) Bādarāyana
on the basis of scripture

The question under discussion in the present section is
whether the knowledge of Self taught in the Upanishads
is merely an accessory to sacrifice entering into its perform
ance through the instrumentality of a qualified performer
or is it an independent means for accomplishing the
highest end of man? The discussion begins with the
statement of the Sūtrakṛas view Through it (i e
knowledge of Self) the highest end of man is accomplished
Thus says the teacher Bādarāyana. On what ground?—

“On the basis of scripture,” because the passage “Verily he who knows the Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman in truth” (*Mund* III 2 9), and such other texts declare that knowledge alone is sufficient for the accomplishment of the highest end of man

२ । शेषत्वात् पुरुषार्थवादो यथाऽन्येष्विति जैमिनिः ।

२ । पूर्वपक्ष (२-७) । कर्तृत्वेन आत्मन शेषत्वात् कर्मशेषत्वात्, कर्माङ्गत्वात् तद्विज्ञानम् अपि विषयकारिण कर्मसम्बन्धि एव, इति अत तस्मिन् अवगतप्रयोजन आत्मज्ञाने या फलश्रुति, सा अर्थवाद एव, ‘यथाऽन्येषु’ यथा अन्येषु द्रव्यसंस्कारकर्मम् “यस्य पर्याप्तमर्थो शुद्धमवति न स पाप श्लोकोति” इति एवञ्जातोयका फलश्रुति अर्थ-वाद, तद्वत् । ‘इति’ ‘जैमिनि’-नामक आचार्य्य मन्यते ।

2 As (the Self is) a subordinate part (of the sacrificial action, Vedic statements about the fruits of the knowledge of the Self are ‘mere arthavādas, as in other cases Thus Jaimini thinks

[The Pūrvapaksha 2-7] By virtue of its being the agent (in sacrifice) the self “participates in”, *i e* becomes a member of, the sacrificial action, hence the knowledge of the Self also, through the object of knowledge, is connected with such action, and consequently, as the purpose of such knowledge is already evident, the Vedic statements about the fruit of that knowledge are “merely arthavādas” *i e* minor statements about objects “As in other cases” This means that in other scriptural passages about materials, samskāras, and actions, the statements about fruits,

c g He whose sacrificial vessel is made of purnawood never hears any evil sloka and so on are mere arthavādas so also here 'Thus Jaimini thinks

३ । आचारदर्शनात् ।

३ । अथ उद्गातादीनां ब्रह्मविद्यां विद्यया सह आचारदर्शनात् आर्थावयनं
 * नात् च वेदनात् ज्ञानात् पुनश्चावसिद्धिः ।

3 And because scripture represents (Brahmavādins also as) performing sacrificial actions

In the scripture Janaka Uddālaka and others who know Brahman are represented as performing sacrificial actions along with the cultivation of the knowledge of the Self. Hence the conclusion is that the highest end of man cannot be fulfilled by mere knowledge.

४ । तत्पुते ।

४ । "यत् एव विद्यया वर्धति श्रद्धा उपनिषदा तद्वै श्रीमान् भवति
 (भा १।१।१) इति च तच्छ्रुतिं विद्यायाः कथमवलम्बनात् न वेदनायाः विद्याया
 य वाच्यमित्यम् ।

4 And because scripture directly declares it

There is a passage viz. When a man does something with knowledge, faith and Upanishad that becomes comparatively more powerful" (Chh 1 1 10) This passage directly declares that knowledge is a mere auxiliary to action. Hence knowledge alone cannot fulfil the highest end of man.

५। समन्वाग्भङ्गात् ।

५। “तं विद्याकामाणी समन्वाग्भवे” (ब्रह्म शास्त्र २) तं परलोकं व्रजन्तं विद्या-
कामाणी समनुगच्छत — इति विद्याकामाणो मादित्यदर्शनात् न स्वातन्त्र्या विद्याया ।

5 And because (a passage declares that knowledge and work) together follow (the departed spirit)

In Bri IV + 2 we have this passage “Him the person who departs this life), his knowledge and his work both follow” As knowledge and work thus go together, it follows that knowledge is not independent

६। तद्वती विधानात् ।

६। छान्दोग्यश्रुतौ (८।२५) तथा अन्यत्र च ‘तद्वत’ समस्त-वेदार्थविज्ञानवत् ।
‘विधानात्’ कामोपदेश-दर्शनात् न विज्ञानस्य स्वातन्त्र्येण फलहेतुत्वम् ।

6 And because precepts (for the performance of sacrifices) are to be found in the scripture for one who possesses it

In Chh VIII 15, and in other scriptural passages we find “precepts” for the performance of sacrificial actions given to “one who possesses it” i.e. a complete knowledge of the purport of the Vedas Hence, evidently, knowledge does not independently produce any fruit

७। नियमाच्च ।

७। “सुर्वन्नेवेह कार्माणि जिजीविषेच्छत समा” (ईशा २) इति एवञ्चा-
तौयकात् ‘नियमात् च’ विद्याया कार्मशेषत्वम् ।

7 And because (karma has been definitely) prescribed

One should wish to live a hundred years here surely by performing duties (Isopanishad 2) From the fact that karma has been definitely prescribed here and in similar passages it is clear that vidyā is supplementary to karma

८ । अधिकोपदेगात् तु वादराय गत्येवं ददृश नात् ।

८ । 'तु' मन्त्रान् पक्ष विपरिवर्तित । यत् उक्त "मन्त्रान् पुनर्वाचयति" इति तत्तु न उपपद्यते । कस्मात् ?— अधिकोपदेगात् यतः वेदान्तेन अधिकस्य ज्ञातीनाम् चामन चर्मसारिण ब्रह्मण्य उपर्द्वज विद्यते । तस्मात् "पुनर्वाचयति" मन्त्रान् इति वात् वाद इत्यस्य मतं तत्तु 'एवं' तथा एव अधिकमित्यति तिष्ठति । तदर्थेनात् वेदान्त-चर्मसारिण ब्रह्मण्य उपर्द्वज मन्त्रान् ।

8 But as there is instruction (in the Vedānta) about the additional One (the Lord) Bādarāyana's view remains unaltered because scripture declares it

The word but sets aside the Pārvaṇakṣha view. The view set forth in Sūtra 2 which says that the fruits of vidyās are mere arthavadas the self being a subordinate part of the sacrifice cannot be maintained. Why so?

Because there is instruction in the Vedānta about an additional one over and above the embodied Self, i.e. because the Vedāntas teach not only about the self of individuals but also about the non-transmigrating Īsvara. Hence

Bādarāyana's view viz., that the object of man's life is accomplished through the knowledge of the Self (Sūtra 1)

“remains unaltered”, *i e*, uncontroverted “Because scripture declares it”, *i e*, because the Vedāntas teach about the Highest Lord, devoid of body

८ । तुल्यत्वं दर्शनम् ।

८ । यत् चक्रम् आचारदर्शनात् कर्मशेषत्व विद्याया, इति अत्र ब्रूम, ‘तुल्यत्वं’ आचारदर्शनम् अकर्मशेषत्वे अपि विद्याया । तथाहि श्रुतिः भवति, “एतच्च अहं वै तद्ब्रह्म आहुर्नृषयः कावषेयाः किमर्था वयमध्येष्यामहे किमर्था वयं सत्यामहे । एतच्च अहं वै तत् पूर्व्वं विद्वांसोऽग्निहोत्रं न जुह्वामहे ।” “एतच्च वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा ब्राह्मणा पुनरेषणायाश्च वित्तेषणायाश्च लोकेषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाश्च भिक्षाचर्य्यं चरन्ति” (बृह ३।५) इति एवञ्जातीयका ।

9 *Scripture represent (the same thing) equally (in the contrary case)*

In Sūtra 3 it was said that as scripture represents the performance of actions, therefore vidyā is supplementary to sacrifice. We say that scripture equally represents the performance of actions where vidyā is evidently not a supplement of the sacrifice. Compare scriptural passages like the following — “The *rishis* of the line of Kavasha, having attained this knowledge, said, “Why should we study the Vedas any longer? Why should we perform sacrifices any more? Indeed, when the ancient sages attained this knowledge, they ceased from performing the Agnihotra.” And, “The knowers of Brahman, when they have known this Self, rise above the desires for sons, wealth, and worlds, they then adopt the lives of mendicants” (Bṛ III 5)

१० । असाध्यविकी ।

१० । “यत् एव विद्या वरीति” इति एवा सृति न सामानिकी समविद्या-
विद्या प्रकृतविद्याभिमुख्यात् । प्रकृता च तद्दीपविद्या ओमित्येतद्वच मुद्दीबमुपासीत”
(वा १।१।१) इति च ।

10 (The word *vidyā* in the passage quoted is) *not used in a universal sense*

In Sūtra 4 the scriptural passage “When a man does something with knowledge etc.,” was quoted. But the word *vidyā* in that passage is not of universal application. It does not refer to *all* *vidyā*, as it is connected only with that *vidyā* which forms the subject matter there namely the Udgāthavidyā taught in the passage. The syllable *Om* is to be meditated upon as the udgātha. (*Chh* I 1 1)

११ । विभाग यतवत् ।

११ । यत् अपि उक्तं तं विद्यासमष्टी समन्वयमिति इति एतत् तत् प्रवर्तते—विभागः यत्र द्रष्टव्यः । यतवत् यदा “यतमात्रा दीयताम्” इति उक्ते विमल दीयते, यत्रात्र एवमेव यत्रात्र अपरार्थः, तद्वत् विद्या यत्र पुनर्व समन्वा भवेत् उक्तं यत्रम् इति ।

11 (There is the sense of) *distribution* (here) *as in the case of* (giving) *a hundred* (to two)

In Sūtra 5 it was said that “Knowledge and work both follow” the departed spirit. We say that there is the sense of *distribution* here, as in the case of a hundred.

When an order is given in such words as, "Give a 'hundred to these two," the hundred is distributed between the two, fifty being given to one, and fifty to the other. Similarly, the passage means that knowledge follows one person and works follow another.

૧૨ । અધ્યયનમાત્રવતઃ ।

૧૨ । છાન્દોગ્યોપનિષદે “આચાર્યકુલાત્ વેદમધીત્ય” (કા ૮.૧૫.૧) इति अथ अध्ययनमात्रस्य त्रवणात् अध्ययनमात्रवत एव कर्मविधि इति अश्ववत्प्राज्ञ ।

12 In the passage referred to the expression “for one who possesses the Veda” is to be taken in the sense of) “for one who has merely read the Veda”

In Sutra 6 the concluding passage of the *Chhândogya* Upanishad (VIII 15 1) is quoted. There, however, the text mentions ‘the reading’ of the Vedas only. Hence we conclude that the ‘precept’ given therein for the performance of sacrifices is meant for one who has merely read the Veda.

૧૩ । નાવિશેષાત્ ।

૧૩ । ‘કુર્વન્ એવેહ કર્મ્મણિ જિજીવિષેત્” इति एवमादिषु नियमस्त्वयेषु न विदुष इति विशेष अस्ति । अविशेषेण नियमविधातात् ।

13. (The mantra quoted) *does not go against us, because it is not specific*

The Mantra “One should wish to live here surely by

performing duties, which is quoted as definitely precluding karma, does not do so specifically for one who has attained knowledge. There is no specialising clause whatever in the rule prescribed.

। ।

१४ । श्रुतयेऽमुमतिर्लब्धे ।

१४ । अथ "अहंकारेण चकार" — विद्यादानं चकार इत्यत्र । "न चकार" इति । अत्र चकार । दातारं चकार इति । अत्र ददाति । अत्र न चकार । अत्र भवति । विद्यादानं नृणां ननु च विद्यादानं ।

14. *Of a person (to perform work) is meant for the glorification of knowledge.*

Another interpretation is that the text "One should wish to live here" permits work with the object of glorifying knowledge. The next clause says "Work does not cling to the man." Glorification of knowledge is the object of this passage the drift of which is — To a man who has attained knowledge no work will cling even though he should perform works all his life — such is the power of knowledge.

१५ । कामकारेण चैके ।

१५ । अथ "चकार" इति । कामकारेण इत्यादि । अत्र चकार । अत्र न चकार । अत्र भवति । विद्यादानं चकार इत्यत्र ।

15. *Some again (proceeded) according to their will*
Some of those who had attained knowledge again

abandoned karma "of their own will," as we find in *Bṛ* IV 4 22 Hence also it follows that knowledge is not a mere supplement to action

१६ । उपमद्म् ।

१६ । अपि च विद्याममयात् क्रिया-कारक-फलजनयस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य 'उपमद्म्' विनाशम् आभवन्ति "यत्र तस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत् तत् केन कं जिज्ञेत्" (बृह २।४।१४ , ४।५।१५) इत्यादिना । तस्मात् अपि विद्याया स्वातन्त्र्यम् ।

16 And (scripture also speaks of) the destruction (of the world and of all works by knowledge)

Further, scripture describes the "destruction" of the whole phenomenal world, of which actions, agents, and fruits of action are constituent elements, by the power of knowledge, in passages such as "But when for him everything has become the Self, how and whom can he then see, how and what can he then smell" ? (*Bṛ* II 4 14 IV 5 15,) etc This also proves that vidyā is independent of action

१७ । जड्वृत्तः सु च शब्दे हि ।

१७ । 'जड्वृत्तः सु च' आश्रयेषु विद्या श्रूयते, न तु तत्र अग्निहोत्रादीनि वैदिकानि कार्माणि सन्ति । जड्वृत्तस्य आश्रमा न श्रूयन्ते वेदे, इति चेत्, आह,—'हि' यतः 'शब्दे' वेदे जड्वृत्तस्य आश्रमा अवगम्यन्ते (छा २।१३।१ , ५।१०।१ , सु १।२।११ , बृह ४।४।१२) इत्येवमादौ । तस्मात् अपि विद्याया स्वातन्त्र्यम् ।

17 And (knowledge belongs) to those stages of life in

which Brahmacharya is prescribed For (such stages are indicated) in scripture

Further, *vidyā* is mentioned in connection with those stages of life in which Brahmacharya is the rule and in such stages of life Vedic works, such as Agnihotra etc., are not performed. If it be objected that stages of life in which Brahmacharya is prescribed are not distinctly mentioned in the Vedas, we reply that such stages are sufficiently indicated in *Chh* II 23 1 *V* 10 1 *Mund* I 2 11 *Bri* IV 4 2' etc. From this also follows the independence of knowledge.

१८। परामर्शो जैमिनिरचोदना चापवदति हि ।

१८। ऊह्यतेयाम् च म दं मयाप "ब्रह्मि धर्ममन्त्रः (वा १।११।१)
इत्यान्तं वैदिकं उदाहरणं तत्र जमिनि परामर्शं उदाहरणम् एव जयत इत्य-
न्तं ब्रह्मिणा विधीयमानं । अत्रैव विदुः । 'अपवदति हि अपि च अन्यथा
सुति' च । मानसम् अपवदति निवृत्ति—'ब्रह्म वा एव दीक्षा वाग्यमुपासते ।'
"आचार्यः । अथ यथाहव ब्रह्मन्तु वा वरुणो (तति १।११) परमाया ।

18 According to Jaimini there is mere mention (of the Brahmacharya stage of life in the scriptural passages) but there is an absence of injunction (in favour of such stages) On the contrary scripture forbids them

According to Jaimini the texts referred to by us as proving the existence of Brahmacharya stages of life (the first of which viz., *Chh* II 23 1 contains the words, 'There are three branches of the law') are "mere

mentions" of such stages because in them there is "an absence of injunction," i e, there are no words prescribing such stages of life "On the contrary, scripture forbids" such stages Direct scriptural statements are to be found which condemn the other (i e, the Brahmacharya) way of life e g, "He who lets the sacrificial fire be extinguished is a killer of the servants of the devas" "Having paid his honorarium to your preceptor (i e., having returned home at the close of your studies, do not cut off the line of children (i e, do marry and bring up a family)" (*Taitti* I 11), etc

१८ । अनुष्ठेयं वादरायणः साध्यश्रुतेः ।

१८ । वादरायण आश्रमांतरस्य अनुष्ठेयं मन्यते । 'साध्यश्रुते' यत् गार्हस्थ्येन आश्रमांतरस्य परामर्शश्रुति समाना दृश्यते, "वयो धर्मस्तन्वा" इत्याद्या । यथा इह श्रुत्यन्तर-विहित गार्हस्थ्यं परावृष्टम्, एवम् आश्रमांतरम् अपि, इति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ।

19 (According to) *Bádaráyana*, (the brahmacharya way of life, too), *is to be actually practised, because scripture places it on the same footing* (as the life of a householder)

According to *Bádaráyana*, the other stage of life, viz brahmacharya, is meant to be actually practised "Because scripture places it on the same footing" In that passage which begins with the words "There are three branches of the law", the brahmacharya way of life and the life of a householder are inculcated with equal force The reasonable conclusion is that as the life of a house-holder enjoined in other passages, is mentioned here, so is the other stage of life, brahmacharya.

tion that brahmacharya is a matter for *injunction* here would go against the unity of the sense of the whole passage. Unity of sense demands here that the 'three branches of the law which have the worlds of the blessed for their result should be contrasted with establishment in Brahman which has immortality for its result. We admit that this is true. But yet in the present discussion we must set aside the consideration of the unity of sense of the passage, and give it our consideration only as containing an injunction (for celibacy). Why so? Because celibacy is mentioned in it for the only time, and no other text is met with enjoining it. This is similar to the case of the carrying of fire-wood. [In the Mahá-pitrí-yajña] the text says, "He should approach, carrying the fire-wood below (the sacrificial spoon containing the offering), for above he carries it for the gods." Now, in this passage, the unity of sense is preserved if we consider it as only mentioning the carrying of the fire wood below. But yet we have to take it as enjoining also the carrying of the fire-wood above, because this particular injunction is not to be met with elsewhere. This is explained in the Púrva-mímámsá, in the Chapter dealing with complements, in the Súra "But it is an injunction in the case of the carrying (of fire-wood), because it is not enjoined anywhere else." For a similar reason we hold that the present passage, which mentions the different stages of life, is also an injunctory passage.

२१ । स्तुतिभावनमुपादानादिति चेन्नापूर्वत्वात् ।

२१ । "स एष रसाना रसतप्तः परम. पराङ्गीर्षोऽमी यदुक्तीथः" (छा १।१।३)

इति एवमातीयताः सुतय इमं उद्गीथानि-मुन्यथा आसीदित् । उपासनाविषया
 इति अग्निं संसृष्टिं मुन्यथा इति पूर्ववत् ।, आसीं सुतीनां प्रवीक्षणम् अतिमात्रम्
 एव । कथात् ?—उपासनात् उद्गीथदीप्तिं कर्माद्वापि उपादाय तत्रयात् । यथा
 इयमेव प्रविष्टो रुद्रपदिह कूर्मं सार्वादि आह्वयतीह इत्याद्या रुद्रादिमुन्यथा,
 इति चित् । अपूर्वत्वात् आसीं सुतीनाम् अपूर्वत्वात्—आसीं विध्यतायां हि
 अपूर्वत्वात् विहितं भवति, मुन्यतायां तु पादयस्वम् एव स्यात् ।

21 *If it be contended (that passages like Chh I 1 3 are) merely laudatory ones on account of the references (they contain to members of sacrifices) we say No Because (the instructions are) not met with elsewhere*

“The udgītha described here is the quintessence of all essences, the highest having the highest abode, the eighth, (Chh I 1 3) Are passages like this merely meant for the glorification of the udgītha etc. or are they also meant to enjoin meditations? The Pūrvapakṣa says that they are for glorification the only object of such passages being to praise the udgītha etc. ‘Why so? On account of the references, & c., because members of sacrificial actions, such as the udgītha etc., are referred to in them. Just as the texts ‘This earth is the sacrificial spoon’ ‘The sun is the tortoise,’ ‘The heavens are the Āhavanīya (fire)’ etc., are meant to glorify members of sacrificial actions, such as the spoon etc. so also here. To this the Sātrakara replies,—“This does not follow. Because these instructions are not met with anywhere else. The fact that they are not met with elsewhere becomes significant only if they are taken to be injunctions for meditations but that fact becomes inexplicable if the passages are taken to be laudatory

२२ । भावशब्दाच्च ।

२२ । “उद्गीथमुपासीत”, “सामोपासीत” “अहमुक्थमस्मीति विद्यात्” इत्यादयश्च विस्पष्टा विशिष्टाः श्रूयन्ते, ते च स्तुतिभावप्रयोजनताया व्याहृत्यैरन् । ‘भावशब्दात्’ ‘उपासीत’ इत्यादौ भावनासामान्यवाचि-शब्दश्चवशात् इति आचार्य्यः कालीवरः ।

22 And also on account of scriptural expressions all of which have the identical sense of meditation

Further, scripture contains clearly injunctive expressions, e g, “One should meditate on the Udgitha”, “One should meditate on the Sāman”, “One should reflect, I am Uktha ” These would be devoid of meaning if the passages were merely laudatory Āchārya Kālivara explains ‘bhavasabdtāt’ thus As we find expressions in scripture having the common meaning of ‘meditate’ (*upāsita*)

२३ । पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन्न विशेषितत्वात् ।

२३ । “अथ ह याज्ञवल्क्यस्य हे भार्य्ये वभूवतु मैत्रेयी च कात्यायनी च” (तृ ४।५) इति एवमादिषु वेदान्तपठितेषु आख्यानेषु संशयः किम् इमानि ‘पारिप्लवार्था’ आख्यायिका-पाठात्मका-अश्वमेधयज्ञाङ्ग-प्रयोजनानि आहोस्वित् सन्निहित-विद्याप्रतिपत्त्यर्थानि ? ‘पारिप्लवार्था’ इमा आख्यानश्रुतयः ‘इति चेत् न’ । ‘विशेषितत्वात्’ यतः पारिप्लवार्थानि व्याख्यानानि “पारिप्लवमाचक्षीत” इति प्रकृत्य विशिष्यन्ते ।

23 If it be said (that Upanishadic stories too, like other stories, are) for *pāriplava-recitations*, we say, No Because (*pāriplava*-stories are always) *specified as such*

Several stories are to be found in the Upanishads, e g ,

the one beginning with the words 'Yājñavalkya had two wives, Maitreyī and Kātīāyanī' (Br IV 5) Here a question arises, Are these stories meant to serve the purposes of the Pāriplava, (i. e. the recitation of tales during stated intervals during the Asvamedha sacrifice)? Or are they meant to introduce the vidyās that stand in proximity to them? If it be said that these scriptural tales are for the purposes of Pāriplava, we say "No. Because certain stories are specified for that purpose, i. e., stories meant to be read at the Pāriplava are specified in the scriptures by the introductory words. Here this pāriplava is to be recited

२४ । तथा चैकावाक्यतोपपन्नात् ।

२४ । 'तथा च' एकावाक्यता उपपन्नात् । 'तथा च' अस्ति च पारिप्लवार्थेन वाक्यानां तेषां सविहितानि विधानि एकावाक्यता एकार्थता एव दृश्यते । उपपन्नात् प्रतीपन-प्रतिपत्ति-सीकार्थं प्रसक्ति-सम्बन्धद्वयनात् ।

24 In the above circumstances (there is) unity of subject-matter (with the vidyās) because they are connected

In such circumstances i. e., the stories not being for the purpose of pāriplava, there is unity of theme between the stories and the vidyās proximate to them. 'Because they (the stories) are connected with the vidyās by way of making them more palatable, and rendering their comprehension easier

२५ । अतएव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा ।

२५ । 'अत एव च' विद्यायां पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वात् (सू ३।४।१) 'अग्नि-इन्धनादि-अनपेक्षा' पुरुषार्थसिद्धौ अग्नि-इन्धनादीनां तत्साध्य-आयमकर्मणाम् 'अनपेक्षा' निमित्तताभावात् ।

25 For these reasons, fire, fuel, etc , are unnecessary

"For these reasons" (adduced in support of the first Sūtra, viz , that man's object of life is accomplished through knowledge), "fire, fuel, etc , are unnecessary," i e , for the accomplishment of man's object of life there is no necessity for fire, fuel etc , and the various sacrificial actions to be performed with them, as enjoined for the different āsramas

२६ । सर्वोपेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत् ।

२६ । यद्यपि उत्पन्ना विद्या फलसिद्धिं प्रति न आयमकर्म अपेक्षते, तथापि विद्योत्पत्तौ 'सर्वोपेक्षा' सर्वेषाम् आयमकर्मणाम् अपेक्षा निमित्तता अस्ति । 'यज्ञादिश्रुतेः' यत "तस्मैत वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसा-ऽनाश्रकेन" (बृह ४।४।२२) इत्यादिश्रुति यज्ञादीनां विद्यासाधनभाव दर्शयति । 'अश्ववत्' यथा योग्यतावशेन अश्व न लाजलाकर्षणे युज्यते, रथचर्यायां तु युज्यते, एवम् आयमकर्मणि विद्यया फलसिद्धौ न अपेक्ष्यन्ते, उत्पत्तौ तु अपेक्ष्यन्ते इति ।

26 But (knowledge) stands in need of all (actions), because scripture mentions sacrifices etc as in the case of the horse

Though knowledge, once it is achieved, does not require, for the accomplishment of its fruit, the assistance of the sacrificial actions to be performed in the various

āśramas, yet for the rise of knowledge there is need of all —of actions of the various āśramas : i.e., the actions stand to knowledge as its means. Because scripture mentions sacrifices etc. : i.e., because sacrifices etc. are described in the scriptures as ways to knowledge in such passages as Brāhmanas seek to know him by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifices by gifts, by penance, by fasting (Br IV 4 22.) 'As in the case of the horse. The special aptitude of the horse is such that he is suited to draw not the plough but the chariot similarly the special utility of the āśrama actions is such that knowledge needs them not for its fruition but for its origination

२०। श्रमदुःसाध्यैतं ज्ञात् तद्यापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया
तेषामवग्यानुष्ठेयत्वात् ।

२०। यदि कश्चित् मन्वेत,—“न यथादीनां विद्यासाधनमात्रं ज्ञाप्य, विधिः प्रमाणम् । तद्यापि श्रमदुःसाध्यैतं ज्ञात् विद्यार्थी । तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया (उ ४।३।१३) इत्यादिषु तद्विधे विद्यासाधनत्वेन श्रमदुःसाध्यतां विधानात् तदङ्गतया च तदुपकारकत्वेन च तेषाम् अप्यनुष्ठेयत्वात् तेषां विद्यासाधनता सिद्धा ।

27 (If it be objected that sacrifices are not directly enjoined as means to knowledge, we reply) *Nevertheless* (the seeker after knowledge) *has to be possessed of calmness of mind subjugation of the senses etc.* As these have been enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge it is obligatory to achieve them

Here some one may object thus —The sacrifices etc. conceived by us to be the means to knowledge, cannot

reasonably be held to be such, because they are not directly enjoined as means to knowledge. We reply - "Nevertheless, the seeker after knowledge has to be possessed of calmness of mind, subjugation of the senses etc. And as these have been distinctly enjoined" as means to knowledge in the passage "Therefore he who knows this, having become calm", etc (*Bri* IV 4 23), and "as these are helpful" to the acquisition of knowledge, "it is obligatory to achieve them" They are therefore proved to be the means to knowledge.

२८ । सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणान्नये तद्दर्शनात् ।

२८ । छन्दोगानां प्राणसंवादे "न ह एवविदि किञ्चनानन्नं भवति" (छा प्रा १।२)' इति । सर्वम् अस्य अदनीयम् एव भवति इत्यर्थः । न इदं सर्वस्य अन्नस्य अनुज्ञानं शमादिवत् विद्यायां विधीयते, परं तु 'प्राणान्नये' परस्याम् आपदि 'सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च' सर्वस्य अन्नस्य अनुमतिश्च—सर्वम् अन्नम् अदनीयत्वेन अभ्यनुशयते । 'तद्दर्शनात्' तथाहि अति चान्नायणस्य ऋषेः कटायाः अवस्थायाम् प्रवृत्तिं दर्शयति छान्दोग्ये (१।१०) ।

28 *Permission to take all kinds of food (given in Chh V 1 2 is meant only) for a state of danger to life, as shown in scripture*

The following passage is found in the Colloquy of the Prânas of the Chhandogas "To him who knows this there is nothing which is not eatable", (*Chh* V 1 2), which means that anything may be taken by him. Now this permission to partake of any food whatsoever is not to be understood as an injunction of an auxiliary to-

knowledge like calmness of mind etc. But only in a state of danger to life in case of the greatest difficulty are foods of all kinds permitted to be taken. Because scripture shows this viz. In the *Chhândogya* Upanishad (I 10) where it is related that the Rishi Châktrâyana, when in great straits proceeded to take unclean food.

२८ । अवाधान ।

१८ । मातृरश्च वत्सम् च स्वम् दधमिह । एव च कृति "माता पक्षी मत्स्यश्च मत्तपक्षी वरा कृति. (वा ७१६/१) इति एवमादि भव्यामस्य विमा मातृम् वत्सवितुं भवत्यति ।

29 And because thus (only do scriptural injunctions) remain uncontradicted

This (interpretation of the permission to take every kind of food) follows also because there must be non contradiction of scriptural injunction. Only thus can the various scriptural injunctions which discriminate between lawful and unlawful food such as the passage "When the food is pure the whole nature is pure when the whole nature is pure memory is steady" (*Chh* VII 26 2) etc. remain uncontradicted

३० । अपि च कार्यते ।

३० । अपि च आपदि सभाशमचपम् अपि कार्यते विदुषः अविदुषः च अविद्विषैव, यथा,

जीवितावयमापक्षी दीडिमति यतस्तत ।

सिध्यते न तु पादिन पक्षपक्षमिवाभय ।

30. *The Smṛiti also says so.*

The *Smṛiti* also states that in times of peril all sorts of food may be taken, both by the enlightened and by the unenlightened, *e. g.* "He who, when in danger of life, eats food from anywhere and everywhere, is no more stained by sin than the lotus-leaf is affected by water "

३१ । शब्दश्चातोऽकामकारे ।

३१ । अग्नस्य प्रतिषेधक 'शब्द' श्रुतिः 'च' अस्ति, 'अकामकारे' स्वेच्छानिवृत्ति-प्रयोजने । यथा, कठानां संहितायां श्रूयते,—“तस्मात् ब्राह्मणः सुरा न पिबेत्” इति । सोऽपि “न ह वा एवविदि” इत्यस्य अर्थवादत्वात् उपपन्नतरं भवति । ‘अतः’ एव-ज्ञातीयका अर्थवादो न विधेयः, इति ।

31. *Further, there is a scriptural text precluding option Hence* (the special permission given in sūtra 28 is not a general injunction)

“There is, further, a scriptural text” against the taking of unlawful food, “which precludes option,” *i e* which seeks to prevent action according to one’s liking in such matters, *viz*, the passage “Therefore a Brāhmaṇa should not drink spirits,” found in the *Samhitā* of the Kathas This text of general prohibition can be maintained with cogency only if we take the passage “To him who knows this” etc (of Sūtra 28) as an amplification, *i e* as a special provision for a particular case “Hence” such permissions are mere amplifications, not injunctions.

३२ । विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकार्त्तापि ।

३२ । चाश्रमवर्त्यं चाश्रमोपनिषीदं सुवृत्ति इत्यादिना 'विहितत्वात्' अनुश्रुत्यो 'अपि' अश्रमम् ।

32. *Being enjoined the works pertaining to the different āśramas (are to be performed)*

Being enjoined by texts such as "As long as he lives, he should perform the Agnihotra" the works pertaining to the different āśramas are to be performed even by those who do not seek liberation.

३३ । सङ्ख्याखिलेन च ।

३३ । सङ्ख्याखिलेन इदं च 'एवं' अश्रमां विधाश्रमसं विद्वत् ।

33 *And also because* works have been mentioned in the scriptures as) *co-operating* (with the study of the Vedas)

Because works have been mentioned (in *Bṛ* IV 4.22.) *vide* Sātra 26) as co-operating with the study of the Vedas, they are proved to be the means of knowledge.

३४ । सर्वथापि त एवोभयसिद्धान् ।

३४ । सर्वथा अपि चाश्रमवर्त्यलपरी विधासङ्ख्याखिलपरी च 'त एव' अवि-
रोधात्त एवार्थो अनुष्ठेयः । अश्रमसिद्धान् सुवित्तिद्धान् अविद्विद्धान् च ।

34 *In all cases the same* (duties are incumbent) *because directed bothwise*

“In all cases” i. e. whether viewed as duties pertaining to áśramas, or as auxiliaries to knowledge, “the same” that is the Agnihotra and such other (ceremonial) duties have to be performed, “because directed bothwise” i. e. enjoined both in the Śruti and in the Smṛiti

३५ । अनभिभवञ्च दर्शयति ।

३५ । ब्रह्मचर्यादि-साधनसम्पन्नस्य रागादिभिः क्लेशैः ‘अनभिभवम्’ अपराभवम् अविकल्पम् इति यावत् च दर्शयति श्रुतिः, “एष छात्मा न नश्यति यं ब्रह्मचर्येणागु-
विन्दते” (छा ८।३।३) इत्यादिना । तस्मात् यज्ञादीनि आश्रमकर्माणि च विद्या-
सहकारिणि च भवन्ति इति स्थितम् ।

35 *Scripture also declares* (that those who perform sacrifices, and consequently have to practise brahmacharya, etc.,) *are not overpowered* (by passions)

Scripture also declares that one who has become proficient in brahmacharya and similar sádhana is not overpowered by such afflictions as the passions etc., e. g. in the passage, “The Self which he discerns through brahmacharya is never lost sight of” (*Chh VIII 5 3*) This establishes the conclusion that sacrifices etc. are not only duties incumbent on the áśramas, but also auxiliaries to knowledge

३६ । अन्तरा चापि तु तद्दृष्टेः ।

३६ । ‘अन्तरा च अपि तु’ अनाश्रमित्वेन अन्तराले वर्तमान अपि विद्यायाम् अधिक्रियते । कुत ? ‘तद्दृष्टे’ यत् रैक-वाचकवी-प्रभृतीनाम् एवम्भूतानाम् अपि ब्रह्मविच्च श्रुतौ दृश्यते । (छा ४।१-३, बृह ३।६, ८) ।

36. *But even a person standing outside (the Āśramas is entitled to knowledge) because scripture declares this*

But even a person who not belonging to any Āśrama, stands without as it were, is entitled to knowledge Why so? Because scripture declares this scripture describes that even persons like Raikva Vāchak navi etc., attained the knowledge of Brahman (*Chh* IV 13 *Bṛs* III 68.)

३७। अपि च अर्ह्यते ।

३७। संवर्तमानवर्तीनां च नम्रवर्थादियोऽपि अनपेक्षित-आश्रमकत्वान् अपि अर्हायोगिनः अर्ह्यन्ते इतिहासः ।

37 *Smṛiti also says so*

It is also narrated in (traditional) history that Sam varta and others, who by going naked etc. showed their disregard for the duties prescribed for the Āśramas, nevertheless became great yogins.

३८। विशेषानुपपद्यते ।

३८। विशेषेण जप-सुपवास-दिवापचरात-प्रवृत्तिरिति वक्ष्यमिदम् 'च' विधातुः अनुपपद्यते इदम् अनुवर्तते ।

38. *And the acquisition (of knowledge is also possible for persons outside Āśramas) through special acts*

And the acquisition of knowledge is also possible

for persons outside âsramas "through such special acts" of devotion as repeating prayers, fasting, the worship of deities etc

३८ । अतस्त्वितरज्ज्यायो लिङ्गाच्च ।

३८ । 'अत तु' अन्तरालवर्तित्वात् तु 'इतरत्' आश्रमवर्तित्वम् 'न्याय' श्रेष्ठम् विद्यासाधनम् । 'लिङ्गात् च' श्रुतिलिङ्गात् स्मृतिलिङ्गात् च । श्रुतिलिङ्गम् "तेनैति ब्रह्मवित् पुण्यकृत् तैजसश्च" (बृह ४।४।८) इति । "अनाश्रमी न तिष्ठेत् दिनमेकमपि द्विज । सवत्सरमनाश्रमी स्थित्वा कृच्छ्रमेकचरेत्" इति च स्मृतिलिङ्गम् ।

39 *But the other state (i. e., belonging to some âsrama) is better than this, on account of indications (in Sruti and Smriti)*

But the other state, i. e., belonging to an âsrama, is a better means to knowledge than this (remaining outside the âsramas), on account of indications in *Sruti* and *Smriti*. The *Sruti*-indication is this, "By that path goes one who has known Brahman, who has performed meritorious deeds (as prescribed for the âsrama), and who has attained splendour" (*Bri* IV 4 9) The *Smriti*-indication is, "A man of the twice-born classes should not remain for a single day outside the âsramas. If he does so for a year, he must undergo an expiation "

४० । तद्भूतस्य तु नातङ्गावो जैमिनेरपि नियमात् तद्रूपाभावेभ्यः ।

४० । 'तद्भूतस्य तु' प्राप्त-ज- रीतिभावस्य तु 'न अतङ्गाव' न तत् प्रच्युतिः स्यात् ?

नियमावद्रूपमावेष्ट्य, नियमात् अतद्रूपत्वं समावात् च । तथा हि चत्वनमात्मनम्
 च चार्थकृषिः प्रसादयन् इति (ब्रा १।१।११) “अरक्ष्यम् इत्यादिति पदं तृती न
 पुनरिष्टान्तिव्यपनिबद्ध इति नियमः । तथा च ब्रह्मचर्यं समाप्य गृही मनेत्
 ब्रह्मचर्योद्वेगं प्रवर्ज्य इति च एवमादौलि आरीकृपाधि वचांसि उपसृज्यन्ते, न एव
 प्रपञ्चोक्त्याधि इति अतद्रूपः । न च एवमावात्, मिष्टा विद्यन्ते इति समाव
 ज्ञेयमेष्वपि इति ‘अपि’शब्देन केमिति वादपयन्तु चम सभविपत्तिं ग्राहि,
 प्रतिपत्ति-वाच्यम् ।

40 For one who has attained that (i. e. the brahma
 charya stage,) there is no becoming otherwise (i. e.
 descending to a lower stage) on account of restrictive
 regulations want (of instruction) of that nature and
 non-existence (of such custom. This is the opinion) of
 Jaimini also

For one who has once attained the stage of brahma
 charya, becoming otherwise, i. e., a descent to a lower
 stage, is not proper. Why so? On account of (a) res-
 trictive regulations, b) want of any instruction about such
 descent to a lower āśrama, and (c) absence of the sanction
 of good custom. The restrictive regulations are contained
 in such texts as mortifying the body in the house of
 the preceptor to the end of one's days (Chh II 23 1)
 and He should go to the forest in other words, he is
 not to return from there. This is the Upanishad. Again
 we find texts teaching the ascent to higher āśramas, such
 as, Having gone through the brahmacharya āśrama, one
 should be a householder. One may however enter the
 wandering stage even from that of the householder.
 But we never meet with texts teaching the reverse order

Further, among the good customs prevailing, there are none such "This is the opinion of Jaimini also" The word "also" here affirms the agreement of Jaimini and Bādarāyana in this view, thus strengthening further the conclusion here set forth

४१ । न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात् तदयोगात् ।

४१ । यदि नैष्ठिक ब्रह्मचारी प्रमादात् अवकीर्त्येत, किं तस्य "ब्रह्मचारी अवकीर्णं नैर्ऋतं गर्द्भमालभेत" इति एतत् प्रायश्चित्तं स्यात्, उत न ? 'न' इति उच्यते । 'अधिकारिकम् अपि' यत् अपि अधिकारलक्षणं निर्णीतं प्रायश्चित्तं तत् अपि न नैष्ठिकस्य भवितुम् अर्हति । 'पतनानुमानात् तत् तदयोगात्' यतः स्मृतौ नैष्ठिकस्य पतनकथनात् तस्य भावः प्रतिपद्यते, यथा

आरुढो नैष्ठिक धर्मं यस्तु प्रच्यवते पुनः ।

प्रायश्चित्तं न पश्यामि येन युज्येत् स आत्महा ॥

41 *The expiation (provided in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā) in the Chapter on Adhikāra (for breaking the vow of chastity) cannot be (claimed by a brahmachārin for life), because it does not apply (to his case, which is a 'fall' according to Smṛiti).*

The question mooted in this Sūtra is this. There is an expiation prescribed (for breaking the vow of chastity) in this text, "A brahmachārin who has broken his vow shall sacrifice an ass to Nirriti" Now, if one who has adopted the vow of brahmacharya *for life* breaks that vow through heedlessness, is he also entitled to expiate himself by that sacrifice, or not ? The Sūtra says, No. Though an expiation has been prescribed in the Pūrva

Mīmāṃsa in the Chapter on Adhikāra, it is not meant for a brahmachārin for life. Why so? Because it does not apply to his case which Smṛiti views as a fall. The fall from chastity of a brahmachārin who had taken a life long vow has been dealt with in the Smṛiti in the following text which applies to the case under consideration — For one who has destroyed his soul by lapsing again from the duties of a Naishtika Brahmachārin which he once undertook I see no expiation that may make him clean again.

४२ । उपपूर्व्यमपि त्वेके भावमग्नवत् तदुक्तम् ।

४१ । अपितु एके भावाद्याः महिम्न इन्द्रवर्षेऽप्युतिम् उपपूर्व्यम् उपपदं पूर्वं यस्य तत् पातकम् उपपातकं मन्वन्ते, न तु महापातकम् इत्ययम् । यदा हि तस्य साधम् प्रत्यभिगम्यिष्यन् इच्छन्ति । अग्नवत् यदा ब्रह्मचारिणः भवन्तीति मत्तोप पुनः संशयः च, एवम् इति । तदुक्तम् तत् उक्तं पूर्वमीमांसकानाम् अपि ।

42. On the other hand certain teachers (hold that such lapse is only) an *upā pātaka* (a minor sin and that expiation for it) exists as in the case of eating. This has been explained (in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsa)

On the other hand certain teachers hold that a lapse from chastity of a brahmachārin for life is only an *upā pātaka*, (a minor sin) and not a *mahā pātaka*, (a deadly sin). Hence they claim that expiation for this sin exists. As in the case of eating just as, when there happens a breach of a brahmachārin's vow by the taking of honey or meat, there may be a purification again so also here. This has been explained in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā

४३ । वहिस्तूमयथापि स्मृतेराचाराच्च ।

४३ । यदि ऊर्ध्वरेतसा स्वायमेस्य प्रथ्वन महापातक, यदि वा उपपातकम्, 'उभयथा अपि' शिष्टे ते वहि कर्त्तव्या "आहूयतित विप्र मण्डलाच्च विनिश्चतम् । उद्वह ह्यमिदं च स्पृष्टा चान्द्रायण चरेत्" इति 'स्मृते', शिष्टानाम् 'आचारात् च' । न हि यज्ञाध्ययनविवाहादीनि तै. सह आचरन्ति शिष्टा ।

43 *But in either case* (such transgressors must be kept) *outside* (the pale of good society), *because both smṛiti and good custom demand it*

Whether a lapse from the vow of chastity of brahmachārins for life be viewed as a mahāpātaka (a major sin) or as an upa-pātaka (a minor sin) in either case, such transgressors must be kept outside the pale of good society. For Smṛiti dictates, "If one touches a Brahmana who has fallen from his vow of brahmacharya, or a man who has been expelled from his order, or a hanged man, or a man whose body is being eaten by worms, he must undergo the Chundrīyana penance" And also "because of good usage", *i e*, because good men do not sacrifice with them, study with them or enter into matrimonial relations with them

४४ । स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः ।

४४ । यज्ञार्हैषु उपासनेषु 'स्वामिन' यजमानस्य एव कर्त्तृत्वम् 'इति' 'आत्रेय' आचार्य मन्यते । 'फलश्रुते' यत् "वर्षति ह्यग्ने वर्षयते एतदेव ९ विधान् दृष्टौ पञ्चविध सामाधानं" (का २।३।२) इति उपासनाफलं उपासनानां कर्त्तव्यं एव श्रूयते ।

44 (The meditations constituting the minor elements of the sacrifice are to be performed) *by the master of the sacrifice himself* Such is the opinion of Ātreya because of the scriptural statements about the fruit

The meditations which constitute the subordinate elements of sacrifices are to be performed by the master of the sacrifice (i.e. by the yajamāna) Such is the opinion of the teacher Ātreya because of the scriptural declaration about the fruit i.e. because the fruits of the meditations accrue to the person meditating as declared in the scripture in texts such as Rain falls for him and he too makes the rain fall for others who knowing thus meditates on the fivefold Sāman in the rain (Chh II 3 2)

४५ । आर्त्विज्यमित्यौकुलोमिस्तस्मै हि परिकीयते ।

४५ । यजामन् उपासकम् आर्त्विज्यम् अर्त्विजिम् एव कथयन् 'इति' 'दोहनीमि' आचार्यं संबोध्ते, हि एतं तस्मै आर्त्विज्यं कर्त्तव्यं अर्त्विज्यं यजमानेन परिकीयते ।

45 According to Audulomi (they are to be performed) *by the priest* because he is paid for all this work

The teacher Audulomi however thinks that the meditations which are parts of the sacrifice are to be performed by the priest because the priest is paid by the yajamāna for the whole sacrifice including the subordinate parts.

४६ । श्रुतेष्व ।

४६ । ‘श्रुते’ अतिप्रमाणात् ‘च’ यज्ञाङ्गीपासनानां ऋत्विक्कामत्वसिद्धिः । यथा “यां वै काञ्चन यज्ञं ऋत्विज आशिपमाशासत इति यजमानायैव तामाशासत इति होवाच” इति (शतपथब्राह्मण १।३।१।२६), “तस्मादु हैविदुक्ताता वृथात् क ते काममागायानि” (छा १।७।८) ।

46 And also because scripture declares that

Scriptural statements also prove that the meditations which form parts of sacrifices are to be performed by the priests “Whatever blessings the priests pray for at the sacrifice, they pray in the interests of the yajamāna Thus declared he” (*Satapatha Brahmana* I 3 1 26) “An udgātri who knows thus may, therefore, say to the yajamana, ‘What desire of yours should I accomplish by my singing?’” (*Chh* 1 7 8)

४७ । सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं तदतो विध्यादिवत् ।

४७ । ब्रह्मद्वारण्यके श्रूयते,—“तस्माद् ब्राह्मण पाण्डित्य निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत बाल्यञ्च पाण्डित्यञ्च निर्विद्याऽयं मुनिरमौनञ्च मौनञ्च निर्विद्याऽयं ब्राह्मण्य” (बृह ३।५।१) । अत्र संशयः,—मौनं विधीयते न वा इति ? सिद्धान्तः, ‘सहकार्यन्तरविधि’ अन्यत् एतत् विद्यासहकारि इति मौनस्य विधि एव अत्र अवगन्तव्यः । इदं च मौनं बाल्य-पाण्डित्यपेक्षया “तृतीयं” ज्ञानातिशयरूपं विधीयते । ‘तद्वत्’ विद्यावत् एव सत्यासिन मौनं विधीयते । ननु, सति विद्यावत्त्वे प्राप्नोति एव तत्र विद्यातिशयः, किं मौनविधिना ? इति अत्र आहुः,—‘पक्षेण’ यस्मिन् पक्षे भेददर्शनप्रावल्यात् विद्यातिशयः न प्राप्नोति, तस्मिन् एव विधिः, इति । ‘विध्यादिवत्’ यथा “दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत” इति एवज्ञातीयके विध्यादौ सहकारित्वेन अन्याधानादिकम् अज्ञातं पूर्वमौमासायां विधीयते, एवम् अविधिप्रधाने अपि अस्मिन् विद्यावाक्ये मौनविधिः इत्यर्थः ।

(Of the three states mentioned in) (Bri III 5 1) the third (viz. muniship meditative silence) is enjoined as another co operating factor (towards knowledge) for (the sanyāsin) possessed of that (i e., knowledge) in case (he is not already perfect in knowledge) As in the case of injunctions etc

In this Sūtra the following text of the *Bṛihadānyaka* will be discussed — Therefore a Brāhmaṇa, having renounced learning should desire to attain a child like state afterwards having renounced both childlikeness and learning he [becomes] a muni and then having renounced both the states of muniship and non muniship he [becomes] a Brāhmaṇa (III 5 1) At the outset (as there is no verb in the text to agree with the word muni) a doubt arises whether the state of a muni is enjoined here or not. The view adopted by the Sutrakāra is as follows. We are to understand that this text is an injunction for (the state of a muni as) another co-operating factor towards knowledge and the state of a muni mentioned in the text as the third after childlikeness and learning is here enjoined because its characteristic is pre-eminence in knowledge. For whom is the state of a muni enjoined? For the sannyāsin possessed of knowledge. Again if the sannyāsin is already possessed of knowledge pre-eminence in knowledge is already established in his case. Why then a further injunction for muniship? To this question the reply furnished in the Sūtra is In case i e. in case pre-eminence in knowledge should not have been established in the sannyāsin owing to the prevalence of the idea of difference (to which all

men are subject), the injunction is to be applied "As in the case of injunctions etc"—The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* declares that in the text "He who desires heaven should offer two *Darsapūrnamasa* sacrifices", the subordinate functions, e.g., the establishment of the sacred fires, etc., are also to be understood as enjoined as auxiliaries. Similarly, though injunctions do not form the main subject in the present text pertaining to *vidyā*, yet the state of a muni is to be understood as enjoined in it as auxiliary to *vidyā*.

४८ । कृत्स्नभावात् तु गृहिणीपसंहारः ।

४८ । कणात् ऋग्वेदे गृहिणा उपसंहारः, "अभिभूमाव्य कुटुम्बे" (८।५।१) इति अतः । अस्य उत्तरं पठति,—'कृत्स्नभावात्' इति । यदुलायासानि यद्वनि च यद्वनकणाणि यज्ञादीनि तः प्रति कर्त्तव्यतया उपदिष्टानि । आश्रमांतरकेभ्योऽपि च यस्मिन् इन्द्रियसंयमादीनि यथासम्भवः तस्य विद्यन्ते । इति अतः "कृत्स्नभावात्" उन्मोदसंयमवन्वितात्, "तु" 'गृहिणा' उपसंहारः समापनं न विरुध्यत ।

48. *The termination 'of the Chhândogya Upanishad) with (instruction about) the householder (is quite reasonable), because the householder is, (as it were, an epitome of) all the āśramas*

Why is it that the *Chhândogya Upanishad* (vi 5. 1) winds up with instructions about the householder, as seen in the passage, "After having received his discharge from the preceptor, (and returned to) his own family," etc. ? To this question the Sūtra replies—Most troublesome and manifold are the sacrifices etc., enjoined as duties on the householder in his own āśrama. In addition to these, duties of other

Āsramas, such as non violence and the control of the senses etc., are also incumbent on him as far as practicable. For this reason :— because he is, as it were an epitome of all the Āsramas, the winding up of the *Chhandogya* with the household is not objectionable

४८ । मौनवदितरयामभ्युपदेयात् ।

४८ । मुनी मौनम् इतरयान् यः चान्मनाम् उपदेयात् मुन्यन् विद्वन्
अभ्युपदेया इतिपति ।

49 Is the other (āśramas) also are enjoined like the state of the muni (they are all to be gone through)

As the other Āsramas also are enjoined in scripture like that of the muni they are all to be equally practised whether by free selection from amongst them or by taking them all without exception

५० । अनापिच्छकुर्वन्मयात् ।

५० । तस्मात् ब्राह्मण पाणिन्यं निविद्य ब्राह्मणं तिष्ठामिन् अन्तर्ध्व — ब्राह्मण
आत्मानम् अनाविच्छुद्धम् आनाध्ययनं धार्मिकान्तिभिः अविच्छिद्यन् दानदपानिभिरिति
मयेत् यदा ब्राह्मणं अमीदृशं यदा न परं तु आत्मानम् आविच्छुद्धं ईदृशं तदा ।
अथवा यदा यदा हि यदा ब्राह्मणं अन्तर्ध्वं भवति तदा भवति ।

50 (The childlike state enjoined in *Bri* III 5 1 means that the seeker after Brahman) is not to make a display of himself for thus alone does that statement retain its consistency

The text "Therefore a Brāhmana, having renounced learning, should desire to attain a child-like state" (*Vide* Sutra 47) means that the knower of Brahman should desist from making a display of himself, i. e., he should not make an exhibition of his knowledge, learning, virtue, etc., and should divest himself of arrogance, pride etc., just as a child, whose sense functions are yet undeveloped, never strives to exhibit himself before others. Because only by this interpretation does the statement become consistent with the whole chapter.

५१ । ऐहिकमप्यप्रस्तुत-प्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात् ।

५१ । किम् इह एव जन्मनि विद्या सिध्यति यतः कदाचित् असुत अपि ? इति भव आह,—विद्याजन्म 'ऐहिकम् अपि' भवति. 'अप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे' अनुपस्थिते बाधके । यदा तु खलु प्रतिबन्धः क्षियते तदा असुत इति । 'तद्दर्शनात्' यतः श्रुतिः ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धं दर्शयति,

यवणाद्यापि बहुभि र्यो न लभ्य

मृक्षलोऽपि बह्वी यन्न विद्य ।

आश्चर्यो वक्ता कुशलोऽस्य लब्ध्वा

आश्चर्यो ज्ञाता कुशलानुशिट ॥" कठ १।२।७)

गर्भस्य एव वामदेवः प्रतिपेदे ब्रह्मभावम् (पेट २।५) इति वदन्ती जन्मान्तर-
मञ्जितात् साधनात् अपि जन्मान्तरे विधीत्पुनरिति दर्शयति । तस्मात् ऐहिकम् आसुम्भिकं
वा विद्याजन्म प्रतिबन्ध-चयापेक्षया इति स्थितम् ।

51 (*The perfection of knowledge may occur even in this world, if no obstacles present themselves. Because scripture declares it*

Does knowledge attain perfection even in this world ? Or is that consummation sometimes postponed to the next world ? To this question we reply "The perfection of knowledge may occur even in this world if no obstacles present themselves. Where however there is some obstacle it occurs in the next world. Because scripture declares it : & scripture shows that there may be effective hindrances to knowledge & g in the passage.

About whom many have not even the means of hearing whom many cannot know even after hearing of him — very rare is a speaker about him. An able man alone can find him. Very rare is a knower of him instructed by a wise teacher. (*Kaṭh* 1. 2. 7). Again in *Aṣṭa* II, 5. It is related that Vāmadeva attained the state of Brahman even when he was lying in his mother's womb. Scripture therefore admits that it is possible for knowledge to spring up in a later birth through exertions made in a former birth. Therefore whether knowledge is to originate in this or in the next world depends on the removal of obstacles.

५२ । एव सुखिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावष्टतेस्तदवस्थावष्टते ।

५२ । 'एवं साधनतादयेन उचितं आमुष्मिन् विद्याग्रन्थविशेषतः सुखिफलानियमः न खलु सुखिफलं सुखिसर्वत्र ज्ञानफलं नियमं विधिं अस्ति । तदवस्थावष्टते यतः सर्वैर्दान्तेषु तदवस्था सुख्यवस्था एव कदा अवधार्यते । ज्ञानेन हि सुख्यवस्थान्न च ज्ञानबीजिकाकाराद्यन अस्ति । तदवस्थावष्टते तदवस्थावष्टते' इति पदार्थाद्यवस्थापरिसमाप्तिं शीतयति ।

fruit (of knowledge) which is the final release, on account of the enunciations about that state, on account of the enunciations about that state

Difference of sādhanas is seen to produce differing results, whereby knowledge is perfected in this world or in the next, but as regards that particular fruit of knowledge which we designate as 'the final release', there is no such rule "On account of the enunciations about that state", i.e., because in all Vedānta-texts that state, viz., the state of final release, is described to be of one kind only. The state of final release is nothing but the state of Brahman, and Brahman cannot have different forms.

The repetition of the last clause indicates the termination of the chapter.

फलनोम चतुर्थाध्याये

प्रथम पाद—संक्षोपासनया जीवन्मुक्ति



१। आसत्तिरसक्तदुपदेशात् ।

१। अस्मन्मननादि-साधनानाम् वासति धीनयुक्तेन समासं करण्य-
मसक्तं उपदेशात् यत् "श्रीवक्षी मनस्यी निदिध्यासितम् (ब्रह्म १।४।३
शाखा १) पञ्चादीनाम् असक्तं धीनयुक्तेन उपदेशे दर्शनपर्यन्तं साधनावधिं
वृत्तयति ।

1 (Spiritual exercises, such as *śravaṇa manana*, etc. require) *repetition because scripture repeatedly inculcates* (such exercises)

Repetition of spiritual exercises, (such as reading sacred books, meditation etc.) must be practised because scriptural instructions about them e g (The Self) is to be heard to be reflected upon to be meditated upon (*Bri II 4 5 IV 5 6*) etc. repeatedly inculcate the performance of such exercises until direct vision should be attained

२। शिक्षाच्च ।

१। 'निष्ठम् अनुमापन्नं धर्म्यं, तत् अपि प्रत्ययावधिं प्रमापयति । आदीन्यम्

(१।५।१, २) उद्गीथविज्ञानं प्रसृत्य “आदित्य उद्गीथ ” इति एतत् एकपुत्रतादीर्घेण अपोथ “रग्मीष्व पर्यावर्त्तायात्” इति रश्मिबहुत्वविज्ञान बहुपुत्रतायै विदधत् सिद्धवत् प्रत्ययावृत्तिं दर्शयति । तस्मात् तत्सामान्यात् सर्वप्रथयेषु आवृत्तिसिद्धिः ।

2 And also because there is an indication

[By an “indication” is meant a characteristic on which an inference may be based] Such an “indication” in one of the scriptural texts also points to repetition of meditations The *Chhandogya* Upanishad, when dealing with the Udgītha-vidyā, rejects one particular view, viz, that “the Udgītha is the sun” (*Chh* I 5 1), on the ground that the result of that meditation would be the possession of one son only, and by another text, viz, “Do thou resolve his rays” (*Chh* I 5 2), enjoins a meditation on the multitude of the sun’s rays, on the ground that the result of such meditation would be the possession of many sons From this it is evident that the repetition of meditations is a well-established doctrine But considered as a meditation, this one is on a par with all other meditations Hence it is reasonable to hold that the instruction about repetition should apply to all meditations

३ । आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च ।

३ । ‘तु’ इति पूर्वपक्षनिरासार्थः । ‘आत्मा’ इति एव परमेश्वरः प्रतिपत्तव्यः । तथाहि परमेश्वर-प्रक्रियायाः जावाला आत्मत्वेन एव एतम् ‘उपगच्छन्ति’ जानन्ति, स्वीकृष्यन्ति,—“त्व वा अहमस्मि भगवो देवते, अह वै त्वमसि देवते” इति । तथा अन्ये अपि “अह ब्रह्मास्मि” (ऋ १।४।१०) एवमादयः आत्मत्वोपगमा द्रष्टव्याः ।

पात्रमिति च आत्मत्वेन एव ईश्वरं विद्वान्वाक्यानि उप त आत्मा सम्मान्यते, (उह
 ३।३।१) “एव त आत्मानोत्पत्त्यत (उह ३।३।३) तत् सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि
 (वा ३।१०) इति एवमात्मनि ।

3 (The sacred texts) *however both understand and inculcate* (the meditation of the Highest Lord) *as the Self*

The word “however” is directed towards a Pūrva paksha position [viz that the Highest Lord is not to be meditated upon as the Self of the devotee]—The Highest Lord is to be understood as the Self. For the Jābālas, in their text about the Highest Lord doubtlessly understand him to be the Self in the passage “O Lord O Deity Thou indeed art I! O Deity I indeed am Thou! Similarly there are other texts, such as “I nm Brahman (Bṛs I 4 40) etc. which clearly understand the Lord to be the Self. Again certain other Vedānta texts distinctly inculcate the meditation of the Lord as the Self e g —‘This (the Lord) is thy Self and is within all” (Bṛs III 4 1) This (the Lord) is thy Self the indwelling ruler the immortal (Bṛs III 7 3) ‘That (the Lord) is the True that is the Self thou art that, (Chā VI 8 7) etc.

४ । न प्रतीके न हि स ।

१ । ‘प्रतीके’ मन्-आत्मन-आदिपादौ ब्रह्मविष्कारे न आत्ममतिं वक्ष्येतात् ।
 न हि स इति च उपासक प्रतीकानि पश्चिमतानि आत्मत्वेन न जानाति ।

4 Symbols (should not be thought of as the Self)

because he (i. e., the devotee) does not apprehend them as the Self)

Symbols, such as the sensorium, ether, the sun, etc. must not be meditated upon as the Self because he (the meditating person) does not apprehend symbols, which are by their nature limited, as the Self.

५ । ब्रह्मदृष्टिर्उत्कर्षात् ।

५ । “मनो ब्रह्मेत्यपासीतेत्यध्यात्मम् । अथाधिदेवमाकाशो ब्रह्मेति” (का३।१८।१) तथा “आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेश” (का३।१८।१) “स यो नाम ब्रह्मेत्यपासी” (का३।१।५) इति एवमादिषु प्रतीकोपासनेषु मन-आदिषु ‘ब्रह्मदृष्टि’ कर्तव्या, न ब्रह्मणि मन-आदि-दृष्टि । कुत ? ‘उत्कर्षात्’, यत एवम् उत्कर्षेण मन-आद्य दृष्टा भवन्ति उत्कर्षदृष्टेः तेषु अध्यासात् ।

5 (In meditating upon symbols, the symbols themselves) *are to be contemplated as Brahman*, (and not *vice versa*), because thus there is an elevation (of the symbols)

The meditation of symbols has been enjoined in such texts as the following,—“One should meditate on the sensorium as Brahman this much about the body. One should meditate on the ākāśa as Brahman this much about the devas” (*Chh* III 18 1), “The sun is Brahman This is the doctrine,” (*Chh* III 19 1), “He who meditates on name as Brahman” (*Chh* VII 1 5) In these symbolic meditations it is the sensorium etc., that are “to be contemplated as Brahman,” and not Brahman that is to be contemplated as the sen-

sonum etc. Why so? Because thus there is an elevation i.e. because on being contemplated thus, the sensorium etc. are elevated in our view the contemplation of something higher than they (*viz.* Brahman) being superimposed on them

६ । आदित्यादिमतयथाह उपपत्ते ।

६ । 'यद्वा' उद्गोवादि यथाह' आदित्यादिमतयथाह' उपपत्ते' यत एवम् अपूर्णमभिप्रायत् आदित्यादिमतिनि मेषि यमाभिः उद्गोवादिषु कथमवधि उपपद्यत । 'यदेव विद्याया करोति तदवापनिषत् तदेव वीर्यवत्' इति (का १।१।१) इति च विद्याया वर्धयति इति तां दमयति ।

6. On members (of the sacrifice) are to be superimposed the conceptions of the sun etc., (and not vice versa) so that there may be success

It is the members of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha etc. that are to be contemplated as the sun etc. and not the sun etc. that are to be contemplated as udgitha etc. Why so? In order that there may be success * i.e., because the work (i.e. sacrifice) attains success only

"Certain constituent members of the sacrificial action—such as the udgitha—undergo a certain ceremonial purification (*samakara*) by being meditated upon as Aditya and so on. The meditations therefore contribute, through the mediation of the constituent members, towards the *apūrva*, the superconscious result of the entire sacrifice"—*Thibaut*.

This seems to be a translation from some annotator; it elucidates the commentary

when its members, such as udgītha etc , are purified by being viewed as the sun etc , through connection with the apūrva. The following passage also declares that knowledge (through contemplation) is a factor in the attainment of success in sacrifice, "Whatever work is done with knowledge, with faith, and with the Upanishad,—the same becomes more powerful", (*Chh* I I 10).

७। आसीनः सम्भवात् ।

७। 'आसीन' एव उपासीत, 'सम्भवात्' यतः समानप्रत्ययप्रवाहकारणम् उपासनम् आसीनस्य एव सम्भवति, न तु गच्छतः धावतः शयानस्य वा ।

7 (The devotee should perform his meditations) *in a sitting posture, for thus only is it possible*

One should meditate only "in a sitting posture , for thus only is it possible" Meditation consists in the continued flow of an identical current of thought This is only possible to a person who is sitting, not to one who is moving, or running, or lying down

८। ध्यानाच्च ।

८। 'ध्यानात्' च उपासनस्य ध्यानरूपत्वात् च तत आसीनस्य एव अनायासेन भवति ।

8 *And also because (meditation means) deep reflection*

Also, because meditation is of the nature of deep reflection, faculty for which is enjoyed only by a person seated

८ । अचञ्चलत्वस्यापेक्ष ।

८ । अचञ्चलत्वं निपुणत्वं 'य' 'अपेक्ष्य' सख्योद्भव आनन्द प्रयोग इवति ।
निपुणत्वं च आसीनस्य एव सम्भवति, ततः च उपासनस्य आसीनत्वार्थम् ।

9 *And also because (meditation has) reference to absence of movement*

The use of the word meditation always implies absence of movement which is possible only to one sitting. For this reason also meditation should be practised sitting.

१० । स्मृति च ।

१ । श्रुतम् च उपासनास्येन साधनं कथयन्ति यथा भावटीका — "तृतीयेन प्रतिष्ठाप्य स्मृतमासनमासन (६।११) इत्यादिना । अतः एव च धीन्यास्येनासाधनविशेषात् साधनानाम् उपदेष्टम् ।

10 *Smritis texts also declare the same*

The *Smritis* also declare the sitting posture to be auxiliary to meditation e.g. the Bhagavadgita has this —

Having placed one's seat in a clean spot — a seat immovable etc. (VI 11) For the same reason instruction is given in the Yoga sūtras about various kinds of sitting postures.

११ । धर्मैकाग्रता तादाविशेषात् ।

११ । 'यस्य दिशि दिशि चासि या सायकस्य एकाग्रता भवति' 'तस्य एव उपासीत । 'अविर्ज्वल' अतः एतद् विपरीतं व्याख्येयमित्येवमाह ।

6 3 1) declares the continuation of meditations up to death. *Sūratī* also has the following — O son of Kunti at the time of death whatever object one thinks of when leaving his body he with his mind pervaded by the thought of that object assumes the form of that object" (*Bhag* VIII 6) and "At the time of death with a steadied mind" (*Bhag* VIII 10). The scriptural passage "One should at the hour of death take refuge in this triad of meditations" (*Chh* III 17 6) also declares that there is a last duty (of meditation) at the time of death.

१३ । तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्व्याद्ययोरन्येषां विनाशो भवत्यपदेयात् ।

१३ । 'तदधिगमे ब्रह्माधिगमे सति 'उत्तरपूर्व्यादयो' अत्र विनाशो भवति, अर्थात् पापस्य अपि, पूर्वपापस्य विनाशो भवति इत्यर्थः । तदपदेयमात् तद्यदि ब्रह्मविद्या प्रक्रियायां सत्यात्मज्ञानमवस्थस्य आत्मामितं दुरितस्य अनभिस्तम्भं विदुषः स्वरदिशति,— 'यदा पुनरुपनाम आत्मा न द्विषन् एवमेव त्विदं पापं कर्म न शिञ्चते (का ३।१३।१) इति । तदा विनाशम् अपि पूर्वोपचितस्य दुरितस्य व्यपदिशति — त एवोक्तानुसमग्री प्रीतिं प्रदूयते इत्यस्य सत्यं' इति । तदपदेयम् (का ३।१३।१) इति । अयम् अपर कर्मव्यवस्थाम् भवति —

मिच्छति उत्तरवर्तिनिदिवान्ते भवत्यस्य ।

तद्यमे आत्मा कर्माणि तद्विन् इत्येव पश्यति ॥ (१ सु १।८)

13 When Brahman is attained non-contamination from and destruction of future and past evil deeds (take place) for thus scripture declares

"When Brahman is attained one becomes immune from the contamination of subsequent sins, and his past

sins also are destroyed "For thus scripture declares ' When treating of Brahma vidyā, scripture declares (in the following passage) that such future sins as would ordinarily cling to one, ceases to cling to him who knows Brahman, "As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows this (i e, Brahman)," (Chh. IV. 14-3) Scripture also declares the annihilation of the accumulated evil deeds of the past for one who knows Brahman in the passage, "As the pith of the Ishikā reed, when thrown into the fire, is burnt, similarly all his sins are burnt," (Chh. V. 24-3) Another scriptural statement about the annihilation of deeds is the following —"The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are dissolved, and his (the wiseman's) deeds cease, when the Higher and Lower (Brahman) is seen" (Mund II 2-8)

१४ । इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाति तु ।

१४ । 'इतरस्य' पुण्यस्य कर्मण्य 'अपि' 'एवम्' अप्यवत् 'असंश्लेष' विनाशः च ज्ञानवत् भवति । 'पाति तु' विदुषः शरीरपाति तु मुक्तिः भवति । 'तु-शब्द' निश्चयार्थः ।

14 A similar non-adherence of the other (i e, good deeds) also (takes place) But (release comes immediately) at death.

"Of the other also," i e, in respect of good deeds also, a similar non-adherence takes place, (i e, non-contact with the future and annihilation of the past good deeds take place) in the case of one who has known

distinctly stated to be the limit of the delay for the attainment of release. If it were not so, i e., if all works (irrespective of the commencement or otherwise of effects) were to be destroyed through knowledge, there would remain no reason for the continuation of the present state of existence, and release would follow immediately on the attainment of knowledge. If such were the case, scripture would not have mentioned the waiting for the dissolution of the body.

१६ । अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्थयैव तद्दर्शनात् ।

१६ । 'तु'-शब्द आशङ्काम् अपनुदति । 'अग्निहोत्रादि' नित्य कर्म 'तत्कार्थयैव' भवति, ज्ञानस्य यत् कार्थं तत् एव अस्य कार्थम् इत्यर्थः । तस्मात् तस्य विनाशः न भवति । 'तद्दर्शनात्' यत् "तमेत वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन" (बृह ४।४।२२) इत्याद्या श्रुति यज्ञादीनां चित्तशुद्धिपूर्वकं ज्ञानफलं दर्शयति ।

16 But the daily fire sacrifice etc., tend towards the same result, because scripture shows this

The word 'but' dispels a doubt. Permanently obligatory duties like the Agnihotra etc. "tend towards the same result", i e., whatever results knowledge produces, these also help to produce. Hence, these obligatory duties are not destroyed. "Because scripture shows this", i e., scripture shows that such sacrifices, by purifying the heart, foster the production of the fruits of knowledge, in such passages as "Bráhmaṇas seek to know him by study of the Vedas, by sacrifices, by gifts", (Br I V 4 22)

१०। अतोऽन्याऽपि ह्येकेषामुभयो ।

१०। 'अतः' अपिहीनादि निष्ठात् कथञ्च अस्या 'अपि हि अस्ति साधुत्वात्, या फलम् अभिधत्वाय कियते । तस्या एव विनिवोग उक्तः एवैव' सांख्यिना "सुष्ठु साधुत्वात्मुपपत्ति इति । तस्या एव च इत्थम् अप्यत्र अप्येव विनाश निरूपणम् — "इतरस्य अपि एवम् अप्येव" इति । एवमातोयकस्य कथञ्च कथञ्च विधां प्रति अनुपकारकत्वे सन्तिपत्ति उभयो अपि अस्मिन्नि वाच्यवशात् अपार्यवी ।

17 *There exists also (a class of good works) other than this According to some (these works have certain results There is (however) agreement of both (Jaimini and Bādarāyana about the futility of these works)*

"Other than this" viz the permanently obligatory duties such as the Agnihotra etc., "there is another class of good works viz those performed with an eye to some fruit According to some people who belong to a particular śākhā of the Vedas, the following is the application of such works,— His friends enter on his good works And the instruction about non-adherence and destruction of effects — "A similar non-adherence of the other &c. (given in Sūtra 14) applies to this class of works also There is however agreement of both the teachers, Jaimini and Bādarāyana, about the futility of such works actuated by selfish motives so far as the origination of true knowledge is concerned

१८। यदेव विध्यतेति हि ।

१८। 'हि' इतः कृतो उक्तम् "यदेव विध्यते करोति तदधीननिवदा तदेक वीर्यवत् भवति (आ १।१।१) । ततः विधातृयुक्तस्य कर्मस्य अपिहीनादि वीर्य-

वचनत्वाभिधानेन स्वकार्यं प्रति कश्चित् चातिशयं सुवाणा विद्याहीनस्य तस्य एव तत्प्रयोजनं प्रति वीर्यवत्त्वं दर्शयति ।

18 *For the text "Whatever work is done with knowledge, etc , (confirms the same view). १*

Scripture says, "Whatever work is done with knowledge with faith, and with upanishad,—the same becomes more powerful' (*Chh I 1 10*) In thus affirming that Agnihotra etc, when joined with vidyá, produce their own effects more powerfully and effectively, the text implies that even without vidyá such works have some power and some effectiveness in producing the same results

१८ । भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा सम्पद्यते ।

१८ । इतरे तु आरम्भकार्ये पुण्यपापे 'भोगेन' 'क्षपयित्वा' नाशयित्वा ज्ञानी ब्रह्म 'सम्पद्यते' प्राप्नोति ।

19 *But (the knower of Brahman,) having exhausted by experience the result of the other two evil deeds, becomes one with Brahman*

But "the other two", i e , good and evil deeds whose effects have commenced, the knower of Brahman "exhausts", i e , destroys, "by actual experience of their results", and thus he attains Brahman

organs of speech and the function of speech, is it meant that the organs and the function both merge in the sensorium ? Or the function only ? On this point the Sūtrakāra says The passage means that only the function of speech, (i e, the uttering of speech by the speech-organs,) is merged in the sensorium But how can we take "speech" in the sense of "the function of speech" ? This difficulty the Sūtrakāra explains thus "On account of observation," i e, the earlier cessation of the (dying person's) *function* of speech, even when his sensorium has not yet ceased to function, is a matter of observation But it is certainly not possible for any one to observe the merging of both the organs of speech and the function of speech in the sensorium "And on account of scriptural evidence," i e, because the word "speech" is also frequently used in the scriptures in the sense of the "function of speech "

२ । अत एव च सर्वाण्यनु ।

२ । "तस्मादुपशान्तेना पुनर्भवमिन्द्रियैर्मनसि सम्पद्यमानै" (प्रश्न ३।८) इति अव अवशिष्टेषु सर्वेषाम् इन्द्रियाणां मनसि सम्पत्तिं श्रूयते । तत्र अपि 'अत एव' वाच. इव चक्षुरादीनाम् अपि स्रष्टिके मनसि अवस्थिते वृत्तिलोपदर्शनात् तत्त्वप्रलय-असम्भवात् शब्द-उपपत्ते च वृत्तिद्वारेण एव सर्वाणि इन्द्रियाणि मन 'अनु'-वर्तन्ते ।

2 For a similar reason, all (sense-organs follow) after the sensorium

The merging in the sensorium of *all* sense-organs without any distinction, is declared in the text, "So the person whose heat is spent out, betakes to another body

with his senses entered into his sensorium (*Pras* III 9)
 About this the Sūtrakāra says 'For a similar reason
 i. e., as was seen in the case of speech the eye and the
 other sense organs also are observed to cease from func-
 tioning when the sensorium is yet continuing to function
 And (as was seen in the case of speech) the merging of
 the organs themselves is no impossibility And as the
 word speech) was seen to admit of that interpretation
 (namely function of speech) we therefore hold that all
 the sense-organs follow after (i. e. merge themselves in)
 the sensorium only in respect of their functions.

३ । तन्मन प्राण उदासीत् ।

३ । 'तत् सन् प्राणं नीयते इति प्रत्यक्षेण इति उदासीत् प्रत्यक्षं
 गीकृतं सुते उदासीत् प्राणं नीयते ।

3 That sensorium merges itself in prāna on
 account of the next clause

'That sensorium merges itself' i. e. by merging its
 function 'in prāna' on account of the next clause of
 the scriptural text quoted in the annotation of the first
 Sūtra.

४ । सोऽध्यक्षे तदुपगमादिभ्यः ।

४ । 'सः प्रकृतः प्राणः अध्यक्षे अविद्या-कर्म-पूर्वेषु प्रया उपविष्टे विद्यानाम्नि
 जीवे विधीयते । तदुपगमादिभ्यः यतः तं जीवं प्रति प्राणानाम् उपगमनम् अनुगमनम्
 अवस्थानं च दूयते । एवमेव विद्यानाम्नि मन्त्राणां च सर्वेषु प्राणेषु अभिधेयानाम्नि
 (उच्यते ३।३।१८) इति उपगमन-सूतिः । अविद्या मयि" (उच्यते ३।३।१९) इति
 अवस्थान-सूतिः ।

4 *That (prāna) enters the ruler (i e, the individual self), on account of 'the scriptural statements about going to the self, etc*

“The Prāna under discussion” merges itself in the “ruler”, i e in the intelligent soul, viz the individual self, which has for its limiting adjuncts nescience, karma, and previous knowlegde “On account of the scriptural statements etc ” i e because there are scriptural texts about the prānas going to, following and abiding in, the individual self. A text about going to the self is this “Thus do all the prānas gather round the self at the time of death”, (*Brī* IV 3 38) A text about abiding in the self is this “He becomes endowed with intelligence”, (*Brī* IV 4 2). [i e, by abiding in the intelligent self he obtains intelligence therefrom]

५ । भूतेष्वतः श्रुतेः ।

५ । स प्राणसंयुक्तः अथ च तेजसहचरितेषु 'भूतेषु' देहबीजभूतेषु सूक्ष्मेषु अवतिष्ठते इति अवगन्तव्यम् । “प्राणस्तेजसि” (का ६।८।६) इति अतः श्रुतेः । ननु च इयं अति प्राणस्य तेजसि स्थितिः दर्शयति, न प्राणसंयुक्तस्य अध्यक्षस्य । न एषः दोषः, यतः “सीदध्यक्षे” इति अन्तराले अध्यक्षः उपसंख्यातः ।

5 (The ruler, with the prāna, goes) to the elements, on account of the next scriptural clause

The ruler (individual self) joined by the prāna, then goes to abide in the elements with which there is also fire, i e in those subtle elements which constituted the seed of the body Scripture declares, (vide Sūtra 1), “His prāna

merges in fire (*Chh* VI 8. 6 It may be objected here that this text declares that the *prāna* only goes to fire but not the ruler and the *prāna* together To this we reply This objection is not valid because in the last *sūtra* *prāna* has been declared as entering the ruler and hence the ruler has a distinct position between *prāna* and the fire

६ । नैकस्मिन् दर्शयतो हि ।

६ । अथ “नैकस्मिन् दर्शयतो हि” इति उच्यते वाक्यता एकम् एव तज्ज. तज्जति “नैकस्मिन् दर्शयतो हि” अतः पाद — “नैकस्मिन् एव तज्जति शरीरान्तरं प्रेरित-
विनाशो भावः प्रवर्तित इति यतः शरीरम् अनेकस्मिन् । दर्शयतो हि यतः त्रैति
प्रवर्तते नुतिच्यते वा एतम् अथ दर्शयतो । अति — “इति त्रैविध्यं आपोमयो वायुमय
अत्र त्रैविध्यं त्रैविध्यं” (इति वाक्यं) इत्यादि । अति अपि —

अस्मिन् माता विनामित्री दमाहोता नृणां धृताः ।

ताभिः सार्वभौमं सर्वं भूयन्त्यनुपूर्वजम् ॥ (मनुः १।१०)

6 (The soul *does not* (go to one element only) *This is shown by both* (scripture and *smṛiti*)

It may be objected again that the next ‘His *prāna* merges in fire’ speaks of one element only viz. fire How do we then bring in (vide *Sūtra* 5) the elements, with which there is also fire ? We reply At the time of moving towards a new body the individual self cannot abide in the one element of fire only for the body is composed of several elements ‘This is shown by both This may mean either both the question and the answer in *Chh* V 3 or both scripture and *smṛiti* Such scrip

tural texts are, “(The self) consists of earth, water, air, ākāśa, fire’ (Bṛ. IV. 4. 5), and the like. Such a smṛiti-
passage is, “Those that are known as the minute perish-
able particles of the five elements, from them is produced
all this in due order” (Manu I 27)

७। समाना चासृत्युपक्रमादसृतत्वञ्चानुपीय ।

७। ‘समाना च’ एषा “वाङ्मनसि” इत्याद्या उत्क्रान्ति विद्वत्-अविदुषी ।
‘आसृत्युपक्रमात्’ यतः यती मार्गद्वयकथनारम्भे ज्ञानिन अपि उत्क्रान्ति कथ्यते । ननु
‘असृतत्वं विदुषा प्राप्तव्यं, न च तत् देशान्तरायत्तं, तत्र कुत भूतान्यथैव सृत्युपक्रम वा,
इति । अत्र उच्यते, ‘असृतत्वं च अनुपीय’ इदं प्रतिज्ञातम् असृतत्वं ज्ञानी अविद्यादीन्
क्लेशान् ‘अनुपीय’ (अन्-उप-उष्य, ‘उष्य’ दाहि) अत्यन्तम् अदग्ध्वा एव प्राप्नोति ।
आपेक्षिकं, न तु सुखम् इदम् असृतत्वम् इत्यर्थः ।

7 (The order of departure) is common (to both the
knowing and the un-knowing) up to the starting point of
the paths. This is (relative) immortality in which
(nescience etc.) have not yet been burnt

The order of departure described by the text “The
speech of the departing person merges in his sensorium,
etc.,” is meant to be the common order of departure, both
of one who knows and of one who does not know, “up to
the starting point of the paths,” because scripture mentions
the departure of the knower also when commencing the
description of the two paths. It may be objected here that
the knower is destined to attain immortality, and immor-
tality cannot be reached by any change of place. How,
then, can ‘abiding in the elements’ or ‘starting on a path’

apply to the knower ? To this we reply This is a sort of Immortality in which nescience *etc* have not yet been burnt. The immortality affirmed here is of the kind obtained by the knowing soul without having burnt : *i e* thoroughly destroyed nescience and other miseries That is such immortality is only relative, and is not the highest immortality

८ । तदाऽपोते संसारव्यपदेशात् ।

८ । 'तत् तज्ज' आदि मूलगुण शरीरादि क साध्यवस्तुतम् 'या चपीति मीच पर्यन्तं परस्माद् दीवतायां च प्रतिष्ठते । संसारव्यपदेशात् यतः शुक्ति उत्पत्त्यात् 'संसार दुःखं व्यपश्रियति' कथयति यथा —

दीप्तिमन्ने प्रपचन शरीरत्वात् दीप्तिः ।

आगुमन्नेऽगुमयति वपाद्यर्थं यथासुतम् ॥ (ऋट ११०)

अथवा सुष्णं प्रायश्चम्यस्यै एव उपायि प्रपचनमयात् अथवा ब्रह्म सम्पद्यते । तत्र विविधानां च आगद्यर्थं स्थात् विद्याशास्त्रे च ।

8 *This (exists) until liberation because scripture declares the worldly state*

This *i e* the subtle elements such as fire *etc.*, which sustained the sense organs, such as hearing *etc* continue to exist (without absorption) in the Highest Deity (vide Sutrā) until liberation. Because scripture declares the worldly state for the departed as in the passage Some enter into the womb for assuming a body others enter into immovable things (as trees and stones)—according to their respective knowledge and actions. (*Kath* II 2 7) Were it not so all would immediately at death lose their

distinctive limiting adjuncts, and attain absolute union with Brahman, and all the *śāstras*, giving injunctions or teaching *vidyās* for the attainment of Brahman) would be rendered meaningless.

८ । सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश्च तथोपलब्धिः ।

८ । सूक्ष्मत्व-सहित निदर्शनीयं 'प्रमाणतः' परिमाणतः सारूपतः 'च' 'सूक्ष्म' भवितुम् शक्नोति । 'तथा उपलब्धि' यतः नाशनिमित्तमप्राप्तात् द्रव्यान्तरे अप्रतिघातात् अद्वयत्वात् च तस्य सूक्ष्मत्वम् उपपन्नम् ।

9 (The *linga sarira*) is subtle in measure, also because it is observed to be thus

The *linga sarira*, (the form in which the soul passes out of the body), being composed of the subtle elements only, 'must be admitted to be subtle, both in essence and in measure' "Because it is observed to be thus" Scripture says that it passes out of the arteries, it never comes into impact with any material body and it is invisible. From these we conclude that it is subtle by nature

१० । नोपसर्द्धेनतः ।

१० । 'अतः' एव लिङ्गशरीरस्य सूक्ष्मत्वात् एव सूक्ष्मशरीरस्य 'उपसर्द्धेन' विनाशिनस्तत् 'न' विवक्ष्यति ।

10 Hence the *linga-sarira* is) not (destroyed) by the destruction (of the gross body)

"Hence", i.e., because the *linga-sarira* is subtle, it is not destroyed "by the destruction" of the gross body

[A Pūrvapaksha view] “Now, as regards one who does not desire The man who has no desires, who has ceased to desire, who is satisfied in his desires, who desires the Self only, of him the prānas do not pass out, being Brahman, he goes to Brahman” (Bṛ IV 4 6) This negative statement is met with in the scripture in connection with the highest knowledge From this denial a doubt may arise, that in the case of one who knows the Highest Brahman, the prānas do not pass out of the body at all Our (the Pūrvapakshin’s) view is, that such a doubt would not be reasonable Why so? Because the text denies the departure of the prānas, not from the body, but “from the embodied soul” How is this known? Because the same text in another recension has the fifth case (“from him”) instead of the sixth case (“of him”, as above quoted)

१३। स्यष्टौ ह्येकेषाम् ।

१३। सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् एतत् । न एतत् अस्ति यत् उक्तम् परब्रह्मविद् अपि देहात् अस्ति उत्क्रान्ति प्रतिषेधस्य देहि-अपादानत्वात् इति । ‘हि’ यत् देह-अपादाने एव उत्क्रान्तिप्रतिषेध ‘एकेषाम्’ समानात्वात् ‘स्यष्ट’ उपलभ्यते, यथा बृहदारण्यके आर्त्तभाग-प्रश्नोत्तरे, “याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच यत्रास्य पुरुषो म्रियत उदङ्मात् प्राणाः क्रामन्त्याहो नेति नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्योऽतैव समवलीयन्ते” (३।२।११) ।

13 (The above position is untenable), *because* (in the texts) *of some there is a distinct* (denial of the departure of the prānas from the body)

[The Sūtrakāra’s view] It is not reasonable to argue, (as has been done in the last Sūtra), that because the departure of the prānas from the *soul* of the knower of Brahman

as the starting point has been denied therefore their departure from the body as the starting point can be affirmed "Because in the texts of some Vedic sages the denial of the departure of the *prānas* from the body as the starting point is seen to be distinct E g in the questions and answers of Ārtaabhāga in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* — Ārtaabhāga asked O Yājñavalkya when a person dies do the *prānas* pass out of him or do they not? No replied Yājñavalkya they are gathered up in him (*Bṛ III 2 11*)

१४ । अर्ह्यते च ।

१४ । अर्ह्यते च महाभारते मरुत्कान्धी वक्ता —

मूर्ध्निमूलाभमृतस्य सन्मरुत्कान्तिं पश्यत ।

देवा अपि मार्गे मुच्यन्त्यप्यस्य परेपि न ॥

14 *Smritis also declares it*

The *Mahābhārata* also declares that the knower of Brahman has neither movement nor departure — He who has attained the state of the Self of all beings who has attained the perfect vision of all beings,—about the path of such a person the gods themselves are perplexed seeking to discover the place of one who has no place at all

१५ । तानि परे तथाध्याज ।

१५ । तानि प्राचगर्दीप्तितानि इन्द्रियाणि मूलाणि च परे परमात्मनि प्रसीयन्ते ।

‘तथा हि आह बत मुनि तत् एव आह — एवमेवाऽस्य परितुष्टिना बोधमवस्था, पुनरात्मना प्रहर्षं प्राप्नुयात् न चान्तिः’ (अत्र ६।३) ।

15 *These (merge) in the Highest Brahman For (scripture) says so*

“These”, i e all the senses meant by the word ‘prāna’, and also the elements (of the knower of Brahman) “merge in the Highest Brahman” “For (scripture) says so”, as in the text “So these sixteen parts of this percipient being which are going towards the Person, are absorbed when the Person is reached”. (*Pras VI 5*)

१६ । अविभागो वचनात् ।

१६ । परब्रह्मणि विदुष ‘अविभाग’ अविभागापत्ति निर्वचयेत् इत्य भवति । ‘वचनात्’ यतः कालाप्रलयम् उक्ता द्युति वदति, “मित्येते तासां नामरूपे पुरुष इत्येवं प्रोच्यते स एषोऽकलीऽमृती भवति” (प्रश्न ६।५) इति ।

16 (This merging in Brahman is) *absolute non-division* (from him) *Because scripture says so*

The merging of the knower in Brahman is of the nature of “absolute non-division from Brahman” there is no remainder left “Because scripture says so” After describing the merging of the parts the text goes on to say “Their name and form cease, and it is called the Person only He becomes partless (i e , indivisible) and immortal”. (*Pras VI 5*)

१७ । तदोक्तोऽयज्वलनं तत्प्रकाशितवागे विद्यामामर्त्या-
न्तःशेषमत्यनुष्मृतियोगाच्च हार्दानीनुष्टहीत, शताधिकया ।

१७ । इदानीं नृत्यपक्षम दर्शयति । ‘तदोक्तोऽयज्वलनं’ तत् तस्य उत्क्रान्ति-
भिच्छत विज्ञानात्मन ओका हृदय, तस्य ज्वलनं भाविफलम्पूरणं भवति यथात् उत्क्रान्ति

भरति, इत्येव । तत्पुनरुद्दिष्टत्वात् तत्र ज्ञानमत्र प्रथमं विद्यात् तत्र चतुस्त्वम्-
 देव सा विद्यात्मा उच्यते इति उच्यते विद्या । विद्यासामान्यात् विद्यावदनं
 तत् क्षिपयति च अति योगात् च ददरविद्यावदित्यात् (भा ८) मूर्धन्यानामगम-
 न्ति च देवता वचनात् च (अठ १११६ वा ८१६६) आर्द्रागुप्येतेन दन्वा-
 वदना समुपमितेन चतुर्गुणेन तत्रापि विद्या 'मताभिष्टया एकापि वसतन्मा-
 मुपयया नाया चतुर्नामति । (अठ १११६ वा ८१६६) ।

17 *First there is a lighting up of his abode (viz the heart) This light enables the soul to discover the door Thus strengthened by the knowledge guided by the memory of that final exit and supported by the grace of the Lord of the heart (the knower of Brahman passes out) through the 101st (artery)*

This Sūtra describes the method of the soul's passing out of the body. First there takes place "lighting up of his" (i.e. of the intelligent self which wants to pass out) "abode". This abode is the heart. The lighting up means the coming of a vision of the future. The sense is that the lighting up occurs first and after that the passing out. 'This illumination enables the soul to discover the door through which he must pass. The verb passes out is understood — Thus strengthened by the knowledge attained guided by the memory of that final exit — that is through meditation of the soul's passage along the artery that penetrates the crown of the head as taught in the Daharavidyā (Kath VI 16 Chh VIII) supported by the grace of the Lord of the heart, i.e., favoured by Brahman who abides in the heart, and through meditation on whom the knower of Brahman has come to partake of

his nature, he passes out through the 101st artery," named Sushumnā (*Kath* III 3. 16, *Chh* VIII 6 6).

१८ । रश्मिानुसारो ।

१८ । दहरविद्याया "अथ या एता रुदयस्य नाडा," (का पा६।१) इति उपक्रम्य सप्रपञ्च नाडी-रश्मि-सम्बन्धम् उक्त्वा उक्तम्, "अथ यतैतदस्याच्छरीरादुत्क्रान्त्यर्थैतैरेव रश्मिभिर्द्वन्माक्रमते" (का पा६।५) इति । पुनश्च उक्तम्,—“तयोर्ध्नायत्रमृतत्वमेति” (का पा६।६) इति । तथात् उपासक यताधिकया नाड्या निष्क्रामन् ‘रश्मि-अनुसारो’ सन् निष्क्रामति इति अवगम्यते ।

18 (After passing out of the body, the soul) *follows the rays*

In the Dahara-vidyā referred to above, a passage begins with "Now these arteries of the heart" (*Chh* VIII 6 1), and after describing in detail the connection between the arteries and the rays, goes on to say, "When he passes out of this body, he passes upwards along those very rays" (*Chh* VIII 6 5) The passage also says, "Moving upwards by that (101st artery) he attains immortality," (*Chh* VIII 6 6) From this it follows that the worshipper passes out of the body through the 101st artery, and then "follows the rays "

१९ । निशि नेति चेन्न सम्बन्धस्य यावद्देहभावित्वात् दर्शयति च ।

१९ । 'निशि' रात्रौ रश्मानुसारित्वे 'न' स्यात्, नाडीसम्बन्धविच्छेदात्, 'इति चेत्' आशङ्क्यत, तत् 'न' युक्तम्, 'सम्बन्धस्य यावद्देहभावित्वात्' यतः, नाडीरश्मि-सम्बन्धः यावद्देह

ବାମୀ । ଦକ୍ଷିଣି ଏ ବଳି ତିବା ବିଷୟ ଲକ୍ଷଣେ ଯଦା ଏକମୁଖ । ତେଣୁ ମତାଦଳୀ ଶା
 ବଦ୍ଧ ଲୀଳା ପଦା, ବାମୀ ଲୀଳା ମତାଦଳୀ ବଦ୍ଧିକୁ ଆସିବ ଶୁଦ୍ଧା (ବାମୀ) ।
 ବଳି ।

19 If it be doubted that the rays cannot be followed by a person dying at night, I say No because the connection (of the ray with the art ray) lasts as long as the body lasts. Scripture too declares this.

The rays are connected with the arteries during the day only. This connection being broken at night the following of the rays may not be possible for a person dying at night.—Should such a doubt be entertained we say No. Hence the connection of the rays with the arteries last a long time before the body last. Scripture too declares this about the connection between the rays and the arteries.—The rays extend from yonder sun and enter into the arteries. They extend from the arteries and enter into yonder sun. (Chh VIII 6.)

२० । अथवायनेऽपि दक्षिणे ।

१ । अतः न चरितं चरितं च विद्यायाः च पदार्थ-व्यवस्थान् च शब्दा-
चरितमित्येवम् च, अतएव अतः अतः विद्यायाः विद्यायाः प्राप्तिरिति एव
विद्यायाः ।

20 *I or the same reason (the knower of Brahman can follow the rays) during the southern progress of the sun also*

For the same reason as waiting is unreasonable as the fruit of knowledge does not depend on any condi

tions, and, as the hour of death is uncertain, the knower of Brahman, even though he may die "during the southern progress of the sun" does obtain the fruit of knowledge

२१ । योगिनः प्रति च स्मर्यते आर्त्तं चैते ।

२१ । भगवद्गीतायाम्,

यत्र काले त्वनावृत्तिमावृत्तिश्चैव योगिन ।

प्रयाता यान्ति तत् कालं वक्ष्यामि भवतर्षभ ॥ (८।२३)

इति प्राधान्येन उपक्रम्य अहरादिकालविशेष अनावृत्तये नियत । कथं रात्रौ दक्षिणायने वा प्रयात अनावृत्ति यायात् इति अत्र उच्यते, 'योगिन' प्रति च' अयम् अहरादिकाल-विनियोग, अनावृत्तये 'स्मर्यते' । 'आर्त्तं च एते' सांख्ययोगे, न श्रौते । अतः विषयमेदात् प्रमादविशेषात् च न अस्य आर्त्तस्य कालविनियोगस्य श्रौतेषु विज्ञानेषु अवतारः ।

21 (Certain directions are, however,) *given in Smṛiti works exclusively for yogins, and both (Sāṃkhya and Yoga) have the status of Smṛiti* (only, not of Śruti)

In the *Bhagavadgītā* we have the text, "O chief of the descendants of Bharata, I will now tell you of the times in which, when dead, yogins attain (respectively) to non-return (*i e*, the cessation of re-birth) and return (*i e*, re-birth) (VIII 23), and so on, which beginning in particular, fixes the day-time etc., as the special seasons when the soul should pass out of the body, in order never to return. A doubt may therefore arise here as to how one who dies at night, or during the southern progress of the sun, should attain the state of non-return? We

reply "These directions about death during day time etc with a view to non return are given in Smṛiti works exclusively for yogins And both Sāṃkhya and Yoga are Smṛitis only and not Śrutis Hence as this restrictive injunction about time has for its application a different class of persons (the yogins) and is also founded on a different authority (Smṛiti) it does not apply to knowledge based on the scriptures"

‘फलं नाम चतुर्थाध्याये छतोयं पाद—देवयानं पन्था

* *

१ । अग्निरादिना तत्प्रथिते ।

१ । अग्निं ज्ञानेभ्यः अग्निरादिना अग्निं चाग्निं प्रथमे भाग्यदर्शने यत्नं पञ्च तिलं पञ्चा दीव्यमानं गच्छति । तत्प्रथितं यत् एष मातां सम्भवेयाम् विदुषाम् प्रथितः । तस्याहिं ३३५१२५३ पञ्चाग्निविद्या-प्रथमं हि (३३५ १) "यं चाग्नौ परश्चै यद्वां मन्त्रमुपासत तैर्ब्रह्मविदमभिमन्त्रयन्ति (३३५१२५) इति विद्यानाम्नीलिनाम् अपि अग्निं चादिना सति गच्छति ।

1 The first (stage on the Devayāna path) is Light, because that is well known

Every seeker after Brahman goes along the path (*viz.* the Devayāna) of which "the first stage is Light" "Because that is well-known," *i e*, this path is well-known to all who have known Brahman *E g* in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* Upanishad, in the section dealing with the Panchāgni-vidyā, we have the passage, "Those who in the forest worship with faith the True, go to Light" (VI 2 15), which says that even for those who pursue another vidyā the path begins with Light

२ । वायुमब्दादविशेष-विशेषाभ्याम् ।

२ । देवयान-पथावलम्बो जीव 'अब्दात्' सवत्सरात् 'वायुम्' अभिसम्भवति । कथम् एतत् अवगम्यते ?—'अविशेष-विशेषाभ्याम्' अविशेष-उपदेशेन, यथा "स वायुलीकम्" (कौषी १।३), तथा विशेष-उपदेशेन, यथा "यदा वै पुण्योऽग्राहोकात् प्रैति स वायुमागच्छति तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा रथचक्रस्य ख तेन स लक्ष्मणाक्रमते स आदित्यमागच्छति" (ऋह ५।१०।१) इति । एतच्चात् आदित्यात् वायो. पूर्वत्वदर्शनात् विशेषात् अब्दादित्ययो अन्तराले वायु निवेशितव्यः ।

2 *The stage of Vayu is reached after that of the Year*, (this is known) *from non-specification and specification* (contained in two texts)

The individual self, moving along the Devayāna path, reaches "Vāyu after the Year" How is this known? "From non-specification in one text, and specification in another" The non-specification text is "He comes to the world of Vāyu" (*Kau* 1 3) The specification-text is, "When the person passes away from this world he comes to Vāyu For him Vāyu leaves a space like the hole of a chariot-wheel Through this hole he ascends, and thus

reaches the sun (*Bṛi* V 10 1) Here Vāyu is specifically mentioned as coming before the sun therefore Vāyu must be given a place between the Year and the sun

३ । तद्धितोऽधि वक्ष्य संवन्धात् ।

३ । आदित्यावन्दमर्षं चन्द्रमसौ विद्यत (ऋ ३।१।१) इति चस्य सृतेः तस्मिन् विद्युतः अधि उपरिष्ठत् 'वदन् दिव्यान् पर्व्वरुमे इति विद्या' वक्ष्यो 'संवन्धात् विद्यावते । तथाहि ब्राह्मणे यदा हि विद्याया विद्यतशीलाकागदिवुनिर्घोषा श्रीभुतो रेपु प्रगल्भ्यऽवाय प्रपतन्ति । 'विद्योतते कागधति वपिप्यति वा इति च वाचो रे (अ१।१।१) । अयां च अविपति वक्ष्य इति सृतिश्रुति प्रसिद्धिः ।

3 After Lightning (there is the world of) Varuna because 'the two are) connecte d

In the successive steps on the Devayāna path after the Lightning' mentioned in the text From the Sun to the Moon from the Moon to Lightning (*Chh* V 10 2) we are to understand that there is the world of Varuna because the two are connected The *Brāhmanas* say that when the broad lightnings dance in the mid spaces of the clouds to the accompaniment of loud thunder waters begin to fall The *Chhāndogya* Upanishad also says "There is lightning and thunder it will rain (*Chh* VII 11 1) And Varuna is reputed to be the lord of waters, both in *Sṛuti* and *Smṛiti*

४ । आतिवाहिकाभ्यासिद्धत्वात् ।

४ । अद्विराप्तिर्मु मार्गपर्व्वेषु संशयं विमु एतानि मार्गविज्ञानि उत भीरुसुभय-
'अथवा भित्ता' वक्ष्यत्वात् इति । अत्र उच्यते — आतिवाहिका भित्ताः एव एते

भवितुम् अर्हन्ति । कुत ? 'तस्मिन्नात्', तथाहि "चन्द्रमसी विद्यत तत्पुरुषोऽमानवः
स एव ब्रह्म गमयति" (का ५।१।१२) इति सिद्धवत् गमयितृत्व दर्शयति ।

4 (Light etc) are conducting divinities, because there is such an indication (in the scriptures)

With regard to the stages on the Devayāna beginning with Light, a doubt may arise as to whether they are landmarks, or places of enjoyment, or conductors of the travellers. The Sutra says, "They are conductors," *i e*, guides on the path. Why so ? "Because there is such an indication in the scriptures," *viz*, in the passage "From the Moon they go to the Lightning. A person, not human, belonging to the worlds of Lightning, then leads them to Brahman" (*Chh* V 10 2). From this passage we take it as settled that Light etc, also are conducting divinities (like this 'Person, not human')

५ । उभयव्याप्तीहात् तत्सिद्धेः ।

५ । यदि अचेतना एव अर्चिरादयः अनेतास्तर्हि मार्ग-तद्वगन्तृणाम् उभयेषाम् अपि 'व्याप्तीहात्' अत्रत्वात् लक्ष्यगति न स्यात् । अतः अचेतन जीव चेतनान्तरेण नेय इति न्यायात् 'तत्सिद्धे' अर्चिरादिना नेतृत्वसिद्धे उक्तलिङ्ग न्यायोपेतम् इति सूत्रार्थः ।

5 And because (the indication) is also a logical necessity, both (the path and the travellers thereon) being devoid of consciousness

If it be contended that the Light etc, are non-intelligent (physical) objects, and consequently incapable of being guides, then, as both the path and the travellers thereon being devoid of 'consciousness, the upward movement

यत' कार्यब्रह्मण एव गन्तव्यत्वम् उपपद्यते प्रदेगवत्त्वात्, न त परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि, तस्य सर्वगतत्वात्, गन्तव्यत्वात् प्रत्यगात्मत्वात् च ।

7 *Bádari* (holds that the selves are thus led not to the Supreme Brahman but) *to the created* (Brahman) , *because to him only is "going" possible*

The path and its stages having been discussed, the goal is now the subject of discussion. About the scriptural text "He leads them to Brahman", the doubt arises, whether they are led to the created lower Brahman (Apara-Brahman) or to the highest, unqualified, chief Brahman. On this point the teacher Bádari holds that they are led by 'the person, not human' to the created, qualified, lower Brahman named Hiranyagarbha. On what ground? "Because to him only is 'going' possible." The created Brahman has a specific locality, and so can be the goal of a journey, but not the Supreme Brahman, who is present everywhere, and is the inner Self of the travelling individual selves.

८ । विशेषितत्वाच्च ।

८ । "ब्रह्मलोकान् गमयति तेषु ब्रह्मलोकेषु परा, परावती वसन्ति" (बृह ६।२।१५) इति श्रुत्यन्तरे 'विशेषितत्वात्' कार्यब्रह्मविषया एव गति इति अवगम्यते । न हि बहुवचनेन विशेषण परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि अवकाश्यते । कार्ये तु अवस्थामेदीयपक्षे सभावति बहुवचनम् । लोकश्रुति अपि विकारगोचरायाम् एव सन्निवेश-विशिष्टायां भोग-भूमौ आज्ञसी, गौणी तु अन्यत "ब्रह्मैव लोक एव सत्ताट्" (बृह ४।४।२३) इत्यादिषु । अधिकारण-अधिकार्यत्व-निर्देश अपि परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि न आज्ञस स्यात् ।

8 *Also because* (in another passage we find) *the qualified* (Brahman mentioned as the goal)

[Bādarāyaṇa's view continued] Brahman the goal has been qualified further in the passage. He leads them to Brahman. In those worlds of Brahman they become great and live for ever. Here evidently the created Brahman is meant for the Supreme Brahman can never be specified by the plural number (worlds) while the created Brahman can be so specified different conditions being possible to him. The word loka (world) should be taken literally here for here it means a place of enjoyment entrance in which is possible and which belongs to the sphere of created things. The word loka has been used metaphorically only in such passages as. This is indeed Brahma loka O hims (Br. IV. 4. 3) etc., but not here. Also the idea of abode and something abiding within it cannot be reasonably spoken of in connection with the Supreme Brahman.

८। मामीष्यात् तदापदेग ।

८। एवं कार्यविरहितं ब्रह्मण उपपदेत, इति च तत्र आह—मामीष्यात् तदापदेग । यत्र ब्रह्मणः पदं ब्रह्म मामीष्यात् तदापदेगः तद्विद्मः अपि ब्रह्मणः पदं न विद्यते ।

9 (In the texts the created Brahman has) *that designation* (Brahman / on account of proximity (to it))

In reply to the question Why is the designation Brahman used with reference to the created Brahman ? the Sūtra says, "On account of proximity" As the Apāra brahman is in proximity to Para brahman the

use of the designation ‘Brahman’ to the former is not objectionable

१० । कार्यात्यये तदव्यये सहैव परमभिधानात् ।

१० । ‘कार्य’ब्रह्मलीकास्य ‘अत्यये’ प्रलयकाले आगते ‘तदव्यये सहैव’ कार्य-
ब्रह्मलीकात्यये हिरण्यगर्भेण सह तल्लीकावासिन ‘अतः परं’ अपरस्मात् श्रेष्ठ विशुद्ध पदं
परब्रह्मपदं प्रतिपद्यन्ते इति ‘अभिधानात्’ श्रुतिवचनात् अवगतव्यम् । भाष्ये न किञ्चित्
श्रुतिवचनं उद्धृतम् । प्रश्नोपनिषदि तु उक्तम्,—“यथा पादोदरस्थश्च विनिर्मुच्यते एव
ह वै स पाश्चात् विनिर्मुक्तः स सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलीका स एतस्माज्जोवचनात् परात्परं
पुनश्चैव पुनर्ब्रह्मणीयते” । (५।५)

10 When the end of (the world of) created (Brahman) comes, (the selves go) with the ruler of that (world) to the Highest (This is stated) on the authority of scripture

When the end of the world of the created Brahman, the time for the total absorption, comes, the selves “dwelling in that world”, with Hiranyagarbha, its ruler, proceed towards the Highest, *i e* towards the plane of the Supreme Brahman, which is higher than that world “This is stated on the authority of scripture” The Bhāshya does not give the scriptural authority Such a passage, however, is met with in the Prasnopanishad, “As a snake gets rid of its skin, so he gets rid of sin” He is taken up by the Saman verses to the world of (the lower) Brahman From this concentration of life (*i e*, the Source of all life) he sees the Person, higher than the high and pervading all organisms (V 5)

११ । अतएव ।

११ । अतएव अतिप्रभावात् ५ ५५१८५ । परम् इति श्रममुनि
आशङ्क्य स्यात्—

ह्यत्र च सत् तं सत् सत्प्रतिप्रति ।

परम्यान्ते ह्यत्रात्मानं प्रतिप्रति परं परम् ॥

11 *And on the authority of Smṛiti also*

On the authority of Smṛiti also we know that suc-
cessive liberation takes place from the lower to the
higher Brahman. For example. When the dissolution
of the world takes place with the end (i.e. absorption)
of the high (Hiranyagarbha) they all—selves with their
nature purified—enter the highest plane (i.e. the
Supreme Brahman) with (the lower) Brahman.

१२ । पर जैमिनिमुच्यत्वात् ।

११ । जैमिनि आशङ्क्य "न एतान् ब्रह्म समर्पति इति अत्र परम् एव न्या-
यपरमिति इति मन्वते मुख्यत्वात् यत् परं ब्रह्म एव ब्रह्म सत्त्वं मुख्यम् अपरमस्य
गौणम् ५५१८५ । मुख्यं गौणं च मुख्ये सम्प्रत्यक्षं भवति ।

12. *Jaimini* (holds that the selves go) to the Su-
preme (Brahman and not to Hiranyagarbha) that being
the primary meaning (of the name)

The teacher Jaimini holds that the text He lead
them to Brahman should mean that they are led to the
Highest Brahman that being the primary meaning
of the name Brahman and Apara Brahman its second-
ary meaning. Between the primary and the secondary
the primary is to be given the preference.

१३ । दर्शनाच्च ।

१३ । “तयोर्द्विमायन्नमृतत्वमेति” (कठ ६।१६ , छा ८।६।६) इति च गतिपूर्वकम् अमृतत्व दर्शयति । अमृतत्वञ्च परमिन् ब्रह्मणि उपपद्यते, न कार्ये, विनाशित्वात् कार्यस्य, “अथ यवान्यत् पश्यति तन्मर्ताम्” (छा ७।१४।१) इति वचनात् ।

13 *And because scripture declares thus*

“The self goes up through it (the 101st-artery), and attains immortality” (*Kath* VI 16, *Chh* VIII 6 6) This text declares that by going along that path immortality is reached But immortality is possible only in the Supreme Brahman, and never in the created Brahman, who is himself mortal As scripture says, “Where one sees anything different, that is mortal” (*Chh.* VII 14 1)

१४ । न कार्ये प्रतिपत्यभिसन्धिः ।

१४ । “प्रजापते सभा वेत्स प्रप्रद्ये” (छा ८।१४।१) इति सुमूर्धो साधकस्य ‘प्रतिपत्ति-अभिसन्धि’ प्राप्ति-सङ्कल्प ‘न कार्ये’ न अपरब्रह्मणि भवितुम् अहति, यत् तत्र “आकाशो वै नामरूपयोर्निवहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म (छा ८।१४।१) इत्यादिना कार्यविलक्षण परब्रह्म एव प्रकृतम् ।

14 *And the intention of reaching (mentioned in certain texts) cannot be applied to the created Brahman*

The “intention of reaching” expressed by the devotee who is about to pass away from this world, in the text “I come to the hall of Prajāpati, the house” (*Chh* VIII. 14. 1) cannot reasonably “apply to the created Brah-

man because the subject matter there has already been specified to be Para brahman who is distinct from the created Brahman by the immediately preceding words. He who is called Ākāśa is the revealer of all names and forms. That within which these (names and forms) exist is Brahman.

१५ । अप्रतीकात्म्यनाश्रयतीति वादराय ॥ उभयथा-
ऽदीपात् तत्सम्पत्तय ।

११ । इदम् इत्यर्थो चिन्मयं हिं भूतान् उभयथा च विविधं च मानव
पुरुषं ब्रह्मज्ञानम् प्राप्नोति इति काचित् पक्षः । तत्र उच्यते — अप्रतीकात्म्यतायां
प्रतीकात्म्यतायां च व्यतिरिक्तं भूतान् चान् उपासकान् गच्छति इति वादराय ।
वाचार्थः सत्यम् । न तु “चिन्मयं भूतानाम् (१।१।११) इति शब्दान् मूर्तिरूपेष्वपि
एव विदुषाम् ब्रह्मगतिं लब्ध्वा अपि तु प्रतीकात्म्यतायां वर्धिता । तत्र विविधभूतानाम्
व्यतिरिक्तं — उभयथा चिन्मयं न एव विविधं चिन्मयं, यतः “चिन्मयं ब्रह्म
प्रतीक-व्यतिरिक्तेषु उपासनेषु उपपद्यते । तत्रैकतयं तत्कृतं ब्रह्म च अस्य उभयथा-
भावस्य समत्वम् हेतुं द्रष्टव्यम् । “यथास्तुतद्विज्ञाने पुरुषो भवति तद्यतः प्रेत्य सत्ता
(वा १।१।११) इति श्रुतिः । न तु प्रतीकेषु ब्रह्मरूपत्वम् अस्ति प्रतीकप्रधानत्वात्
उपासकत्वम् ।

15 He (the Person not human) leads only those who do not meditate through symbols (to the world of Brahman). This is the opinion of Badarayana. Because there is no fault (of reasoning) in admitting this two fold view and (the two-fold view arises from) the meditation on that

A doubt here arises, viz., Does the Person not human

take men of all grades of meditation, without distinction, to the world of Brahman ? Or does he take some of them only ? The Sutrakīra says, 'He leads only those who do not meditate through symbols' - i. e., he leads to the world of Brahman all meditators except those who meditate on particular objects as symbolically representing Brahman. "This is the opinion of Badarayana. An objection may be raised here — The Sūtra 'Going along the Devayana path) *applies to all without exception*' (III 3 3D) seems to teach that all meditators reach Brahman but in the present Sūtra meditators on symbols were excluded. Is there no inconsistency between the two views ? To repudiate the charge of inconsistency the Sūtra says "Because there is no fault of reasoning", there is no inconsistency, because the argument about non-restriction of going (contained in Sūtra III 3 3D) is meant to apply to all meditations including those through symbols. "And the meditation on that" - i. e., the argument from 'the meditation on that' seems to support the two-fold view. Scripture says, "According to what a person meditates on in this world, the same will he become when he passes away from here." (Chh. III 14 1). In the case of symbols, it cannot be said that the meditation is on Brahman, for in such meditations it is the symbol that preponderates.

१६ । विशेषञ्च दर्शयति ।

१६ । 'विशेष च फलविशेषं च दर्शयति श्रुतिः नानादिषु प्रतीकौपासनेषु पूर्व्वेष्वात् पूर्व्वेष्वात् उत्तरमिन् उत्तरमिन् उपासने । यथा, "यावन्नाम्नी गतः, तदाश्च यथाकामचारो

‘फल’-नाम चतुर्थाध्याये चतुर्थः पादः सुक्तात्मनः स्वरूपम्

०

१ । सम्पद्याविर्भावः स्वेनशब्दात् ।

१ । अथ ब्रह्मभावप्राप्तिं कथयति । छान्दोग्ये श्रूयते, “एवमेवैष सम्प्रसादोऽ-
आच्छरीरात् समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरूपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिपद्यते” (८।१।३) ।
तत्र सश्रूय, किं देवलोकादि-उपनीगस्थानेषु इव आगन्तुकेन केनचित् विशेषेण अस्मि-
निपद्यते आहोस्वित् आत्ममात्रेण ? तत्र उच्यते, ‘सम्पद्य’ ब्रह्मभाव प्राप्य जीवात्मन
केवलेन आत्मभावेन आविर्भावो भवति, न आगन्तुकेन अपररूपेण । ‘स्वेन’-शब्दात्
यत् स्तुत्युक्तेन ‘स्वेन’-शब्देन आत्मरूपाविर्भाव एव उपपद्यते ।

1 *On reaching (Brahman, the soul) manifests itself (in its own form), on account of the word, ‘own’ (in the text)*

The state of attaining the nature of Brahman is henceforth to be the subject of discussion. The *Chhândogya* Upanishad says, “In the same way, the soul, in its state of unsullied serenity, rises out of this body, and possessed of the highest light, manifests itself in its own form” (VIII 12 3). Here a doubt arises. Does the soul manifest itself through some extraneous characteristic, as souls dwelling in the world of the gods and in such

other place of enjoyment do? Or does it manifest itself as a pure self? The Sūtra says On reaching *i* & on attaining the nature of Brahman the individual soul manifests itself in its own pure character and not through any incidental characteristic. On account of the word *own* in the text *i* & because from the phrase in its own form in the text above quoted the only possible inference is that the soul manifests it self in its own form.

२। मुक्त प्रतिष्ठानात् ।

१। यः स्वयमेव निवसति इति ज्ञानं स मुक्तः स एव आत्मा । स्वप्रतिष्ठानम् । अथ पुनः स्वप्रतिष्ठानं मुक्तः स्वयम् इत्यादौ भवति इति ?— प्रतिष्ठानात् स्वतः कृतिः “एतं त्वं हि मुक्तोऽस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षम् । (वा. पा. १. १. १) इति आदिवाक्ये स्वप्रतिष्ठानम् । अथ पुनः स्वप्रतिष्ठानं मुक्तः स्वयम् इत्यादौ भवति इति ?— प्रतिष्ठानात् स्वतः कृतिः “एतं त्वं हि मुक्तोऽस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षम् । (वा. पा. १. १. १) इति आदिवाक्ये स्वप्रतिष्ठानम् । अथ पुनः स्वप्रतिष्ठानं मुक्तः स्वयम् इत्यादौ भवति इति ?— प्रतिष्ठानात् स्वतः कृतिः “एतं त्वं हि मुक्तोऽस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षम् । (वा. पा. १. १. १) इति आदिवाक्ये स्वप्रतिष्ठानम् । अथ पुनः स्वप्रतिष्ठानं मुक्तः स्वयम् इत्यादौ भवति इति ?— प्रतिष्ठानात् स्वतः कृतिः “एतं त्वं हि मुक्तोऽस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षम् । (वा. पा. १. १. १) इति आदिवाक्ये स्वप्रतिष्ठानम् ।

2 (The soul thus manifesting itself in its own nature) is released because scripture promises thus

The soul described above as manifesting itself is released from bondage and exists henceforth in its pure selfhood. How is it known that the soul now obtains release? Because scripture promises thus. By the words Him I shall explain further to you (Chh VIII 11 3) the scripture promises to describe the self as unstained by the imperfections of the three states (of

waking, dreaming and sleeping) It then introduces the subject (of the released soul) by the words “On his being free from the body, pleasure and pain cannot touch him” (*Chh* VIII 12. 1) The passage concludes with the words (*vide* last Sūtra) “The soul manifests itself in its own form that is the Highest Person” (*Chh* VIII. 12 3) And also the opening words of the narrative (of Prajāpati, Indra and Virochana), *viz*, “The Self which is devoid of sin” (*Chh* VIII. 7. 1) make a promise of describing the released soul

૩ । આત્મા પ્રકારણાત્ ।

૩ । “પર જ્યોતિરપ્રસમ્યદ્ય” (છા ૮.૧૨.૩) અત્ર ‘જ્યોતિ’-શબ્દેન આત્મા એકંદ્ર આવેદ્યતે, ન ભૌતિકં જ્યોતિ । ‘પ્રકારણાત્’ યત ‘જ્યોતિ’-શબ્દ પરમાત્મપ્રકારણે ઉક્તો ।

3 (The ‘highest light’ of which the soul is possessed) *is the Self, that being the subject-matter* (of the scriptural passage)

In the phrase “Possessed of the highest light” (*vide* Sūtra 1) of the scriptural text, the word ‘light’ means “the Self”, and not physical light, “that being the subject-matter” of the whole chapter from which the passage is taken

૪ । અવિભાગેન દૃષ્ટત્વાત્ ।

૪ । મુક્તા પરમાત્મના ‘અવિભાગેન’ એવ અવતિષ્ઠતે । ‘દૃષ્ટત્વાત્’ યતઃ “વત્સલમસિ” (છા ૬.૧.૭), “અહ પ્રજ્ઞાસિ” (મહ ૧.૪.૧૦), “યત્ર નાન્યત્ પશ્યતિ” (છા ૭.૨.૧૧) ઇત્યાદય સ્ત્રોતય પ્રજ્ઞાયા સહ મુક્તાત્મનં અવિભાગ દર્શયન્તિ ।

4 (The released soul abides) in a state of non division (from Brahman) because such is seen in scripture

The released soul abide in a state of non division from the Highest Self because such is seen in scripture" Scriptural text such as That art thou (Chh VI 8 7) I am Brahman (Br I 4 10) Where he sees no other thing (Chh VII 24 1) etc. show that the released soul abides in a state of non division from Brahman

५। माध्वेण जैमिनिरूपय्यासादिभ्य ।

५। माध्वेण ब्रह्मवर्त्मिना परवत्तयात्मनोऽपि हवेन मुनिना निरूपयत इति जैमिनि आचार्ये मन्त्रे । अतः — उपनिषदां अत्र यत् एव आत्मवत्तयात्मनोऽपि हवेन "सर्वकामं सर्वसङ्गं । इति ८०१" इति एवम् अन्तर्गतं शब्दविशेषितं एतत् प्रकथयत ।

5 *Jaimini holds (that the released soul manifests itself) in the same nature as that of Brahman on account of scriptural references etc*

"The teacher Jaimini holds that the released soul manifests itself in those very qualities of freedom from sin etc. which belong to Brahman. Why so? On account of scriptural references etc. : e because such an inference follows from the collocation of words beginning with 'This Self which is devoid of sin and ending in 'Whose desires are true whose volitions are true etc. (Chh VIII 7 1)

६ । चितितन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः ।

६ । 'चिति' चैतन्यम् एव तस्य आत्मन स्वरूपम्, अतः, 'तन्मात्रेण' चैतन्यमात्रेण सुक्तात्मा निप्यद्यते । 'तदात्मकत्वात्' यतः, आत्मा चैतन्यात्मकः, एव । सत्यकामत्वादद्य तु वस्तुस्वरूपेण एव धर्मा उच्यन्ते, तथापि उपाधिसम्बन्धाधीनत्वात् तेषां न चैतन्यवत्-स्वरूपत्वसंभवः । 'इति औडुलोमिः' नाम आचार्यः, मन्यते ।

6 (The released soul manifests itself) as pure intelligence because its essence consists of that, thus says Audulomi

The nature of the self is pure intelligence Hence the released soul manifests itself as that alone (i e, as pure intelligence) "Because its essence consists of that" That is, because the self is of the essence of intelligence The other qualities, such as "having true desires" etc, are indeed mentioned in the text as attributes really inhering in Reality, but they are dependent on connection with limiting adjuncts, hence they cannot constitute its essential nature like intelligence,—so thinks the teacher named Audulomi

७ । एवमप्युपन्यासात् पूर्वभावादविरोधं वादरायणः ।

७ । एवम् अपि पारमार्थिक-चैतन्यमात्र-स्वरूप-अभ्युपगमे अपि 'उपन्यासात् पूर्वभावात्' व्यवहारापेक्षया पूर्वस्य अपि उपन्यासादित्य' अवगतस्य सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वादि-ब्राह्म-ऐश्वर्य-रूपस्य अप्रत्याख्यानात्, अविरोधः मन्यते आचार्यः वादरायणः ।

7 Even in that case, there is no inconsistency, says Bādarayana, because of the existence of the former qualities known from reference etc

Even in that case *i e* even if intelligence alone is taken to be the essential nature of the self yet because of the former qualities known from references etc that is as the former attributes inferred from references etc *e g* the lordly divine powers such as true volition etc cannot be denied from a relative standpoint therefore there is no inconsistency — so thinks the teacher Bāda-
rāyana.

८ । सङ्ख्यादेव तु तच्छ्रुति ।

८ । मुक्तात्मनः सङ्ख्यात् एव तस्य भावः सिध्यति न तु निमित्तात्मनोपेक्षया ।
'तच्छ्रुतिः' यतः सङ्ख्यानिर्दिष्ट एव वादविशया श्रूयत इत्या — स यदि पित्रभीतकामो
भवति सङ्ख्यामीमांसे वितरा ममुनिष्ठानि (द्वा पक्षौ) इत्यादि ।

8 But (a released soul's wishes are fulfilled) by mere will *b* cause scripture says so

To a released soul the fulfilment of desires comes through his will only but not through the instrumentality of anything else Because scripture says so In the Vidyā of Brahman within the heart we read of such direct fulfilment of desire *e g* If he longs for the world of the fathers by his mere will do the fathers rise (*Chh* VIII 2 1) and so on

९ । अतएव चानन्याधिपति ।

९ । यतः एव च यस्या सङ्ख्यात् एव 'य' मुक्तात्मनः अतन्याधिपतिः सत्यति ।

9 And for this very reason (the released soul) has no other over lord

‘And for this reason’, i. e., because its wills are absolutely effective, the released soul has no other overlord

१० । अभावं वादिरिरह ह्येवम् ।

१० । ‘वादिरि’ आचार्य मुक्तात्मन शरीरेन्द्रियाणां च ‘अभावम्’ याच, ‘हि’ यत स्तुति, “मनसैतान् कामान् पश्यन् भवते ब्रह्मचोकि” (छा ८।१।५) ‘एवम्’ मुक्तात्मन शरीरेन्द्रियाणाम् अभाव कथयति । यदि मनसा शरीरेन्द्रियै च विहरेत्, तदा “मनसा” इति विशेषणं न स्यात् ।

10 *Bādarī* (teaches) the absence (of a body and sense-organs in a released soul) because (scripture declares) thus

“The sage Bādarī teaches the absence” of a body and sense-organs in a released soul, “because scripture”, in the passage “In the world of Brahman he (the self) rejoices, seeing those desired objects with his mind” (*Chh* VIII 12 5), declares “thus”, i. e., the absence of the body and the organs in the case of a released soul. Had he rejoiced with his mind as well as with a body and its organs, the text would not have used the adverb “with his mind”

११ । भावं जैमिनिर्विकल्पासननात् ।

११ । ‘जैमिनि’ आचार्य मुक्तस्य मनीवत् शरीरेन्द्रियाणां च ‘भाव’ मन्यते । ‘विकल्प-आसननात्’ यत “स एकधा भवति विधा भवति” (छा ७।२।२) इत्यादिना अनेकधा भावविकल्पस् आसन्नति । न हि अनेकविधा विना शरीरभेदेन चाक्षसी स्यात् ।

11 *Jaṇini* (on the other hand, teaches) *the presence* (of a body and sense organs in released souls) *the cause scripture* (gives the soul) *the option* (of self multiplication)

The sage *Jaṇini*, on the other hand teaches the presence of a body and sense organs along with a mind in a released soul. "Because scripture gives the option i. e. because scripture in such passages as He is one he becomes three (*Chh* VII 26 2) declares that the self has the option of self multiplication. Self multiplication cannot be possible without various bodies.

१२ । द्वादशावदुभयविधिं पादशायनीन ।

११ । यत् एवमपि द्वादशान् शरणान् दत्वाऽऽत्मनोऽपि समीरताम् प्राणीनां च प्राप्नुमन्ति । यत् समीरतां सदन्वयति तत् प्राणीनां भवति, यत् तु प्राणीनां तदा प्रसीदति इति भावः । यत् द्वादशं यत् यत् न । नाम यावत् समन्विष्टमिति तां समम् "प्रसीदति" च भवति एवमस्मिन् अपि ।

12 *For this reason Bādarāyaṇa* admits both (kinds of existence for the released soul) *lik the twelve days sacrifice*

For this reason i. e. because scripture contains indications of both kinds, 'the teacher *Bādarāyaṇa* admits both kinds of existence corporeal and incorporeal) for the released soul. When the released soul chooses to clothe itself in a body it appears with one when it chooses to remain incorporeal it appears without one. Like the twelve days sacrifice. This sacrifice because

scripture contains indications of both kinds, becomes sometimes a 'satva' and sometimes an 'ahīna' sacrifice, similarly here

१३ । तन्वभावे सम्यवदुपपद्यते ।

१३ । तनु-अभावे मुक्तात्मनः उपलब्धि 'सम्यवत्' स्वप्नावस्थावत् 'उपपद्यते' ।

13 When the released soul has no body, (perceptions) are possible (to him) as in the dreaming state

In the state of absence of body, perceptions may occur to the released soul as they occur to us in our dreaming state

१४ । भावे जाग्रदवत् ।

१४ । तनो 'भावे' सत्तायाम् मुक्तात्मन उपलब्धि 'जाग्रदवत्' भवति ।

14 When the released soul has a body, (perceptions occur to it) as in the waking state

When the released soul has a body, his perceptions are (as real) as they are to us in our waking state

१५ । प्रदीपवदविशस्तथा हि दर्शयति ।

१५ । 'प्रदीपवत् आवेश' यथा प्रदीप एकाः अनेका-प्रदीपभावम् आपद्यते विकारशक्तियोगात्, एवम् एका अपि सन् मुक्तात्मा ऐश्वर्ययोगात् अनेकभावम् आपद्य सर्व्वाणि सङ्कल्पवृष्टानि शरीराणि आविशति । 'तथाहि दर्शयति' यत आत्मम् "स एकावा भवति विधा भवति, पञ्चधा सप्तधा" (छाँ ७.२.६.१२.) इत्यादिना एकास्य अनेका-भावम् दर्शयति ।

15 *Entering (into several bodies) is similar to that of a lamp for scripture shows thus*

'The entering of the released soul into several bodies is similar to that of a lamp. Just as the one flame of a lamp through its power of self modification can convert itself into several flames similarly a released soul through its lordly power can multiply itself and enter all the various bodies created by its will. For scripture shows thus" : e., because scripture by such passages as He is one he becomes three five seven (*Chh* VII 26. 2) shows that one may become many

१६ । स्वाप्यय-सम्पत्तोरग्यतापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि ।

१६ । अर्थं पुनः सुषुप्त्यवस्थयादिप्रवेशादि-उदयम् ईदृशं च अभ्युपगम्यते यावता "तत् त्वं न विजानीयात्" (उद १।३।१७ ३।३।१३) "न तु तद्वितीयमस्ति (उद ३।३।१९ इत्याद्या) इति एवमातीत्ययां श्रुतिः विश्वविद्यानं वारयति इति अत उक्तं पठति,—स्वाप्यय-सम्पत्तिः । सम्पत्तिः शेषवत् । तयोः अन्तरमाऽपेक्षाम् अपेक्ष्य एतत् विश्वविद्यानभाववचनम् उक्तम् । कथम् अपेक्षयते ?—आविष्कृतं हि यत् तत् तत्र एव तदविवक्षावद्भावात् आविष्कृतम् अविवक्षितम् एतन्मी श्रुत्याऽप्युक्त्याव तावन्निवृत्तिरिति न प्रेयः संशयः (उद १।३।१९ ३।३।१९) एव वा अत्र सर्वमाश्रयमात्रम् (उद १।३।१७ ३।३।१३) "एव सुप्ति न कश्चन कामं कामयते न कश्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति (साय् १) इत्यादि श्रुतिः ।

16. (The denial of specific cognitions found in certain texts) refers to either of the two states of deep sleep and union. This is manifest from the texts

An objection may be raised here. How can we

admit the possession of lordly powers, (e. g., that of entering several bodies etc.), by a released soul, in the face of such scriptural texts to the contrary, as "Then whereby can he know another?" (*Bri.* II 4. 14, IV 5 15), "Then there is no second" (*Bri.* IV 3. 23) etc., which expressly declare that the soul (in that state) can have no specific cognitions? To this objection we reply This denial of specific cognitions refers in every case to either of the two states, *viz*, dreamless sleep, and union with Brahman How is this known? "This is manifest from the texts", i. e., in the texts on the absence of cognitions, the two above states are manifest as being the very subject-matter of the texts. *E g* "Rising from out of these elements, he vanishes again in them When he has departed, there is no more consciousness" (*Bri.* II 4. 12, IV 5 13), "When to him all this has become the Self" (*Bri.* II 4. 14, IV. 5. 15), "When falling asleep, he desires no more desires, and dreams no more dreams" (*Bri.* IV. 3. 19, *Mán* 5), etc

૧૭। જગદ્વ્યાપારવર્જી પ્રકરણાદસન્નિહિતત્વાચ ।

૧૭। 'જગત્-વ્યાપાર-વર્જી' જગત્-ઉત્પત્તિ-કાર્ય વર્જ્યિત્વા અન્યત્ અર્થિભાદિ-આત્મકમ્ એશ્વર્યમ્ મુક્તાત્માનામ્ ભવિતુમ્ અર્હતિ । જગત્-સૃષ્ટ્યાદિ-કાર્ય તુ નિત્યસિદ્ધમ્ રૂઢશ્ચરસ્ય એવ । 'પ્રકરણાત્' યતઃ રૂઢશ્ચર-પ્રકરણ એવ સૃષ્ટ્યાદિ-વ્યાપારઃ ઉક્તાઃ, ન તુ જીવપ્રકરણે । 'અસન્નિહિતત્વાત્ ચ' યતઃ ચ જીવઃ સૃષ્ટ્યાદિ-વ્યાપારે અસન્નિહિત વહુદૂરસ્થિતઃ, સદ્યઃ પશ્યાત્ તદુત્પત્તેઃ ।

17. With the exception of creative activity, (all

other lordly powers may be possessed by the released soul) *because of topic and absence of proximity*

'With the exception of cosmic affairs *viz.*, creation of the world etc., all other lordly powers *e.g.* the power of reducing ones self to an atomic size etc. may belong to released souls. The creation of the world etc., belong to the eternally perfect Īsvara only. Because of topic", *i.e.*, because creation etc. are treated of in the scriptures under the topic of Īsvara, and not of Jīva. "And absence of proximity that is the individual self is not proximate to, *i.e.* very far from, the act of creation" etc. it having been born after creation

१८। प्रत्यक्षोपदेशादिति चेत्तादिकारिक भाग्यस्योक्ते ।

१८। "चेतीति आशङ्क्यम् (ते १६) इत्यादि 'प्रत्यक्ष उपदेशात् मुक्तानां निरङ्कुशम् ऐश्वर्यं भवति इति चेत् आशङ्क्यं स्यात् 'न सा युक्ता । आधिकारिकं न प्रत्यक्षोपदेशे यत् सन्निवृत्त्यदिषु विधीयमानेषु बाधयितुं य परमेश्वर, तत् आशङ्क्यं एव इदं आशङ्क्यमिति उच्यते । ईश्वर्यप्राप्त्यात् मुक्तानाम् ऐश्वर्यम् न निरङ्कुशम् इति भावः ।

18. If (it be objected that) *from direct scriptural statements* (the power of the released soul is known to be absolute) *we say No because such power is said to belong to the Lord abiding in the solar regions*

If It be objected that from such direct scriptural statements" as He attains lordship" (Tait I 6) the lordly power of the released soul is known to be absolute *we say No* "Because such power is said to belong

to the Lord performing special functions and abiding in the solar regions", १ e, because scripture expressly declares that the attainment of lordship by the released soul is dependent upon the Highest Lord, who for the discharge of certain specified offices abides in the solar regions Being dependent upon the Highest Lord, the lordly power of the released soul cannot evidently be absolute

१८ । विकारावर्त्ति च तथाहि स्थितिमाह ।

१८ । न केवलं सवितमण्डलादि-अधिष्ठान सविकार पारमेष्ठ्ये रूप, किन्तु 'विकारावर्त्ति च' विकारातीत निर्गुण च । 'तथाहि स्थितिम् आह' यत आन्नाय 'तथा' सगुण-निर्गुणरूपेण विवक्षा 'स्थितिम्' आह, "तावानस्य सहिमा ततो जायाश्च पुरुष । पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्याश्वत दिवि" (छा ३।१।२।६ ऋक् १०।८०।३) इत्यादिना ।

19 (The Highest Lord) has also an unqualified non-derived form, for scripture declares his abiding thus

The Highest Lord not only has a qualified effected form, e g, the one by which he rules the solar regions, "but he has also a non-derived unqualified form" "For scripture declares his abiding thus", १ e, in both the unqualified and qualified forms, as in the passage, "Such is its greatness Greater than it is the Person All beings constitute one-fourth of him the other three-fourths are all that is immortal in heaven" (Rik. X 90 3, Chh III 12 6) etc

२० । दर्शयतश्चैवं प्रत्यक्षामुमाने ।

१ । 'अथ च-चतुर्मासि क्षुति-क्षुती परस्मै रूपेण विज्ञातवन्ति' दशयत च ।

"न तत्र सूर्या भाति न चन्द्रवारकः ।

मेमा विद्युती मांति कुतोऽग्नयि ॥ (ऋ १।१।४ मृ १।१।१) इति श्रुतिः ।

'न तत्रावर्तते सूर्यो न द्यमाही न पावसः । (गे १।४) इति स्मृतिः ।

20 *And perception and inference (i. e. scripture and smṛiti) both show this*

Both scripture and smṛiti declare that the highest light is above all effected things & g the scriptural texts 'The sun does not shine there nor the moon the star, or these lightnings How hall this fire shine there?' (*Katha* II 2. 15 *Mund* II 2 10) And the Smṛiti text 'The sun lights not that [place], nor the moon nor fire (*Gitā* \V 5)

२१ । मीगमात्रमाभ्यनिह्नाय ।

२१ । इत च न मुक्तानाम् ऐन्द्ये निरङ्कुशं यस्यान् भागमात्रम् एवाम् चणदि सिद्धेन ईश्वरेण समागतम् इति श्रुतिः—“तमाह चापो न खलु मी । हि यसौ चरं ते शीघ्रं (ऋषी १।६) इति । न यदेतां दिवतां सर्वानपि भूतान्यपि हि वन्दितं सर्वानपि 'भूतान्यवन्ति' (इह १।३।१) ते न च एतस्य दिवताय मातुष्यं समीकताश्चरन्ति (इह १।३।१३) इत्यादि भेद स्पष्टीय निश्चितः ।

21 *And scripture indicates that the equality (between the Highest Lord and the released soul) consists only in enjoyment*

Another reason why the lordly power of the released

soul cannot be taken to be absolute is, that the equality between the eternally perfect Lord and the released soul consists, as declared in the scriptures, in enjoyment only In everything else differences are indicated, as in the texts "To him Brahman says This world of mine, consisting of water, is thine" (*Kaushī* I 6), "And as all beings honour that deity, so do all beings honour him who knows that" (*Bṛ* I 5 20), "By this observance he wins identity of nature and identity of abode with that deity" (*Bṛ* I 5 23)

२२ । अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिः शब्दात् ।

२२ । मुक्तानाम् ऐश्वर्यस्य अन्तवर्त्ते अपि न तेषाम् ब्रह्मलोकात् पुनरावृत्तिः प्रत्यागमनम् अस्ति, इति अनेन उपसंहरति,—ब्रह्मलोकात् मुक्तानाम् अनावृत्ति एव सिद्धिः, "ब्रह्मलोकमभिसम्पद्यते न च पुनरावर्त्तन्ते" (का ८।१५।१) इत्यादि-‘शब्दात्’ अतिवचनहेतोः । सूत्राभ्यासः शास्त्रसमाप्तिं दर्शयति ।

22 (Of the released souls) *there is no return, because scripture says so, there is no return, because scripture says so*

The Sūtrakāra concludes by saying that though 'the lordly power of the released souls is limited, yet there is no return for them from the world of Brahman Their non-return is proved by scriptural statements such as "He reaches the world of Brahman, and does not return." (*Chh* VIII 15 1) etc

The repetition of the words of this sūtra indicates the conclusion of the work

